Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

10-15

Authors: Witold Płotka

There is no abstract

54-69

Authors: Mihály Vajda

Abstract In this paper the author reflects on the phenomenological motives in his departure from the Marxism of Georg Lukács in the Hungary of the late 1960s and early 1970s. He first encountered phenomenology at the university during the classes of Ágnes Heller, another future dissident of Marxism, which led him to study the Logical Investigations when he became a research assistant at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1961. Following in the footsteps of other readers of Husserl’s opus magnum, the author was confronted by Husserl’s manifest Platonism in the first and equally manifest psychologism in the second volume of the same work. This apparent contradiction between atemporal objectivities and their life-world origins led him to the phenomenology of Max Scheler, to whom the author dedicated the fourth chapter of his second monograph on Husserl published in 1969. The thinker who radically overcame Husserl was, for the author, Martin Heidegger. Modern scholarship has meanwhile convinced him of the fundamental differences between these two phenomenologists, but one lesson remains: Phenomenology is characterized by evidence that originates from seeing, rather than mere words and argumentations. Key words Marxism, phenomenology, Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Hungarian reception of phenomenology, Lukács.

90-114

Authors: Wing-Keung Chik

Abstract Being one of the spokespersons of the civic manifestos Charta 77, Czech Philosopher Jan Patočka (1907– 1977) passed away after repeating interrogation. For human dignity, Patočka stands himself in truth in front of violence. What is the origin of responsibility which resists injustice? What is the significance of living in truth for being confronted with violence? In the text of Charta 77 «The Obligation to Resist Injustice» (1977), Patočka points out that morality of humanity is the ground of obligation. Then, what is the relationship between humanity and moral obligation? Regarding to the question above, this paper attempts to investigate the relationship of responsibility and living in truth, and demonstrates that there is an ontological responsibility of insistence implicated in living in truth, through illustrating the structure of manifestation of problematization. Socratic care of soul is the practice of familiarizing citizens with problematization through reflective dialogue as pluralization of otherness (doxai) of others. Otherness unveiled is the beginning of thinking and of the formation of polis. At last, with the analysis of worldliness of world as manifestation of plurality, the article will show that the responsibility of living in truth, as responding to plurality of world and realizes problematization which reforms community as polis with liberation and unity, is philosophical-political revolutionary. Key words Care of the soul, problematization, responsibility, Arendt, otherness, dialogue, thinking, polis, pluralization.

133-149

Authors: Irene Breuer

Abstract In his book Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik, László Tengelyi has enquired into the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book, he thematized a real necessity of a non-apriori kind at Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called «a necessity of the fact». His research settled the basis for the present enquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental features involved therein at Aristotle and Husserl, insofar as facticity is concerned. I intend to show that although both authors share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, they differ as to their necessity: Aristotle attributes a contingent necessity to the factual being i.e. to reality, a necessity characterized by its being temporarily conditioned by actuality and which can therefore be defined as the «conditional necessity of a fact». As to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology must, upon the basis of the eidetic method, determine the possibilities out of which the ego constitutes the factual world. He states the necessity of the fact as an eidetic necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws. Later on, I’ll try to show how enquiries into a «metaphysics in new sense» lead to a revision of the meaning of «fact» and to an inversion of the order of foundation as well: The original givenness of the world, the primal I, intersubjectivity and historicity as primal and absolute facts carry the eidetic necessities. Accidental causes, on the other hand, account not only for the contingency of the real but, at Husserl, for the ego’s «essential openness» and its core of primal contingency. In this context, I’ll argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us — an event as Ereignis. Key words Aristotle, Husserl, facticity, accidental, necessity, contingency, absolute, event.

171-182

Authors: Petr Urban

Abstract Despite the emphasis on the relational and interpersonal domain found in the phenomenological tradition, a genuinely relational phenomenological ethics is still a desideratum. The aim of this paper is to call attention to care ethics as an already developed relational moral theory built on the idea of the centrality of the relational domain and to suggest a reason why phenomenologists and care ethicists should care more about each other. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, we focus on the phenomenological views of the lived body, intersubjectivity and mutual incorporation. Second, we discuss the current applications of the phenomenological insights in the so-called enactive approach to social cognition and pose the question of its ethical implications. The final section introduces the ethics of care as a current relational moral theory and highlights some points of commonality between care ethics and phenomenology. The paper concludes that the dynamics of care and mutual concern central to the ethics of care might be well analysed and further developed in terms of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity. Care ethics, on the other hand, might provide a well-elaborated framework for developing a phenomenological ethics ascribing a central place to the relational and interpersonal dimension of moral phenomena. Key words Phenomenology, care ethics, phenomenological ethics, enactivism, the lived body, intersubjectivity, relationality.

194-213

Authors: Vedran Grahovac

Abstract In this text I suggest the possibility of the strategic-philosophical closeness between Husserl and Kracauer, by closely reading Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation and Kracauer’s essay «The Mass Ornament». Although the both thinkers come from the traditionally different and often mutually opposing philosophical schools, neither of them simply dismisses or crosses out the position they criticize. To the contrary, I propose that both thinkers exaggerate the seeming self-evidentiality of the phenomenon they analyze. In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl rearticulates the whole-part relation as it is conceived within the formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. The phenomenological analysis, which is conducted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is «measured» by the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled. In the second part of my essay I pay attention to Kracauer’s suggestion that the vitality of the mass ornament is reflected in the contextual insignificance of its parts. Kracauer addresses the problem of mass depersonalization through the close and sarcastic inspection of the role of abstract rationality in the capitalist mode of production. This close inspection adopts the strategy of exaggeration, where the critical distance must not be considered beyond its ability to disclose the self- obscuring apparatus of the mass performances and spectacles. This disclosure, as Kracuaer suggests, must therapeutically lead through the center of the mass ornament, and not away from it. Key words Husserl, Kracauer, wholes and parts, Logical Investigations, phenomenology, Critical Theory, phenomenological analysis.

232-246

Authors: Jan Josl

Abstract In this essay I consider the end-of-art thesis in its metaphysical and empirical versions. I show that both use the correspondence theory of truth as the basis for their conception of the history of art. As a counterpart to these theories I have chosen Patočka’s conception of the history of art. His theory is based also on the relationship between art and truth, but he conceives truth in the phenomenological sense of manifestation. In the rest of the essay I seek to show the consequences Patočka’s conception has for the history of art. In the first part, I set out to show Patocka’s critique of Hegel’s aesthetics as a system based on the correspondence theory of truth. In particular, I endeavour to explain his critique of some intrinsic problems of Hegel’s aesthetics, the general failure of Hegel’s system to achieve its goal, and, lastly, Hegel’s giving up on the meaning of the art in the present. I also seek to show that Danto’s version runs into the same problems and conclusions as Hegel’s. In the second part I discuss Patočka’s analysis of modern art and the aesthetic attitude, where he finds a hidden affinity between art and aletheia, which Hegel overlooked. The last part of the essay focuses on the consequences that the conception of the truth of art as aletheia have for the history of art. I conclude that art in such a conception represents an independent field of the manifestation of being in history beside philosophy. Moreover, modern and contemporary art do not mean the end of art; rather, they have their place in art history based on aletheia, since they are more focused on the manifestation itself than on what is manifested. Unlike Hegel and Danto, therefore, Patočka retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. His conception of the history of art, summed up under the idea of aletheia, has greater explanatory potential than Hegel’s and Danto’s conceptions, and it retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. Key words Phenomenology, aesthetics, Jan Patočka, truth, Hegel, Danto, history of art.

258-271

Authors: MORITZ GEIGER, Tr. by Olesya Bessmel'tseva

Abstract The following fragment represents the aesthetical researches of the German philosopher Moritz Geiger acted in the first half of the 20th century, whose works are considered to have initiated the phenomenological approach in the aesthetic domain. Being a fellow by many bright personalities, the representatives of the psychological aesthetic (Wundt, Lipps), Geiger favours on the one hand the psychological approach for it leads out of the speculative philosophism into empirical experience. On the other hand Geiger gets close with phenomenology and Husserl and belongs since 1907 to the Munich school of phenomenology. Geiger sees in the phenomenological approach an opportunity to shift the focus from the feeling subject to the aesthetic object. He insists on the permissibility and rather necessity of speaking about the objective aesthetic characteristics of an artwork. They are the aesthetic values, which mark an object of aesthetic enjoyment. So in the fragment below Geiger focuses first on the phenomenological nature of the aesthetic enjoyment. In the attached fragment Geiger proceeds from the Kantian argumentation about the particularities of aesthetic enjoyment and analyses the aesthetic enjoyment in its relation to the interest and the will of an individual as an enjoying subject. The preface introduces the general structure of the article, its stepwise concretizing of the problem domain beginning with the outline of the phenomenological bounds of pleasure in general and moving toward the narrow analysis of the aesthetic enjoyment in particular and its relation to the axiology and the psychological phenomenology. Thus the main peculiarities of Geiger’s phenomenological method could be put to the scrutiny of his analysis of the chosen distinct domain as well as his tendency to avoid any schematism and any simplification within the domain. That makes Geiger’s language such an subtle and sensitive instrument for it should be able to articulate the slightest nuances of pleasure types. Key words Phenomenological aesthetic, psychologism, aesthetic enjoyment, will, interests, Kant, Schopenhauer.

281-298

Authors: MARC RICHIR, Tr. by Roman Sokolov

Abstract This publication is a translation into Russian of Marc Richir’s article Phenomenology of the poetic element, accompanied by a preface of translator. In his article Richir reveals «poetic element» of phenomenal experience as its fundamental condition, relying on it as a tradition and techniques of transcendental phenomenology and the empirical study of psychoanalysis. Richir gives concrete empirical content borrowed from Husserl’s concept of perceptual fantasies, referring to the theory of D.V. Winnicott’s «transitional object», and then extrapolates the results to the experience of creation and perception of the «poetic» work (knowing the latest in a broad, Aristotelian sense). Perceptual imagination of Richir’s phenomenology should be separated from «pure fantasy»: the latter is a «minimum level of conceptual self-image». It has been in existence as «the rudiments of sense», which take place in a passive synthesis of «extra-linguistic peace schematism». Pure fantasy becomes perceptive fantasy just when there is inversion (revirement) «germ of meaning» in the «sense bud», thanks to some fancy a change of perspective. This process involves the formation of a special «field of play» (Winnicott), or transcendental interfact space, which establishes a primary (preintentional) type of relationship between the two egos: the baby and mother, spectator and actor. In this respect, perceptual «sees» in fantasy not an object, and the other perceptive imagination in the fantasy that belongs to another. This formed the primary locus of communication: interfact transcendental space that is being «played intentionally», then it becomes a space of intersubjectivity. Dating back to some fancy-affective sphere, perceptive fantasy (or «poetic element») has a «phenomenological redundancy» in comparison with the logical concept. Therefore, one can speak about a special type of knowledge of reality beyond its objectivist and logical explication. Key words Transcendental phenomenology, perceptive fantasy, poetic element interfact transcendental, transitional field transcendental bosom, the phenomenon of language, formless, fantasy-affectation, the experience of the sublime.

9

Authors: Alexander Schnell

This is the foreword to the issue as a whole

25-53

Authors: Dominique Pradelle

Abstract This study focuses on the essential difference between Kant's and Husserl's transcendental Idealism. In fact, Husserl describes in the «Cartesian Meditations» his own ontological thesis as a «transcendental idealism», in which all sorts of entities have to be constituted by an activity of the transcendental subjectivity, so that we have to regard pure consciousness as the ontological origin of all entities in the world. But this study is interested in the two opposite significations of the kantian copernican inversion. On the one hand, the copernican inversion has the same sense as the phenomenological reduction, which implies that Husserl can't agree with Kant's presupposition of absolute things in themselves; on the second hand, it involves a relativistic and anthropologistic orientation, so that the aprioristic structures of given objects are founded on the universal structures of finite subjectivity, on pure forms and faculties of human consciousness. At the opposite, Husserl enounces a methodological prescription for any phenomenological elucidation: it is not allowed to presuppose in phenomenology any given faculty or given nature of transcendental subjectivity. This prescription has important consequences on which this study focuses. First the ontological difference between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus, infinite and finite type of intuition, doesn't have any validity: the difference between factual and rational truths only depends on the essence of the truth itself, and doesn't have its foundation on the ontological difference between creative and receptive sort of intuition. Secondly, this first thesis admits an immediate application on the level of subjective constitution of objects: the modality in which an object appears to the subjectivity doesn't depend on the universal structure of finite subject, but is exclusively founded on the essence of the object itself, so that it is impossible to consider the aprioristic constitutive structure as a merely subjective structure. Thirdly, in this transcendental phenomenology everything has to be constituted by subjectivity: the aprioristic character of the pure forms of sensibility is not founded on the structure of finite subjectivity, but rather on the essential connection between sensual material and form; so that it is not allowed to presuppose any facticity of time and space; the pure forms of sensibility have to be constituted by a special type of synthesis that we have to elucidate in opposition to other types of higher levels. The profound signification of Husserl's anticopernican inversion is that the field of transcendental phenomenology consists of the essential form of an eidos ego, which is «more objective than any objectivity», as Levinas said; and that transcendental phenomenology is completely dominated by the principium reddendae rationis. Key words Copernican inversion, constitution, intuition, Kant, phenomenology, subjectivity, transcendental idealism.

63-70

Authors: Georgy Chernavin

Radically different strategies of interacting with sound common sense, found within three big philosophical discourses of the 20th century (analytic philosophy, poststructuralism, phenomenology), led nearly to the impossibility of communication between those discourses. The judgement by Deleuze concerning Kant's critical philosophy and Husserl's transcendental philosophy seems to be an example of the failed philosophical dialogue, this time between post-structuralism and (classical as well as modern) transcendentalism. Deleuze sees in transcendental philosophy the dominance of the twofold instance of the common sense; the two forms are the sensus communis (which dominated already in Kant) and the bona mens (which crystallized in the Husserlian Urdoxa). Even if one could agree that the poststructuralist reading of transcendental philosophy is likely sometimes too rash, it is still helpful. One can then see that at the center of the research-field of transcendental phenomenology a real nodal point of paradoxes remains: first of all, the so-called «paradox of human subjectivity» — the relation between the empirical and the transcendental, which seems to be paradoxical for sound human understanding. One could contrast here the goal of transcendental research, which consists in sense-building and sense-enrichment, with the poststructuralist art of the forming, inventing and production of concepts. The passion for paradoxes, the provocation of the sound human understanding as a motor of thinking (characteristic of poststructuralism) is still bound to doxa and to the common sense, although it tries to «turn it inside out». Transcendental philosophy tries rather to take a «step back» from the solidification of common sense in order to observe the sense-building in statu nascendi. Key words Transcendental philosophy, poststructuralism, common sense, doxa, paradox, Husserl, Deleuze.

87-98

Authors: Guillermo Ferrer

Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations of a subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness. To this end, a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affects the inner sense is necessary. Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appear to me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its succession on the space, thus inasmuch as I am conscious, at least implicitly, of my activity of the drawing. Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering, I will hypothesize the idea that a phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant's theory of self-affection; however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Self shall be set. Because of these limits, the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes» of my life-history, namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past. Also, in this respect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself. From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant's theory in this way: by reflection on my past, the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memory to some extent with substitutes. In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediation of phantasy and imagination. Key words Self-affection, reflection, past I, Self, irrevocability, substitutes, phantasy.

121-138

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract The author of the article framed the question of the possible relevance of the treatment of the Schelling's philosophy in the context of a phenomenological one. Thereby, he points its problematic character, referencing Husserl's treatment of German idealism after Kant (including the thought of Schelling) as the romantic idealism. At the same time, he also states the influence of Schelling on the few phenomenologists who made their careers after Husserl. The article's author reviews the concept of the «being outside-itself» or «ecstasy» in Schelling and Heidegger (as one of the phenomenologists) for the further concretization of the theme. The ecstasy in Schelling is the new name for the idealistic intellectual intuition, by which a singular subject loses its own position as subject and thereby gets to the position of the absolute subject. The absolute subject is one which cannot be an object already. Schelling identifies the ecstasy understood in this way with the wondering as philosophical initiation in Ancient Greece. Such ecstasy leads to unknowing knowledge in Schelling's words. The concept of being outside-itself means the structural element of being of human Dasein, i.e. of temporality in Heidegger. This philosopher thinks that a human being is always already outside itself ontologically, before any intuition both sensual and intellectual. The human subject is not closed in on itself, for then it has to transcend from its immanence to the outside. It is always outside itself, it is ecstatic. In its ecstasies, it is always in the world, instead of being inside the world and other people. Heidegger bases his critique of the traditional metaphysics of the subject on such understanding of the ontological structure of Dasein, i.e. of the true «subject». In conclusion, the article's author states that the approaches to the problem of being outside-itself of both mentioned philosophers are in principle, quite different. Schelling tries to rehabilitate the subjectivity by the reduction of the singular subject to the absolute one. On the contrary, the finitude of human Dasein is the necessary condition of its being in Heidegger. The ecstasy is interiorization in Schelling, but it is exteriorization, which has been always already realized, in Heidegger. However, the author of the article also pinpoints a certain isomorphism of the treatments of ecstasy in both thinkers. In the different ways they attempt to overcome the crisis of the understanding of the subject as closed in itself, create the conditions of this isomorphism. Key words Being outside-itself, ecstasy, intellectual intuition, wondering, Dasein, temporality, existence, metaphysics, German idealism, phenomenology.

154-185

Authors: Yusuke Ikeda

In this paper I outline main theses of Fink's phenomenological interpretation of Kantian transcendental philosophy. My aim is to clarify how and to what extent Kant's philosophy determines Fink's «phenomenology of enworlding [Verweltlichung]». First, I show the very starting point and original motivations of Fink's interpretation of Kant. I proceed by examining the contexts in which Fink refers to Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason and showing that in these contexts Fink is dealing with a specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant's cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant's profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink's criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant's «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure reason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant's account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink's phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink's phenomenological interpretations of Kant's transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger's (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant's philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink's cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel's idea of dialectic, as on Kant's (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink's phenomenology). Key words World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.

203-217

Authors: Simona Bertolini

Abstract Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel's conception of the absolute had a decisive role in the genesis and development of Eugen Fink's philosophy. While Husserl and Heidegger showed Fink two different and fruitful ways to interpret phenomenology, Hegel suggested and offered him the conceptual means with which to combine these theoretical models and elaborate a third phenomenological paradigm, based on the concept of world. This is not only valid for Fink's early interpretation of Husserl's thought, but also (and especially) for the version of phenomenology that Husserl's last research assistant developed after World War II and the death of the old professor. Two goals characterize this second phase of Fink's philosophy: on the one hand, the purpose to pose the fundamental question of Being anew, without mistaking it for the «ontic» question referred to beings and things (in accord with Heidegger's indications and with the concept of «ontological difference»); on the other hand, the purpose to combine ontology, so interpreted, with genetic phenomenology and its rigorous method. The aim of the paper is to highlight how and to what extent the realization of this philosophical project is based on the interpretation of both Hegel's idealism and of the experience of consciousness Hegel describes in Phenomenology of Spirit. Assuming that Fink is looking for an ontological ground coinciding with the genesis of the structure of the world (in accord with the concept of phenomenological reduction), Hegel appears as the Western philosopher whose system of thought offers a conceptual model in accordance with such a requirement. Key words World, being, phenomenology, metaphysics, self-consciousness, ontological experience, phenomena.

239-283

Authors: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling; Andrei Patkul (tr.)

Abstract This publication is the translation of the first fragment of F. W. J Schelling's Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism accompanied by the analytical translator's preface. In his treatise, Schelling assesses the history of modern philosophy. Namely, he treats it as history of experiments, the goal of which was in the search for the primary fact in the world. In Schelling's opinion, this fact is in the growing over-weight of the subjective over the objective. Only his philosophy of nature was able to find this fact. However, it is not genuine fact but only pure fact, because it does not content in itself any ground for the over-weighting of the subjective over the objective. For resolve this problem, Schelling starts to use the concepts formed by Ancient philosophers, namely by Pythagoras and Plato. The concepts of the limitless and the limit are belonging to the series of the mentioned concepts. Accordantly, Schelling associates the notion of the objective with the one of the limitless being and the notion of the subjective with the one of the limit or limiting instance. His inquiry into the correlation between the limitless being and the limit, i.e. between the objective and the subjective leads him to the declaration of the existence of the free efficient cause, which determinates their interplay and the rise of that-what-should-be from that-what-should-not-be. Since the limitless is the objective and the limit is the subjective in accordance with Schelling, such efficient cause is also the cause of the progressive over-weighting of the subjective over the objective as well. It can explain the fact, which the Schelling's philosophy of nature has only found but not explained. The in his preface, the translator puts the question of the possibility as well as of a relevance of the Schelling's late philosophy to the phenomenological thought. In this context, he emphasizes few moments, by which the later Schelling' philosophy could be of interests for phenomenologists, namely the following ones: the concept of philosophical empiricism itself, the Schelling's division between the pure fact and the genuine fact, his treatment of history of philosophy as history of experiments. Moreover, he speaks about main difficulties connected with the translation of Schelling's text into Russian and gives a German-Russian glossary for utility of Russian readers. The translator gives also the commentaries by Arthur Drews, who reedited the Schelling's treatise in 1902, in their Russian translation. Key words Philosophical empiricism, genuine fact, over-weight of the subjective over the objective, subjection, the limitless, limit, substance, cause, German idealism.

323-331

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract The content of the presentations, which were delivered on the 46th Annual Husserl Circle Meeting in Helsinki (Finland) from June 9th to June 12th, 2015 is presented briefly in the review. The speakers of the meeting touched the themes, which are of very importance as well for today's reception of Husserl's philosophy as for the stay of the problematic field of Post-Husserlian phenomenology. The problems of intentionality, of active and passive syntheses, of correlation of logic and semiotics, of empathy and intersubjectivity, of correlation of intentional acts and intentional objects belong to the main subjects, which were treated in the presentations. The psychological applications of the phenomenological method, which were inquiered by several speakers during the meeting, could be also of very interest. Key words Husserl, Husserl Circle, intentionality, type, passive syntheses, intersubjectivity, empathy, typification, phenomenological ontology.

9-37

Authors: Alexey Savin

This article aims to define the phenomenological philosophy. To achieve this goal, the author exposes a phenomenological philosophy's genesis by means of genetic phenomenology. This investigation is necessitated by the problem situation. On the one hand, many versions of phenomenological philosophy emerged and developed; on the other hand, the idea of postphenomenological philosophy was put forth. Therefore the question inevitably arises about the foundation of unity of phenomenological philosophy and about its essence. In order to solve the problem the author traces the history of phenomenology's basic methodological concepts — epoche and reduction, and clarifies the meaning of the discussion on the nature of the phenomenological method. In the light of genetic phenomenology, epoche and reduction are the exposure of the connection between habitualization and horizon in the main aspect — as the connection between the natural attitude as the primary habit (Urgewohnheit) and the world as the universal horizon. The analysis of the history of interpretation and criticism of Husserlian epoche and reduction concepts reveals latent consensus among thinkers, who adhere to different variants of phenomenological philosophy, in the understanding of the phenomenological enterprise as such. The author demonstrates that the universal theme of phenomenological research within the framework of the latent basic consensus is the intimacy with the world. The general method of phenomenological investigation is the explication of the history of the intimacy with the world as the origin of all thinkable horizons. The author supposes that the phenomenological philosophy is the disclosure of the transcendental history of the domestic world (Heimwelt). Moreover the phenomenological philosophy implies the phenomenological understanding of the phenomenological reduction, i. e., comprehension of its historicity and its connection with the horizon of the world, which it takes as the theme. Hence the author infers his definition of phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy is the genealogy of the intimacy with the world. (Phänomenologische Philosophie ist Genealogie des Vertrauens mit «der» Welt). Key words Phenomenology, reduction, genealogy, intimacy, habitualization, historicity, horizon, world, Husserl.

70-96

Authors: Anne Gléonec

This article is the second part of our phenomenological study on the analogy between the body and the political body. Its aim is to confront the previous analysis of Claude Lefort's critique of the ontologies of the Political Body with the Merleau-Pontian thought of history, institution, and corporeality. Indeed, this Merleau-Pontian thought, specifically developed in the courses of the 1950's, allows for a renewal of the analogy itself, via another reading of the Lefortian major inheritance: Machiavelli and Marx. By parallelly following Merleau-Ponty's evolutive reading of these two authors, and the essential changes in his phenomenology of perception, this article thus proposes to disclose the main entry points into a Merleau-Pontian reform of the analogy; an analogy that has to be thought against the ambiguity of the flesh that Claude Lefort inherits precisely from Merleau-Ponty. By discussing this ambiguity that «The Visible and the Invisible» is often charged with via a reading of Merleau-Ponty's courses at the Collège de France — specifically Institution, Passivity, and Nature — this article intends to disclose the political meaning of the concept of intercorporeity, with which the human body will no longer be understood as «one's own body», but rather interpreted in a radically a-subjective way. Moreover, this very concept of intercorporeity specifically opens a novel way to understand the meaning of the central concept of the analogy of the political body itself, namely the concept of incorporation. Indeed, by following Merleau-Ponty's lesser known thought of the 1950's, one can think incorporation against the classical schema of fusion, that is to say, on the opposite, as an encounter of dispossessions, and thus as a path into a new analogy. Key words Body, flesh, Gestalt, history, institution, Machiavelli, Marx, Merleau-Ponty.

114-123

Authors: Claudio Rozzoni

This paper aims to analyze the question of how to define the essence of the theater, building on a conference Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset held in Lisbon in April 1946, where he radically raised the question of the «strange» relationship between reality and unreality that the «world of the stage» makes possible for us to experience. On the one hand, Ortega states that theater is essentially vision, while, on the other hand, it seems that such a seeing, in itself, leads to a problematic relationship with a not-seeing. In particular, Ortega seems to claim that in theater spectators experience a vision both «paradoxical» and «magic», insofar as it entails an essential not-seeing that gives rise to a play between opacity and transparency. A play that is also to be found in a masterwork many phenomenologists admired, Proust's Recherche, in which, in order for Marcel to see the image of Phaedra, the ordinary body of the actress Berma has to vanish. Here the body becomes transparent and one no longer sees the performer himself: he/she is simply a window opening upon a great work of art. This way, the spectator can experience «this new order of creatures» that reminds us of the «êtres d'une nouvelle nature» of which Du Bos wrote in the Eighteenth Century. However, regarding the topics of the «image-window», Eugen Fink and his teacher Edmund Husserl had already paved the way, and an intertwined reading of some important texts of both authors can in turn shed new light on this question. With regard to Husserl, special attention will be paid to a very interesting text from the Husserliana XXIII (probably dating to 1918) in which he, taking theatrical image into profound consideration, paradoxical and powerful notion of perceptual phantasy. Key words Aesthetics, image, theater, transparency, opacity, window, perceptual phantasy, feelings.

146-157

Authors: Natalia Artemenko

The theme «Heidegger and ethics» remains controversial among the researchers of Heidegger. Somehow it turns to talk about Heidegger and do not raise issues of ethics and, by contrast, the talks about ethics often directly concern the figure of Heidegger. Our task is not to justify the possibility of «Heidegger‘s ethics». The question of ethics in Heidegger‘s philosophy should be shown as quite competent as well as the demonstration an ethical perspective in his thinking at different stages. However, the very first difficulty that we face, setting themselves above the problem is that Heidegger quite rare and very specific — for the most part even negative — spoke about ethics. The second problem — quite obvious here — Heidegger did not leave us any systematic work devoted to ethics. In this article we try to trace the path of Heidegger‘s thinking in order to understand where there is any possibility of the ethical dimension in Heidegger‘s philosophy which is seen by different researchers in the different manners. Heidegger proposes to consider ethics in its original source, distinguishing it from morality as well as from «ethics» as a «philosophical discipline» closed to the social or political issues. Heidegger distinguishes ἔθος and ἦθος, preferring to talk about «ethos» and not about «ethics». The main «hero» for Heidegger is Aristotle. Heidegger was not so much influenced by Aristotle as he helped to bring Aristotle to some entirely new and unexpected interpretation which is differ from the traditional interpretation. We must say that Heidegger from the outset challenged the established and entrenched in the European metaphysics the primacy of practical over the theoretical. To rethink the «first» of the first philosophy — that's what Heidegger attempts, referring to the Aristotelian texts. The leading question in regard to the interpretation of Aristotle is the question about existential objectness, in which and through which human existence and the existence of life being interpreted. Heidegger asks himself what is a phenomenal base of the explication of Dasein and what categories occur here. We are following this question in the article, beginning with the project of the hermeneutic phenomenology and ending with the existentiall-historical thinking as significant milestones of Heidegger's path of thinking. Key words Ethics, ἔθος, ἦθος, Aristotle, Dasein, existence, being, ontology, ontic foundation, hermeneutic phenomenology, factuality, Ereignis.

171-174

Authors: Fedor Stanzhevskiy

The seventh study of the «Rule of Metaphor» deals with the problem of the reference of metaphoric statement. Poetic statements do not just constitute accentuating the message for its own sake. Far from being restricted to the emotive function, poetry also has a heuristic function which takes away the strong opposition between the internal and external, the subjective and objective. Metaphor re-describes reality and makes it possible to see it in a different way, «to see as...» Metaphor is based on the tension between two poles: «is» and «is not». Ricœur considers the nature of our phenomenological experiencing of the world in the language. He shows how the meaning emerges directly from our existence. The relationship between meaning, language and reality is the field of work of metaphor, in which we originally find ourselves. In this study Ricoeur takes up the question of reference on two different levels: semantic and hermeneutical ones. While the first presupposes the difference of semantics and semiology, the nature of predication, the second lets us shift from language to ontology and regard the problem as an ontological one. Here Ricœur addresses Frege's and Benveniste's theories of references, pointing the ideas they have in common. Approaching the hermeneutical research of reference, we face the necessity of postulating a special discursive entity, that is, the text. Concerning the discursive production Ricœur analyzes such categories as production and labor, disposition and codification, style and individuality, singularity. By considering the structure of the piece of work as its meaning and the world of the work as its denotation, hermeneutics regulates the transition from the structure to the world. Interpretation means revealing world, which the given work addresses, based on its composition, style and genre. Key words Reference, denotation, semantics, hermeneutics, poetic function, reality, metaphor, emotive function.

220-223

Authors: Daria Kononetc

This paper is a translation into Russian of the article by Riccardo Lazzari where the poorly explored topic of Eugen Fink's phenomenological interpretation of Kant's «Critique of pure reason» is discussed. In this work he puts in a par interpretation made by Fink in his works: «Welt und Endlichkeit», «Alles und Nichts», «Epilegomena zu Immanuel Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”» — with others phenom-enological interpretations of «Critique of pure reason». Comparing method of interpretation used by Fink with interpretations made by Heidegger and Husserl author discovers a specific of phenomeno-logical interpretation of Fink and its role as a method that allows phenomenological philosophy to find a way to negotiate metaphysics and to clarify one of the main philosophical problems that is the prob-lem of the world. In this article Lazzari particularly analyses the Fink's lecture «World and finitude» (1949) which is the most important text for understanding of the role of «Critique of pure reason» for Fink's own phenomenological approach. The aim of the article is to summarize the evolution of Fink's interpretation of Kant's «Critique of pure reason» during his entire philosophical research. The problem of the world is the guiding idea of this study. At the same time, Lazzari analyzes the role of Fink's inter-pretation of Kant in the debate about the meaning of the world between Fink, Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's phenomenological project. Key words Phenomenology, E. Fink, phenomenological interpretation, world, infinity, finitude, transcendental dialectic.

240-307

Authors: A. Patkul, Prep. by N. Artemenko

This publication is a transcript of the open disputation dedicated to the theme Ontology of Consciousness: Naturalism vs Transcendentalism, which has been held at March 27, 2015 at the Institute of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University. Both positions, naturalism and transcendentalism, were presented by the teams of two experts, who offered to the public their vision of correlation between naturalism and transcendentalism as well as attacked the arguments of opposite side. Moreover, the audience had the possibility not only to put the questions to experts, but also to make short remarks on the subject of discussion. The following problems were discussed during the disputation time: the causal conditionality of the consciousness, constitution of the object of nature and belonging of consciousness to their realm, the possibility of the freedom inside the natural world, the perspectives of the naturalization of the phenomenology. But the consensus has not been reached. The range of opinions reached by the experts during the discussion was quite extensive: from the recognition that transcendentalism and naturalism are enemies, which fight each other until final victory, to the assumption of the possibility of mutual complementarity or at least a correction of its own thesis under the influence of criticism opposite side. Key words Naturalism, transcendentalism, consciousness, subjectivity, freedom, causality, intentionality, constitution, mental states.

314-321

Authors: A. Khakhalova

The review addresses the clue aspects of the book. Namely, the review concerns the conception of experiential self on different levels of inquiry, analyses models of intersubjectivity in phenomenological tradition, the nature of shame from interdisciplinary perspective. Also, the reviewer notices the author's emphasize on relationship between phenomenology and other scientific traditions. The author discusses the interdisciplinary approach to the problem. As such, the author considers antirealist position to the problem of the self, arguing about its inconsistency in relation to the phenomenologically elaborated conception of experiential minimal self. Various conceptions of identity are also under the interest in first part of the book. Key words Intersubjectivity, experiential self, minimal self, constructivism, antirealism, shame, stream, We, identity, narrativity, pathology.

329-329

Authors: NN

ANNOUNCE

330-331

Authors: NN

ANNONCE

9-20

Authors: Sergey Kulikov

The main purpose of article is representation of conceptual introduction to a cycle of the future researches devoted to reconstruction of phenomenological views on processes of creation of images of science. That purpose is achieved as a result of detection of key features (the conceptual bases) of pre-phenomenological and phenomenological ways of a reflection of science. Research leans on a method of the comparative analysis. Classical and non-classical variant of creation of images of science were compared. Members of classical philosophy assumed that there is a way to present science in an image of unity of knowledge. Such image could be valid without any exceptions. Since works of Neo-kantianism, modern philosophy has developed the idea that creation of a uniform image of science is problematic. The phenomenology keeps classical idea of unity of images of science, but the unity is interpreted as a complex of «comprehension» intensions of consciousness. Such complex of intensions gives the horizon of judgment of each of images of science in terms of their relations to concrete subject domain. Theoretical value of the work consists in identification of conditions under which phenomenological approach leads to institutionalization of the pluralistic image of science. As a result research leads to the original conclusion that the problem of phenomenology consists in constituting a pluralistic image of science. Key words Philosophical and methodological studies, classical philosophy, non-classical philosophy, phenomenology, mission of phenomenology, uniformity of scientific knowledge, pluralism of images of science.

35-54

Authors: Anne Gléonec

This paper focuses on the analogy between the body and the political body, and presents the problem that is still – for our political time – this very analogy. It is done, at first, by following and developing the original work of the French political thinker Claude Lefort, who changed the terms and even the meaning of political phenomenology itself. Yet, if Claude Lefort’s inheritance has to be increased in phenomenology, his thought also reveals a strange paradox which opens with it a critical confrontation that a second article will fully develop, and that is here synthesized: indeed, the analogy of the political body is at the same time what in its very refusal unifies contemporary political philosophies – dismissing the analogy either as the language of another age of politics or as the language of the totalitarian wish of reincorporation –, and what nevertheless continues to resist implicitly in all these political writings, even if it is at times under the mask of the complicated lexicon of some Flesh of the social. By coming back to the concept of Flesh itself and its origin in the thought of M. Merleau-Ponty, the end of the article opens a confrontation between the political phenomenology renewed by Claude Lefort and our own attempt to phenomenologically reform the analogy of the political body. Key words Political body, institution, history, democracy, totalitarism, flesh, analogy.

71-80

Authors: Anna Khakhalova

The problem addressed in this paper is the genesis of the empathetic, intersubjective intentionality which underlies second- person interactions. This theme is one of the most intriguing in contemporary philosophy and interdisciplinary research. The article seeks to elucidate the foundations of the phenomenon of the оther which we always already have in our daily embodied practices. First, we present a critical analysis of some aspects of the theory of intersubjectivity, such as analogical inference, anonymity of intersubjective being, inaccessibility of immediate experience of the Other. Then, based on such topics, as corporeity, the enactive nature of subjectivity, historical and social aspects of subjectivity, we elaborate the concept of empathy as lying at the very foundation of any encounter with the Other. As a result, we demonstrate the closeness of Husserlian idea of non-objectifying intentionality to the empathetic approach in contemporary philosophy. As precursors of the latter we mention M. Buber, L. Wittgenstein, M. Sheler, who advocate the dialogical (second-person) structure of consciousness and its em/ sympathetic nature. We also present an interpretation of empathy as an exclusive and unique form of intentional relation (E. Thompson) which permits to experience the Other in а direct, immediate way from second-person percpective (Sh. Gallagher). The analysis of empathy is also promising for contemporary interdisciplinary studies of affective consciousness, which are also mentioned. The article stresses the necessity of further studying «being-with» in both phenomenological and interdisciplinary dimensions to the extent that intersubjectivity constitutes the sense of the self on both transcendental and experiential levels. Key words Affectivity, corporeity, tradition, anonymity, sociality, embodied practices, intentionality.

99-113

Authors: Pablo Posada Varela

Husserl was the first to clarify the specificity of the phenomenological realm. A phenomenon is an articulated whole whose intensity and richness are parallel to its purity. It is under the guidance of this coalescence that we re-examine the final clause of the Principle of principles («Ideen» I, § 24), often misinterpreted as a limitation of phenomenality. However, Richir’s phenomenology of the nothing-but-phenomenon («rien que phenomena») remains faithful to the final clause of the Principle of principles in that it does not surpass the (nothing-but-) phenomenon in the name of any extra-phenomenological instance. Contrary to the apperceptions emerging from symbolic institution, the nothing-but-phenomenon takes place in the element of a concrete indeterminacy that phenomenalizes itself according to a reflexivity (intrinsic to the phenomenon) that develops itself all along an essentially transpassible phase of presence. Therefore, phenomenalization takes the form of a flickering (clignotement) that, in its final state, becomes autonomous and calls up subjectivity itself. Linked to the hyperbolic épochè, the vertigo of this autonomization outlines what Richir calls the beyond copernican turn (l’au-delà du renversement copernicien) leading thereby a non-standard phenomenology, which takes the form of an architectonic of the various levels of phenomenalization. Key words Phenomenalization, reflexivity, phenomenological flickering, apperception, Principle of principles, concrete indeterminacy, transcendental correlation, symbolic institution, architectonic, transpassibility, the «beyond copernican turn», hyperbolic épochè, Marc Richir, Edmund Husserl.

118-139

Authors: OSCAR BECKER, trans. by K. Lostchevsky

The paper is the first translation of one of the major articles by Oskar Becker into Russian. The article contains the basic points of his philosophy in the tabloid form. The brief scientific commentary accompanies the publication of this translation. Becker believes that one cannot to limit metaphysics only by ontology. It also has to include paraontology. He treats paraontology as the doctrine of essence and the eternal stay of the things. In accordance with the philosopher, the principle of paraontology is so called paraontological indifference (opposed to the Heidegger's ontological difference), i.e. the equality of essence and existence. Basing on this principle, Becker states that a human being exists not only as an existence but also as a paraexistence. Both unconscious (prehistoric) and superconsciuos (superhistoric) belong to the paraexistential dimension of a human being in Becker's opinion. In this context, he provides a detailed analysis of the difference between the historic and extrahistoric types of the being in terms of phenomenology. It is possible to characterize the extrahistoric dimension by the terms beginning, repetition, rhythm, order and seamlessness and so on. Becker declares his understanding of the concrete relationship between view of paraexistence and M. Heidegger's existential analytics. He believes that it is impossible to describe the paraexistential dimension of a human being as reductive privation of ontology of Dasein, as Heidegger did. Becker also attacks Heidegger's view that the nature is only extreme case of the being of the entities in the world in its Heideggerian sense. Nature is cosmos but not a result of «de-worlding» of the world. Thus, Becker retrieves the notions of birth and polis opposing them to Heidegger's notion of death. He also introduces the term paratranscendence (the «other-nothingness») which he treats as the whole universe. Becker tries to rehabilitate the paraontological significance of the eidetic dimension, where essence and existence are the same. The author of the brief scientific commentary to the translation emphasizes the basic theoretical points of Becker's article as well as discusses translation variants of Becker's terms Dasein, Dawesen and Getragenheit given by the article's translator, comparing them to the former versions of their translations into Russian. Key words Dasein, Dawesen, paraexistence, existence, paraontology, paraontological indifference, the unconscious, the superconscious, cosmos, essence, actual being.

144-158

Authors: ERNESTO SPINELLI; Trans. by A. Khakhalova

The research is concentrated on the translation of the chapter of E. Spinelli's book «The Interpreted World». The issues discussed here interest contemporary researchers and need to be studied profoundly: what is essential in studying human being today in comparison with the classical view of humanities and existential philosophical is absolutely foreign in the view of natural science; which approaches in contemporary psychotherapy can satisfy the most important principles of humanitarian inquiry; whether they assimilate the very idea of phenomenological-existential method in its variations and its language of description etc. properly. The author starts with an observation on differences between scientific approach and phenomenological one. It is the latter which could be more appropriate for psychologists, due to its concentrating on uniqueness, singularity and changing nature of human reality. This paper studies such criteria as trustworthiness, credibility, personal experience in the works of many contemporary researchers. What is more, phenomenological method reconsiders the notions of objectivity and causality, demonstrating another orientation for researcher. Namely, one of its significant achievements consist in assurance of fundamentally inter-relational (inter-subjective), or dialogical character of psychic reality, which is the corner stone of therapeutic practice. Another important principle of phenomenologically-oriented study suggests the accomplishment of unbiased vision, which approximates us to the very nature of the phenomenon of the other's reality. Addressing several experimental studies, Spinelli phenomenological technology, its fitness and adequacy in psychotherapeutic practice. Key words Inter-relationality, co-constitutionality, meaning, co-researcher, bracketing, final statement, psychotherapeutic experience.

161-176

Authors: MIKEL DUFRENNE; Trans. by E. Zolotuhina-Abolina, V. Zolotuhin

In Introduction M. Dufrenne describes the specificity of his approach to the aesthetic experience and sets the objectives of the work. Following phenomenological tradition, he realizes an eidetic analysis of aesthetic experience. He considers it as an experience of a spectator, not as that of an artist. Its main object is a work of art. So Dufrenne wants to break the vicious circle of mutual definition of object and experience, but he does not manage to. He thinks that the work of art is not defined by aesthetic experience, it provokes this experience. According to Dufrenne, a work of art has a common noema with an aesthetic object, but their noeses are different. It can be perceived as an object without aesthetic qualities. At the same time the work of art, when perceived skillfully and rightly, is an aesthetic object. Aesthetic quality can be realized only by adequate aesthetic perception. Phenomenology becomes deontology. So object and experience are mutually defined. To describe pure aesthetic experience of the spectator M.Dufrenne proposes to look at prominent, universally recognized works of art. And he poses the question: what is the authentic criterion that makes them prominent? The author thinks that it cannot be a subjective judgement of taste because it leads either to underestimation of some works, to placing them beyond the sphere of “the beautiful” or to levelling of aesthetically valuable works and fakes. According to Dufrenne, the aesthetical object cannot be measured outwards. It gives a measure itself and becomes imperfect when it cannot be that to what it strives for. Aesthetic object isn't only self-legislative, it gives a norm to its creator. Anyway, M.Dufrenne says, for being a chef-d'oeuvre a work of art must have a full sensual being and sense. It is possible when the artist is himself authentic. The goal of spectator's aesthetic perception is to constituently open the object. Key words Aesthetic experience, aesthetic object, experience of spectator, work of art, noema, noesis, subjectivismus, judgement of taste, authentic work.

186-191

Authors: L. Tsypina

The review deals with the Conference Limits of Science 2014: Between Myth and Science held at the University of Wrocław (Poland). The Conference was dedicated to the 140th anniversary of E. Cassirer, which is why reports presented there by the researchers from Austria, Germany, Poland, Russia and France were devoted to the symbolic universe of the thinker and its interpretations in contemporary philosophy. The author summarizes the main content of the reports and problems raised during the discussions. They can be divided into three groups. The first one deals with the problem of completeness of Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and hints at subjects it implies, such as ethics, politics, or technology. The second one is related to the duality of methodological reception of Cassirer’s ideas in modern versions of philosophy of language, philosophy of art and philosophy of science. The third one reflects the interest for Cassirer’s heritage in the framework of spatial turn. All conference participants noted exceptional productivity of the philosophy of symbolic forms and expressed their desire to continue a fruitful dialogue. Key words E. Cassirer, symbolic function, symbolic form, philosophy of culture, philosophy of language, spatial turn.

201-209

Authors: A. Patkul

The basic notions explicated in the book Living Experience and the Concept of Event by V. Melas, are emphasized in this review. The reviewer believes that the main achievement of the author is the introduction of the notion of interval of consciousness into contemporary phenomenology. The reviewer also provides a profound analysis of distinction between living experience and action which are the types of interval in consciousness. Moreover, Melas touches upon relations between logical and historical, between world and event. Some concepts used by the author, e.g. the notion of fact, are criticized by reviewer. As a conclusion, the reviewer advises the reader to read this book. Key words Interval of consciousness, living experience, action, project, distance, readiness, relation between logical and historical, world, event, fact, phenomenological reduction, reduction of the natural attitude.

210-212

Authors: NN

ANNOUNCE

8-9

Authors: NN

FROM THE EDITORS

23-35

Authors: Tatiana Tatarintseva

Abstract The article attempts to defend and advance the project of Gadamer's hermeneutics of trust given that today the notion of understanding is inextricably tied to the view of tradition, discourse and language as inevitably contaminated by ideological distortions by supplementing it with Foucault's critical insights. The common ground between Foucault and Gadamer is that both thinkers militate against the notion of understanding as a process guided by universal criteria of rationality (in particular against Habermas' notion of non-distorted communication) maintaining instead that individuals are inextricably embedded within a particular tradition. Foucault, we maintain, is extremely important for Gadamer in that he develops a mode of critical relationship towards the tradition but precisely understood as a dynamic within the tradition itself, renegotiating and expanding the space of personal freedom; this process, no doubt, being guided by engaged individual perspective and self-understanding without any recourse to an Archimedean point of view outside of any tradition. In doing so Foucault is able to provide a much needed method of immanent critique of ideological distortions (potentially always present in the tradition, discourse or language) that remains faithful to the basic tenants of Gadamer's hermeneutic outlook. We consider a model that schematically demonstrates how such immanent critique can be carried out. We take Gadamer's notion of understanding as realised in an open and charitable dialogue and internalise this dialogue within a single subject taking place between two distinct perspectives: a critical Foucauldian perspective on the one hand, and the immediate self-undertstanding of situated subjectivity on the other. This internal dialogue should enable the subject to maintain a critical distance with respect to aspects of oneself that are a product of social practices and conditions (as demanded by critics of Gadamer), yet remaining within the space of Gadamerian dialogical understanding situated in the first-person ontology. Key words Philosophical hermeneutics, hermeneutics of trust, hermeneutics of suspicion, under- standing, dialogue, prejudices, ideology.

60-92

Authors: Yusuke Ikeda

Abstract This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl's and Fink's phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion”, which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions — a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason” (Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink's characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl's. This difference or distance comes from Fink's conception of “enworlding” (Verweltlichung), i. e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink's very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world's originally enframing function (die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion) of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” (Eindringen) of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink's phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world. Key words Transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.

116-139

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract This paper is the first publication of a translation of the classical phenomenological article by Oskar Becker into Russian. It contains an exemplary application of phenomenological method in the field of esthetics. The aim of the article's author is to introduce the new category of “vacuity” (it goes from K. Solger) in the former esthetics. Becker believes that vacuity is a con- stitutive feature of the beautiful as well as of the esthetic domain as such. He also calls it “fragility” and “frailness”. The philosopher uses the method of separation (die Abhebung) trying to distinguish the proper meaning of fragility and the similar but not identical phenomena. He states that fragility belongs to any esthetical phenomenon regardless of its tragic or comic character or of its character of pulchritudo vaga. The analysis of the possibility of the disinterested pleasure as opposed to the phenomenon of “thrill” in the field of esthetics given by Becker is of very importance. Generally, he thinks that the esthetical objects are phenomena as phenomena. And their way of being is auto to phainesthai in the sense of Th. Hobbes. The main thesis relating to the esthetical phenomena by Becker, who follows F. Schelling here, is that their ontological basis is in the identity of conscious and unconscious principles of being. In conclusion, Becker analyses of the temporality of being of an artist basing on Heidegger's hermeneutical ontology. Becker, however, introduces his own notion of stateliness (die Getragenheit), which shows that the being of an artist is raised by grace of nature outside the ordinary historicity. Thus, according to Becker. Key words Phenomenology, Phenomenon, Esthetics, Art, Artist, Way of Being, the Beautiful, Historicity, Nature, the Conscious, the Unconscious.

165-170

Authors: Andrei Patkul, Olga Bashkina

Abstract The article treats the notion of consciousness in three theories: those of Leibniz, Kant and Husserl. Klaus Kaehler tends to examine how these three doctrines relate to each other and whether it is possible to register a linear development among them. Though Kaehler un- derlines difficulties in comparing views of these philosophers, he draws some informative parallels between them. The author starts off by mentioning Leibniz as the bearer of the initial understanding of consciousness and emphasizing that Leibniz' monadology contains the basic form of the ideas which will be later expressed by Kant and Husserl. Defining consciousness as the notion of the being's mode, and accordingly, the structure of the subject, Kaehler unfolds the interpretation of this notion both before the transcendental turn and after it. He holds Leibniz to be responsible for the transcendental turn, as Kaehler finds a crucial element of Leibniz' theory: the dependence of each and every being from the independent substantial unity (the monad). According to Leibniz, the outer world exists only in the form of mutual self-representation of the monads. What Kant does, according to Kaehler, is that he on the basis of Leibniz notes that not only an existing individual substance, but the finite reason-subject should be considered in its limits. As a result, everything existing is determined by the immanent structure of the subjectivity. Husserl in his turn insists on examining the activities and intentionality of the consciousness. sort of substantiality or relation from this notion. Key words Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, consciousness, transcendental turn, reason, perspectivism.

193-195

Authors: Georgy Chernavin

Abstract This paper deals with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Firstly, through the analysis of a passage found in “Logical Investigations”, the author will show Husserl’s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. He will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl’s works written after the 1920’s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as practical philosophy. The author makes this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is practical philosophy, firstly, in the sense that it investigates various forms of practical intentionality and, secondly, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. Key words Practical intentionality, transcendental phenomenology, Husserl, practical philosophy, experience, perception, intentional experience, stream of consciousness.

211-214

Authors: Fedor Stanzhevskiy

Abstract The second part of the chapter eight of the “Rule of Metaphor” deals with further philosophical implications of the metaphor. Ricoeur dissipates any suspicion of complicity between the metaphorical and metaphysical. He shows that it is due to a wrong understanding of the metaphor as embedded in nomination, while its proper place, as Ricoeur insists, is in discourse. The living metaphor is a principle animating thought and inciting it “to think more”. The very relationship between thought and poetry, between speculative and metaphorical discourses proves to be a dynamic process based on the dialectics between the poetical experience of belonging and the speculative power of distancing. Key words Metaphor, literal and figurative, speculative discourse, lexicalization, resemblance, reference.

237-250

Authors: Natalia Artemenko, Andrei Patkul

Abstract This is the text of an interview given by professor of department of logic of the philosophical faculty St. Petersburg State University Yaroslav A. Slinin to Natalia Artemenko and Andrei Patkul. Prof. Slinin talks about the genesis of his philosophical views, in particular, about his way into phenomenology. His recollections of the phenomenological community in the former Leningrad is of very interest in the context of Soviet philosophy’s historiography. It ought to remarked that the course under the titled «Phenomenology and Logic» delivered by Prof. Slinin since 1970 brought to bear overwhelming influence on the shaping of today’s philosophical community in St. Petersburg. Hence, the problems of correlation between phenomenology and logic are discussed in this interview. Prof. Slinin points that the problematic of logic is the confluence point of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, which deal with the same problems but by different methods and in different attitudes. The main distinction points between these two philosophical trends are, on the one hand, that phenomenology has a metaphysical background, which is denied by representatives of classical analytical philosophy, and on the other hand, that phenomenologists as distinguished from analytical philosophers accept the intellectual intuition of essences. Prof. Slinin states with regard to correlation between phenomenology and contemporary cognitive sciences that the Husserl’s distinction of transcendental and natural attitudes is very important up to now. He gives his own interpretation of Husserl’s doctrine of reduction in this context. Prof. Slinin tries to show also that Heidegger describes by ontological terms the same phenomena which are described by Husserl in transcendental terms. As conclusion, Prof. Slinin talk about his other non-phenomenological interests in philosophy, namely, about ancient philosophy (particularly, patristic, early modern and Russian philosophy. Key words Phenomenology, logic, cognitive sciences, philosophy in USSR, reduction, intersubjectivity, theory of subjectivity, ethic.

261-267

Authors: Alexei Krioukov

Abstract In this short review I share my impression from an excursion, which was held in December 2013 in Göttingen, through the places where Edit Stein lived during her working period on her PhD thesis under the supervision of Edmund Husserl. Under the guidance of Mary Heidhues, we walked through Göttingen and saw the places where Edit Stein first lived upon her arrival in the city, the evangelical church where her supervisor Adolf Reinach's funeral was held after his fall during the first world war, the nice old house where the Göttingen phenomenologists met with each other, the building of the university aula which was both a place for the official affairs and a disciplinary cell, and many other interesting places. This text is followed by the chronological biography and the autobiography of Edit Stein. Key words Edit Stein, Edmund Husserl, early phenomenology, Göttingen, biography, excursion.

272-279

Authors: Igor Evlampiev

Abstract The author of the book focuses on two “metaphors” of memory, i.e. two ideas about how the act of memory is carried out and how then we “restore” what is remembered. Metaphor of storage is absolutely understandable and familiar to every man. At first glance it seems to be a universal form of memory. We are all in our everyday experience believe that memories are “stored” in a certain area of our consciousness and recovered from it if needed. However, one of the main theses of the book is the claim that such a widespread understanding of memory although captures some of its features, but still does not correspond to its essence and is not able to explain its meaning. The second “metaphor” describes memory as a project. This approach seems to be paradoxical (because the project is something adressed in the future), but the author shows convincingly that only an understanding of the memory can grasp its essence, and puts it at the center of the human personality. Key words Metaphor, memory, personality, store, project, imprint, neglect, Plato, St. Augustine, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Henri-Louis Bergson.

281-282

Authors: NN

No abstract

284-285

Authors: NN

No abstract