Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

13-29

Authors: James Mensch

Husserl’s Crisis contains his final attempt to understand the world in terms of an ultimately constituting consciousness. The path he chooses is that of a reduction to the “life-world,” the world that appears when we bracket the results of the objective sciences. His claim is that “the ‘objective’ a priori [of the natural sciences] is grounded in the ‘subjective-relative’ a priori of the lifeworld”. It is from the latter that he attempts to achieve his vision of “a universal, ultimately functioning subjectivity”. In this article, I question whether this is possible. If the world were the product of this functioning subjectivity, the latter could not be part of the world. But, the inherent sense of the reduction to the life-world leaves us with the sensuous embodied subject, who is a part of the world. How can we think of the a priori in terms of this subject? I conclude by considering both Merleau-Ponty’s and Patočka’s attempts to conceive of such an a priori.

46-65

Authors: Alice Pugliese

The paper presents an assessment of the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt (life-world) on the basis of the late manuscripts on genetic analysis. The reflection on the concept of the life-world intends to evaluate the contribution of phenomenology to the philosophical debate beyond the contention between realism, naturalism, and subjectivism. The paper starts by evaluating the idea of the “universal correlation”, thereby stressing the egological figure of the “Ich-kann” (I-can) as the proper candidate to achieve the constitution of the life-world. The author claims that the constitutive activity of the I-can is based not only on intellectual and perceiving acts, but rather on a comprehensive praxis, which also bears ethical meaning. The sense-borrowing activity of the I-can is namely responsible for the inner articulation of the plural particular worlds (Sonderwelten) within the encompassing life-world. Such a relation between interest-centered worlds and the encompassing life-world is not merely empirical and cannot be explained in causal and factual terms. It rather points out a peculiar subjective responsibility intended as a specific access to the world that bears a significant moral meaning. Here appears a pre-predicative and pre-normative form of responsibility rooted in the temporal and intentional structure of experience, connected with the first forms of socialization and with the essential structure of the life-world as a world “for everybody”.

82-99

Authors: Beat Michel

It is well known that Husserl never accepted to publish Ideas II. During one of his conversations with Cairns, he explained his failure to complete the second volume of Ideas by a “feeling of inadequacy to his task”. In this paper I argue that the apparent simplicity of the subject of Ideas II – the successive constitution of the material and animal nature and of the world of spirit – hides a much more difficult question: the relation between nature and spirit, and even more specifically the relation between mind and body. We will show that in Ideas II this problem leads to an aporia in both senses of the word: contradiction between two apparently valid positions and obstruction of a passage. Husserl may well have noticed this aporia when he spoke of a “vicious circle”. However, he was probably not conscious of its severity and did not really develop a solution. We will argue that Husserlian phenomenology simply does not have the conceptual means to tackle the difficulty. To surpass the aporia one must go beyond the strict context of phenomenology to reason in terms of a phenomenological metaphysics.

121-148

Authors: Victor Molchanov

Communication and intersubjectivity are considered as correlative problems of the phenomenology of consciousness. The term “communication” is taken in the narrow sense and refers to already formed communities with relatively independent subjects. Intersubjectivity is understood as a double constitution: the goals and means for their achievements, on the one hand, and their coherence of action, on the other. The source of intersubjectivity and communicative consciousness as a whole is the discriminating ability of consciousness, and above all the ability to distinguish between one’s own and another’s, as well as between what is real and what is unreal. The first difference is correlated with the problem of a common understanding of goals and objectives, the second with efforts for coherence. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s approach to the problem of intersubjectivity. I show that the concepts of one’s own and others’ must be supplemented by the concept of real and unreal. Criticism of the Husserlian conception focuses on the premise of the early phenomenology of the primacy of perception in relation to judgment and all other modes of consciousness. In this paper judgment is regarded as the primary ability of a person to communicate, to determine the relationship between parts and the whole in search of common solutions and a common understanding, which remain relative and factual also through judgments. I conclude that the difference and correlation of the act of consciousness and meaning is the source of communication; any communication involves internal communication on the type of feedback. Any communication has two levels: (1) communication and (2) communication of communication.

164-176

Authors: Georgy Chernavin

The article raises the question of possible common philosophical experience, a more fundamental one that the usual division into schools or traditions of philosophy. I propose to seek for such an experience in a typical (for the twentieth-century philosophy) form of a philosophical wonder which I would call the “oddity of the obvious”. Using the example of the Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies, I try to demonstrate how this experience works, showing the important discrepancy between the two philosophers: a differently placed frontier between the sense and the nonsense. The most striking feature that characterizes the types of philosophical wonder established in the analytical and phenomenological traditions is an element that escapes their view: in the first case it is the being-in-itself which is considered absurd (widersinnig); in the second case it is pre-predicative experience which is proclaimed meaningless (unsinnig). I specify what strategies Husserl and Wittgenstein use, dealing with the experience of the “oddity of the obvious”; namely, they try either to retain the incomprehensibility of the obvious or to dissolve the “mental cramp”. The philosophical tradition (phenomenological or analytical one) takes one of the possible forms of the philosophical wonder to be the basic form. For the phenomenological philosophy, quite an emblematic feature is the effort to retain the “oddity of the obvious”, and for the analytical philosophy (of wittgensteinian provenance) – the dissolution of “mental cramp”, of philosophical bewilderment, the release from vague intellectual disquiet. Concluding the article, I propose to consider the alteration of the philosophical wonder models as a possibility of overcoming intrashop discrepancies between the philosophical traditions.

191-225

Authors: Alexey Savin

The article aims to explain the connection of Marcuse’s concept of dehistorization with his interpretation and criticism of the Heideggerian concept of historicity. Dehistorization in Marcuse’s philosophy, according to my tentative definition, is the kind of transformation of the creative social forces and human abilities denying an existing reality that makes them elements of the mechanism producing and reproducing the existent reality, and thereby makes them a manner of repression of the human striving for freedom and happiness and a way to perpetuate domination. According to Marcuse, dehistorization is the main form of reproduction of the false totality. The idea of dehistorization is the prevailing critical concept in Marcuse’s philosophy. It appears in the course of his criticism of fascism. The basis of the formation of the dehistorization concept is Marcuse’s criticism and interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of historicity during his “Heideggerian Marxism” period (1928–1933). This Heideggerian conception is the ultimate achievement of contemporary philosophy. The ultimate character of this achievement is given to it, according to Marcuse, that it treats history from the viewpoint of being in contrast to Hegel’s idealistic dialectics and German historicism of the 19th century, which interpreted it from the viewpoint of consciousness or the spirit. There are four main tendencies in Marcuse’s criticism and transformation of Heidegger’s conception of historicity. 1. The deformalization of Heidegger’s treatment of historicity of Dasein. The explanation of the material substance of historicity, i.e. the explanation of the material character of conditions of human existence (Dasein) as the definitive feature of historicity. 2. The concretization of Dasein, its treatment not as an individual, but as a class in view of substantial differences of the environment (Umwelt), material conditions of its existence. 3. Following from both the deformalization of historicity and the concretization of Dasein – the rehabilitation of the “being-with” (Mitsein) and the public sphere (Mitwelt), and, thereby, of the space of political struggle as the sphere of authenticity. 4. The disclosure of the fundamental role of the phenomenologically considered spatiality (Räumlichkeit) in the constitution of concrete historicity, i.e. historicity determined by the material, social and political character of Dasein and the world. Marcuse’s interpretation and criticism of Heidegger’s conception of historicity and his criticism of dehistorization based on it paves the way to his ontological interpretation of Marxist dialectics as the method of the struggle against dehistorization and false totality and as the only truly revolutionary way of thinking.

250-281

Authors: Natalia Azarova

In this article, we examine Heidegger’s poetry, which was published in the 81st volume of his collected works. We consider it as an independent discursive practice that could express existence in a different mode of philosophical discourse, which could either be called “philosopher’s poetry” or “discourse of a thinker” — the experience of thinking in a pure form. With the help of poetry, Heidegger establishes the very possibility of poetic thought. Heidegger’s poetry during all his life, his work is ever-changing, from rhymed text to rhythmical vers libre, while simultaneously varying formats: counting rhyme, ecphrasis, a poem-commentary, aphorism, and so on. At the same time, the format of Heidegger’s poetry, as wells as its graphics, the attention to short (simple) words, form a connection with the Avant-garde poetry contemporary to him and in particular the minimalism of the middle and second half of the 20th century. The actual form of the poem (the rhyme, the length of the verse, and its vertical dimension, the iconization and the ductility) of the poetical word allows the philosopher to build connections that are equal in value without using common discursive elements such as cohesion tools and semblance. An etymological explosion sounds more persuasive in a poem than in a philosophical text, not only because of consonance, but also due to the graphics of the verse. Heidegger is attempting to “achieve” an untranslatable text, and thus his poetry is a manifestation of the possibilities of his native language, which is may be conceived as the universal discourse of a thinker. The most important aspect in the poetry of the philosopher is a new concept of text creation, an experience of a contemporary discussion through the speech of Parmenides. The non-linear nature of a poetical text, the dialectic of fragmentation/unity could materialize the lack of linearity in the wandering in front of the opening (Lichtung). The thinker’s discourse is characterized by a procedure of recurrence that is achieved by the cyclical nature of Heidegger’s poetry, the main unfinished text, and his gravitation around mini cycles and open cycles. Poetical discourse is a way towards antipropositionality, whereas poetry allows to stop perceiving language as a tool for creation of expression devices. It is also a theological approach: not to deduct the unknown from the known. Heidegger’s poetry can be seen as theological poetry as well.

303-319

Authors: MAX SCHELER, Trans.: Daniil Dorofeev, Alla Shapkina

We hereby present to the reader a translation of a fragment of one of Max Scheler’s main works, The Nature of Sympathy. Max Scheler was the most important figure in the philosophical life of Europe in the 1910-20s in phenomenology, axiology and philosophical anthropology. This work is an example of expressive, original and deep interconnection and intersection of these directions. The book was published in 1923 and was a significantly expanded, supplemented and rethought version of the book Phenomenology and Theory of the Feeling of Sympathy and of Love and Hate (1913). One of the central themes of this work is the development of a holistic theory of phenomenology of intersubjectivity (which first appeared in printed form) on the basis of the examination of the problems of personal relations between the “I” and “Other” by the experience of emotional sympathy. In the presented translation, Scheler carries out a detailed phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of “sympathy” (Mitgefühl), in the course of which he criticizes theories of the Other (such as that of T. Lipps) and reveals various forms of “sympathy.”

329-357

Authors: EDIT STEIN. Trans.: Anastasiia Kartcheva. Editors:Natalia Artemenko, Alexei Krioukov

This publication is a translation of the article by Edith Stein, a German-Jewish philosopher, in which she analyses and compares philosophical positions and theories of Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas. The selection of such central figures results from two main directions in Stein’s life and research: on the one hand, from phenomenological work as Husserl’s scientific assistant and editor of his manuscripts, and, on the other hand, from her conversion to Catholicism, which led her to a detailed learning of Thomas Aquinas’ legacy and initiation into the Carmelites religious order. The challenge that Edith Stein offers in this work is to bring these two ways together, to break the boundary between faith and knowledge and to show the possibilities of productive interaction between both phenomenological and scholastic methods. Despite their great divergences caused by historical background and different starting points of philosophical thought, Stein shows us, that these methods share common basic foundations and are able to complement each other in solving philosophical problems arising from experience, knowledge and practical action in the world. Thanks to studies that have been undertaken, the author draws the conclusion that the scholastic legacy of Aquinas could be promising for findings ways to deal with some internal problems of Husserl’s phenomenological project and to overcome its limitation. The first attempt of such a comparison that was realized in this article provides the basis for another of Stein’s works, namely her book Finite and Infinite Being (Endliches und ewiges Sein), where she tries to build her own ontological project based on the synthesis of the scholastics and phenomenology but is placed mostly in the coordinate system of Aquinas’ theoretical field.

366-375

Authors: Vadim Prozersky

The main ideas of Eugen Fink’s book Play as Symbol of the World and Other Writings are discussed in the review and the most significant thoughts of the German philosopher on the problems of ontology of play are highlighted. O. Fink has managed to give a new solution to the ontological problems of play, as one of the basic phenomena of human existence, to uncover its previously unknown aspects and to show its dual nature and worldliness. In general, O. Fink’s analysis of play shows the productivity of the phenomenological investigations in new areas of research.

390-410

Authors: Andrei Patkul

In this review, I emphasize and analyze the main outcomes of the philosophical investigation presented in Victor Molchanov’s book. I state that Molchanov’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which is based on the so-called “model of production” as well as his reconstruction of F. Brentano’s thought, could be very fruitful for the contemporary understanding of the essence and the limits of phenomenological research. I think that the phenomenal primacy of differences over identities and the methodological primacy of analysis over interpretation in phenomenology defended in this text are authentic theses that could renew the phenomenological way of thinking. The thesis of the primacy of space-experience over time-consciousness and the genesis of such consciousness as a kind of fiction from the space-experience is contentious, but could also be productive for the understanding of phenomena and the phenomenal world. The conceptions of the primordial body-judgments and space as condition of historicity are of great interest and well-reasoned applications of the main theoretical thesis of the primacy of space-experience over time-consciousness. Finally, I conclude that the author of the book formulates an original version of phenomenological philosophy. We could characterize this type of phenomenology as an “analytical phenomenology.” I am sure this version should be detailed and developed in the future investigations by the book’s author and his followers.

9-44

Authors: Sergei Nikonenko

The matter of the article is to give an outline of American theories of intentionality and to compare it with E. Husserl’s phenomenology. It is one of the first Russian systematic studies of American theories on intentionality that is represented here. It is John Searle’s philosophy that is the main American theory of intentionality. Some other thinkers (R. Chisholm, J. Findlay, N. Rescher, E. Thompson, D.W. Smith, etc.) are studied here too. Searle treats intentionality as a natural quality of consciousness. He forbids the linguistic approach; intentionality is understood from the point of view of humanistic (internal) realism. Intentionality is successive when the subject is satisfied by his acquaintance with the object. The main feature of intentionality is aspectuality that has the subject of not eliminated subjectivity of any conscious act and the first person ontology. Searle proposes the collective intentionality that is analogous to phenomenological intersubjectivity. E. Thompson proposes the synthetic theory of intentionality that unites phenomenology, philosophy of consciousness and neural science. D.W. Smith proposes the theory of intentional context. He rejects the study of atomistic intentional acts. Husserl’s and Searle’s theories of phenomenology may be united in several main points: 1. Experience is an internal process; 2. Experience cannot be separated of aspectuality; 3. Intentionality cannot be eliminated in any conscious act; 4. The other mind can be considered only from internal point of view; 5. There is collective intentionality of mankind. There are several distinctions between Husserl and Searle: 1. Searle is an realist on intentionality, Husserl puts on an idealistic concept of it; 2. Searle considers intentionality from empirical point of view, not from the rationalist one; 3. Searle is an adept of skepticism about self, he rejects transcendental concept of cogito. But irrespective of distinctions there is convergence of analytical and phenomenological views in contemporary philosophy of consciousness.

58-78

Authors: Corijn Van Mazijk

Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have to choose between any of these positions. Central to the outline I offer is that there are multiple approaches to non-conceptual content in play today. By separating them we can begin to oversee the diversity of phenomenological contributions to the debate about non-conceptual content. I conclude that current literature presents us with at least three sound phenomenological accounts of non-conceptual content, but also that these are generally not incompatible with conceptualism.

97-115

Authors: Sergei Kulikov

The subject of our research is the features of naturalism and of historicism in the whole system of the scientific worldview. The author identifies and describes the types of naturalism, achieving the purpose of clarification of circumstances in which its separate options become complementary ways of scientific understanding of reality. The resulting picture is enriched with the features of historicism, introducing the element of relativity to the scientific views of the world. Special attention is paid to the possibility to reconstruct the eidos of science as a generalized ideal of research activities. The research methodology includes the implementation of the phenomenological research program, the foundations of which were laid in the works of Husserl. This program allows us to understand the idea of science in the framework of the ideal of cognitive activity, the roots of which date back to the writings of Aristotle. The phenomenological perspective of our research allows us to see the essential characteristics of both naturalism and historicism, to identify options for their constructive engagement. The result reveals a possibility to make a nontrivial conclusion about the relation between naturalism and historicism, for the debate of naturalism and of historicism, taken by itself, i.e. as relatively independent phenomenon, opens horizons of the internally unified consciousness understood in science in two ways. The first one is a set of research intentions of the validity; the second one coincides with the implicit dependence of the scientific worldview from the orientation to the historical changes of the foundations of self-reflection of science that, in fact, form the semantic structure of scientific knowledge as a unique ideal for research activities.

140-160

Authors: Vitaly Lekhtsier

This article focuses on the phenomenological aspects of Cheryl Mattingly’s empirical research. Cheryl Mattingly is one of the brightest representatives of modern American medical anthropology. Medical anthropology – actively developing social science – often, especially since the end of the 80-ies of the last century, refers to the conceptual resources of phenomenological philosophy to justify their methodological and value priorities. Such reference is connected with the attention of medical anthropologists to the subjective experience of illness and health, to the meaning of suffering, to patients’ storytelling, to situational effects of clinical interactions, to the changes in the life-world of man caused by serious chronic diseases. The first part of the article explicates the theoretical framework of the version of the applied phenomenology, which is offered by Mattingly in her long-term research conducted in 1990s and 2000 years. The subject of these research works was clinical interactions between occupational therapists and their patients. The analysis of these interactions is based on Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenologically grounded thesis that between the narrative and the experience of time there is an isomorphism thanks to the binding force of the plot. Mattingly brings the concept of narrative and a series of accompanying characteristics from the sphere of philosophical narratology to the sphere of phenomenology of (inter)action. The main idea of Mattingly is that the action itself has a narrative structure, – in the sense that actors themselves perform emplotment of interaction, configure the current events in a way that they are built into a whole, namely therapeutic history in which each successive episode of therapy follows from the previous one. The second part of the article illustrates on example of real therapy session how these ideas work in practice, in the process of the interpretation of particular therapeutic interactions. In general, we are planning to show that, although Mattingly’s appeal to phenomenological context is not systematic, and it is more correct to speak of the phenomenological “motives” in her work, it can be treated as one of the most interesting applications of phenomenological philosophy in the field of social sciences.

181-191

Authors: Alexander Frolov

We present here a Russian translation of the 8th paragraph of Husserl’s book “Experience and Judgment” (1939). The paragraph includes a systematic outline of the phenomenological conception of horizonedness, while in no other Husserl’s book – from “Ideas I” to “Crisis” –we can find a fragment dealing with the idea of horizon elaborated so deep. The idea however is a substantial element of Husserl’s conceptualization of experience as an open, indefinite process. In the 7th paragraph of “Experience and Judgment” the world is conceived as a universal “ground of certainty”, upon which all our experience is based, and in the 8th paragraph the intentional structure of experience (mostly as perception) is explicated. That structure is characterized as horizontal. The crucial difference here is between the “inner horizon” and the “outer horizon” of an object. The outer horizon stretches finally into the “world-horizon” – the ultimate, universal horizon comprising all partial horizons and perspectives. In its turn, typization functions here as a way of representation of objects laying beyond the field of what is given. Typization also covers latent aspects of present objects and concerns even their patent aspects. The most general type, according to Husserl, is “object as such” – a basic category of formal ontology. The idea of horizon has been a fundamental principle of classical phenomenology. Nowadays it provokes hot discussions among such authors as Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. The discussions relate to the very essence of phenomenology. That’s why we find publication of the fragment to be important.

201-210

Authors: Dalius Jonkus

This publication presents three manuscripts of the famous Russian-Lithuanian philosopher Vasily Sesemann. We offer publications of essays on Scheler, Bergson and Lossky – these are the texts of Sesemann’s manuscript collection, which is located in Vilnius University (F122-104, F122-105, F122-106). This group of essays is integral. All these essays, in one way or another address the issue of the philosophical understanding of intuition, which Sesemann discussed in all his major works. Essays are dedicated to the philosophers who somehow influenced the author’s position. The texts were written during his stay in the camp of the GULAG (1950-1955) in Taishet (Irkutsk region). It is known that Sesemann taught Western philosophy and aesthetics for other prisoners. We can assume that these essays refer to the materials or recordings of his lectures. Among the prisoners in the same camp was Dandaron, who later became a famous scientist and created the original version of neo-Buddhism. While preparing manuscripts for publication it was discovered that in the posthumously published “Letters on Buddhism” Dandaron often recounts the thoughts of Sesemann, especially when it comes to understanding of intuition. In Dandaron’s handwritten archive in Ulan-Ude are the manuscripts, which, according to the titles and topics discussed, coincide with the manuscripts of Sesemann. From the available data we conclude that the manuscripts found in Dandaron’s archive – “The relationship between matter and spirit” and “Aesthetics” – are the recordings of Sesemann’s lectures.

235-240

Authors: Jakub Bużniak

The report presents an overview of the International Conference on “Phenomenology and Practice: The 2nd Conference on Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement In Central and Eastern Europe” that took place on September 8-10, 2016 at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Poland. The report characterizes the structure of the conference, presents the conference attendees and introduces the main ideas of key lectures given by the guests.

265-271

Authors: Man-To Tang

The review provides an outline of the book and critically examines the Heideggerean hermeneutic phenomenological approach developed by F. W von Herrmann to the refutation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Reviewer traces four essential differences in author’s critical analysis of the two phenomenological approaches by Heidegger and Husserl, and problematizes several difficulties in the author’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. On the one hand, the reviewer shows that Husserl’s phenomenology, at least, can be interpreted in two ways, namely the static approach and the genetic approach. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, especially in Crisis, explicitly expresses his hermeneutic character. Therefore, von Herrmann’s interpretation may not be faithful to Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole. On the other hand, von Herrmann develops Heidegger’s idea of the primacy of a-reflective hermeneutics, which is a pre-theoretical primordial science. With reference to K. Popper’s and K. Jaspers’ criteria of science, the reviewer doubts that the development, which aims at going beyond reflective and theoretical science, can still be regarded as a science because it cannot meet any established criterion.

11-14

Authors: Irina Kazakova

No Abstract

46-73

Authors: Tomas Sodeika

It is usually assumed that the main goal of seminars delivered between 1959 and 1969 by Martin Heidegger to the Swiss Psychotherapists in Zollikon were the philosopher’s attempt to make his own philosophy useful. According to Medard Boss, Heidegger’s “philosophical insights” can be useful insofar as they can serve as a theoretical basis of psychotherapeutic practice. But such an interpretation of Heideggerian philosophy could hardly be acceptable to Heidegger himself. One of the main features of Heideggerian thinking is the longing to return to the primordial θεωρία, i.e. to the knowledge as an aim in itself. Therefore, the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and Boss’ Daseinsanalysis can be understood as a kind of “war of the worlds” between psychotherapy that seeks to turn philosophy into a means of increasing the efficiency of the practice and philosophy that seeks to preserve the status of θεωρία. However this “war” belongs to another dimension too. “War” can be understood as πόλεμος mentioned in the 53rd fragment of Heraclitus, i.e. as a tragic action, through which the openness of being is accomplished. In the article this action is viewed through the prism of the confrontation of the two modes of attunement (Befindlichkeit), which Heidegger calls the “resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit) and “detachment” (Gelassenheit). These modes can be thought of as two emotional spaces, a confrontation of which Heidegger himself has experienced when he was treated by the psychotherapist Viktor von Gebsattel in 1946. In the fight between “resoluteness” and “detachment” the openness of being is accomplished. But in order to participate in this openness, it is necessary to hear it as call and to accept as challenge. Such call Heidegger hears first and foremost in the language of poetry. The proximity of poetry and philosophy he recognizes as a “dangerous proximity”. But, according to Heidegger, this is the “healing danger”, because exposing ourselves to it, we participate in the “war of the worlds”, in which the openness of being is accomplished. It seems that similar “healing danger” arises from proximity of philosophy and psychotherapy. If so, then the Zollikon seminars can be viewed as Heidegger’s trial to enter into the “war of the worlds” as the openness of being.

89-108

Authors: Irina Glukhova

The purpose of this article is to give an idea about contemporary Daseinsanalysis as it was developed by Ph.D. Alice Holzhey, a Swiss Daseinsanalyst and psychoanalyst, chairman of the Swiss Society for Daseinsanalysis and Hermeneutic Anthropology, and a student of Medard Boss. One of the main features of Holzhey’s approach, which distinguishes it from other schools of Daseinsanalysis, including the approach of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, is the return to Freud’s psychoanalysis and its new interpretation as, essentially, a hermeneutic orientation aiming at clarification of the meaning of seemingly meaningless symptoms. Referring to Heidegger’s early philosophy, mainly to his Being and Time, Holzhey creatively compares his philosophical anthropology to Freud’s idea that mental suffering always has a hidden – unconscious – meaning. Drawing on three rules for analytical work proposed by Freud – the rule of free associations, the rule of defocused listening and the rule of abstinence – Holzhey radically revises the conceptual foundation of analytic interpretations. Where the classic Freudian psychoanalyst sees the problems in psychosexual development, Holzhey talks about a particular sensitivity (Hellhörigkeit) to the “ontological inclusions” in everyday ontic events. Where it was a mental illness, which was defined as a pathological deviation from a healthy “norm”, Alice Holzhey saw “philosophers in spite of themselves” – people suffering from having the gift of a particular sensitivity to the existential givens of their own being. The possibility to use this method to consider patients’ problems in psychotherapy and psychological counseling – including different types and schools of counseling – makes Holzhey’s approach of practical use in a variety of therapeutic areas and for different issues. This article is based on personal meetings and conversations, participation in Alice Holzhey’s seminars, as well as on the work on the author’s translation of Holzhey’s book, Suffering from One’s Own Being

122-141

Authors: Ado Huygens

The author describes a limit situation in which he found himself during his journey in Egypt. He describes this experience as a kind of panic attack and associates this experience with what Heidegger called Grundstimmung. As a Daseinsanalyst, the author decided not to avoid this exceptional and terrifying inner turmoil but, on the contrary, to describe day after day his feelings, emotions, the sense of strangeness and homelessness while at the same time rereading “Sein und Zeit”. The author reports being able to experience in his flesh, beyond any theoretical approach, what Heidegger puts into one of his main concepts, Angst. This concept delivers the uncanny experience of the meaninglessness of existence, of “not-being-at-home”. He describes his experience which permitted him to vividly explore through Heidegger’s Daseinsanalysis the way a human being lets natural entities be, the way he has to face his finitude through Angst, and finally, the way Dasein is confronted with “nothingness”. Nevertheless, the author wonders, whether the feeling of “unfamiliarity” or “errancy” might also be the source of the “clearing” and lead us to experience of authentic life? Step by step, Angst is questioning “trust”. What does it mean to trust the world or oneself? This article intertwines theory and Erlebnis, such that living experience is manifested by Heidegger’s hermeneutic and, conversely, Heidegger’s hermeneutic is embodied in living experience. This article bridges an ontic journey in Egypt and an ontological journey in which Dasein’s Being unfolds.

175-199

Authors: Charlotte Spitzer

“To be alive”. A sixteen years old client of mine used this expression to describe her wish and within the possibility of what may come after the therapeutic process. It is a beautiful and pure and at the same time a universal uttering. The epochs of childhood and youth are very special periods in the life of all of us. Never again we experience such an immense kind of development in our existential possibilities. It’s intensity, tempo and dimensions are tremendous. Therefore the risks are also very high. In this process we are highly sensitive, vulnerable and bare so that every difficulty, every disappointment, every – even short – loss of love can have a deep and devastating impact on our possibilities to be open to the world and be free in living out our own Dasein as well as living out from our own true ground. In this particular period of life, we are totally and utterly exposed and if we don’t get what we need in order to develop and grow in our unique way, if we are unable to respond appropriately to what life brings for us, we develop psychological disorders. In my article I would like to illuminate the human existence, this very specific period of life, through daseinsanalytical, phenomenological view. This includes personality development, openness towards the unique individual possibilities to come to the world and getting and staying open to the world, being truly alive. The term “development” is discussed here in its phenomenological understanding, describing the phenomenon as becoming more and more open to the world due to the unique individual possibilities. Furthermore some Existentialia and how they reveal itself in their singular mode to the world are being outlined in different phases of childhood and youth. Finally the therapeutic uniqueness of daseinsanalytical relationship is described under the aspect of psychotherapy with youth

226-247

Authors: Alexey Bocharov

This article analyzes the spectator practices as they relate to the strategies of auteur cinema. Traditionally, the viewer experiences in the film are discussed in the context of engagement and clinging. The author tries to actualize a different perspective, associated with the specifics of the contemporary art Cinema – a situation of emptiness, lack of events, in which the audience is bored in the cinema hall. Therefore, the article attempts to justify usage of the phenomenological and ontological philosophical language for film analysis through thematizing the cinematic experience. The specific method is phenomenological reduction, embodied in the act of contemplating the cinematic experience as a phenomenon. Heideggerian analytics of boredom sentiment and the direct experience of contemporary cinema are fundamental for this article. The analysis of Bela Tarr’s film “The Turin Horse” demonstrates that the film can cause boredom by means of its unique time technique, as it requests the viewer to remain in its not-clear-how-much-lasting time for excessively long. The viewer finds oneself put in the position of extreme aesthetic, where one is to contact with the film in a blank way, by no means. The viewer is passivated, experiencing the movie through every moment of the present, embracing the film “as a whole”. Due to the long time, through lack of sharpness of thought the bored is both detached and involved. By means of non-public, personal passivity, the viewer is immersed into the cinematic and, therefore, focused on the film “as a whole”, but still dispersed towards putting together the grains of the film: its details, repetitions of everyday situations. Therefore, it is not through reflection, but through the location in the event and affect, through questioning, that the viewer gets closer to the meaning of the film.

271-289

Authors: Carina Pape

Mikhail Bakhtin aimed to invent a phenomenology of the self-experience and of the experience of the other in his early work. In order to realize such a phenomenology he combined different approaches he called idealism and materialism / naturalism. The first one he linked to Edmund Husserl, but did hardly name him directly concerning his phenomenology. Does this intersubjective phenomenology give a hint that Bakhtin used Husserlian ideas more than considered yet? Or did they both invent similar ideas independently from each other? Both thinkers dealt with the issue of intersubjectivity. Husserl judged statements on other psycho-physical realities as metaphysics in the Logical Investigations II, but in his Ideas I he described the others as enhancing one’s experience through their “experiential surpluses”. In the same way Bakhtin described the unique perspective of the other as a mandatory and valuable part of the world of the act in his Philosophy of the Act and his investigations on Author and Hero. In order to understand the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology for Bakhtin’s early philosophy we need to take a look closer at those contentual parallels as well as some paraphrases yet unnoticed. This gives hint for the question if for Bakhtin Husserl was more than just a name dropped. In this article I reconstructed the relations between both thinkers and answered the question if the dating of Bakhtin’s early work until 1928 has to be re-considered

308-314

Authors: Irina Kazakova

The article of the swiss psychiatrist and psychotherapist Gion Condrau, closest associate of Medard Boss, one of the main representatives of psychotherapeutic daseinsanalysis, is propaedeutic and includes an extensive introduction, a range of significant historical and biographical inclusions concerning the Martin Heidegger’s life and consistent consideration of certain concepts of heideggerian daseinsanalytic underlying psychiatric and therapeutic daseinsanalysis: the investigation of the fundamental structure of Dasein as any particular human being and existentials this structure is determined by. The wealth of citations allows to reveal the historical, social and ideological context in which there has been a becoming of daseinsanalysis in Swiss in the early postwar period. The central theme of existentials in this context sounds differently than in philosophical one, because the concrete suffering human being appears now as a subject of research in his corporeal being, feeling guilty, remorse, being ashamed, experiencing anxiety, fear of death, etc. Therefore, the concept of “Dasein” itself requires a closer look. The last part of the Condrau’s work is devoted to the phenomenological method as the main instrument of daseinsanalysis, namely as the analytic-psychotherapeutic instrument. Daseinsanalysis considers itself and its development in relation to classical psychoanalysis, and Condrau’s thinking in this sense is drawn into permanent dialogue with Freudian thought. There is no other psychotherapeutic tradition in the history of classical daseinsanalysis – it is of fundamental importance for the understanding of what daseinsanalysis is. It is, above all, psychoanalysis, reinterpreted in the key of Heidegger’s ontology and received in this connection a new specific and fairly hermetic fulfilment, if we talk about location of daseinsanalysis in the psychotherapeutic space in general. And this analytical fulfilment has almost complete taken over from the Heidegger’s ontology the language for its establishment, reflection and self-reflection of its subject. In this regard some key psychoanalytic concepts are questioned and reviewed, for example, the concept of transfer, that certainly is a challenge not only for psychoanalysis but also for the whole contemporary psychotherapy.

428-439

Authors: Konstantin Gemenetzis, Irina Kozakova

The report presents an overview of the 9TH International Forum of Daseinsanalysis that was held on September 24-26/2015, at the central building of the University of Athens, organized by the International Federation of Daseinsanalysis (IFDA) and the Hellenic Society of Daseinsanalysis (HSDA). The IFDA forums take place every three years, with representatives from all the daseinsanalytic societies and working individual daseinsanalysts from all around the world. The report sketches the central idea of the event, points out the organizational background of the meeting, and shows the structure of the conference schedule.

454-463

Authors: Irina Kazakova

The review discusses the main points of the book. The most important reflections of the author concerning the clinical and psychological picture of schizophrenia and the mode of human existence, which is typical schizophrenic patient and are emphasized. Based on consideration of case studies and analysis of the main approaches to the description and study of schizophrenia Wyrsch unfolds in details the phenomenology of schizophrenia in its various currents. The central focus of the review is on the concepts of a schizophrenic person and schizophrenic basic mood, which from the point of the author’s view, define the specificity of the essential mode of schizophrenic Dasein.

10-15

Authors: Witold Płotka

There is no abstract

54-69

Authors: Mihály Vajda

Abstract In this paper the author reflects on the phenomenological motives in his departure from the Marxism of Georg Lukács in the Hungary of the late 1960s and early 1970s. He first encountered phenomenology at the university during the classes of Ágnes Heller, another future dissident of Marxism, which led him to study the Logical Investigations when he became a research assistant at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1961. Following in the footsteps of other readers of Husserl’s opus magnum, the author was confronted by Husserl’s manifest Platonism in the first and equally manifest psychologism in the second volume of the same work. This apparent contradiction between atemporal objectivities and their life-world origins led him to the phenomenology of Max Scheler, to whom the author dedicated the fourth chapter of his second monograph on Husserl published in 1969. The thinker who radically overcame Husserl was, for the author, Martin Heidegger. Modern scholarship has meanwhile convinced him of the fundamental differences between these two phenomenologists, but one lesson remains: Phenomenology is characterized by evidence that originates from seeing, rather than mere words and argumentations. Key words Marxism, phenomenology, Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Hungarian reception of phenomenology, Lukács.

90-114

Authors: Wing-Keung Chik

Abstract Being one of the spokespersons of the civic manifestos Charta 77, Czech Philosopher Jan Patočka (1907– 1977) passed away after repeating interrogation. For human dignity, Patočka stands himself in truth in front of violence. What is the origin of responsibility which resists injustice? What is the significance of living in truth for being confronted with violence? In the text of Charta 77 «The Obligation to Resist Injustice» (1977), Patočka points out that morality of humanity is the ground of obligation. Then, what is the relationship between humanity and moral obligation? Regarding to the question above, this paper attempts to investigate the relationship of responsibility and living in truth, and demonstrates that there is an ontological responsibility of insistence implicated in living in truth, through illustrating the structure of manifestation of problematization. Socratic care of soul is the practice of familiarizing citizens with problematization through reflective dialogue as pluralization of otherness (doxai) of others. Otherness unveiled is the beginning of thinking and of the formation of polis. At last, with the analysis of worldliness of world as manifestation of plurality, the article will show that the responsibility of living in truth, as responding to plurality of world and realizes problematization which reforms community as polis with liberation and unity, is philosophical-political revolutionary. Key words Care of the soul, problematization, responsibility, Arendt, otherness, dialogue, thinking, polis, pluralization.

133-149

Authors: Irene Breuer

Abstract In his book Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik, László Tengelyi has enquired into the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book, he thematized a real necessity of a non-apriori kind at Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called «a necessity of the fact». His research settled the basis for the present enquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental features involved therein at Aristotle and Husserl, insofar as facticity is concerned. I intend to show that although both authors share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, they differ as to their necessity: Aristotle attributes a contingent necessity to the factual being i.e. to reality, a necessity characterized by its being temporarily conditioned by actuality and which can therefore be defined as the «conditional necessity of a fact». As to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology must, upon the basis of the eidetic method, determine the possibilities out of which the ego constitutes the factual world. He states the necessity of the fact as an eidetic necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws. Later on, I’ll try to show how enquiries into a «metaphysics in new sense» lead to a revision of the meaning of «fact» and to an inversion of the order of foundation as well: The original givenness of the world, the primal I, intersubjectivity and historicity as primal and absolute facts carry the eidetic necessities. Accidental causes, on the other hand, account not only for the contingency of the real but, at Husserl, for the ego’s «essential openness» and its core of primal contingency. In this context, I’ll argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us — an event as Ereignis. Key words Aristotle, Husserl, facticity, accidental, necessity, contingency, absolute, event.

171-182

Authors: Petr Urban

Abstract Despite the emphasis on the relational and interpersonal domain found in the phenomenological tradition, a genuinely relational phenomenological ethics is still a desideratum. The aim of this paper is to call attention to care ethics as an already developed relational moral theory built on the idea of the centrality of the relational domain and to suggest a reason why phenomenologists and care ethicists should care more about each other. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, we focus on the phenomenological views of the lived body, intersubjectivity and mutual incorporation. Second, we discuss the current applications of the phenomenological insights in the so-called enactive approach to social cognition and pose the question of its ethical implications. The final section introduces the ethics of care as a current relational moral theory and highlights some points of commonality between care ethics and phenomenology. The paper concludes that the dynamics of care and mutual concern central to the ethics of care might be well analysed and further developed in terms of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity. Care ethics, on the other hand, might provide a well-elaborated framework for developing a phenomenological ethics ascribing a central place to the relational and interpersonal dimension of moral phenomena. Key words Phenomenology, care ethics, phenomenological ethics, enactivism, the lived body, intersubjectivity, relationality.

194-213

Authors: Vedran Grahovac

Abstract In this text I suggest the possibility of the strategic-philosophical closeness between Husserl and Kracauer, by closely reading Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation and Kracauer’s essay «The Mass Ornament». Although the both thinkers come from the traditionally different and often mutually opposing philosophical schools, neither of them simply dismisses or crosses out the position they criticize. To the contrary, I propose that both thinkers exaggerate the seeming self-evidentiality of the phenomenon they analyze. In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl rearticulates the whole-part relation as it is conceived within the formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. The phenomenological analysis, which is conducted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is «measured» by the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled. In the second part of my essay I pay attention to Kracauer’s suggestion that the vitality of the mass ornament is reflected in the contextual insignificance of its parts. Kracauer addresses the problem of mass depersonalization through the close and sarcastic inspection of the role of abstract rationality in the capitalist mode of production. This close inspection adopts the strategy of exaggeration, where the critical distance must not be considered beyond its ability to disclose the self- obscuring apparatus of the mass performances and spectacles. This disclosure, as Kracuaer suggests, must therapeutically lead through the center of the mass ornament, and not away from it. Key words Husserl, Kracauer, wholes and parts, Logical Investigations, phenomenology, Critical Theory, phenomenological analysis.

232-246

Authors: Jan Josl

Abstract In this essay I consider the end-of-art thesis in its metaphysical and empirical versions. I show that both use the correspondence theory of truth as the basis for their conception of the history of art. As a counterpart to these theories I have chosen Patočka’s conception of the history of art. His theory is based also on the relationship between art and truth, but he conceives truth in the phenomenological sense of manifestation. In the rest of the essay I seek to show the consequences Patočka’s conception has for the history of art. In the first part, I set out to show Patocka’s critique of Hegel’s aesthetics as a system based on the correspondence theory of truth. In particular, I endeavour to explain his critique of some intrinsic problems of Hegel’s aesthetics, the general failure of Hegel’s system to achieve its goal, and, lastly, Hegel’s giving up on the meaning of the art in the present. I also seek to show that Danto’s version runs into the same problems and conclusions as Hegel’s. In the second part I discuss Patočka’s analysis of modern art and the aesthetic attitude, where he finds a hidden affinity between art and aletheia, which Hegel overlooked. The last part of the essay focuses on the consequences that the conception of the truth of art as aletheia have for the history of art. I conclude that art in such a conception represents an independent field of the manifestation of being in history beside philosophy. Moreover, modern and contemporary art do not mean the end of art; rather, they have their place in art history based on aletheia, since they are more focused on the manifestation itself than on what is manifested. Unlike Hegel and Danto, therefore, Patočka retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. His conception of the history of art, summed up under the idea of aletheia, has greater explanatory potential than Hegel’s and Danto’s conceptions, and it retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. Key words Phenomenology, aesthetics, Jan Patočka, truth, Hegel, Danto, history of art.

258-271

Authors: MORITZ GEIGER, Tr. by Olesya Bessmel'tseva

Abstract The following fragment represents the aesthetical researches of the German philosopher Moritz Geiger acted in the first half of the 20th century, whose works are considered to have initiated the phenomenological approach in the aesthetic domain. Being a fellow by many bright personalities, the representatives of the psychological aesthetic (Wundt, Lipps), Geiger favours on the one hand the psychological approach for it leads out of the speculative philosophism into empirical experience. On the other hand Geiger gets close with phenomenology and Husserl and belongs since 1907 to the Munich school of phenomenology. Geiger sees in the phenomenological approach an opportunity to shift the focus from the feeling subject to the aesthetic object. He insists on the permissibility and rather necessity of speaking about the objective aesthetic characteristics of an artwork. They are the aesthetic values, which mark an object of aesthetic enjoyment. So in the fragment below Geiger focuses first on the phenomenological nature of the aesthetic enjoyment. In the attached fragment Geiger proceeds from the Kantian argumentation about the particularities of aesthetic enjoyment and analyses the aesthetic enjoyment in its relation to the interest and the will of an individual as an enjoying subject. The preface introduces the general structure of the article, its stepwise concretizing of the problem domain beginning with the outline of the phenomenological bounds of pleasure in general and moving toward the narrow analysis of the aesthetic enjoyment in particular and its relation to the axiology and the psychological phenomenology. Thus the main peculiarities of Geiger’s phenomenological method could be put to the scrutiny of his analysis of the chosen distinct domain as well as his tendency to avoid any schematism and any simplification within the domain. That makes Geiger’s language such an subtle and sensitive instrument for it should be able to articulate the slightest nuances of pleasure types. Key words Phenomenological aesthetic, psychologism, aesthetic enjoyment, will, interests, Kant, Schopenhauer.

281-298

Authors: MARC RICHIR, Tr. by Roman Sokolov

Abstract This publication is a translation into Russian of Marc Richir’s article Phenomenology of the poetic element, accompanied by a preface of translator. In his article Richir reveals «poetic element» of phenomenal experience as its fundamental condition, relying on it as a tradition and techniques of transcendental phenomenology and the empirical study of psychoanalysis. Richir gives concrete empirical content borrowed from Husserl’s concept of perceptual fantasies, referring to the theory of D.V. Winnicott’s «transitional object», and then extrapolates the results to the experience of creation and perception of the «poetic» work (knowing the latest in a broad, Aristotelian sense). Perceptual imagination of Richir’s phenomenology should be separated from «pure fantasy»: the latter is a «minimum level of conceptual self-image». It has been in existence as «the rudiments of sense», which take place in a passive synthesis of «extra-linguistic peace schematism». Pure fantasy becomes perceptive fantasy just when there is inversion (revirement) «germ of meaning» in the «sense bud», thanks to some fancy a change of perspective. This process involves the formation of a special «field of play» (Winnicott), or transcendental interfact space, which establishes a primary (preintentional) type of relationship between the two egos: the baby and mother, spectator and actor. In this respect, perceptual «sees» in fantasy not an object, and the other perceptive imagination in the fantasy that belongs to another. This formed the primary locus of communication: interfact transcendental space that is being «played intentionally», then it becomes a space of intersubjectivity. Dating back to some fancy-affective sphere, perceptive fantasy (or «poetic element») has a «phenomenological redundancy» in comparison with the logical concept. Therefore, one can speak about a special type of knowledge of reality beyond its objectivist and logical explication. Key words Transcendental phenomenology, perceptive fantasy, poetic element interfact transcendental, transitional field transcendental bosom, the phenomenon of language, formless, fantasy-affectation, the experience of the sublime.

9

Authors: Alexander Schnell

This is the foreword to the issue as a whole

25-53

Authors: Dominique Pradelle

Abstract This study focuses on the essential difference between Kant's and Husserl's transcendental Idealism. In fact, Husserl describes in the «Cartesian Meditations» his own ontological thesis as a «transcendental idealism», in which all sorts of entities have to be constituted by an activity of the transcendental subjectivity, so that we have to regard pure consciousness as the ontological origin of all entities in the world. But this study is interested in the two opposite significations of the kantian copernican inversion. On the one hand, the copernican inversion has the same sense as the phenomenological reduction, which implies that Husserl can't agree with Kant's presupposition of absolute things in themselves; on the second hand, it involves a relativistic and anthropologistic orientation, so that the aprioristic structures of given objects are founded on the universal structures of finite subjectivity, on pure forms and faculties of human consciousness. At the opposite, Husserl enounces a methodological prescription for any phenomenological elucidation: it is not allowed to presuppose in phenomenology any given faculty or given nature of transcendental subjectivity. This prescription has important consequences on which this study focuses. First the ontological difference between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus, infinite and finite type of intuition, doesn't have any validity: the difference between factual and rational truths only depends on the essence of the truth itself, and doesn't have its foundation on the ontological difference between creative and receptive sort of intuition. Secondly, this first thesis admits an immediate application on the level of subjective constitution of objects: the modality in which an object appears to the subjectivity doesn't depend on the universal structure of finite subject, but is exclusively founded on the essence of the object itself, so that it is impossible to consider the aprioristic constitutive structure as a merely subjective structure. Thirdly, in this transcendental phenomenology everything has to be constituted by subjectivity: the aprioristic character of the pure forms of sensibility is not founded on the structure of finite subjectivity, but rather on the essential connection between sensual material and form; so that it is not allowed to presuppose any facticity of time and space; the pure forms of sensibility have to be constituted by a special type of synthesis that we have to elucidate in opposition to other types of higher levels. The profound signification of Husserl's anticopernican inversion is that the field of transcendental phenomenology consists of the essential form of an eidos ego, which is «more objective than any objectivity», as Levinas said; and that transcendental phenomenology is completely dominated by the principium reddendae rationis. Key words Copernican inversion, constitution, intuition, Kant, phenomenology, subjectivity, transcendental idealism.

63-70

Authors: Georgy Chernavin

Radically different strategies of interacting with sound common sense, found within three big philosophical discourses of the 20th century (analytic philosophy, poststructuralism, phenomenology), led nearly to the impossibility of communication between those discourses. The judgement by Deleuze concerning Kant's critical philosophy and Husserl's transcendental philosophy seems to be an example of the failed philosophical dialogue, this time between post-structuralism and (classical as well as modern) transcendentalism. Deleuze sees in transcendental philosophy the dominance of the twofold instance of the common sense; the two forms are the sensus communis (which dominated already in Kant) and the bona mens (which crystallized in the Husserlian Urdoxa). Even if one could agree that the poststructuralist reading of transcendental philosophy is likely sometimes too rash, it is still helpful. One can then see that at the center of the research-field of transcendental phenomenology a real nodal point of paradoxes remains: first of all, the so-called «paradox of human subjectivity» — the relation between the empirical and the transcendental, which seems to be paradoxical for sound human understanding. One could contrast here the goal of transcendental research, which consists in sense-building and sense-enrichment, with the poststructuralist art of the forming, inventing and production of concepts. The passion for paradoxes, the provocation of the sound human understanding as a motor of thinking (characteristic of poststructuralism) is still bound to doxa and to the common sense, although it tries to «turn it inside out». Transcendental philosophy tries rather to take a «step back» from the solidification of common sense in order to observe the sense-building in statu nascendi. Key words Transcendental philosophy, poststructuralism, common sense, doxa, paradox, Husserl, Deleuze.

87-98

Authors: Guillermo Ferrer

Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations of a subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness. To this end, a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affects the inner sense is necessary. Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appear to me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its succession on the space, thus inasmuch as I am conscious, at least implicitly, of my activity of the drawing. Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering, I will hypothesize the idea that a phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant's theory of self-affection; however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Self shall be set. Because of these limits, the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes» of my life-history, namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past. Also, in this respect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself. From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant's theory in this way: by reflection on my past, the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memory to some extent with substitutes. In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediation of phantasy and imagination. Key words Self-affection, reflection, past I, Self, irrevocability, substitutes, phantasy.

121-138

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract The author of the article framed the question of the possible relevance of the treatment of the Schelling's philosophy in the context of a phenomenological one. Thereby, he points its problematic character, referencing Husserl's treatment of German idealism after Kant (including the thought of Schelling) as the romantic idealism. At the same time, he also states the influence of Schelling on the few phenomenologists who made their careers after Husserl. The article's author reviews the concept of the «being outside-itself» or «ecstasy» in Schelling and Heidegger (as one of the phenomenologists) for the further concretization of the theme. The ecstasy in Schelling is the new name for the idealistic intellectual intuition, by which a singular subject loses its own position as subject and thereby gets to the position of the absolute subject. The absolute subject is one which cannot be an object already. Schelling identifies the ecstasy understood in this way with the wondering as philosophical initiation in Ancient Greece. Such ecstasy leads to unknowing knowledge in Schelling's words. The concept of being outside-itself means the structural element of being of human Dasein, i.e. of temporality in Heidegger. This philosopher thinks that a human being is always already outside itself ontologically, before any intuition both sensual and intellectual. The human subject is not closed in on itself, for then it has to transcend from its immanence to the outside. It is always outside itself, it is ecstatic. In its ecstasies, it is always in the world, instead of being inside the world and other people. Heidegger bases his critique of the traditional metaphysics of the subject on such understanding of the ontological structure of Dasein, i.e. of the true «subject». In conclusion, the article's author states that the approaches to the problem of being outside-itself of both mentioned philosophers are in principle, quite different. Schelling tries to rehabilitate the subjectivity by the reduction of the singular subject to the absolute one. On the contrary, the finitude of human Dasein is the necessary condition of its being in Heidegger. The ecstasy is interiorization in Schelling, but it is exteriorization, which has been always already realized, in Heidegger. However, the author of the article also pinpoints a certain isomorphism of the treatments of ecstasy in both thinkers. In the different ways they attempt to overcome the crisis of the understanding of the subject as closed in itself, create the conditions of this isomorphism. Key words Being outside-itself, ecstasy, intellectual intuition, wondering, Dasein, temporality, existence, metaphysics, German idealism, phenomenology.

154-185

Authors: Yusuke Ikeda

In this paper I outline main theses of Fink's phenomenological interpretation of Kantian transcendental philosophy. My aim is to clarify how and to what extent Kant's philosophy determines Fink's «phenomenology of enworlding [Verweltlichung]». First, I show the very starting point and original motivations of Fink's interpretation of Kant. I proceed by examining the contexts in which Fink refers to Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason and showing that in these contexts Fink is dealing with a specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant's cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant's profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink's criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant's «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure reason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant's account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink's phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink's phenomenological interpretations of Kant's transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger's (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant's philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink's cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel's idea of dialectic, as on Kant's (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink's phenomenology). Key words World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.

203-217

Authors: Simona Bertolini

Abstract Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel's conception of the absolute had a decisive role in the genesis and development of Eugen Fink's philosophy. While Husserl and Heidegger showed Fink two different and fruitful ways to interpret phenomenology, Hegel suggested and offered him the conceptual means with which to combine these theoretical models and elaborate a third phenomenological paradigm, based on the concept of world. This is not only valid for Fink's early interpretation of Husserl's thought, but also (and especially) for the version of phenomenology that Husserl's last research assistant developed after World War II and the death of the old professor. Two goals characterize this second phase of Fink's philosophy: on the one hand, the purpose to pose the fundamental question of Being anew, without mistaking it for the «ontic» question referred to beings and things (in accord with Heidegger's indications and with the concept of «ontological difference»); on the other hand, the purpose to combine ontology, so interpreted, with genetic phenomenology and its rigorous method. The aim of the paper is to highlight how and to what extent the realization of this philosophical project is based on the interpretation of both Hegel's idealism and of the experience of consciousness Hegel describes in Phenomenology of Spirit. Assuming that Fink is looking for an ontological ground coinciding with the genesis of the structure of the world (in accord with the concept of phenomenological reduction), Hegel appears as the Western philosopher whose system of thought offers a conceptual model in accordance with such a requirement. Key words World, being, phenomenology, metaphysics, self-consciousness, ontological experience, phenomena.

239-283

Authors: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling; Andrei Patkul (tr.)

Abstract This publication is the translation of the first fragment of F. W. J Schelling's Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism accompanied by the analytical translator's preface. In his treatise, Schelling assesses the history of modern philosophy. Namely, he treats it as history of experiments, the goal of which was in the search for the primary fact in the world. In Schelling's opinion, this fact is in the growing over-weight of the subjective over the objective. Only his philosophy of nature was able to find this fact. However, it is not genuine fact but only pure fact, because it does not content in itself any ground for the over-weighting of the subjective over the objective. For resolve this problem, Schelling starts to use the concepts formed by Ancient philosophers, namely by Pythagoras and Plato. The concepts of the limitless and the limit are belonging to the series of the mentioned concepts. Accordantly, Schelling associates the notion of the objective with the one of the limitless being and the notion of the subjective with the one of the limit or limiting instance. His inquiry into the correlation between the limitless being and the limit, i.e. between the objective and the subjective leads him to the declaration of the existence of the free efficient cause, which determinates their interplay and the rise of that-what-should-be from that-what-should-not-be. Since the limitless is the objective and the limit is the subjective in accordance with Schelling, such efficient cause is also the cause of the progressive over-weighting of the subjective over the objective as well. It can explain the fact, which the Schelling's philosophy of nature has only found but not explained. The in his preface, the translator puts the question of the possibility as well as of a relevance of the Schelling's late philosophy to the phenomenological thought. In this context, he emphasizes few moments, by which the later Schelling' philosophy could be of interests for phenomenologists, namely the following ones: the concept of philosophical empiricism itself, the Schelling's division between the pure fact and the genuine fact, his treatment of history of philosophy as history of experiments. Moreover, he speaks about main difficulties connected with the translation of Schelling's text into Russian and gives a German-Russian glossary for utility of Russian readers. The translator gives also the commentaries by Arthur Drews, who reedited the Schelling's treatise in 1902, in their Russian translation. Key words Philosophical empiricism, genuine fact, over-weight of the subjective over the objective, subjection, the limitless, limit, substance, cause, German idealism.

323-331

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract The content of the presentations, which were delivered on the 46th Annual Husserl Circle Meeting in Helsinki (Finland) from June 9th to June 12th, 2015 is presented briefly in the review. The speakers of the meeting touched the themes, which are of very importance as well for today's reception of Husserl's philosophy as for the stay of the problematic field of Post-Husserlian phenomenology. The problems of intentionality, of active and passive syntheses, of correlation of logic and semiotics, of empathy and intersubjectivity, of correlation of intentional acts and intentional objects belong to the main subjects, which were treated in the presentations. The psychological applications of the phenomenological method, which were inquiered by several speakers during the meeting, could be also of very interest. Key words Husserl, Husserl Circle, intentionality, type, passive syntheses, intersubjectivity, empathy, typification, phenomenological ontology.