Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

273–296

Authors: ANDREI PATKUL

The goal of the article is, one the one hand, to show the concrete correlation between the phenomenological conception of the world in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and its conception in the critical philosophy of Kant, insofar such philosophy could be treated as one of the significant predecessors of Heidegger’s understanding of the world. On the other hand, this explication allows us to analyze the limits and the borders of Heidegger’s phenomenological conception of the world. In order to achieve such goal, the following tasks were undertaken by me: (1) the reconstruction of the phenomenological conception of the world in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology at two levels (i.e. (a) the world as wholeness of involvement and (b) the world as the direction of the transcendence)); (2) the reconstruction of Kant’s cosmological concept of the world made from the perspective of the interpretation of this concept given by Heidegger; (3) detection of the continuity and divergence between Kant’s cosmological concept of the world and its phenomenological conception posed by Heidegger in light of Kant’s concept of the transcendental ideal. As result, I would like to pose and defend the following theses. (1) Heidegger primarily treats the world as a priori condition of the possibility of the wholeness of involvement, and yet, more fundamentally it is treated as the direction for the transcendence of human Dasein. Thus, being understood as such direction, it represents universal horizon of the existent possibilities. (2) Kant characterizes the world as an idea of reason, namely, as the totality of appearances, being formed on the bases of the universal hypothetic synthesis of the unconditional one. Herewith, Kant’s cosmological concept of the world ought to be distinguished from his concept of the moral world. (3) Both Kant and Heidegger understand the world as the totality a priori, which in every case differently presupposes the presence of the human being. (4) The concept of the world as the direction of the transcendence posed by Heidegger has the formal functions similar to those, which are ascribed by Kant to the concept of the sum-total of all possibilities, consequently, not to the world, as the totality of appearances, but to the totality of all objects of thought altogether (to the transcendental ideal). Thereupon, Heidegger believes that whole definition of the Kant’s cosmological concept of the world can be achieved only from the perspective of the transcendental ideal. (5) Heidegger tries to overcome the limitation of Kant’s theory of the world as present being by understanding it as the condition for possibility of that-which-is as ready-at-hand. For Heidegger it is also a way to manifest the ontological foundation common both for Kant’s cosmological and moral concepts of the world.

312–336

Authors: SVETLANA KONACHEVA

The paper is devoted to the dialogue between Orthodox theology of the latter half of the 20th century and Heidegger’s philosophy. We focus on the interpretation of the apophasis in the works of Vladimir Lossky. Our research tasks are not so much the description of the direct influence of Heidegger’s philosophy on the Lossky’s theological reflections, but, rather, a demonstration of the parallels between Heidegger’s existential and historical thinking and Lossky’s negative theology. In the first part we highlight the points common to early Heidegger’s interpretation of the mystical theory of cognition and Lossky’s understanding of the mystical theology of the Eastern Church: the correlation between theology and mystical experiencing, overcoming the conceptual frameworks, the knowledge of God as a transformative practice, which is aimed at the radical unity with God. There are also common features in both in Heidegger’s and Lossky’s critical interpretations of the identity of the concepts of God and being in Meister Eckhart’s mystical theology. Lossky opposes Eckhart’s God as Esse absconditum with the apophaticism of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite who has thought out God beyond being. Heidegger insists on the theological differentiation distinguishing between God and being. We also compare the concept of detachment given in the works of Eckhart, Lossky and later Heidegger. Lossky’s explanation of the human personality is focused on irreducibility of a person to nature; he referred to the ecstatic character of existence of Dasein, but his anthropology is constituted on doctrine of a human being seen as the image and likeness of God. Further development of Orthodox apophaticism (Chr. Yannaras, D. B. Hart and J. P. Manoussakis) demonstrates a critical attitude towards Heidegger’s philosophy. Such attitude originates in their attempts to develop the ontology of personal being. We argue that Orthodox thinkers correlate with Heidegger in their search for a renewal of theological method, for the identical-differential mode of thinking moving from subject-object speculation to the ecstatic transformations of subject. The difference is in the emphasis on the personal character of the mystical ecstasy, founded on the trinitarian provisions inherent to the Eastern Church.

365–390

Authors: ANDREI LAURUKHIN

The article analyzes the nature of the presence of the political aspect in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Reconsidering the critique, expressed in Friedrich Fellmann’s, Hannah Arendt’s and Jürgen Habermas’ works, an author detects the strengths and weaknesses of such critique, as well as reveals the conceptual foundations and content of the political dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology. Herewith, the focus is made on the theory of intersubjectivity and theory of lifeworld, which constitute the conceptual core of Husserl’s phenomenological research on social, ethical and political issues. The reconsideration of Fellmann’s critique is based on considering the nature of the presence of the political dimension in Husserl’s intellectual and biographical legacy. Analyzing Arendt’s critique, an author argues that there are two theories of intersubjectivity existing in Husserl’s phenomenology: a theory of constitution of the alter ego in the “primordial world” through “analogizing transfer” and a theory based on the doctrine of “the primary Self”, mutual constitution and on the analyses of passive genesis. The problematization of Habermas’ critique is based on rethinking given the place of practical philosophy in Husserl’s phenomenology and its importance, as well as on defining the heuristic potential the concept of the lifeworld has for constructing the social and political theory. Relying on the philosophy of the state, reconstructed by Karl Schuhmann adapted from Husserl’s legacy, an author explicates the key prerequisites, ideas and terms, constitutive for the political dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology and essential for its understanding in historic-philosophical and modern contexts. The results of the analysis contribute to more adequate understanding of the nature of the political problematic in Huserl’s phenomenology.

414–429

Authors: ANNA YAMPOLSKAYA

In this paper I undertook a study of Henri Maldiney’s problematization of the way which we aesthetically experience the world in. The notion of aisthesis unites the aesthetic, in its etymological meaning, as related to the sensory perception, and the aesthetic, as related to the theory of art. According to Maldiney, aisthesis, or sensing, cannot be described in Kantian terms of experience as being structured by intelligence; being pre-reflective and ante-predicative, sensing should be classified as épreuve, passive experience that puts one to the test. Sensing is not just the sensory perception: it is holistic and gives the access to the world as a whole; in sensing one senses not the qualities of individual objects but, rather, the world which is not got crystallized in objects yet. Sensing is also a basic level of communicative human experience: through sensing one obtains an access to the world as being shared with others. Sensing is aesthetically important inasmuch as it possesses its own rhythm. I have carried out the analysis of two metaphysical notions, i.e. transpassibility and transpossibility, introduced by Maldiney in order to overcome the classical dichotomies of passibility/impassibility and possibility/impossibility accordingly. Aesthetically, rhythm as opposed to schema, is transpossible; it also constitutes the work of art in a dynamic unity. The hypothesis I come to can be formulated as follows: there is a special synthetic function of rhythm that can be opposed to the synthetic function of intentionality. This synthetic function cannot be normalized and, thus, it paves a way to de-transcendentalized and de-normalized phenomenology. In the conclusion I contemplate the experience of depression as described by Matthew Ratcliffe. Ratcliffe deals with a methodological challenge of how to apply transcendental notions to the empirical. I argue that the language of transpassible and transpossible can be used as a replacement for the Husserian language of transcendental constitution.

452–471

Authors: PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

Unlike most other philosophical systems of India, Buddhism, though it gives a central place to “consciousness” in its philosophical enquiry, does not raise its status to a transcendental metaphysical level. Buddhism, in this way, has a special affinity with the phenomenological approach. The present paper focuses on the points of a contact between phenomenology and mindfulness meditation, the Buddhist spiritual practice. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part gives an account of the four kinds of mindfulness meditation based on the Buddha’s sermons on mindfulness. Then it focuses on their core features, namely, “objectivity”, “impermanence and other essential features” and “dynamic, yet passive awareness”. These features bring the two approaches close to each other. The second part brings out similarities and differences between the two approaches. The phenomenological approach, like the approach of mindfulness meditation regards consciousness as being of the intentional and propositional nature. It also emphasizes immanent to consciousness and brackets transcendent to it. Both approaches exhibit a scientific temperament and both tend to be presupposition-less. In spite of these close similarities, there are glaring differences between these two approaches. The phenomenological inquiry is aimed at intellectuality, whereas that of the Buddhist approach is spiritual. Phenomenology attributes reality to essences, whereas there is a tendency to deny ontological status to essences in Buddhism. Husserl’s acceptance of transcendental or pure ego contrasts with the no-self theory of Buddhism. Intentionality attributed to consciousness is also alien to all forms of Buddhism. The third part of the paper asserts the similarities and differences between the two approaches open to various possible forms of phenomenological practice. Furthermore, the paper suggests that different models of phenomenology are possible within Buddhism.

475–491

Authors: BRIGITTE FLICKINGER

For almost two millennia the relationship between a physician and a patient, with regard to medical treatment, was settled according to the paternalistic moral principles laid down in the Hippocratic oath and later, in a modernized diction, in the Declaration of Geneva. With social und scientific changes occurring over the recent decades this structure lost its ethical balance and, thus, requires an amendment. Medicine is split into a curative part and a new field of scientific biomedicine, researched in laboratories independently from the relationship between a physician and a patient. While doctors have been experiencing increasing economic and legal restrictions, actual and potential patients have been tending to make use of the new medical opportunities, claiming their right to autonomous decisions. With advances made in biomedicine, the concept of health became broader and now it includes all sorts of the desired treatment (Wunschmedizin) and projective diagnosis. Today not only patients seek medical assistance, but also clients who, on the basis of their own right for autonomy, claim to have their bodily wishes fulfilled by medical practitioners. The article examines the ethical implications of these changes, with special attention paid to the concept of autonomy. Autonomy, in Kant’s enlightened deontological ethics, is the basis of such universal moral principles as the human dignity and the social responsibility. However, as can be shown, for contemporary biomedical ethics the concept of autonomy is based on libertarianism and utilitarianism. Moreover, the newly revised Declaration of Geneva neither is able to solve the moral dilemma physicians have to face choosing between professional duty and own conscience, nor can it compensate for the lack of responsibility of both sides in the relationship between a physician and a patient. Mutual respect can help to recreate a full-fledged notion of autonomy that would regain its moral value.

509–530

Authors: MAURO FOSCO BERTOLA

As Susan Sontag highlights in her seminal monograph “Illness as metaphor” published in 1978, the appropriation of illness for constructing powerful metaphors which have a great impact on broad social, political or cultural issues became a widespread phenomenon both in everyday life and in artistic discourse. For various arts illness turns into an important meaning-making metaphor for the social and cultural phenomena. In my article I intend to explore the use of such kind of metaphor in the context of Franz Kafka’s short story Country Doctor („Ein Landarzt”). A condition of a man who is ill is similar to the condition described by Freud in terms such as “oblivion”, “suppression”, “negation” etc. This text is very important for the psychoanalytical interpretation of Kafka’s legacy because one can see a definite parallel between a wound of a young man and his sexual desire for Roza. In my article I also analyse Hans Werner Henze’s homonymous radio opera, composed in 1951, which is based on Kafka’s text. Thanks to the special expressive instrumental medium, Henze creates an atmosphere of unreality and fuzziness of the Kafka’s short story. Adopting Walter Benjamin’s interpretation of Kafka’s œuvre qua a reflection on the “illness of tradition” („Erkrankung der Tradition”) in relation to the modern situation, I point out that Kafka and Henze share common understanding of modernity as well as show how Henze re articulates this idea of modernity as “illness of tradition” both in his poetic as well as in his compositional strategies after World War II.

542–545

Authors: VASILY SESEMANN (Prepared by Dalius Jonkus)

The text of The Problem of Spiritual Beauty belongs to Sesemann’s manuscript collection, located at the Vilnius University (F122-85). The text was written by Sesemann during the time of his imprisonment in the Gulag labor camp in Taishet (Irkutsk region). Being in the camp, Sesemann used to teach western philosophy and aesthetics to other prisoners. Sesemann devotes the manuscript of The Problem of Spiritual Beauty to reflection on the circumstances which make the aesthetic contemplation of the moral qualities possible. According to Sesemann, spiritual beauty is possible not only in the ethical field, but it also manifests itself in intellectual constructions. Ethical actions and products of human thinking are not the same, but both of them can be of the aesthetic value. All of them require the conditions for sensual presentation and realization in the specific situations. Ideas must be sensually expressed in order to acquire aesthetic value. Sesemann emphasizes two following points with respect to the aesthetics of ethical behavior. First of all, the reference is made not to general judgments about beauty, but to individual experiencing of a particular situation. Secondly, aesthetic experiencing is provoked by the actions, which astonish by their spontaneity, clarity and timeliness in a concrete situation.

554–562

Authors: SERGEY TROITSKIY, NIKITA KRECHKO

The review of the International Scientific Conference “Phenomenology of Oil”, held at the Institute of Philosophy of the St Petersburg State University on May 17-18, reflects the structure of the event, presents the participants of the conference, includes the main abstracts of the reports. The conference was devoted to the issues related to the ontological, socio-cultural, economic role oil plays in the modern world order. The program was conveniently divided into three thematically related and logically arranged components: theoretical, demonstration, interactive. The first and main one involved delivering of reports and organized discussions. The composition of speakers was distinguished by diversity of nations (Italy, Germany, Poland) and professions (philosophy, literature, art). Besides the main (scientific) part, a film seminar, an exhibition of Vitaly Kasatkin’s paintings in oil and oil products (the demonstration part), the conference “Phenomenology of Oil” also included a master class of painting in oil, which was of great interest. Such workshop made it possible to feel the potential hidden in the very object of two-day intellectual and artistic exploration. As a result, a number of oil-related phenomena, that can not be described and analyzed through classical approaches and generally accepted terminology have been detected, which suggests the need for developing the research in the domain of the oil philosophy.

576–585

Authors: ANNA YAMPOLSKAYA

Frangeskou’s point of departure in his juxtaposition of Levinas and Kant is the problem of transcendental schematism but not the tension between autonomy and heteronomy as it is common for most of the published literature. Thus, the middle ground between Levinas and Kant is occupied by Heidegger, but also by Franz Rosenzweig with his “biblical” version of ecstatic temporality. Levinassian diachrony is described by Frangeskou as a new form of ecstatic temporality, different from the interpretations given by Heidegger and Rosenzweig. It is analogous to transcendental schematism of reason. We briefly compare Frangeskou’s interpretation with Marc Richir’s notion of transcendental schematism which also goes back to Levinassian diachronic temporality. Richir’s schematism functions as a medium joining together heterogenous elements such as the layer of “phenomenological”, i.e., the unstable and flickering sense, and the layer of “symbolic”, i.e., the organised and stabilised sense. In a similar way, for Frangeskou, diachronic temporality provides a synthesis (though, not a synchronisation) of God, the world and a man.

597–607

Authors: MAXIM MIROSHNICHENKO

This review is an attempt to read the main ideas of Catherine Malabou’s Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality, with a particular emphasis made upon the problem of the modifiability of the transcendental one and the rejection of the a priori dimension of subjectivity within scientific and philosophical thought of a materialist orientation. Malabou’s thesis of the epigenesis of pure reason evinces the dynamical dimension of the transcendental one, integrating structural and evolutionary conceptions of reason. Epigenesis secures the stability of the phenomenal world and provides the possibility of a contingent metamorphosis of reason, thereby establishing the economy of the transcendental contingency. Largely, Malabou’s work has many affinities with the recent phenomenological thought, although it makes just a few explicit references to phenomenological philosophers as such

13-31

Authors: Rosemary R. P. Lerner

Unlike Kant’s practical philosophy and aesthetics that still enjoy a wide popularity, two Kantian topics that belong to his transcendental philosophy have become favourite targets of manifold attacks as out-dated and archaic, especially during the 20th century: the concept of the “transcendental” and the role of the “I think”. Yet, a century and a half later Husserl salvaged both of these concepts in their essential core, and – against the tide of his time – dealt with them anew, for he considered them revolutionary and unprecedented in history. Husserl’s phenomenological method profoundly differed from Kant’s constructive methodology – albeit his transcendental turn was also inspired by it – enabling him to overcome many of the controversial aspects of Kant’s interpretation. Thanks to Husserl’s retrieval, both concepts survived the implacable judgment of history and are currently being seriously reconsidered, in ever increasing measure, as relevant for philosophy. Although both topics are intertwined and should be dealt with jointly, this article is only concerned with some aspects that are central to the “meaning of the transcendental”. First, as it has been introduced by Kant, and second, as it has been retrieved by Husserl in its essential core, broadening its reach far beyond the merely “speculative” or “theoretical” level to which Kant confines it, in order to encompass the whole field of lived human experiences (theoretical, practical, or evaluative), as well as in cultural and scientific endeavours.

57-78

Authors: Azul Katz

The present paper explores the place that imagination and phantasy hold in the transcendental philosophies of Kant and Husserl when they are not subordinated to functions that are external to them. The Kantian imagination (Einbildungskraft) has a key function within reason, both theoretical and practical, but it seems to exhibit its true potential in the aesthetic subjective domain, as productive imagination — in addition, this aesthetic domain is defined as the most properly human. In Husserl’s work, phantasy (Phantasie) has a relevant methodological function in the intuition of essences and plays other constituting roles, for example in empathy — and therefore in intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, the Husserlian phantasy shows its full potential not when it is bound to a presentation through perception — as it does in its constituting functions, but when it is pure and moves freely in an enlarged eidetic sphere. Husserlian phantasy would not only allow the transit from facts to essences, but it would also allow the reverse path, limiting essences towards facticity. In this framework, a final consideration points to the challenges raised by the exploration of this intermediate sphere of experiences involving productive imagination and pure phantasy, regarding the hierarchy and margins of the transcendental constitution.

98-102

Authors: Francesco Pisano

Husserl’s late claim of that transcendental logic is self-founded stands in a puzzling relation with the facticity of nature. This relation concerns issues such as the traceableness of a “living present” in the immanence of living consciousness. The article considers this matter through a specific perspective, gained by reference to the project of a transcendental foundation of the science of nature. This project requires the problematic possibility of a formal determination of facticity. One could characterize the phenomenological finding of a “living present” as Husserl’s attempt to resolve the discrepancy between fact and form in a “living being” which consists of both actual materiality and transcendental ideality. This conciliatory solution remains questionable, given the impossibility to provide an a priori foundation of this synthetic moment through the self-reflexive movement of transcendental logic. However, the systematic project of transcendental phenomenology as such entails the question concerning the a priori foundation of our ordinary knowledge of facts. It seems, then, to require a solution of this sort. The problem of grounding the scientific knowledge of natural facts dates back at least to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. So does the need for the definition of an empirical moment of this grounding. A discussion of Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft presents an aporetic facet of the way in which transcendental philosophy responds to this need. An analogous impasse occurs in Husserl’s mature work. The concept of “living present” holds a central role in defining Husserl’s stance towards this stalemate. The analysis of this role aims to clarify both Husserl’s specific position in the broader context of transcendental philosophy, and an aspect of the transcendental foundation of the science of nature. I conclude that this foundation must encompass a factual, non-formalizable element: a material residue, required in order to complete its reflexive movement.

137-159

Authors: Claudio Tarditi

In this text, I intend to demonstrate the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenology for the debate on Cantor’s continuum hypothesis. Once described the classical formulation of this problem by Cantor, Dedekind, Zermelo-Fraenkel, and Hilbert, I observe that the current discussion about this issue is characterized by the opposition between a Platonist (Gödel) and a formalist (Cohen) solution. Although this latter is widespread among mathematicians, a few of them still think that the continuum conjecture is relevant for a philosophical foundation of set theory and, in general, for a scientific description of reality. Most of them have been somehow inspired by Husserl's phenomenology. This is the case, for instance, for Weyl and Gödel himself, even if both of them gradually abandoned phenomenology for, respectively, constructivism/predicativism and Platonism. My aim in this text is to reconstruct this “minor” history, in order to show how Husserl’s account of the continuum, developed in different ways by Weyl and Gödel, remains the unique radical attempt to found mathematical formalization on intuition. Although the continuum, namely the phenomenological condition of both the flux of the lived-experiences and the flowing of the intuitive data, is a real leitmotiv of the phenomenological method as a whole, it plays a peculiar role in the early Husserl, notably in his lectures of 1891 on Philosophy of Arithmetic, those of 1905-1908 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and those of 1907 on Things and Space. In these texts, there emerges a theory of how the concept of the continuum originates in the intuition of concrete data: more precisely, the intuition of continuity is conceived as the phenomenological condition for any mathematical formalization of the continuum. This does not entail that Husserl is not committed to the problem of a rigorous formalization of the continuum. Rather, as demonstrated by his in-depth inspection of spatial perception and time-consciousness, he is fully aware of the limits of any attempt of formalizing continuity (the same limits Weyl will emphasize concerning Cantor-Dedekind’s axiom). Accordingly, it is precisely for its attempt to keep together intuition and formalization that transcendental phenomenology still plays a relevant role in the current debate about the foundation of mathematics.

186-202

Authors: Don Beith

The critical insights of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology evolve out of a tension in the nature of consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is a synthetic activity or intentional that discloses the horizon in which meanings and objects have conditions of possibility. On the other hand, in perception we find the workings of sense that point to a dynamic, expressive origin prior to the pure activity of consciousness. Our investigation is concerned with explaining how this passivity of consciousness is itself a synthesis that arises out of our expressive bodily nature. There is a clear logical connection between the ways Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceive of a synthesis within sensibility and bodily affectivity, where each thinker requires us to conceptualize nature as a mode of expressivity, with the implication that transcendental conditions of possibility must, mysteriously, happen within the very intercorporeal and temporal fields that they render possible.

223-227

Authors: Eric Beauron

In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant develops what the Critique of Pure Reason calls the “rational physiology”, which is the metaphysics of corporeal nature. The aim of this text is to specify the object in general as matter and as the “movable in space” and, for this purpose, to take into account the various properties that make possible the material donation of the object, such as rest, speed, direction, impenetrability, attraction, repulsion, etc., the so-called predicables of the pure understanding (§ 10 of the CPR). Those predicables constitute the properties that are indeed necessary to ground the natural science (mathematical physics) and are here examined from a transcendental point of view thanks to the system of the categories and principles of the Analytics of Principles. The structure of the book is thus the following: Phoronomy deals with quantity (Axioms of Intuition), the Dynamics with quality (Anticipations of Perception), the Mechanics with relations (Analogies of Experience) and the Phenomenology with modalities (Postulates of Empirical Thought). What Kant seeks to account for, then, is the applicability of the mathematics that make the intuitive and apodictic certainty possible thanks to the construction of the object in an a priori intuition. The methodological problem concerns the possibility of this a priori construction, which must be here realized in the realm of existence. How to connect the empirical properties of the object to the necessary and universal principles provided by the categories in order to account for the possibility of the mathematical construction of the object? The metaphysics of the corporeal nature is different from the transcendental cognition of the pure nature in general because it considers the transcendental schematism from the point of view of space and not of time

234-239

Authors: Paul Slama

This review presents historical and philosophical hypotheses of Chad Engelland's book by first considering the general thesis of a Heidegger transcendental philosopher, then emphasizing the importance of this theme for the treatise Sein und Zeit (1927), finally considering promises and aporia of such an interpretation for the second Heidegger. Heidegger first endorsed the program of a certain transcendental philosophy, to reject it in a second part of his work. Each time, the problem is to know what type of transcendental philosophy it is, which implies asking the question of Heidegger's relation to both transcendental philosophy of Kant and transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Does the thought of utensility or authenticity in Being and Time refer to a transcendental questioning? And is it a Kantian or Husserlian transcendental? But also, can the thought of Ereignis and of the last God be so, as C. Engelland thinks? The reviewer insists on the importance of understanding the role of intuition in phenomenology’s relationship to Kant, but also on the link made by Heidegger between Kant's first and second Critiques, that is, between the theory and practice. Finally, it shows from the book the role of affectivity, not without indicating possible extensions including the analysis of neokantism, or Hölderlin.

30-45

Authors: Claudia Serban

The paper examines the possibility, the meaning, and the legitimacy of understanding Husserl’s concept of the life-world as an anthropological world. This understanding lies upon the fact that the life-world is always given to us as a human world, and invites to inquire into the way I always necessarily experience myself as a human person. Nevertheless, even though it is by becoming human that the I enters the world, the self-experience of the human person coincides neither with its self-experience as a transcendental ego, nor with its experience of the life-world. Thus, the question of the anthropological world deeply concerns the relationship between phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy and anthropology. This means that a positive comprehension of the life-world as an anthropological world will only emerge when anthropology will no longer be considered as the mortal enemy of transcendental phenomenology, and consequently the idea of a transcendental anthropology will no longer seem inconsistent or absurd. This demonstration is led by exploring some of Husserl’s late texts, such as the famous 1931 conference on “Phenomenology and Anthropology” and several manuscripts from the 30s published mainly in the XVth and XXIXth volumes of the Husserliana. The interest of speaking of an anthropological world thus appears to lie in the emphasis on the historicity and on the cultural impregnation of the life-world. Ultimately, the anthropological world is the life-world considered in its irreducible facticity; and this allows us to view the ontology of the life-world also as an ontology of facticity. Nevertheless, the specific requirements of transcendental phenomenology will always preserve an irreducible tension between transcendental (rather than human) life and its worldly dimension and horizon.

66-81

Authors: Andrzej Gniazdowski

Phenomenology, one of the most important and influential philosophical movements of the last hundred years, has been very rarely subjected to the comparative historical research that would place its idea in the broad socio-political as wells as cultural context. Even more rarely, if at all, has it been analyzed from the perspective of the history of ideas. Such an analysis would allow to regard phenomenology as an expression of some broader worldview. The aim of the article is to reconstruct such a historical as well as practical background of its idea formulated by Edmund Husserl in his Logos-article. The applied method refers in its character to the methodology of the Warsaw School of History of Ideas, especially to the interpretation strategy that Leszek Kołakowski followed in his book Husserl and the Search for Certitude. The conclusion of the article is that the initial, practical impulse of the idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science consisted not so much in his religious, but rather in his socio-political search. This allows us to interpret the idea of phenomenology as a form of resistance against the racist tendencies of that time.

100-120

Authors: Hynek Janoušek

Even today, much of the development of Husserl’s interpretation of Bolzano’s philosophy prior to the Logical Investigations remains in the dark. However, recently published manuscripts from Husserl’s early period make it easier to understand Husserl’s original approach to Bolzano’s ideas. This article aims at describing one aspect of Husserl’s reception of Bolzano, namely his reception of the latter’s concept of propositions in themselves. It also corrects some errors concerning the traditional interpretation of Lotze’s and Frege’s influence on Husserl’s turn against psychologism. Whereas Husserl’s 1896 “Logic Lectures” employ a number of Bolzano’s terms and ideas, there is no trace of Lotze and almost no trace of Frege when the objectivity of logic is discussed. It is rather the integration of Bolzano’s famous concept of propositions in themselves that forms the core of Bolzano’s logical realism, into Husserl’s early phenomenology which drives Husserl’s move against the alleged psychologism of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. The article reconstructs Husserl’s early unsuccessful attempt to avoid the pitfall of psychologism by using a Brentanian theory of abstraction. This failure opened the way for a more positive appreciation of Bolzano’s concept of propositions in themselves. Such a concept posed problems for Husserl’s theory of judgment as inspired by Brentano, Stumpf, and Erdmann. Describing the twists and turns of the integration of Bolzano’s proposition in itself into Husserl’s work should contribute to a better understanding of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, philosophy of logic, and, generally speaking, of the history of philosophy of the 19th and 20th century

149-163

Authors: Natalia Artemenko

Over the past several decades, the figure of Gustav Špet (1879-1937) has grown unceasingly in prominence, and the significance of his work in contemporary philosophy has increased accordingly. Alongside this process has been another, just as relentless – that of the elaboration and enrichment of our conceptions of the philosopher’s creative character, as well as of nature and essence of his philosophy. Špet’s phenomenon was to become yet another of the major individual projects on the synthesis of the humanities that emerged during his time in the first half of the 20th century. From the point of view of historical fact, Špet’s involvement with the phenomenological movement is limited to him being Husserl’s student in Göttingen from 1912-1913, and to their subsequent written correspondence. Appearance and Sense, the monograph devoted to the problems of phenomenology, was published in 1914. The interweaving of phenomenology and hermeneutics that occurred in Appearance and Sense allowed Špet to reveal the very essence of phenomenology, the exact essence which, according to his words, Husserl was unable to unveil. And here he referred to hermeneutics in order to present phenomenology in a basic and essential way. In this text, hermeneutics and phenomenology are bound tightly together, and they intersect constantly. Following on from A. Savin, we endeavour to justify the thesis that hermeneutics, for Špet himself most likely a detailed commentary of his phenomenological research with no independent significance of its own, gained meaning only within the scope of his phenomenological program.

177-190

Authors: Sergueï Gachkov

This article is conceived as a rather unusual investigation. On the one hand, it treats of the relations between phenomenology and Marxism in the work of the early Claude Lefort. Scholars emphasize that the amalgamation of the phenomenology and Marxism of Lefort is due to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. But we think it does not prohibit him from applying phenomenology to the social domain. Thanks to phenomenological methods, Lefort has access both to the philosophy of history and theoretical sociology. So we try to develop the ‘social critique’ of Lefort in a phenomenological sense. This article analyzes the work of the early Lefort in the context of the thought of and debates between Merleau-Ponty, Castoriadis, and Sartre. But these investigations are not only historical; the article also raises questions about the real connections between phenomenology and Marxism. The original side of our research is to associate the phenomenology of Lefort with the material phenomenology of M. Henry. So we face a double task. From one side, our objectives are historico-philosophical. We try to discover the meaning of the Lefort’s phenomenological Marxism. From the other side they are phenomenological: we try to describe the phenomenon of the materiality of a social class in the aim to study the fundamental concepts of Lefort’s philosophy. We investigate the problem of the class consciousness in the terms of the being of a phenomenon in the world. As a result, we have to do with the problem of a renewal of the concept of the matter and the praxis. This problem is not easy to solve in one text. But we think we have arrived at the following result: in the Russian literature Lefort is considered only as a political thinker, and we showed that he is both a political philosopher and a phenomenologist. Moreover, in a sense his phenomenological approach can be more important to elucidate social phenomena.

226-249

Authors: Tomas Šinkūnas

In spite of the many important findings made within the theory of emotions, scholars still struggle to coherently account for the unique structure of disgust or determine its essence. In contrast to much of the contemporary literature on disgust, I aim to show that, through employing the phenomenological method in his 1929 essay “Disgust” (Der Ekel), Aurel Kolnai was able to grasp the real significance of the phenomenon of disgust. The current study aims to clarify and present Kolnai’s insight into the nature of disgust wherein the latter is first and foremost conceived as an ambivalent, multifaceted, but coherent phenomenon. Namely, as a defense mechanism that reacts against the proximity of a disturbing object charged with an ambiguous value of confusion that fluctuates between surplus of life and intention towards death. In order to achieve this goal, I present Kolnai’s notion of disgust by first focusing on the foreground of the phenomena of disgust: the essential features of the intentional content of disgust, the object of disgust in particular. I then present and analyze the life-death complex as the underlying structures of the visceral sense of disgust. Lastly, I show how the life-death complex relates to the visceral sense of disgust, thereby affirming the coherence of disgust.

282-302

Authors: Daniil Dorofeev

The article is intended to emphasize the essential significance of Max Scheler, one of the leaders of the “Munich phenomenology”, in the phenomenological movement of the twentieth century, because his role in it is clearly understated today and his phenomenology does not simply amount to a historical context. The author examines the reasons why Scheler’s phenomenology has not received the proper recognition, research and development, appearing in the shadow of such figures as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others. The article reveals the originality and actuality of Scheler in the field of phenomenological research of intersubjective problems – he began to investigate its in his publications of the 10-ies of the last century first among philosophers. Separately, author marks the principal differences in the solution of the problem of intersubjectivity and the relationship between the I and the Other in the writings of E. Husserl and M. Scheler. So, Scheler’s understanding of intersubjective relations was based on personalistic, axiological, emotional grounds; he did not exaggerate the meaning of the activity of the Self; he turned to the experience of modern psychological theories (for example, Gestalt psychology), especially in the analysis of the perception of the Other in child psychology; he noted intersubjective community as a priori characteristic of human being. At the same time, the connection between Scheler’s understanding of the relationship of the I and the Other and Heideggerian is noted, and his influence to the existential psychotherapy and logotherapy of V. Frankl is a fact. In conclusion author analyzed the four main forms of sympathy that Scheler explores at the beginning of his final work (“The Nature of Sympathy”) in the field of phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As it seems to the author of the article, Scheler’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity is actually today, it can help to more productive reveal the phenomenological potential and deserves more attention and studying.

320-328

Authors: Alexei Krioukov

In the first part of the introductory article to the translation from German into Russian of the Edith Stein’s work “Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas” is given a short biography of Edith Stein who has written her PhD thesis by Edmund Husserl in Göttingen then worked with him in Freiburg and who was one of the originators of the early phenomenological movement, collaborated with such phenomenologists as Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré, Max Scheler, Hans Lipps, Martin Heidegger, and Roman Ingarden. In the second part of the introductory article the main theses and ideas of the translated work are presented in which Edith Stein tried to compare the seemingly uncompatible philosophies of Edmund Husserl and St.Thomas Aquinas.

358-365

Authors: ULDIS VĒGNERS, MĀRA GRĪNFELDE

The report presents an overview of the international conference Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The 3rd Conference on Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe, which took place from June 29 to July 1, 2017, at the University of Latvia in Riga, Latvia. The report briefly outlines the aim, history, and future plans of the conference series dedicated to the traditions and perspectives of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe, provides information about the aim and structure of the conference, and gives short summaries of the keynote lectures.

376-389

Authors: Alexandr Pogonyailo

The review considers the main ideas of the book, pointing out the most significant moments related to the author’s thoughts on the Uhr-Ich concept in Husserl’s later phenomenology. The focus of the review is on how exactly the author brings the Uhr-Ich notion to phenomenological clarity as well as what the notion means in the capacity of “a self-evident proximity” of one’s own self.

411-424

Authors: Vladimir Belov

The growing number of studies outside of Russia of the work of the Russian philosopher Vasily Emilevich Sesemann, who was undeservedly forgotten in his homeland, gives rise to the need to clarify some important points that somehow manifest themselves in assessing the nature of this work. Two main ideas are substantiated in the article: firstly, that V. E. Sesemann was always a Russian philosopher and, secondly, a philosopher of original and independent, despite strong influences from the intuitivism of N. Lossky, the Neo-Kantianism of H. Cohen and P. Natorp, the phenomenology of E. Husserl and the new ontology of N. Hartmann. In his work, Sesemann sought to develop a modern version of classical Platonism and Neo-Platonism, which is characteristic of the so-called Solovyovian school of Russian religious philosophy, but enriched and critically rethought through the achievements of the most influential philosophical trends of the day. The author justifies these statements in a discussion with the most significant works of Western researchers of the Russian philosopher’s work, among which are two monographs by T. Botz-Bornstein and D. Jonkus, respectively, in English and Lithuanian. It is also emphasized that the ambiguity and inaccuracy of the interpretation of the position of Sesemann in relation to the phenomenon of intuition on the part of the latter researchers is due to the fact that his theory of knowledge is not a self-sufficient sphere, but is built into the overall process of human perfection. And, although most of Sesemann’s works are devoted to the theory of knowledge and aesthetics, the main feature of his thinking was systematic. On the original image of the interpreted theory of knowledge is built the entire building of his philosophy: ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion and culture.

45-57

Authors: Michał Piekarski

In this article we would like to prove that the so-called Ludwig Wittgenstein’s phenomenology was not the phenomenology in Husserlian sense. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought is most often associated with analytical philosophy, pragmatism or a specific metaphilosophical programme. Conversely, the philosopher is rarely considered as belonging to the phenomenological school. What remains problematic is whether 1) Wittgenstein did in fact practice some form of phenomenology and, if so, 2) what school of thought should it be related to? Both problems may be brought down to one basic question of 3) what is phenomenology? The answer to this last question, albeit tentative, will help us answer questions one and two. We can give a preliminary answer to our third question. We could say the following: phenomenology is a method to describe what is given for description and how it is given in terms of analysing the conditions under which an object may appear. As such, it is a transcendental way to encapsulate conditions determining the possibility of any experience. We may ask now whether Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist by this definition of phenomenology. If we conclude that he was not, we will try to answer our second question – can we talk of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology in any other sense, much as we do in the case of phenomenologies of Mach, Einstein or Austin. Ludwig Wittgenstein used the word phenomenology to describe his philosophy twice. First, in his notes from 1929 which later served as material for the posthumously published Philosophische Bemerkungen, and then in 1951 in a collection of notes published as Bemerkungen über die Farben. Let us consider what he wrote in 1929.

79-96

Authors: Dalius Jonkus

Vasily Sesemann’s philosophy is still insufficiently investigated, especially its relationship with phenomenology. Modern researchers often classify Sesemann’s philosophy as neo-Kantianism, although they also admit its relationship with phenomenology. Sesemann often defined his position as critical realism. He emphasised the difference between his philosophy, the logical idealism of neo-Kantianism and the transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology. It should also be emphasised that an understanding of critical realism in Sesemann’s philosophy is intertwined with the concept of intuition in Russian intuitivism and phenomenological philosophy. Sesemann criticises neo-Kantian idealism, because this philosophical construction is based on scientific knowledge and rejects the immediate givenness of reality. The article discusses Sesemann’s philosophy in the context of neo-Kantianism, intuitivism and phenomenology. The purpose of this article is to show that Sesemann criticises neo-Kantian epistemology resorting to a phenomenological idea of direct knowledge. Sesemann understands intuition as a direct access to the things themselves, as a practical understanding of the world, which is the basis of logical and scientific knowledge. Sesemann transforms the concept of intuition from the theoretical into practical and establishes a relationship between the act of cognition and intuition of values. Although Sesemann’s evaluation of phenomenology remains ambivalent: firstly, he understands Husserl’s phenomenology as an intuition, i.e. as a direct approach to the things themselves, and, secondly, phenomenology for him is a return to the idealistic tradition with which she fought.

116-139

Authors: Yaroslav Slinin

In the article I intend to demonstrate that the Cartesian rule never to accept anything unobvious and doubtful for true ends up with solipsism. Confines himself to this rule Descartes obtains an elemental and absolute truth of “I think, therefore I am”. However, the doubtless existence of my ego does not imply the doubtless existence of the other egos. Descartes tried to find a way out by composing the ontological argument for the existence of God. This argument cannot be recognized as sound since by no means all of it transitions are doubtless just as cogito ergo sum is. As a result Descartes failed to eliminate the solipsism problem. At a later stage Husserl trying to overcome relativism and skepticism, being convinced that each truth is an absolute and believing that all absolute truth must be doubtless attempted to discover such truth. Husserl’s procedure of the phenomenological reduction appeared to be an improved version of Descartes’s method of doubts. It delivers the result that the only existence of transcendental ego and everything that is immanent to it is doubtless. This result corresponds to the Cartesian thesis of the obviousness of sum cogitans. According to Husserl the autonomous existence of God and nature turn out to belong to the domain of doubtful transparentness. As for the existence of other egos, according to Husserl it is transcendental and doubtless at the same time. The sum cogitans appresentation which is an analogical apperception bears witness for that fact. From my point of view, nevertheless, an argumentativeness of the analogical apperception is no better than that of Descartes ontological argument. It cannot provide rationalization for the thesis that the transcendental existence of other egos is obvious and doubtless. Thus, the transcendental solipsism stays ambiguous. In the end of the article I am analyzing the two main characteristics of sum cogitans: its contingency and discreteness.

161-180

Authors: Stoyan Asenov

In 1926 Coco Chanel designed the little black dress and this marked the beginning of the remarkable longevity of this garment in the world of fashion. This longevity embodies the paradox of being always in fashion in a world of transience. This paradox allows us to see in the little black dress a unique story unraveling between the body and the dress, which represents the woman beyond ephemeral fashion and gives femininity a unique status. The little black dress is a phenomenon which affords us the opportunity to reveal some fundamental characteristics of the modern ways of constituting the body and femininity. An important question to answer here is how philosophy can address the understanding of this particular phenomenon. I think that even though the reconstruction of this phenomenon within the confines of the specific cultural and historical context could yield important considerations, this approach is more likely to hinder understanding because it fails to highlight the uniqueness and integrity of the subject being studied. Therefore, this text employs a different approach: understanding is only possible through a phenomenological interpretation of the “interplay” between the body, the colour black and the smallness of the dress – that is, through a phenomenological interpretation of the relationship that exists between the black clothing and the body and the “work of the small”. The main premise is that this “interplay” temporalises the body thus rendering the little black dress a phenomenon of time above all. The body leaves the physical mode of existence whereby natural femininity becomes historical and biographical. Within this context the mystique and allure of femininity are not so much exuded by the physicality of the body as are connoted by the body’s representation as a concealed story and a hidden biography. In this way the woman is enabled into a new form of existence – that of a story; however, this is not a story of the natural woman, but the story of a biographically individuated femininity. This gives new dimensions to the erotic inasmuch as it goes beyond the erotic that stems from the immediate sensation and image and becomes the erotic that stems from the imagination.

192-200

Authors: EDMUND HUSSERL

We present here a Russian translation of the 8th paragraph of Husserl’s book “Experience and Judgment” (1939). The paragraph includes a systematic outline of the phenomenological conception of horizonedness, while in no other Husserl’s book – from “Ideas I” to “Crisis” –we can find a fragment dealing with the idea of horizon elaborated so deep. The idea however is a substantial element of Husserl’s conceptualization of experience as an open, indefinite process. In the 7th paragraph of “Experience and Judgment” the world is conceived as a universal “ground of certainty”, upon which all our experience is based, and in the 8th paragraph the intentional structure of experience (mostly as perception) is explicated. That structure is characterized as horizontal. The crucial difference here is between the “inner horizon” and the “outer horizon” of an object. The outer horizon stretches finally into the “world-horizon” – the ultimate, universal horizon comprising all partial horizons and perspectives. In its turn, typization functions here as a way of representation of objects laying beyond the field of what is given. Typization also covers latent aspects of present objects and concerns even their patent aspects. The most general type, according to Husserl, is “object as such” – a basic category of formal ontology. The idea of horizon has been a fundamental principle of classical phenomenology. Nowadays it provokes hot discussions among such authors as Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. The discussions relate to the very essence of phenomenology. That’s why we find publication of the fragment to be important.

211-234

Authors: VASILY SESEMANN

This publication presents three manuscripts of the famous Russian-Lithuanian philosopher Vasily Sesemann. We offer publications of essays on Scheler, Bergson and Lossky – these are the texts of Sesemann’s manuscript collection, which is located in Vilnius University (F122-104, F122-105, F122-106). This group of essays is integral. All these essays, in one way or another address the issue of the philosophical understanding of intuition, which Sesemann discussed in all his major works. Essays are dedicated to the philosophers who somehow influenced the author’s position. The texts were written during his stay in the camp of the GULAG (1950-1955) in Taishet (Irkutsk region). It is known that Sesemann taught Western philosophy and aesthetics for other prisoners. We can assume that these essays refer to the materials or recordings of his lectures. Among the prisoners in the same camp was Dandaron, who later became a famous scientist and created the original version of neo-Buddhism. While preparing manuscripts for publication it was discovered that in the posthumously published “Letters on Buddhism” Dandaron often recounts the thoughts of Sesemann, especially when it comes to understanding of intuition. In Dandaron’s handwritten archive in Ulan-Ude are the manuscripts, which, according to the titles and topics discussed, coincide with the manuscripts of Sesemann. From the available data we conclude that the manuscripts found in Dandaron’s archive – “The relationship between matter and spirit” and “Aesthetics” – are the recordings of Sesemann’s lectures.

241-264

Authors: Prepared by R. Loshakov

What is the event? How the phenomenology of event is possible if the “event” is not the phenomenon in the classical meaning of this word? French philosopher Claude Romano discusses these questions with his Russian colleague Ruslan Loshakov. The interlocutors consider the concept of event in different contexts, paying special attention to the relationships which connect the phenomenology of event with Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger and Levinas’ ideas.

272-280

Authors: Sergei Nikonenko

The review considers the clue aspects of the book. De Warren makes the main subject of research Husserl’s idea of subjectivity in relation to the problem of time-consciousness. Husserl’s system itself the author refers to the subjective idealism. Husserl’s subjectivity is treated as the constitution of the world in time-consciousness. De Warren tries to argue that the idea of temporality is important for Husserl’s understanding of the identity of the subject. Conducting a comparative analysis of the ideas of Husserl and Brentano, de Warren shows that Husserl was the first who achieved in phenomenology a clear understanding of the experience. Criticizing the views of Derrida, de Warren argues that Husserl insists on the definition of I as a self-sufficient subject in spite of the importance of the problem of Other. One of the main conclusions of the book is the following: the subject is the history of the constitutional exercise of his own temporality. But it is a matter for further discussions. In the opinion of the reviewer this conclusion seemed to be controversial, but it doesn’t reduce the impression of a fundamental, profound and subtle analysis of the phenomenological ideas of time and subjectivity.

15-45

Authors: Irina Kazakova

This article is propaedeutic and has as its main objective the introduction of psychotherapeutic daseinsanalytical discourse to the russian-speaking space. Despite the fact that this approach has already been introduced in a number of translations and articles, however the lack of a common field of discussion and the presence of discrepancies and distortions in the terms require а special propaedeutic work. The article briefly presents the history of daseinsanalysis represented by Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. The psychoanalytic origins of daseinsanalysis is emphasized in a special way. This is due to the fact that daseinsanalysis formed within a common analytical discourse, but with a considerable output beyond it through an appeal to the Heidegger’s ontology and its daseinsanalytics. Such a marginal daseinsanalysis’ position determines the specificity of the analytical process, the development of major therapeutic issues and psychopathological issues as well as the specific reflection of analytical praxis. The article also considers the phenomenological method from the standpoint of how it can be implemented in analytical and therapeutic practice. This issue is discussed on an example of the situation taken from the movie The Secret Life of Antoine Watteau (Ce que mes yeux ont vu) in which the professor teaches the student to “see” the painting of the artist and what it depicts. This process is very similar to the Socratic maieutic procedure and it helps to disclose the specific attitude in a phenomenological study, which Heidegger calls Gelassenheit. To understand this attitude we also appeal to the fragment of Being and Time and the analysis of the specific construction of the medial verb passive voice in conjunction with semantic verb “see” (ἀποφαίνεσθαι), which helps to understand the true practical meaning of the phenomenological attitude

74-88

Authors: Tatiana Shchyttsova

The article is devoted to critical discussion of the daseins-analytical conception of a Swiss psychotherapist Alice Holzhey-Kunz. The author tries to explicate an internal contradiction peculiar to the approach of Holzhey-Kunz and at the same time to reveal a productive (heuristic) nature of that inconsistency. The main thesis of the article is that the key conceptual innovation of the Swiss psychotherapist (the substantiation of the emergence of psychic disorders by the onticoontological character of understanding) allows to problematize the principal theoretical framework of her version of Daseinsanalysis, namely the Heidegger’s idea of ontico-ontological difference. Such a problematization takes place due to the revealing a fundamental conflict between the ontic and ontological dimensions in the patient’s experience; to speak more presicely – between the patient’s openness to the ontological truths about himself and his involvement into the ontic dimension of everyday life. The author sees a decisive merit of Holzhey-Kunz in the identification of the existentials (the existential a prioris) as an actual experience of psychotherapeutic patients. The Swiss psychoterapist defines this kind of this-worldly ontological experience as Hellhörigkeit (in German) – which means literally “sensitive hearing” – and treats it as an empirical ground for various forms of psychic suffering. The author argues that the phenomenon of “sensitive hearing” cannot be unambiguously related eirther to the ontological dimension or to the ontic one and thereby calls into question the theoretical clarity of ontico-ontological difference in Heidegger’s existential analytics of Dasein. A decisive moment in the experience of “sensitive hearing” is that the authentic revealing of the ontological truth takes place not by virtue of the Dasein’s own act. The moment is clearly contrary to the logic of the Heidegger’s conception. “Sensitive hearing” presupposes beingaffected, passive vulnerability in relation to what you find yourself exposed to (against your own will). Being considered in the context of Being and Time, “sensitive hearing” appears therefore as a kind of “ontopathology” – an inappropriate existential constitution – and by this very irrelevance enables a question concerning possibility of another ontology of human existence. The author concludes that the Holzhey-Kunz’ psychotherapeutic interpretation of the Heidegger’s principle of ontico-ontological difference reveals the necessity of critical rethinking of the extent to which the corresponding theoretical frame is valid and promising (fruitful) in terms of the philosophical substantiation of psychotherapy.

109-121

Authors: Alexey Lyzlov

One of the most important tasks of Dasein-analytical work is the task to help the person to learn to be oneself. The question of how is it possible to find oneself, to find “the most my ability to be” is one of the major issues in Heidegger’s Being and Time. However, Heidegger works not in a vacuum. Before him this issue explores S. Kierkegaard. M. Heidegger is obliged to this author very much; even the concept of Dasein has a prototype in Kierkegaard’s Tilværelse. In this article we analyze how S. Kierkegaard understands what it means to be oneself, revealing Kierkegaard’s understanding of human beind as Selv (danish word that is difficult to translate into Russian; in the article we will leave it without translation, arguing in favor of this). Understanding Selv in accordance with S. Kierkegaard as “positive third” in a human being as the synthesis of opposites, we trace how a fixation on one term of synthesis in prejudice of the other leads to going away from being oneself. We take such pairs of opposites as the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. Further we speak on how the self-attitude as belonging to the self-consciousness is rooted in the attitude to oneself, carried out in acting, and describe three ways of giving up being oneself (three ways to despair), that are analyzed by S. Kierkegaard in terms of self-awareness. Finally, we show that, according to S. Kierkegaard, there is no continual transition from the state of alienation from the real being oneself (the state, that is initial for each human being) to the authentic being oneself; and that the transition from one to the other requires, in the Kierkegaard’s terms, a “jump”, associated with the coming to believe. This “jump” at the same time leads to the change of attitude to the other. In conclusion of the paper we set a problem of possibility of such a “jump” in psychotherapy.

142-174

Authors: Konstantin Gemenetzis

This paper is an attempt to explore the dreams along various ways. A critical crossroad is the point where the dream manifests itself as a figure of the Other. Dream interpretations (Sigmund Freud, Medard Boss), violate the alterity of the dreamer – they relate the dream to the constitution of the awake. Dream interpretations are answers to the “Whys” and the “Hows” of a dream. They are explanations that just soothe the uneasiness caused by the uncanny dream world. Few quotes from Elias Canetti’s notes emphasize on the singularity of a dream and its mysterious, i.e. inexplicable nature. A brief critical review of Medard Boss’s conception of dreams allows to understand a dream as magnifying mirror of the existential features decisive for the shortcomings one faces in his everyday life. In psychoanalytic practice (and not only here) we cannot grasp a dream by going straight to the point. “Free associations” and “free floating attention” guide us to other, indirect and unforseen ways of approach. Remembering and forgetting dreams is an experience different from remembering and forgetting things. The question “What is a dream?” is a trap because it demands an answer like “The dream is …”. A dream is not something, it is not a “that”. We attempt to speak about dreams following a phrase in Odyssey – “sie gingen vorbei an den Toren der Sonne, an der Gemeinde Träume, und kamen dann schnell an ihr Ziel, zur Asphodeloswiese”. Further goes a brief discussion of Beckett’s play for television (“Nacht und Träume”). And finally a revision of the famous Dschuang Dsi’s dream (“Butterfly Dream”) on the basis of a painting by Katsushika Hokusai “The chinese philosopher Sōshi looking at butterflies”.

200-225

Authors: Roland Strobl

In this case study I want to show the development during Daseinsanalysis of a woman suffering from a long term schizoaffective disorder. After three attempts to start and remain in therapy, and following eleven inpatient admissions to different psychiatric hospitals, it seems, that the phenomenological approach of Daseinsanalysis has helped her continue and, over time, she has been able to find a better way of coming closer to the aim which has been most requested of her until now – of becoming lively – but without it resulting in a psychiatric hospital admission. Firstly I will attempt to give an overview of my patient’s history, including my first encounter with her: a public help desk for working assistance for psychiatric patients in 2001, and then, soon after, as she started Daseinsanalysis in my private practice. She discontinued the therapy on account of not being able to cope with difficult feelings arising from having fallen in love with me, her analyst. I could not respond in the way she expected me to. That was the first break in our therapeutic relationship and another one was to follow two years later, when she came closer for the second time. It was my mistake as her therapist, to interfere as her father had done. She told me during one of those sessions that this was her experience and this prompted the second break. And now, since 2013, our relationship seems strong enough to continue and to come closer together to her first aim. The core question in my case study as an example from the practice in Daseinsanalysis is: how is it possible for the therapist to find the right balance in his or her approach between abstinence, through which patients can find enough space to develop freely and the naturally occurring possibilities in every relationship, which make people and their relationships lively?

248-270

Authors: Marcus Sacrini

The aim of this article is to show that Husserl’s later analyses of the perceptual syntheses (for instance in Analyses concerning passive and active syntheses) dispense with the notion of categorial intuition, carefully described in the Sixth Logical Investigation (1901). In order to show this result, initially I reconstruct Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition described in “Logical Investigations”, relating it to the problem of evident knowledge conceived as intuitive fulfillment of signifying acts. Categorial intuition is founded on simple intuitions, although it cannot be reduced to them. Simple intuitions only offer a global grasping of the intended object, with partial perceptual intentions continually fused therein. In its turn, categorial intuition consists in a new sort of act, the result of a covering synthesis between disclosed partial perceptual intentions and the global perception in which those same intentions had already been operating, although implicitly. It is highlighted that in this synthesis intuition depends on signifying intentions that guide the selection of intuitive aspects to be synthesized. It follows from this that the categorial components of the so called categorial intuition come from outside the very sphere of perception. In contrast with this position, Husserl, in later texts describes, by means of the notion of passive synthesis, the genesis of categoriality in the very realm of sensibility, which allows him to formulate a new approach to clarify the phenomenological sources of knowledge.

290-307

Authors: Nelly Motroshilova

This article is conceived as a rather unusual comparison of the two ways in philosophy, as well as of the same ideas of H. Vaihinger, on the one one hand, and of early E. Husserl, on the other hand – in the period, when they were the colleagues at Halle University to the end of XIX-th century. The analysis, given in this article, is concentrated on the special problems as follows: – the early “objective” juxtaposition to the end XIX-th century of the naturalism, positivism, pragmatism as represented by H. Vaihinger and of the anti-naturalistic orientation of early Husserl; – the H. Vaihinger’s “Die Philosophie des Als Ob” and some ideas of Husserl (“Logische Untersuchungen”) about so called “the laws of nature” as “idealized fictions”. Special attention in the work of H. Vaihinger also deserves his important historical and philosophical investigations. This is, for example, his comments to Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”. It must be said that the philosophy of H. Vaihinger still very poor explored, as well as the works of early Husserl. The author intends to shed light on this poorly explored subject.

315-427

Authors: Gion Condrau

No abstract

440-453

Authors: Alexey Lyzlov

The review provides an outline of the book and discusses the approach by A. Holtshey-Kunz to the interpretation of psychopathological phenomena, developed by her within daseinsanalysis. Reviewer traces the logic of author’s critical analysis of daseins-analytical approaches by L. von Binswanger and M. Boss, and problematizes number of important points in the author’s interpretation of M. Boss’s daseinsanalysis. The reviewer shows the problematic nature of the author’s interpretation of Heidegger’s “Being and Time” – the interpretation, on the basis of which she concludes that the “fall” of Dasein has the structure of wish and coordinates daseinsanalysis with psychoanalysis. This interpretation, however, allows the author to substantiate and develop an original approach to the understanding of mental suffering, presented in the concluding part of the book. Тhis approach is discussed in the end of review.

464-474

Authors: Alexandr Pogonyailo, Larisa Sokolova

The following review discusses the primary content of the book, highlighting the insights which the reviewers consider to be particularly significant for the conception of the transcendental genetic phenomenology of M. Richir – and its place in contemporary philosophy. The book’s author focuses on the primary challenges of Richir’s phenomenology, provides a new solution to the transcendental question and performs a constructive critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. The main focus of this review is placed on how the author articulates the terms “just-phenomenon”, “hyperbolic reduction” and “architectonics” which Richir employs to research the sphere of the phenomenological.