Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law

7-24

Authors: Stephen Parker Larson

Information and the technological advancements for which mankind develops with regards to its storage has increased tremendously over the past few decades. As the total amount of data stored rapidly increases in conjunction with the amount of widely available computer-driven devices being used, solutions are being developed to better harness this data (LaTulippe, 2011). One of these solutions is commonly known as a search appliance. Search appliances have been used in e-discovery for several years. The Google Mini Search Appliance (Mini) has not only been used for e-discovery, but for indexing and searching internal documents. To accomplish these tasks, search appliances not only cache html versions of the documents, they contain metadata about the indexed documents, as well as metadata about search activity. This research analyzes the Mini to determine what forensically interesting artifacts exist on the device.

49-56

Authors: Fred Cohen

Many in digital forensics seem to forget that the science part of digital forensics means experimentation and that implies a whole lot of things that most practitioners never learned.

65-68

Authors: Simson Garfinkel

Hoog, A., and Strzempka, K. (2011). iPhone and iOS Forensic: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple iPhone, iPad and iOS Devices. Syngress, Elsevier, xv + 310 pages; ISBN-10: 1597496596; ISBN-13: 978-1597496599, $69.95 Reviewed by Simson Garfinkel, Naval Postgraduate School In April 2011 news outlets around the world revealed shocking news about Apple’s iPhone: for reasons that were not apparently clear, every iPhone contained a small SQLite database that logged where and when the user had been whenever the phone was turned on, and those records went back for pretty much as long as the user had owned their phone. Apple eventually declared that the data cache was the result of a bug and issued a software update to prune the database (it had previously grown without limit). Privacy activists rejoiced that their beloved iPhones were once again trustworthy. But forensics examiners just shook their heads: many had known about the iPhone’s tracking capabilities for more than a year and had kept quiet. They had made good use of that data. Apple’s pro-privacy patch was actually a setback for law enforcement.

7-20

Authors: John C Ruhnka, Windham E. Loopesko

The article surveys the changing risk environment for corporations from their employees electronic communications. It identifies the types of liabilities that corporations can incur from such communications. It presents the objectives of corporate internet use policies and the types of provisions such policies should contain. It suggests an alternative risk-based approach to corporate acceptable use policies instead of a traditional laundry list of internet use prohibitions.

41-70

Authors: Murad Mehmet, Miguel Fuentes Buchholtz

Money launderers hide traces of their transactions with the involvement of entities that participate in sophisticated schemes. Money laundering detection requires unraveling concealed connections among multiple but seemingly unrelated human money laundering networks, ties among actors of those schemes, and amounts of funds transferred among those entities. The link among small networks, either financial or social, is the primary factor that facilitates money laundering. Hence, the analysis of relations among money laundering networks is required to present the full structure of complex schemes. We propose a framework that uses sequence matching, case-based analysis, social network analysis, and complex event processing to detect money laundering. Our framework captures an ongoing single scheme as an event, and associations among such ongoing sequence of events to capture complex relationships among evolving money laundering schemes. The framework can detect associated multiple money laundering networks even in the absence of some evidence. We validated the accuracy of detecting evolving money laundering schemes using a multi-phases test methodology. Our test used data generated from real-life cases, and extrapolated to generate more data from real-life schemes generator that we implemented.

87-90

Authors: Joshua Bartolomie

Wilhelm, T. (2013). Professional Penetration Testing: Creating and Learning in a Hacking Lab 2E. Waltham, MA: Syngress, 464 pages, ISBN-10: 1597499935; ISBN-13: 978-1597499934, US$79.99 Reviewed by Joshua Bartolomie, CISSP, CEECS, CFCE, DFCP, CRISC, CSM Organizations often strive for proactive information security programs in an effort to limit occurrence and impact of security breaches. However, traditional security programs run the risk of being unable to provide adequate insight and proactive awareness into real attack vectors that may exist within their organizations. With attack methods and efforts becoming increasingly aggressive, and effective, organizations must take equally assertive measures to protect their critical information and assets. Penetration testing is one of those tools that is often misunderstood, overlooked, and undervalued. A true adversary would not hesitate to exploit every potential to gain entry or cause a disruption to their target.

7-40

Authors: Kishore Singh, Peter Best, Joseph Mula

Fraud is a multi-billion dollar industry that continues to grow annually. Many organisations are poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud. Fraud detection strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently identify fraudulent activities that circumvent preventative measures. In this paper we adopt a Design-Science methodological framework to develop a model for detection of vendor fraud based on analysis of patterns or signatures identified in enterprise system audit trails. The concept is demonstrated be developing prototype software. Verification of the prototype is achieved by performing a series of experiments. Validation is achieved by independent reviews from auditing practitioners. Key findings of this study are: i) automating routine data analytics improves auditor productivity and reduces time taken to identify potential fraud, and ii) visualisations assist in promptly identifying potentially fraudulent user activities. The study makes the following contributions: i)a model for proactive fraud detection, ii) methods for visualising user activities in transaction data, iii) a stand-alone MCL-based prototype.

73-92

Authors: Eric David Shaw

This research uses two recently introduced observer rating scales, (Shaw et al., 2013) for the identification and measurement of negative sentiment (the Scale for Negativity in Text or SNIT) and insider risk (Scale of Indicators of Risk in Digital Communication or SIRDC) in communications to test the performance of psycholinguistic software designed to detect indicators of these risk factors. The psycholinguistic software program, WarmTouch (WT), previously used for investigations, appeared to be an effective means for locating communications scored High or Medium in negative sentiment by the SNIT or High in insider risk by the SIRDC within a randomly selected sample from the Enron archive. WT proved less effective in locating emails Low in negative sentiment on the SNIT and Low in insider risk on the SIRDC. However, WT performed extremely well in identifying communications from actual insiders randomly selected from case files and inserted in this email sample. In addition, it appeared that WT’s measure of perceived Victimization was a significant supplement to using negative sentiment alone, when it came to searching for actual insiders. Previous findings ( Shaw et al., 2013) indicate that this relative weakness in identifying low levels of negative sentiment may not impair WT’s usefulness for identifying communications containing significant indications of insider risk because of the very low base rate and low severity of insider risk at Low levels of negative sentiment (Shaw et al., 2013). Although many of the “false positives” acquired in the successful search for actual insiders in this experiment were shown to be true positives for other forms of insider risk, WT still produced fairly high rates of false positives that could burden analysts, as described by the search times provided. As further research and development proceeds to address this problem, we again recommend the use of WT in an integrated multi-disciplinary array of detection methods that will serve as an initial screen to narrow the search for individuals at-risk for insider activities. The implications for insider threat research, detection and prevention are discussed.

115-118

Authors: Thomas Nash

Shavers, B. (2013). Placing the Suspect behind the Keyboard: Using Digital Forensics and Investigative Techniques to Identify Cybercrime Suspects. Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 290 pages, ISBN-978-1-59749-985-9, US$51.56. Includes bibliographical references and index. Reviewed by Detective Corporal Thomas Nash (tnash@bpdvt.org), Burlington Vermont Police Department, Internet Crime against Children Task Force. Adjunct Instructor, Champlain College, Burlington VT. In this must read for any aspiring novice cybercrime investigator as well as the seasoned professional computer guru alike, Brett Shaver takes the reader into the ever changing and dynamic world of Cybercrime investigation. Shaver, an experienced criminal investigator, lays out the details and intricacies of a computer related crime investigation in a clear and concise manner in his new easy to read publication, Placing the Suspect behind the Keyboard. Using Digital Forensics and Investigative techniques to Identify Cybercrime Suspects. Shaver takes the reader from start to finish through each step of the investigative process in well organized and easy to follow sections, with real case file examples to reach the ultimate goal of any investigation: identifying the suspect and proving their guilt in the crime. Do not be fooled by the title. This excellent, easily accessible reference is beneficial to both criminal as well as civil investigations and should be in every investigator’s library regardless of their respective criminal or civil investigative responsibilities.

7-16

Authors: Fred Cohen

Many inconsistency analysis methods may be used to detect altered records or statements. But for admission as evidence, the reliability of the method has to be determined and measured. For example, in China, for evidence to be admitted, it has to have 95% certainty of being correct, and that certainty must be shown to the court, while in the US, evidence is admitted if it is more probative than prejudicial (a >50% standard). In either case, it is necessary to provide a measurement of some sort in order to pass muster under challenges from the other side. And in most cases, no such measurement has been undertaken. The question of how to undertake a scientific measurement to make such a determination, or at least to claim such a metric, is not well defined for digital forensics, but perhaps we can bring some light to the subject this issue.

39-72

Authors: Eric David Shaw

This research introduced two new scales for the identification and measurement of negative sentiment and insider risk in communications in order to examine the unexplored relationship between these two constructs. The inter-rater reliability and criterion validity of the Scale of Negativity in Texts (SNIT) and the Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communications (SIRDC) were established with a random sample of email from the Enron archive and criterion measures from established insiders, disgruntled employees, suicidal, depressed, angry, anxious and other sampled groups. In addition, the sensitivity of the scales to changes over time as the risk of digital attack increased and transitioned to a physical attack was also examined in an actual case study. Inter-rater reliability for the SNIT was extremely high across groups while the SIRDC produced lower, but acceptable levels of agreement. Both measures also significantly distinguished the criterion groups from the overall Enron sample. The scales were then used to measure the frequency of negative sentiment and insider risk indicators in the random Enron sample and the relationship between the two constructs. While low levels of negative sentiment were found in 20% of the sample, moderate and high levels of negative sentiment were extremely rare, occurring in less than 1% of communications. Less than 4% of the sampled emails displayed indicators of insider risk on the SIRDC. Emails containing high levels of insider risk comprised less than one percent or the sample. Of the emails containing negative sentiment in the sample, only 16.3%, also displayed indicators of insider risk. The odds of a communication containing insider risk increased with the level of negative sentiment and only low levels of insider risk were found at low levels of negative sentiment. All of the emails found to contain insider risk indicators on the SIRDC also displayed some level of negative sentiment. The implications of these findings for insider risk detection were then examined.