Brazilian Political Science Review

e0001

Authors: Amanda Vitoria Lopes

Voting for a presidential ticket is a common characteristic that is particular to the majority of presidential systems. When a voter chooses a candidate for president, they are actually also voting for the other person on the ticket, in other words, the potential successor if the mandate is interrupted. Therefore, the selection of the candidate who will run for election alongside the presidential candidate represents an opportunity to nominate someone who can increase the ticket’s electorate or increase a possible president’s capacity for governance. In the literature there is an absence of systematic studies of these strategies used in the selection of vice-presidential candidates. In order to fill part of this gap, this study proposes a Vice-Presidential Candidate Profile Index (VPCPI), which allows an analysis of the strategies adopted in the selection of running mates. For the case of Brazil after redemocratization, the results were hybrid, in other words, strategies were adopted to select candidates who can help attract votes for the ticket, but who also have political experience to act in future governments.

e0004

Authors: George Avelino Filho, Ciro Biderman, Scott Desposato

An emerging literature finds that legislators frequently suffer a negative incumbency advantage in developing countries but disagrees as to the sources of this anti-incumbent bias. We contribute to this literature by examining the case of Brazil, where the extant literature predicts a large incumbency disadvantage. Building a new methodology for OLPR which leverages both inter- and intraparty thresholds, we find, contrary to expectations, a large ‘positive’ incumbency advantage. We further exploit within-country variation and show that this advantage appears to be largest in the least developed areas. Our results suggest that previous work may be confounding country-specific factors with development levels.

e0006

Authors: Sérgio Simoni Jr.

Recent controversies in the literature on the electoral effects of cash transfer programs reveal the limitations of traditional models associating public policies to voting. Why would beneficiaries reward parties for programmatic policies when the government has no control over the distribution of the benefits? Are they guided by short-term retrospective voting in favor of the incumbent without forming durable links? By studying the Brazilian case, based on the Bolsa Escola-Program, formulated by the PSDB, and the Bolsa-Família Program, formulated by the PT, I test different theories and propose an alternative approach. My thesis is that the long-term electoral effect of programmatic policies is a consequence of credit-claiming efforts made by the competing parties, resulting in reciprocity from voters. My argument is built on the examination of parliamentary deliberations throughout the formulation of these programs and on the analysis of public opinion surveys conducted in 2005, a transitional moment when there were beneficiaries of both programs, and in 2018, the year of the first presidential election with the Bolsa-Família Program being implemented with the PT as an opposition party. The data show that party leaders came to the defense of these social programs to varying degrees and in different moments of their terms in office and that these different mobilization strategies reflected on voting behavior.