Brazilian Political Science Review

e0002

Authors: Carla de Paiva Bezerra, Murilo de Oliveira Junqueira

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic policy innovation created in Brazil in the early 1990s, recognized worldwide as an effective policy tool for directly involving the population in budget decisions. Its diffusion in Brazil was strongly stimulated by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) as a showcase of the ‘Petista Way of Governing’. However, after the party took the presidential office, PB lost its status as a top participatory policy. Without its leading promoter, PB gradually declined in Brazil. What explains such a drastic change in PT’s policy preference? What are the possible explanations for the retrenchment of PB? We argue that gradual changes in fiscal laws have led to lower investment and tighter local budgets, reducing the effectiveness of PB and discouraging further adoption of this policy, thus resulting in its decline in Brazil. The shift in PT’s policy preference is therefore explained by the fact that the party adapted to the context of increasing budgetary rigidity. Using panel data analysis, we found that both the adoption and the continuity of PB at the local level between 1996 and 2016 are strongly correlated with budget and investment, a finding that supports our initial hypothesis.

e0004

Authors: Ursula Dias Peres

This paper aims at understanding the governance of public budgeting in large metropolises with the use of comparative analysis. The analysis is focused on budgetary governance in London and São Paulo and uses qualitative and quantitative data from 2008 to 2019 to understand whether analytical categories such as incrementalism of expenditures, complexity of budgetary rules, bureaucratic hierarchy, bargaining, and muddling through are useful to compare two metropolises, especially to determine the discretionary power of mayors in making budget allocation decisions. The analytical categories are derived from the studies of theorists of economics and political sociology, notably Wildavsky (1975, 1969), Wildavsky and Caiden (2004), Schick (2009, 1976), Caiden (2010) Lascoumes and Le Galès (2005), Baumgartner and Jones (2005), and Fuchs (2012, 2010). The main argument of the paper is that, despite the administrative and political differences between London and São Paulo, similar dimensions can explain decisions about budget allocation and the political discretionary power of mayors. The study shows that mayors have little discretionary power, particularly in contexts of fiscal austerity; it also highlights the importance of property tax as a means to protect such power.

e0007

Authors: Luís Locatelli

This article explores the connection between the proportional electoral system (PR) and party organizations as a key institutional determinant of party-group linkages from cross-party and national perspectives. Developing a nuanced framework, we propose an integrated model to address two questions: 01. Do candidate-centred electoral systems affect the development of party-group linkages? 02. In the case that electoral systems do have an impact, is it a direct impact or is it mediated by party organizations? Using V-Party (2020) and V-Dem (2020) databases, we selected and analyzed 617 parties in 48 countries covering third-wave democracies, post-communist countries, and the most extensive proportional democracies in Europe (Western and Eastern Europe) and Latin America between 1989 and 2019 – Large- N cross-national comparative analysis (JANDA, 1980). Based on panel models, we found that the candidate-centred electoral system is negatively related to the development of strong ties between parties and groups, but only in the case of party organizations with low levels of party strength, intraparty cohesion, and financial linkages with non-party groups. When decision-making powers are concentrated in the hands of powerful party elites, these elites can solve coordination problems, mitigate intraparty conflicts, and deal with the consequences of personalization. Therefore, intraparty politics varies empirically since parties respond to their contextual challenges (electoral rules) strategically, with consequences for party-group linkages.

e0001

Authors: Amanda Vitoria Lopes

Voting for a presidential ticket is a common characteristic that is particular to the majority of presidential systems. When a voter chooses a candidate for president, they are actually also voting for the other person on the ticket, in other words, the potential successor if the mandate is interrupted. Therefore, the selection of the candidate who will run for election alongside the presidential candidate represents an opportunity to nominate someone who can increase the ticket’s electorate or increase a possible president’s capacity for governance. In the literature there is an absence of systematic studies of these strategies used in the selection of vice-presidential candidates. In order to fill part of this gap, this study proposes a Vice-Presidential Candidate Profile Index (VPCPI), which allows an analysis of the strategies adopted in the selection of running mates. For the case of Brazil after redemocratization, the results were hybrid, in other words, strategies were adopted to select candidates who can help attract votes for the ticket, but who also have political experience to act in future governments.

e0004

Authors: George Avelino Filho, Ciro Biderman, Scott Desposato

An emerging literature finds that legislators frequently suffer a negative incumbency advantage in developing countries but disagrees as to the sources of this anti-incumbent bias. We contribute to this literature by examining the case of Brazil, where the extant literature predicts a large incumbency disadvantage. Building a new methodology for OLPR which leverages both inter- and intraparty thresholds, we find, contrary to expectations, a large ‘positive’ incumbency advantage. We further exploit within-country variation and show that this advantage appears to be largest in the least developed areas. Our results suggest that previous work may be confounding country-specific factors with development levels.

e0006

Authors: Sérgio Simoni Jr.

Recent controversies in the literature on the electoral effects of cash transfer programs reveal the limitations of traditional models associating public policies to voting. Why would beneficiaries reward parties for programmatic policies when the government has no control over the distribution of the benefits? Are they guided by short-term retrospective voting in favor of the incumbent without forming durable links? By studying the Brazilian case, based on the Bolsa Escola-Program, formulated by the PSDB, and the Bolsa-Família Program, formulated by the PT, I test different theories and propose an alternative approach. My thesis is that the long-term electoral effect of programmatic policies is a consequence of credit-claiming efforts made by the competing parties, resulting in reciprocity from voters. My argument is built on the examination of parliamentary deliberations throughout the formulation of these programs and on the analysis of public opinion surveys conducted in 2005, a transitional moment when there were beneficiaries of both programs, and in 2018, the year of the first presidential election with the Bolsa-Família Program being implemented with the PT as an opposition party. The data show that party leaders came to the defense of these social programs to varying degrees and in different moments of their terms in office and that these different mobilization strategies reflected on voting behavior.