Security and Defence Quarterly

3-14

Authors: Nikolay Todorov Dolchinkov

It is known that everything on our planet is subjected to constant exposure from the natural and anthropogenic, earth and space SIR, and is situated in conditions created by natural and technical radioactive Backlight. The ionizing radiations accompany planet life in its diff erent manifestations of all phases of the evolution. The National Automated System for continuous monitoring of the radiation background has 26 local monitoring stations (LMS) covering the whole country, with greater density around NPP ‘Kozloduy’. Radiometric measurements in real conditions, sampling, and analysis are carried out by the Executive Environment Agency (EEA) at the MoEW and radiological control laboratories. A special place in radiation safety is taken by timely detection of radioactive waste and materials that appear in one way or another in the environment.

32-49

Authors: Juha-Matti Lehtonen

EU Defence Ministers have adopted a joint Strategy on Defence Research & Technology (R&T) that includes a 2 % goal for defence R&T expenditure. Th is paper discusses the feasibility of such a goal for a small country, including the motivations for undertaking defence R&T work in small countries, and asks are they diff erent from the large countries? New and improved weapons systems that create a technological advantage in the battlefi eld are grounded on research in technology. However, as capability models demonstrate, there are also other aspects of military capability than the materiel which can therefore be a topic for research. Th rough reviewing a selection of strategy documents from large and small European countries, the fact that only large countries have fi nancial possibilities for major weapons system development and production is highlighted, while in small countries, this link from R&T through development to production and operation is broken. Both defence research and defence industrial base fi gures support this view. Small countries may still have a number of other reasons to engage in R&T in either technology or other areas, but these appear not to be able to suffi ciently motivate R&T expenditure even close to the 2% level.

79-97

Authors: Sergiy Orel

The methodology of environmental risk is becoming more common to assess the impact of chemical pollution on human beings and the environment, providing information for making environmental remediation decisions. This article examines the impact on human health chemicals that penetrated into river water as a result of an accident at a military ammunition depot. The river is the source of drinking water for the population. Assessing the impact of chemicals on the health of adults, adolescents and children is carried out in stages (tiers), from simple to complex. Assessment is carried out both for carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic substances. The first tier is executed by a deterministic method – a method in which all biological, chemical, physical, and environmental parameters are assumed to be constant and can be accurately specified. Deterministic methods commonly apply to either a “most likely” value for a parameter, or a conservative value. When the obtained values are insufficient for making the decision, the second tier of a risk assessment begins. The values in this case have the form of probability distributions that determine their variability. Processing the risk model with the help of the one-dimensional Monte Carlo method gives more accurate data in the form of risk distribution. However, the method does not consider the lack of knowledge about the values of input variables, so, at the third tier of a risk assessment, the two-dimensional Monte Carlo method is used. In this case, the specifi ed values of risk look like trend charts and indicate the limits of probability of risk for a certain percentage of the population.

3-18

Authors: Krystian Frącik

From July 2015, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) moved into the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and started acting in the supporting role. From that time, one of the most important Security Force Assistance tasks has been maintaining and developing relationships with its counterparts in the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) and Afghan National Defence Security Forces (ANDSF). Being aware of the importance of those connections, the enemies of Afghan society have attempted a tactic named Insider Attack (IA). Insider Attack is not a new means of tactic. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Britain and the Soviet Union were victim to insider attacks. Insider attacks have a significant strategic impact on the campaign, as they erode the relationship between the Afghan National Defence Security Forces and Coalition Forces. Insider attacks occur for numerous reasons, including personal grievances, insurgent influences, psychological distress, and ideological motivations. More than half of the attackers have insurgent ties. NATO utilises Target Focused Analysis & Neutralisation and Counter Intelligence Support Teams to screen, vet, and interview persons of interest, as well as collect, analyse, and exploit biometric data, documents, and media. Other measures implemented to mitigate insider threats are the threat Awareness and Reporting Programme (TARP) and the Terrorism Espionage and Sedition briefing to RSM personnel. Incorporating appropriate lessons learned from the British, Russian and ISAF experience into RSM training and operations will have a positive impact on responding to Insider Attacks while reducing their frequency across the Combined Joint Operational Area - Afghanistan. It is clear that the common approach to defeating Insider Threats must be holistic and each activity should be conducted according to equal principles. The conceptual framework for countering Insider Threats has five functions: prepare, deter, detect, respond, recover and exploit. This conceptual framework underpins the common approach and guides of counter - measures. While skills and drills are important, combatting Insider Threats is first and foremost about mindset and therefore it needs to be command-led. If proper preparation makes Coalition Forces members culturally adaptive, develops effective systems and procedures, and hones military skills and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, NATO will be able succeed in the Resolute Support Mission.

46-73

Authors: Juha Mattila, Simon Parkinson

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has made major advances in linking physical dimension through information to cognitive dimension as described by John Perry et al. (2004) in their model for Information Superiority. The information technology linkage between the physical and cognitive dimensions has created new ways of effect both for the red and blue force. The paper focuses on the information dimension and searches for better models to describe the structure of blue force information, especially from the Enterprise Architecture (EA) approach. Enterprise Architecture has been developed to better communicate the complex structures of military capabilities. Major EA frameworks (TOGAF, DODAF) recognise the layer of information between business and technology, but in practice, the focus turns more to the technology as has happened in several Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Enterprise Resource Management (ERM) programmes. The paper develops a tool for architects to use in measuring the maturity of information management in the current military organisation and in defining the possible paths of evolution in information management available for the military.

100-117

Authors: Grzegorz Pilarski

The fact that NATO has acknowledged cyberspace as the fifth dimension of combat operations indicates that this problem issue is really topical and is pointing at the direction from which the possible threat can be expected. However, the issues of information communication technology (ICT) security on the national level have been tackled in numerous countries for many years. Technological advancement has resulted in making communication, and at the same time services rendered in cyberspace, an international domain. Thus, the aspects of cyberspace threats should be considered through the international prism. The above-presented approach has become an incentive for the author to take up research on international activities in terms of cyberspace defence and reaction to the already identified as well as future threats.

3-29

Authors: Marzena Żakowska

Serbia began the process of integration with the European Union in 2003. After eleven years on a difficult road to the transformation of political and constitutional contexts, Serbia gained the chance to become a member of the Community. On the path to accession to the European Union, Serbia had to resolve some strategic challenges, of which the main one is the problem of regulating the political status of Kosovo.

45-69

Authors: Adam Radomyski, Witold Materak

The contents of this article are focused on presenting the results of research concerning development of the means of air threat as a major determinant of changes in the modernisation of the air defence system in Poland. In this regard, the authors emphasise the role and means of air threat as a kind of pacemaker development of air defence systems. In this article, the main area of scientific considerations are technical and tactical aspects concerned with the evolution of manned and unmanned aircraft. The directions of their development of combat capabilities and an estimate of their use in contemporary and future battlefields against military objectives and non-military ones are covered. The article has high educational value and highlights future threats to the state air defence system and development trends in the twenty-first century.

93-109

Authors: Dariusz Drzewiecki

A definition of the concept of information was placed in the publication of spatial ata with reference to the hydrometeorological systems covering the country. The next keys to the encryption and transmitting of hydrometeorological measurement were specified in the international system for warning against the dangerous phenomena of the weather. The characteristics of meteorological data they presented were based on the system of weather satellites (circumpolar and geostationary) and of the POLRAD radar system, included in the radar security system of European space. At the end, a few examples were given of geoportals monitoring the state of the natural environment and elements of the ISOK security system, the SMOK system and SSH military system of the Republic of Poland.

5-20

Authors: Sławomir Piotrowski

The crisis in eastern Ukraine and Crimea is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges of security currently facing the international community. In pursuing its objectives, the state is often guided by different motives, but the common denominator change in the approach to cooperation with Russia is now Ukraine. The author analyses the changing geostrategic situation surrounding Russia, which is the result of its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. This has also been analysed by countries like China, Japan, India, Turkey and Middle East countries.

35-51

Authors: Marcin Urbański

In this article, the author examines the Arctic region in the context of the energy and security policy of the Russian Federation. The author emphasises the factors which currently influence the increasing interest in the Arctic of the countries which claim rights to this region, which are: the US, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Russian Federation. Among the most important factors indicating the essence of the Arctic, the author points out, inter alia: plenty of energy deposits, which because of the changing climate, are more available, the size of the Arctic area and new transport routes. The author indicates the possibilities of using the Russian Federation policy regarding the Arctic in order to, among other things, strengthen the country’s international position. The author also presents the extent to which claiming the right to exclusive exploitation of mineral resources by the Russian Federation is the real motive of its actions and its intention to totally subordinate the Arctic area. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to answer the question whether the Arctic is likely to be a place of military conflict in the future? The article also examines the issues related to the legal status of the Russian Federation regarding the Arctic, the political activity of the Russian Federation in this region and the possibility of the Russian Federation exploiting energy resources in the Arctic region. The article brings together the issues connected with the Russian Federation and its policy in the region of the Arctic Ocean, and also portrays the importance of the Arctic in the changing international security environment.

75-98

Authors: Milton Paul Davis

Modern political thinkers have ushered in the theoretical concepts of modern alliances and collective security/defense. Before these political theories were turned into modern organizations, many radical changes had to take place in how international relations were perceived in Europe and the world. These dynamic changes started at the end of the Thirty Years War, with the signing of the Westphalia treaties in 1648, and came to fruition with the forming of the League of Nations in 1920. This article explores this 272 year historical process including its impact on the population of the Baltic Sea countries.

121-133

Authors: Robert Kobryński

In this article, the author presents some common areas for the categories of power and security. Diagnosis of the security environment of a political unit should include both A qualitative and quantitative approach to the assessment of its power and that of neighbouring countries. Such comparisons of balance of power between the countries give the security assessment a broader range. it may be used, in addition, by design for the foreign and security policy of a state.

147-163

Authors: Radim Zahradníček, Pavel Otřísal, Zdeněk Skaličan

Managing the consequences after using weapons of mass destruction is considered a classic task of the Chemical Corps units and formations. Restoring essential combat capability of troops and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event is a primary goal of operations, which are termed “CBRN consequence management”. The paper discusses the current approach to the topic in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provides notes from operational experience that can lead to the development of relevant military capabilities. Based on an analysis of theoretical and practical approaches, the authors propose capability areas of modern Chemical Corps units that support CBRN consequence management operations.