Russian Journal of Political Studies

14-21

Authors: Marianna Napolitano

This paper’s aim is grasping the issue of tradition-change in the Russian Federation from religious and cultural perspective. In particular, it will consider the return to power of the Russian Orthodox Church in post-soviet era, analysing the ideology on which its role is based on, and its connections with Kremlin’s ideology. After the failure of the Soviet project, a large part of Russia’s political elites believe that Russia must adapt its political and religious systems according to its own history and identity: this shift means henceforth the idea that Russia must not be a copy of Western world. One harbinger of this idea was the concept of “managed democracy” developed by V. Surkov and embraced by the Kremlin in 2004. The concept may be interpreted in strict relation with the one of Russkij Mir, developed later to identify the community of ethnic Russians, The second harbinger may be seen in the “traditional values” discourse, that present Russia as a different civilizational universe. Although it is difficult to trace the exact moment in which the term traditional values was used for the first time in explicit opposition to liberal values, it is designated to denote the moral sphere, and this field has become the center of the Church presence in the public debate. In 2014, in his annual state of the nation address, President Putin pointed to traditional value as one of the country’s policy priorities: this is perfectly coherent with Russia tendency in the public sphere to define its international activity in terms of moral duty. This is true in particular in relation to the liberal – secularized West, appointed as the “antichrist”. What are the terms and reasons of this opposition? Which kind of principles allow us to identify the Russian community as different from the western one?