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The Problem of Scientific Method in the Second Positivism
Authors: Sergey A. Lebedev, Sergey N. Kos’kov
Number of views: 206
In 70-ies of the XIX century to replace the first positivism in the philosophy of science comes second positivism, the main representatives of which were well-known Austrian physicist and historian of science, Ernst Mach and the eminent French mathematician and physicist Henri Poincare. Continuity second positivism in relation to the first was two points. Firstly, it is the denial of the scientific nature of the entire classical ("metaphysical") philosophy (from Plato to Hegel, etc.); secondly, in the empiricist interpretation of the nature and content of scientific knowledge. Major differences between the first and second positivism were also two: firstly, representatives of the second positivism believed that in science there is no pure empirical knowledge, not dependent on any theory, and secondly, that the possible discovery and evidence of scientific logic laws and theories. According to representatives of the positivism of the second process of opening scientific laws is not logical, but the psychological process, where the decisive role played by experience, intuition and creativity of the scientist. And secondly, and the process of making scientific hypotheses are not governed by purely methodological rules and is a product of a convention of scientists (Poincare), or governed by considerations of economy of thought, when at the same explanatory power of scientific hypotheses are preferred the most simple of them in meaningful plane. However, a clear elimination representatives of the second positivism role of methodological control in the processes of discovery and justification of scientific knowledge had as its inevitable consequence of excessive subjectivization process of scientific knowledge and the negation of his natural character (internal logic of development), as well as its objective determination (the object of study and the social context of knowledge).