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The Problem of Scientific Method in the Logical Positivism
Authors: Sеrgey A. Lebedev
Number of views: 361
Logical positivism is one of the leading areas of philosophy and methodology of science of the XX century. This is the third stage of the evolution of positivism, which replaced its second stage, represented empiriocriticism Mach and conventionalism of Poincare. In contrast the first positivism (Comte, John. St. Mill, G. Spencer), representatives of the second positivism believed that there is not only the logic of the discovery of scientific laws and theories, but also the logic of justification and adoption. They believed that the process of invited of scientific hypotheses, and the process of their adoption is not governed by the rules (methods) of logic, that both of these cognitive processes are psychological and creative. Logical positivism (B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, R. Carnap, H. Reichenbach and others) appeared in the wake of the successful development of mathematical logic. The program of its application to the analysis of the structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge was the main purpose of the methodology of logical positivism as a new program of the philosophy of science. The logical positivists agree with the fact that there is no opening of the scientific laws and theories of logic, that the nomination of scientific hypotheses is to a large extent a creative and psychological process. But they believed that it is possible to build an ideal model of a logical structure of scientific theory and assessment from the viewpoint the model structure of real scientific theories according to their proximity to the ideal model. Secondly, they believed that it is possible the reconstruction of the logical process of confirmation of scientific laws and theories of facts and calculate the degree of such confirmation. The knowledge this extent should be a rational reason to choice the best of competing hypotheses. This part of the epistemological program of logical positivism was named as “neoinduktivism”. Its implementation is anticipated the possibility of constructing a probabilistic inductive logic and its application to the evaluation of the degree of confirmation of the actual scientific hypotheses and theories. The article shows that none of the stated objectives of the methodological program of logical positivism was not achieved, that the structure of scientific knowledge and the process of verification and acceptance by scientists of scientific theories and hypotheses can not to be reconstructed (modeled) by purely logical means, that these cognitive structures and processes are not purely logical, and that require for their adequate description of a more complex categorical language than the language of logic.