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The Economic Development of the Russian State in the 17th–18th centuries: Modernization or Protomodernization

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the economic processes in Russia in the 17th–18th centuries taking into account the main provisions of the modernization theory. The mentioned theory is the foundation of the methodological apparatus in this research, and regarding the indicated period it is interpreted in its classical formulation as a transition from a traditional (agrarian) society to a modern (industrial) one. Particular attention is paid to such features of the Russian modernization model as ‘catching up’ nature, as well as determination of the starting point, factor and mechanism of modernization processes in the national history. The correlation of the economic development of the Russian state and the main trends of transition from tradition to modernity is carried out on the basis of transformation of the key features inherent in the traditional economy into characteristics that are present in the market/mixed system. At the same time, the emphasis is made on such changes as transition of the priority position of agriculture to industry; presence of basic signs of industrial revolution; establishment of pluralism of ownership forms instead of the predominance of the collective-community; elimination of tendencies that distinguish natural economy; formation of basic principles of state regulation of economic relations; widespread functioning of the laws of value, supply and demand, as well as the competition mechanism; introducing freedom of the producer and consumer’s actions into mass practice. Based on these criteria, it is concluded that the Russian society of the 17th century should be characterized as a traditional society. The shifts that have emerged in the economy of the Russian Empire of the 18th century allow speaking only of protomodernization, since the industrial revolution was identified in a series of economic realities of the historical development of Russia not earlier than the 30s of the 19th century.

Keywords: modernization, ‘catching up’ modernization, protomodernization, economy, Russia, traditional/agrarian society, modern/industrial society, modernization factor, modernization mechanism, Great Northern War.

1. Introduction

Historical processes can be viewed through the prism of various concepts: formational, modernization, civilizational, world-systemic, institutional, synergetic, postmodern, etc. (Mironov, 2018: 31-74). However, the use of a single concept for creating explanatory models for the historical development of all countries and peoples cannot always give a result that will be considered objective and highly productive. Such universalism often leads to the fact that “historical facts are adjusted to a predetermined scheme” (Mironov, 2018: 65). A striking example is the dominance of the formation approach, which took place in the national historical science of the Soviet period.

Trying to overcome mono-conceptual determinism, historians, philosophers, sociologists and political scientists come to the idea of the necessity to combine various theories of historical development, hoping that the synergistic effect will be productive in this case and the resulting interpretative model will be able to

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claim objectivity and deep insight into the essence of the studied phenomena. Of course, such a methodological device may have the right to exist and lead to serious historical research.

However, the application of only one specific concept to the interpretation of historical processes that took place in the development of various states at certain stages of their formation, depending on the goals set, can also be fully realized. In this case, we mean the time interval of the 18th – the first half of the 20th centuries for the Russian state. In our opinion, an acceptable concept for creating an interpretive model of historical processes in Russia in the period indicated above is the modernization theory. The possibility of practical application of this theory is often called into question because of its dichotomy expressed in explaining the development of various countries and peoples as a transition from a traditional society (often associated with the East) to a modern one (identified with the West) (Kapustin, 2001: 14). It should be noted that in this case the so-called classical interpretation of the modernization theory is taken as a basis. According to critics, the dichotomy of the modernization concept outlined above leads to the unidirectionality of the historical process, when “periods of non-linear development are ignored” (Bagdasaryan, 2022: 80). This provision is quite justified if we give the classical interpretation of the modernization theory a universal character (Bukhovets, 2016: 35-36, 48). However, if the modernization concept is used to interpret historical processes within a narrower framework, for example, for the development of the Russian state in the 18th – first half of the 20th centuries, the above classical interpretation has the right to practical implementation.

In this case, we should talk about the priority of Western civilization, which, with the help of various measures and means (where wars played one of the important roles), tried to extend its influence to the rest of the world. Characterizing the Western civilizational type, S. Huntington distinguishes “three major components, in Europe, North America, and Latin America” (Khantington, 2006: 54). The American researcher notes that the first sprouts of the Western power and its “overpowering, unidirectional impact” on all other civilizations appeared towards the end of the 15th century. As evidence, he cites the following facts: the expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula and the penetration of the Portuguese into Asia and the Spaniards into both Americas (Khantington, 2006: 63). At that moment, within the framework of Western civilization, the European center dominated. However, such a monopoly was gradually becoming a thing of the past, when the United States and most of Latin American countries gained independence from their European mother countries. Despite this fact, the influence of Western civilization continued to expand, when it began to control almost all of Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Khantington, 2006: 63).

Such a strengthening of the position of the West, according to S. Huntington, is explained by a complex of reasons, summarizing which the American scientist comes to the following conclusion: “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do” (Khantington, 2006: 65).

The dominance of Western civilization continued, according to the author of the monograph “The Clash of Civilizations”, until the early 20th century. This does not mean a complete cessation of Western influence on the rest of the world. In the previous century the power of Europe and the United States began to decline, and the relationship between Western and other civilizations “was dominated by the reactions of the West to developments in those civilizations” (Khantington, 2006: 67).

A.J. Toynbee adhered to a similar point of view with approximately the same chronological framework. In his fundamental work “A Study of History”, the English philosopher also dates the rise of Western civilization and the beginning of its expansion of influence on other countries to the last quarter of the 15th century, when it began to master the technique of ocean navigation, which led to a clash between the Old and New Worlds. At the same time, Toynbee notes that the peak of the dominant role of the West fell on the period between 1683 (the second siege of Vienna by the Turks) and the Second World War. After the end of the latter war, “one of the rivals in the struggle for political power again turned out to be a non-European power”, by which the USSR was meant (Toynbi, 2006b: 197).

Close in conceptual features to the two points of view indicated above in terms of their theses and conclusions about the problem of the Western influence on the non-Western world, one should consider the position of the well-known Russian researcher of modernization problems V.G. Fedotova. The main premise for the formation of her interpretation model is the comprehension of the ‘catching up’ version of modernization, which is widespread in Russian humanities. V.G. Fedotova is trying to overcome the dichotomy of the classical interpretation of modernization processes through a modern understanding of the modernization theory, where Western civilization is treated not as the only one model, but as one of the possible models for the development of non-Western countries, which is generally characterized by such a concept as “Multiple Modernities” (Eisenstadt, 2000; Huntington, 2016: 100-101; Sztompka, 2015: 26-27). The author of the monograph “Modernization and Culture” clearly associates the superiority of the West with the New Age (Fedotova, 2016: 40). At the same time, she notes the debatability of the beginning and end of this time interval in the periodization of the world history (Fedotova, 2016: 48).

V.G. Fedotova is a supporter of the historical development law “Challenge-Response” formulated and proved by A.J. Toynbee (Toynbi, 2006a: 134-157). In relation to the problem posed, this was refracted through the violent, in many cases, impact of Western civilization on non-Western societies (Fedotova, 2016: 38).

However, it does not mean that there is only an external factor to start the transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one. In these cases, the non-Western world often had its own needs for modernization recognized by its political elite who were a kind of actor in the modernization processes (Fedotova, 2016: 33-37).

Despite the less unambiguous position of V.G. Fedotova regarding the chronological framework of the intensive influence of the West on other countries, she generally agrees with S. Huntington and A.J. Toynbee. The beginning of this process, in her opinion, coincides with the so-called era of mercantilism, during which “the challenge of the West was its ability to master the world space” (Fedotova, 2016: 46). Further, V.G. Fedotova distinguishes five phases in the formation of the West. At the same time, the last two of them are defined as “the era of the scientific and technological revolution that began in the mid-1950s of the 20th century and “new technological cycles of the 21st century” (Fedotova, 2016: 47-48) interpreted through the terms “late modernity” and “postmodernity” (Fedotova, 2016: 50). It is for the last two phases that V.G. Fedotova uses a broad understanding of the concept “modernization”, in which the West is considered as one of the possible alternatives among “Multiple Modernities”.

Based on the above reasoning, it is necessary to formulate the basic problems that will be partially or completely solved in this work on the basis of empiricism that took place in the economic development of the Russian state in the 17th–18th centuries:

1. Expediency of the monoconceptual approach, stated as the main thesis in the initial part of this paper, as an explanatory model of the historical development of the Russian state.
2. Identification of the features of the Russian version of modernization, such as:
 - a. the starting point of modernization processes in Russia;
 - b. determination of the mechanism and factor of Russian modernization.

2. Materials and methods

Taking into account the methodological orientation of the article, materials should include scientific papers evaluating the heuristic potential of the modernization paradigm. There is no unity of views on this aspect among domestic scientists, and existing points of view can be combined into three approaches:

1. The critical approach is explicitly presented in the works of B.G. Kapustin and V.P. Buldakov. The first researcher, analyzing the application of the modernization theory to the history of the Russian state in the last fifteen years of the 20th century, reveals its following shortcomings: developmentalism, a linear evolutionist interpretation of history, a rigid opposition between “tradition” and “modernity”, etc. (Kapustin, 2001: 14). The second researcher does not see the need to raise the question of the modernization development in Russia, the result of which should be an innovative type of consciousness that implies self-restraint of the state, which is not ready for such a scenario (Buldakov, 2016: 79-82).

2. The skeptical approach was formulated by the Belarusian historian O.G. Bukhovets. He believes that transitological models used by domestic scientists to interpret Russian reality at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries cannot be universal. However, the modernization discourse, in his opinion, is quite applicable to explaining the historical processes that took place in the late Russian Empire and the Soviet State until the middle of the last century (Bukhovets, 2016: 35-36, 41-44, 48).

3. The optimistic approach can be traced in the works of V.G. Fedotova, B.N. Mironov and others. The first researcher, arguing with B.G. Kapustin, reveals such flaws in the position of critics of the modernization theory as the ontologization of theoretical constructs, anti-historicism and presentism as a kind of the latter (Fedotova, 2016: 118). The second researcher notes the long evolutionary path covered by the modernization paradigm, which allowed its supporters to revise “such fundamental characteristics of the modernization process as irreversibility, progressiveness, length, evolutionism, unilinearity, regularity, randomness” (Mironov, 2018: 41).

The methodological basis of the paper is the modernization theory. Based on the above points of view, it is necessary to summarize that the concept “modernization” can be interpreted using two meanings:

- a) narrow (classical) understanding: as a transition from an agrarian (traditional) society to an industrial (modern) one;

- b) broad: as “a specific way of social establishment that provides the population with wide-open access to the expanding capabilities of human potential implementation” (Sztompka, 2015: 25).

When creating an explanatory model for the history of Russia, both interpretations can be used, but in relation to different periods. Thus, the first of them, in our opinion, is more in line with the realities of the historical development of the 18th – the first half of the 20th centuries. This thesis will be substantiated below. As for the broad meaning, it mainly characterizes the period of the second half of the 20th – early 21st centuries. The starting point here should be considered the First World War that became a landmark event determining the crisis phenomena, which consisted in the exhaustion of the potential for the development of an industrial society and the start of the transition to a post-industrial one. This trigger determined the formation of the situation, which many researchers assessed as “Multiple Modernities”. The main part of this work, which is largely methodological in nature, is devoted to a more detailed identification and justification of the features of the Russian version of modernization.

3. Discussion

I.V. Poberezhnikov, a well-known domestic specialist on the problems of modernization, in his works notes the debatability in the issue of determining the beginning of modernization processes in Russia (Poberezhnikov, 2015: 12; Poberezhnikov, 2021: 90–91). In particular, he classifies the existing points of view on this issue in relation to the five starting chronological cut-offs:

“1. 16th–18th centuries.

2. The era of Petrine reforms (the most common point of view among both foreign and Russian scientists).

3. Early 19th century (at the same time, the period of the 16th–18th centuries is interpreted as an epoch of the continuation of old traditions; in this case, Petrine reforms are not considered as a watershed in the history of Russia).

4. The era of the Great Reforms.

5. The turn of the 19th–20th centuries” (Poberezhnikov, 2015: 12).

Such temporal differentiation, according to the Ural researcher, is due to different interpretations of the term “modernization”.

At the same time, characterizing imperial modernization, I.V. Poberezhnikov actually distinguishes two stages in its development: proto-industrial (manufactory) stage, which had Petrine reforms as a starting point, and early industrial stage, which started either from the 1830s (the beginning of the industrial revolution), or from the mid-1880s (“the establishment of the modern economic growth model in the Russian economy”) (Poberezhnikov, 2021: 94–95).

The controversy of the issue regarding the start of modernization processes in Russia is also noted by B.N. Mironov, who in most of his modern works uses the modernization theory as a key methodological basis. He also notes the pluralism of opinions on the concept “modernization” as the main reason for the lack of a single point of view on the problem of the beginning of transition of the Russian state from an agrarian society to an industrial one. Referring to the experience of Great Britain, the historian from St. Petersburg proposes to consider the industrial revolution as a basic process, which indicates a clear manifestation of Russia’s transition from traditional to modern society. Proceeding from this, B. N. Mironov conducts a periodization of Russian modernization as follows: “1) 18th – first half of the 19th centuries, 2) second half of the 19th century – 1917. Moreover, he considers the first stage as prerequisites for the industrial revolution (protomodernization), while the second stage is viewed as modernization itself, the start of which was laid by the industrial revolution dating back to the 1830s–1850s (Mironov, 2017: 16–17; Mironov, 2018: 663).

Regarding the mechanism of modernization processes, I. V. Poberezhnikov gives a clear statement of this problem. In particular, he analyzes the views of two Western scientists W. Rostow and N. Smelser. The first one has an economic approach, the cornerstone of which is a mechanism of “growth in the rate of accumulation” (Poberezhnikov, 2014: 143), while the second one represents a sociological interpretation of the problem, which is based on structural differentiation (Poberezhnikov, 2014: 144).

Among domestic researchers who are supporters of the ‘catching-up’ model of modernization, the wave mechanism of the development of modernization processes in Russia prevails in the explanatory model (Gavrov, 2004: 38–72; Kononov et al., 2014: 102). Offering a typology of civilizations in the modernization key, V.G. Fedotova singles out the “mechanism of development” as one of the criteria. This mechanism, in her opinion, can be innovative, mobilizing, based on a combination of innovations and mobilizations or on statist mechanisms or dictatorships (Fedotova, 2016: 79–80). For Western countries, modernization is based on the replacement of tradition with innovation. In traditional societies, according to V.G. Fedotova, innovation is allowed as long as it does not threaten tradition, otherwise innovation ends with a return to tradition, which is characterized as cyclical development (Fedotova, 2016: 86).

The concept “modernization factor” has practically not been developed either in domestic or foreign historiography. A.J. Toynbee interprets this term in the form of “challenges”, which are classified as: a) the Stimulus of Hard Countries; b) the Stimulus of New Ground; c) the Stimulus of Blows; d) the Stimulus of Pressure; e) the Stimulus of Penalizations. Taking into account the ‘catching-up’ model of Russian modernization, the most appropriate factor in this case, in our opinion, is “the Stimulus of Blows”. Wars should be considered as such “blows” when “the unexpected crushing defeat could stimulate a defeated side to bring everything in order and prepare a victorious counterattack” (Toynbi, 2006a: 397–399). E. and H. Toffler agree with a similar point of view: “Past wars reach across time to affect our lives today. The torrents of blood spilled centuries ago over issues now forgotten, the bodies charred, impaled, broken or blown into nothingness, the children reduced to swollen bellies and stick-limbs – all shaped the world we inhabit today” (Toffler, Toffler, 2005: 2).

4. Results

In our opinion, determining the start of modernization processes in Russia should be correlated with the starting point of its transition from a traditional society to a modern one in the economic sphere. It was the latter that had more favorable starting conditions than the political, social or spiritual subsystems of Russian society. For this purpose, it is enough to analyze the general course of development of the Russian state in the 17th century. Quite naturally, the question may arise: why not consider the possibility of the

presence of modernization changes in an earlier period? The answer will be as follows. Europe was the West civilization where modernization manifested itself for the first time. In this case, Europe is understood as a concept, and not a region, which significantly narrows its geographical scope (Fedotova, 2016: 59-73). The shift in the vector of modernization processes in the West went in line with such a trend as (Figure 1).




Fig. 1. The vector of modernization processes in the development of the Western Civilization

The spiritual modernization of Europe was based on the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, which led to significant transformations in the mentality of Western European society through the spread of anthropocentrism, humanism and religious pluralism, the secularization of public consciousness, and the formation of a special work ethic. Chronologically, these tendencies manifested themselves in the 14th–18th centuries. Further, the transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one continued as part of the democratization of the political system during the European revolutions of the 16th–17th centuries, as a result of which either a constitutional monarchy or a republic was established in different countries. And, finally, economic modernization as a basis is built on the industrial revolution, which in Great Britain, the leader of the economic development in Europe at that time, began no earlier than the 18th century. The economic transition from a traditional society to a modern one was accompanied by corresponding changes in the social sphere: an increase in the level of social differentiation, social mobility, urbanization, and the level of education among the population; the formation of individualism as the main social attitude that replaced collectivism.

In Russia, these processes could take place only in a later period, therefore, it is not possible to talk about any prerequisites for modernization transformations before the 17th century. Nevertheless, even during this period, Russian society was a society of a traditional type. If we analyze the state of the domestic political sphere, it should be noted that the reign of the first Romanovs was marked, first of all, by the formation of an absolute monarchy. Estate-representative bodies, organizationally taking shape in the sphere of public administration in Russia in the second half of the 15th – 16th centuries, gradually lost their influence in the indicated period: the practice of convening Zemsky Sobor ceased to be implemented in the second half of the 17th century, and the Boyar Duma ceased to exist at the turn of the 17th–18th centuries. The system of *prikazy* reached its climax as the bureaucratic beginning of the administrative apparatus. A set of laws the *Ulozhenie* summed up the existing trends. And, finally, the struggle between secular and ecclesiastical authorities, which was clearly outlined as early as the 16th century, passed one of its key stages through the conflict between Alexis and Patriarch Nikon, which ultimately led to the deprivation of patriarchal dignity and marked the strengthening of the position of the tsar. The abovementioned list of trends indicating that the Russian state steadily followed the line of strengthening the autocratic-monarchist principle in governance, which in fact was the direct opposite of the result of modernization in the political sphere – the liberalization and democratization of the political regime, the formation of the right-wing state and civil society, is not complete.

In the social sphere, there were also changes that went in the opposite direction relative to the basic modernization trends. The *Ulozhenie* was the final point on the way to the formation of serfdom for the peasantry, which at that time constituted the predominant majority in the social structure of Russian society. This fact led to the conservation of existing social relations and did not provide an opportunity for the development of the modernization plan trends that were outlined above with a general description of the European transition from tradition to modernity.

The spiritual attitudes inherent in the bulk of the Russian society did not correspond to the main result of modernization in the mental plan – an innovative type of thinking, the desire to change existing life practices, individualism, egalitarianism in family relations, secularization of public consciousness, rationalism of the worldview. If we characterize the spiritual world of Russian society in the 17th century, the main role will be played in it by such social attitudes as patriarchal relations (or paternalism), religiosity, monarchism, the principles of egalitarian land use (or social justice), communal collectivism combined with individual principles (Kozhevnikova, 2011; Porshneva, 2000: 91-102).

Considering the direction of our study, we will define the main features inherent in the economy in a traditional society, and then on this basis we will analyze the main results of the economic development of the Russian state in the 17th century. In this case, it is necessary to talk about the traditional economic system, which, when conducting a typology of economic relations, is singled out by theorists along with

market, mixed and planned (administrative-command) systems. Its main characteristics are the predominance of the agricultural sector in the economy structure; high proportion of manual labor in production technologies; the presence of the subsistence economy, which as a consequence has a low level of trade development; the prevalence of collective (communal) property over other forms (state, private); the basic units of industrial production become the handicraft workshop and the family farm.

Next, we outline the main trends in the economic development of Russia in the 17th century with a view to their correlation with the features of the traditional economy outlined above. None of the historians disputes the fact that agriculture was still the foundation of the economic sphere of the Russian state during this period. This is evidenced, first of all, by the fact that peasants in the social structure of Russian society constituted the absolute majority – 88.7% (Mironov, 2018: 445). The Time of Troubles made quite significant adjustments to almost all spheres of Russian society, including the system of economic relations, and specifically agriculture (Milov, 2001: 24). First of all, it is worth noting the reduction in the area of cultivated land, since the hostilities and social upheavals at the turn of the 16th–17th centuries covered the most agriculturally (and not only) developed territories of European Russia. The recovery process in this case dragged on for decades. Most of the farms used traditional systems and methods of land cultivation associated with slash-and-burn (*podsechno-ognevoye*) and *perelog* agriculture and previously spread three-field farming (*trekhpol'e*). Under the prevailing conditions it was impossible to talk about any mechanization of agriculture. The degree of peasants' involvement in commodity-money relationship was at an extremely low level due to naturalization of relations, which led to almost complete self-sufficiency of the rural population. The main strategy for the development of the agricultural sector was not the introduction of new technologies, but the further expansion of extensiveness, which received significant support from the colonization of Siberian and Far Eastern lands (Murav'eva, 2001: 81-82).

However, the economy of the Russian state during the period under study was also marked by the emergence of new phenomena in the system of social production. In this case, we are talking about the development of entrepreneurial activity, including the manufacturing industry. The sprouts of the indicated tendencies can also be found in earlier periods, in particular, in the second half of the 15th – the first half of the 16th centuries, when the Cannon Yard (Pushchniy Dvor) and the Armory (Oruzheynaya Palata), resembling manufactories in their characteristics, were created (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 54-55). However, even in the next century, the development of manufactory production did not become the dominant trend in the Russian economy (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 62). In many ways, various factors affected this situation, including the consequences of the Time of Troubles, the overcoming of which stretched for almost half a century; insufficient private capital, which could significantly change the situation around; strict legal regulation, under which the owner of the manufactory could not feel himself the full owner of the enterprise; the weak formation of the free labor market, which was held back by the presence of serfdom for peasants; unsuccessful economic reforms (increasing the price for salt and introducing copper money into circulation) in order to replenish the state treasury, which led to corresponding social upheavals and destabilization of the internal situation of the state; and others. Therefore, the number of manufactories that functioned on the territory of the Russian state seems negligible, and during the 17th century it did not show a desire to increase: in general, according to researchers, about 60 manufactories arose during this period, while by the end of this period there were no more than 30 manufactories (Murav'eva, 2001: 82).

However, along with these rather negative factors, it is necessary to highlight positive aspects that contributed to the development of domestic manufactory production in the analyzed period. In this series, it should also be noted the relative stabilization of the domestic and foreign political situation associated primarily with overcoming the consequences of the Time of Troubles; the creation of an appropriate legal basis through the *Ulozhenie* of 1649, the Customs Charter (*Tamozheniy Ustav*) of 1653, the Trade Charter (*Torgovaya Ustavnaya Gramota*) of 1654, the New Trade Charter (*Novotorgoviy Ustav*) of 1667, etc.; the regional specialization of the economy; the formation of the all-Russian market; the beginning of Siberia development; the activation of foreign trade relations, first of all, with England, Holland, as well as other European countries; and others (Murav'eva, 2005: 54-55; Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 58). These phenomena led to the formation of a relatively ramified structure of domestic entrepreneurship: “state, palace and private. The latter, in turn, was divided into boyars and nobles, merchants, townspeople, monastic and foreign” (Murav'eva, 2005: 62). But even with such a structure, it is worth talking only about creating prerequisites for the formation of manufacturing production in Russia, which does not allow to define it as a leading trend in the functioning of the domestic economy.

Trade at that time occupied a fairly large place in the system of domestic entrepreneurship. The most significant phenomena that took place in the 17th century have already been indicated above. However, a pronounced protectionist policy, pursued during the reign of Alexis and associated to a greater extent with the activities of A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin, should also be mentioned. It was outlined almost at the very beginning of the reign of the second monarch from the Romanov dynasty, when various privileges previously granted to English merchants began to be cancelled. With the help of the legislative acts already mentioned above, customs duties, which were 2-3 times higher than similar measures provided for Russian merchants, were established for foreigners in the middle of the 17th century. The culminating moment in the implementation of this policy was the New Trade Charter of 1667. It established a ban on retail and

significantly limited wholesale trade for foreigners, while duties were levied on them only in gold and silver and could reach 22 %. However, all the positive phenomena that characterized Russian trade in the 17th century could not overcome one of the main features of the traditional economy inherent in the Russian state, i.e. the naturalization of economic relations, since, as noted above, there was a weak involvement of the peasant economy in commodity-money relationship.

The thoughtfulness of the economic policy of the state left much to be desired. The most important factor that forced the authorities to resort to changes in the fiscal and monetary plan was the regular shortage of money in the treasury. This was largely due to the creation of “new model” regiments, the maintenance of which required serious funds, while the amount of financial expenses was constantly increasing. According to the calculations made by V. O. Klyuchevsky, the number of military formations that were financed from the state treasury from 1631 to 1681 increased by 2 times, while the cost of maintaining them more than tripled (Klyuchevskiy, 1989a: 203). An important role in this regard was played by military foreign policy actions carried out by the Russian authorities.

In general, the Russian state was in the general trend of the tax policy pursued by the leading European countries. The theory of mercantilism that prevailed in Europe provided for the replacement of direct taxation with indirect one. According to the apt testimony of V.O. Klyuchevsky, “in Moscow they tried to embark on the same path in a completely original way at the direction of not some outlandish theory, but bad home-grown practice. In Moscow’s financial policy, indirect taxes generally prevailed over direct ones” (Klyuchevskiy, 1989a: 208).

Struggling with the budget deficit, the authorities indulged in various scams. In this case, of course, we mean an attempt to replace many direct taxes with the introduction of an increased duty on salt. However, the outcome of this action led to the infamous Salt Riot (Klyuchevskiy, 1989a: 208-209).

Another important transformation of the fiscal system was the reform carried out during the reign of Theodore, which led to the replacement of land (*pozemel’noye*) taxation with household (*podvornoye*) taxation. However, peasants tried to reduce the tax burden by enlarging households (Murav’eva, 2001: 85).

The introduction of copper money should be attributed to the measures of the monetary direction. However, due to poor knowledge of the basic laws of monetary policy, as well as the desire to solve the problem of lack of funds as much as possible, the relevant senior officials actually led the financial system to disorder, which was embodied in the Copper Coin Riot (Klyuchevskiy, 1989a: 209-212).

It is also important to note the purchase of foreign coins – Jachymovsky tolars, which became one of the sources of silver for the Russian state. They were melted down into Russian coins with a higher nominal value, which brought substantial income to the treasury (Murav’eva, 2001: 86).

On the whole, it should be mentioned the rather spontaneous nature of the economic policy pursued during this period, since the main goal of innovations of the fiscal and monetary plans had the filling of the state treasury, and not the improvement of the financial system.

Thus, Russian society in the 17th century was characterized by the typical features of a traditional society in all spheres of life. Only various degrees of readiness for modernization transformations in various directions can be taken into account. The economy turned out to be the most prepared for modernization, since it outlined a greater number of advances and innovations, while the development of political and social spheres went in the opposite direction, and the spiritual world of the Russian people was conserved on the basis of prevailing mental attitudes.

Next, the economic development of the Russian state in the 18th century for its compliance with the modernization trend should be analyzed. To do this, it is necessary to outline the basic characteristics of economic modernization, since they play a key role in our study. Of course, the key point in this process is the industrial revolution, which is defined as the replacement of manual production by machine one, when manufactory, as the predominant unit in industry, gives way to factories and plants. Ultimately, this leads to the eradication of the foundations of the traditional economy and the formation of trends inherent in the market economic system, i.e. functioning in accordance with the laws of value, supply and demand, as well as the mechanism of competition; pluralism of forms of ownership instead of the dominant of collective-community monism in economic relations; the mass nature of production and consumption as a change in the individual craft; maximization of the degree of freedom in the behavioral practices of the producer and consumer; gradual introduction of state regulation instruments in the economy, such as fiscal and monetary policies.

The last decade of the 17th century and the first quarter of the 18th century were marked by the independent reign of one of the most famous monarchs in the history of Russia, Peter I. As noted above, many Russian historians tend to link the starting point for the formation of modernization processes in Russian society precisely with the period of his reign. The general goal of the first Russian emperor looks quite obvious – to turn Russia into a state of the European type. However, it is necessary to take into account, first of all, the starting conditions of the Russian state, and, as was proved above, they were far from allowing modernization to begin in full swing.

It has already been indicated above that the state economic policy in the 17th century was largely due to a lack of funds in the treasury, and the budget deficit was associated with numerous foreign policy campaigns and the need to maintain the “new model” regiments. Under Peter I, the situation changed little, moreover, this trend became pronounced, as it was extrapolated to most areas of the Russian economy.

The most important international conflict of the first half of the 18th century, which generally changed the face of Russia, was the Great Northern War. The latter was of a local nature and ended for the Russian side with an unconditional victory. Taking into account the already quoted A.J. Toynbee, it is logical to assume that wars play a significant role if they have a geographically wider scale – regional, continental, world – and also end in defeat for any of the countries. The rulers of the defeated country act in this case as the actors of modernization processes, since in the future it is necessary to correspond to the level of development of the winners in order to avoid defeats in the future. As we can see, the Great Northern War only partially corresponds to these features. At the same time, many of the transformations made by Peter I were dictated precisely by bitter defeats at the beginning of this military conflict.

The first Russian emperor himself unambiguously highly appreciated the role of war for state activity. He wrote in his memoirs about the preparation of the first Azov campaign: “Although at that time, as they worked near Kozhukhov during Mars fun, there was nothing more than a game, but this game became a harbinger of real actions” (Pavlenko, 1994 : 39); or he instructed his son, Tsarevich Alexei: “I don’t teach you to be willing to fight without a legitimate reason, but to love this business and teach with all the opportunity, since this is one of the two necessary things to rule, i.e. order and defense” (Pavlenko, 1994: 39). Such reasoning of Peter I was largely gained through military operations, primarily during the Great Northern War, which lasted about 21 years and amounted to about half of his reign, and if we talk about his independent reign, it was even more than half.

Large-scale changes under the influence of the war with Sweden occurred in the system of taxation, trade and manufacturing industry. As in the previous century, the lion’s share of the state budget was “eaten up” by the maintenance of the regular army and navy. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, for 1705–1707 this item of expenditure accounted on average for about 90 % of the total revenue, with an annual budget deficit of 25 %. By the end of reign of Peter I, the situation had changed: the army and navy expenses were reduced to 67 % of the nominal budget and to 75.5 % of the real one (Klyuchevskiy, 1989b: 116, 130). Such “successes” were achieved through much trial and error.

At the initial stage, all attempts of Peter I to solve the problem of lack of funds were reduced to four areas: a) restructurization of tax authorities, which supposed to reduce the scale of embezzlement and increase the collection of taxes; b) using the experience of predecessors through coinage; c) creation of a more structured system of monetary units; d) introduction of new charges. However, these measures did not produce the desired effect: the budget deficit grew every year. It became clear that it was necessary to radically restructure the entire taxation system. The result of this conclusion was the introduction of a poll tax, the share of which in the revenue part of the state budget in 1724 amounted to 53 % (Knyaz’kov, 1914: 271-274, 288-293). According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, such an alignment was in complete conflict with the principles of mercantilism policy, when the main burden of taxes fell on the taxable population, while indirect taxation did not live up to expectations even with the intensive growth of trade and manufacturing industry (Klyuchevskiy, 1989b: 131). It is necessary to repeat the conclusion drawn for the economic policy of the Russian state in the 17th century: during the reign of Peter I, there was a chaotic nature of the taxation system reform due to the need to maintain the army and navy and not concern for the improvement of the financial system.

As known, the first Russian emperor was a supporter of mercantilism policy, therefore, he attached great importance to the development of trade, both external and internal. However, the methods used in the first quarter of the 18th century were predominantly administrative in nature. It is necessary to consider the following methods precisely in this vein: the introduction of state monopolies for the sale of a certain list of goods that were supposed to bring maximum income to the treasury; the forcible creation of “kumpans” (*kumpanstva*), i.e. formations of several merchants who were under the strict control of the state; the forced movement of the trade flow from Arkhangelsk to St. Petersburg. Of course, such measures were far from the principles of the market economy and brought serious disorganization into the system of trade relations (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 85-86). At the same time, positive trends that took place during this period and were associated with the restructurization of trading corporations (the former hundreds (*sotny*) acquired a new design in the form of guilds), the policy of protectionism (Customs tariff (*Tamozheniy Tarif*) of 1724) (Pavlenko, 1994: 491), the construction of canals (Ivanovsky Canal, The Vyshnevolotsk water system, the canal between the Mologa and Syas rivers, the Ladoga bypass canal, etc.), acquiring the coast of the Baltic Sea could not overcome the negative effect of the economic and social costs of Petrine reforms (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 88).

In many ways, the situation was similar in relation to industry. The main thesis in this case will sound as follows: it was the state needs that determined the emergence and rapid growth of “large” manufactories. Most industrial enterprises were opened with public funds. Even after the victory in the Great Northern War following the results of the Battle of Poltava began to seem like a reality and the state began to develop private enterprise, the latter was under strict state tutelage. Despite the impressive figures indicating the growth of private manufacturing industry (out of 233 enterprises that appeared in the first quarter of the 18th century (Klyuchevskiy, 1989b: 110), about half were privately owned by the end of the reign of Peter I), a high degree of voluntarism in the state policy should be noted in relation to manufactories, as well as the fact that the lion’s share of their products was the state order. In addition, it is necessary to say about forced, rather

than free-lance labor (registered (*pripisnoye*) and possession (*possessionoye*) peasantry) at these enterprises, which after 1736 became decisive for entire industries (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 89–93).

Thus, most of the features inherent in the market economy were absent in Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century. The state grossly interfered in trade and industrial relations, thereby deforming the main principles of the market – the operation of the laws of supply and demand and the competitive mechanism. Russian merchants and manufacturers could not fully enjoy economic freedom and initiative.

Next, the economic development of the Russian Empire under the successors of Peter I should be considered. It is important to note that not a single international conflict in which Russia participated in 1725–1796 played such a role as it did in the case of the Great Northern War. The hostilities with Turkey are not taken into account in this case, since the Ottoman Empire cannot be considered a state that has achieved any success on the path of modernization. Similarly, it is worth evaluating the participation of the Russian state in the Polish conflicts. The two wars with Sweden could not acquire the same significance for Russia as the Great Northern War, because they ended in victory for the Russian side and this result did not become the basis for any large-scale efforts. The Seven Years' War, which covered a large number of European countries and even outgrew the continental framework due to the fact that hostilities were fought between Great Britain and France for the North American colonies, could break out of this series. However, the Russian troops in the campaign against Prussia were assigned a supporting role, which was repeatedly emphasized by the Conference called to lead Russia and its army during the war (Kersnovskiy, 1992: 110). And the very end of this international conflict did not lead to any serious consequences for the Russian side. The pro-Prussian position of Peter III nullified all the efforts of the Russian army, which did not suffer a single defeat in this war. Based on these considerations, one should speak about a certain impulse of the Great Northern War, which continued to affect the further development of the Russian state, since the transformations of the successors of Peter the Great were largely based on the solid foundation that the first Russian emperor laid.

The economic development of Russia in the 18th century after 1725 was marked by the rapid growth of manufactory industrial production. By the end of the reign of Peter I there were 233 manufactories, while by the middle of the 18th century there were already 683 of them (almost a threefold increase), and by the beginning of the reign of Paul I this number had increased 9–10 times to 2000–2400 units (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 123). At the same time, there was such a tendency as a change in the proportions of merchant and peasant manufactories, in which civilian workers were predominantly employed, in relation to state and patrimonial manufactories where serf labor was predominant. In many ways, this trend was facilitated by the relevant regulatory legal acts. First of all, Berg Regulation (*Berg-Reglament*), published in 1739 during the reign of Anne and providing for the privatization of state-owned metallurgical enterprises should be mentioned (Anisimov, 1994: 446). Secondly, it is necessary to note the Manifesto on Freedom of Entrepreneurship (*Manifest o svobode predprinimatel'stva*), which was published in 1775 and allowed everyone to engage in entrepreneurship (with the exception of industries that provide for the army and the mining industry) (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 119). The further spread of freelance labor was facilitated by decrees of 1752 (establishing restrictions on the purchase of peasants for factory camps (*fabrichnie stany*) from 12 to 40 people) and of 1762 (depriving industrialists in principle of the right to buy serfs for manufactories) (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 108).

The innovation of Catherine's reign was the emergence of peasant manufactory accompanied by the formation of a layer of "capitalist" (*kapitalistie*) peasants. Moreover, towards the late 18th century, the proportion of this category of the population increased significantly. But in this case, this trend should be treated with a great degree of caution, since such manufactories legally belonged to landlords, and the majority of workers were quitrent peasants (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 125–126).

Thus, in the industrial sector of the Russian state of the 18th century, the tendency of the predominance of the manufacturing enterprise was consolidated. However, this phenomenon should be regarded only as a fully formed preparation for the industrial revolution. As a result, in this regard, it is worth talking only about a certain degree of readiness for the start of modernization transformations.

Trade during the reign of Anne and Elizabeth was marked by a confrontation between two trends: on the one hand, there were protectionist measures based primarily on the corresponding customs tariff adopted in 1757; on the other hand, efforts to form a free trade policy were made, when moderate customs duties were established in 1731 (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 108–109). E.V. Anisimov states a serious increase in the trade balance of Russia in the period from 1725 to 1739 (Anisimov, 1994: 443–444). The further development of trade relations under Elizabeth was facilitated by the abolition of internal customs duties carried out in 1754 on the initiative of P.I. Shuvalov. It should be noted that a certain impetus to the growth of trade relations was given by the emergence and formation of the banking sector. The beginning was laid by Anne, who signed the decree on the opening of the Mint (*Monetnaya kontora*). This measure was supported by Elizabeth, under whom in 1754 the creation of noble and Merchant banks was announced. This trend was continued by the activities of the Copper Bank (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 110–115).

In the second half of the 18th century, Catherine II also contributed to the development of trade. In a series of measures, it is necessary to note the liquidation of the Manufacture Collegium (*Manufaktur-*

kollegiya) and the abolition of state monopolies. The liberal policy pursued by the empress led to a significant increase in the volume of domestic trade, which by the beginning of the 19th century reached no less than 500 million rubles (Vereshchagin, Khayrtdinov, 2009: 115-116). An important role in this regard was played by the introduction of paper money (*assignaty*) in 1769. Of course, relatively poor familiarity with the principles of monetary policy led to an increase in inflation, but this was largely due to the Russian-Turkish war in 1787–1791. (Kamenskiy, 2001: 462). It should be noted that the creation of Assignment banks had as its goal not only the stimulation of trade through the improvement of money circulation in the country and the development of the banking system, but also the same urgent need for finance to solve foreign policy tasks, in particular, the intensification of hostilities during various military conflicts.

Thus, it is necessary to denote a fairly rapid pace of trade development under the successors of Peter I, which was largely facilitated by various measures taken in 1725–1796. However, it is worth mentioning the strengthening of serfdom, which significantly hindered the development of economic relations, in general, as well as the manufacturing industry and trade, in particular.

Despite the new trends that emerged in the industrial and commercial spheres, agricultural production continued to play a leading role in the national economy throughout the 18th century. Of course, the urban population was increasing, but this growth was not the determining factor that would have made it possible to record large-scale changes in the structure of the Russian economy. Moreover, in percentage terms, the share of urban dwellers in the social composition of the population in European Russia does not show a clear trend. Thus, B.N. Mironov defines the proportion of city dwellers as follows: in 1719 – 3.9 %, in 1762 – 2.8 %, and, finally, in 1795 – 4.2 % (Mironov, 2018: 445).

L.V. Milov in his fundamental work “The Great Russian Ploughman and peculiarities of the Russian historical process” outlines the following trends in the development of agriculture in the Russian state of the 18th century: traditionalism in relation to farming methods determined by the dominance of a three-field crop rotation throughout European Russia (Milov, 2001: 32-33, 38); widespread subsistence farming (Milov, 2001: 35); an extensive development path associated with the use of such a farming system as fallow and “maximum exploitation of the land fertility” leading to plowing (*vypahannost'*) of the soil, i.e. “reducing the fertility of regular arable land”, however, increased attention was paid to the intensification of soil cultivation through manure fertilization and “increasing the frequency of plowing and harrowing” (Milov, 2001: 38, 57, 93-109); the prevalence of the plow (*sokha*) as the main agricultural tool, while there was a widespread use of binots (*kosulya*), and also involved plows, scratch plows (*ralo*), harrows (*borona*) (Milov, 2001: 77-85, 87-93), etc.

In this case, one cannot ignore the fact that government policy led to a rapid growth in peasant crafts and seasonal works (*otkhodnichestvo*), which resulted in the expansion of the labor market and increase in the number of manufactories (Milov, 2001: 550). A certain role was played by the foundation of the Free Economic Society in 1765 trying to achieve an increase in labor productivity in agriculture, which should have affected the increase in the degree of its marketability. However, the dominance of serfdom severely limited the development of these innovations. The general review we have made in relation to the agricultural sector allows to conclude that there is a rather high degree of conservatism in the sphere of agricultural production, which clearly hindered the formation of modernization processes in the Russian state.

5. Conclusion

To sum up the general results of our study, the Russian society of the 17th century must be characterized as a typical traditional society. This is evidenced by the intensive formation of the absolute monarchy, completion of serfdom registration, and mentality based on appropriate social attitudes. At the same time, the economy demonstrated a higher level of readiness for transformations of the modernization type: the greatest degree of conservatism was inherent in agriculture, while in trade, industrial production and, in general, the economic policy of the state, the first sprouts were outlined, indicating the best starting opportunities for the transition of Russia from an agrarian society to an industrial one.

The 18th century was marked by even greater changes on the path to modernization. The cornerstone event in this case was the Great Northern War, which, due to the defeats of the Russian state at the initial stage, predetermined many of the reforms introduced by Peter I. He became a kind of an actor for these processes willing to turn Russia into a European power. In the future, his successors relied on the achievements of the Russian state in the first quarter of the 18th century when carrying out their reforms, quite often referring to the activities of the first Russian emperor. This allows us to conclude that the modernization mechanism in Russia was of a mobilization nature and was determined by the “challenges” of the West in the form of the Great Northern War.

It is necessary to correctly assess the significance of transformations in Russia throughout the 18th century for the development of modernization trends. In the political sphere, the final formation of the absolute monarchy and authoritarian regime under Peter I, which during the reign of Northern Semiramis acquired a more presentable form of “enlightened absolutism”, was outlined. The social sphere was marked by an even more serious strengthening of serfdom, which reached its apogee during the reign of Catherine II. The spiritual world of the main part of the Russian society has not undergone any changes, with the

exception of the nobility and the top of the urban population, which to a greater extent began to have features of the European mentality.

The Russian economy has found itself in the orbit of a more serious level of change. However, in its pure form, the basic characteristics of the market economy have not yet taken shape in it. This was largely due to the hypertrophy of the state in the development of economic relations, which significantly limited the economic freedom of both producers and consumers. Private and state property increased their presence in the economy of the Russian Empire, but agriculture was still dominated by collective-community land ownership. Manufactory production and trade volumes grew by leaps and bounds, especially during the reign of Catherine II, but the priority remained with the agrarian sector of the Russian economy. Despite the fact that many enterprises in the Russian Empire of the period under study were called factories and plants, in reality they had all the characteristics of a manufactory, since machine production did not become a determining factor in them. Proceeding from this, it is impossible to speak about the formation of a serious scale of mass production and mass consumption in Russia. Thus, one should agree with the opinion of B.N. Mironov and I.V. Poberezhnikov that transformations of the Russian state throughout the 18th century should be regarded only as protomodernization, while the beginning of the real transition of the Russian society from an agrarian society to an industrial one should be attributed to later period – not earlier than the 30s of the 19th century – when the first manifestations of the industrial revolution were identified.

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