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SIGNIFICAÇÃO, SIGNIFICADO E SENTIDO: O EVENTO VOCACIONAL TEM UMA APARÊNCIA DE CRISTAL

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"Les événements sont comme les cristaux, ils ne deviennent et ne grandissent que par les bords, sur les bords."

(Deleuze, 1969, p. 19)

Abstract: Having Gilles Deleuze's "Logique du sens" as a reference, we propose a deep appreciation of the concepts of signification, meaning and sense that may affect the understanding of some key constructs of Vocational Psychology with implications for career guidance. The purpose is to grasp the concept of sense from a certain indistinctness that seems to pervade the theoretical corpus of Psychology in general, and Vocational Psychology in particular. First, we emphasize the tradition of research and practice in vocational psychological guidance and dive into the vocational characterisation of those constructs. Then, we propose a way of looking at these concepts as a phenomenon and event for vocational development. Our intention was to put the phenomenological questioning at the centre of the psychological practices and lead a reflection around language that goes beyond a purely symptomatic and empirical understanding, a reflection that grasps its collapse from the casuistry of narratives.

Keywords: sense; meaning; vocational psychology; phenomenology.

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Resumo: Tendo como referência a "Logique du sens" de Gilles Deleuze, propomos uma apreciação dos conceitos de significação, significado e sentido que levem a uma compreensão mais aprofundada de alguns construtos-chave da Psicologia Vocacional, com implicações para a as práticas de consulta psicológica vocacional. O objetivo é o de resgatar o conceito de sentido de uma certa inespecificidade que prevalece no *corpus* teórico da Psicologia em geral, e da Psicologia Vocacional em

particular. Em primeiro lugar, enfatizamos a tradição de pesquisa e prática em consulta psicológica vocacional e mergulhamos na caracterização, dentro de uma teoria do vocacional, desses construtos. Em seguida, propomos uma maneira de observar esses conceitos enquanto fenómenos e acontecimentos para o desenvolvimento vocacional. A nossa intenção foi a de colocar o questionamento fenomenológico no centro das práticas psicológicas e conduzir a uma reflexão em torno da linguagem que vá além de uma compreensão puramente sintomática e empírica, uma reflexão que apreenda o seu colapso na casuística das narrativas.

Palavras-chave: sentido; significado; psicologia vocacional; fenomenologia.

PSYCHOLOGY AND CAREER GUIDANCE:
MEANING IS A TEMPTING THING

Meaning is the subtext of life and experience its primary commodity. Understanding the processes through which signification and sense operate would be a major psychological achievement. In narrative-hermeneutic tradition applied to Psychology, the singularity of meaning is soaked by individuality where the narrative of the self and identity arise in parallel, sharing the assumptions of continuity, unity and coherence, even if they flare up in chaos. But relying on a subject's capacity to construct meaning as if it could act from the inside to the outside is a purpose that seems to obscure research and intervention in the field of psychological consultation.

With implications for practice, a vast work on meaning (McLean & Thorne, 2003; Thorne et al., 2004; Park & George, 2016) and on the way humans organize thought in the form of narratives (Erikson, 1968; Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Bruner, 1990; White & Epston, 1990; Guidano, 1991; Neimeyer & Levitt, 2001; Pals & McAdams, 2004; Savickas, 2005; Thompson, 2010; Ferretti, 2018) has been developed in the field of Psychology over time. In career counselling, developmental-contextualist, critical-constructivist and narrative-hermeneutic paradigms emerged as a response to a reductionist and dualist (subject-world) way of placing the problem of "guidance". This narrative-hermeneutic approaches tried to grasp how the experience of relating to learning and working is organised into narratives, biographically rooted – intergenerationally

(Laband & Lentz, 1983; Vondracek, Lerner & Schulenberg, 1986; Oren, Caduri & Tziner, 2013) and contextually (Brofenbrenner, 1977, 1989; Lent, Brown & Hacket, 1994, 1996) –, and how meanings are process and product of the identity construct (*e.g.,* Campos & Coimbra, 1991; McAdams, 1996; Cochran, 1997; Meijers, 1998), comprising future time perspective (Volder & Lens, 1982; Nuttin & Lens, 1985; Savickas et al., 1984; Zimbardo and Boyd, 2008). But when we seek to understand the processes of signification and meaning under the aegis of a Hegelian dialectic we seem to miss our goal, as confusion thrives between the phenomenal apprehension of continuity and the concept of becoming that operates in the language of signification.

A dazzling work around self-narrative construction was developed by Kenneth Gergen (1991), to whom we are far from the illusion that "words take the place of things". He proposes a more poststructuralist understanding, where language is said to be a "system for itself" in consonance with central names in the study of semiology, such as Saussure and Peirce. For this author, Western languages orientation towards the substance (identifiable in the prevalence of names) is conceived as constrictive of continuity, process and becoming. According to Shotter (2011) this perspective should guide psychological research into other horizons. In Garfinkel (1967) tradition, he reinforces that each new encounter, each new relationship is *another first time*, leaving us before the possibility of understanding singularities, instead of looking for patterns.

In the philosophical field, meaning is analysed as a pure event (Foucault, 2001; Deleuze, 1983; Derrida, 2001; Bárcena, 2004), disconnected from the notion of causality characteristic of probabilities theory. It is a reversed relation of forces (Foucault, 2001), that introduces a "radical novelty" (Bárcena, 2004). For Deleuze (1969), the constitutive relationship of the event with the becoming (below the chronological time that persists in the causes affecting bodies) would communicate through language, where personal uncertainty would not be an external question to what is happening, but an objective structure of the event. Regarding the approaches within the epistemological field of Psychology, the great difference seems to lie in the conceptualisation of "discontinuity" and

"uncertainty" as something that belongs to the nature of the event itself (they are not conceived as occurrences born in the subjective experience).

So, considering the field of psychological career guidance, how can we safeguard the concepts of signification and meaning of a certain non-specificity to which the "subject-world" equation relegates them?

THE PARADOXES OF SIMULTANEITY IN VOCATIONAL DISCONTINUITIES: SEIZING THE CONCEPTS OF INDECISION, PROCESS AND EVENT

In Deleuze, the concept of becoming vividly passed through Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland". Alice shows us how it is possible to dodge the present by the simultaneity that characterises the experience of becoming: at a certain point in time, Alice becomes greater than she was and smaller than she is. Here, the concepts of "before" and "after" are indistinct, since there is not an object of a productive action in time, but only the process – itself – of becoming. *Becoming*, Alice remains in the paradox of going in two directions at once: she bigger and smaller at once through the process of becoming.

The understanding of this paradox comprises a relevant reading of the vocational object as a process, where indecision so often punctuates the discontinuities of one's path. Uncertainty, as Deleuze clarifies, is not external to the experience, but a structure of the event that crosses two senses at the same time, lacerating the subject in this twofold direction.

The feeling of indecision experienced in times of choice and vocational transition – so often associated with difficulties solving this kind of tasks – may, after all, be perceived as a relevant investment in the vocational experience. The twofold direction places the subject before the evidence of the present and this one does only breathe through becoming. The psychodynamic approaches to the vocational (*e.g.*, Bohoslavsky, 1993) remind us that *becoming someone* is also the question of ceasing to be *someone else*: that self-possibility expressed through the glimpse of a professional project here conceived as a concretisation of a core of values, interests, capabilities,

personal stories, experiences and intimate geographies. But in this experience of *ceasing to be someone else* we witness the collapse of an essentialist vision of "vocation", realising that *becoming another* is the only constant. The unfolding of every moment involves the loss of territories of possibilities that are not actualised by this now, for future beings (Guattari, 2000). This understanding does not make clearer the path that may open later, but it highlights the need to apprehend the double direction unfolding that path: it just opens itself since it experiences its closure.

In this context, the vocational object cannot be understood as a *process* opposing the notion of *event*: in fact, it comprises the both ideas. This polarisation sought to dissociate Vocational Psychology current approaches – the developmental, contextualist, and constructivist ones – from a cognitivist tradition in this domain, where the realisation of the "right choice" was conceived as a finite moment of what would be the "vocational event" par excellence. With Deleuze we can then perceive the dichotomy "process-event", where the event appears as infinitely divisible. It is always what *has just happened* and what *will come to pass*, without ever being what happens besides the common result of going in two directions at the same time. This notion of event gives even greater visibility to the understanding of the vocational as a process, not because of its developmental trait – *i.e.*, that temporal continuum as seen from the outside –, but by the way the infinite is there constituted.

SURFACE AND DEPTH: QUESTIONING THE CONCEPTS OF SELF-DISCOVERY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE

We are used to associate the infinite with the notion of depth, as if the various earth strata were accumulating or relentlessly dividing beneath us. At the same time, the image of a distended sky seems to serve the same purpose for the vision of infinity. These images seem to contribute to the misunderstanding between surface and depth – being surface in articulation with immensity and continuity and depth with the primacy of meaning that we feel comfortable imagining as a content that totally fulfils.

But Deleuze leaves us with the question of what might be more intimate than events such as *growing*, *diminishing*, *being cut off*. In the depths of the bodies would be mixtures, since the bodies penetrate one another and coexist in all their parts. On the surface we would have incorporeal events resulting from this intermingling, expressed in the form of verbs and appearing through their own happening: to grow, to diminish, to darken, to pale… Therefore, this infinite divisibility consents what happens in the vocational field as a paradox that unfolds itself in language. Hence the notion of having something about ourselves to discover, that has for so long marked the tradition in psychological career guidance, can no longer be accepted, since "there is nothing to see behind the curtain (…) because everything is visible, or rather all possible science is along the length of the curtain" (Deleuze, 1969, p. 19). This surface does not take any density from the vocational composition; it enables to understand it in the act of signification as it distends and constitutes itself in language. So, psychological consultation has the challenge of understanding subjectivity in the variety of the modalities that this fold may assume: the folding of our material bodies, language, memory or time.

NOISE AND ABSURD: THE VOCATIONAL PATH TOWARDS SENSE

Events may be articulated through propositions and that is why Deleuze deals with the exploration of relationships in the proposition that best suit the effects at a surface layer – those effects are nothing less than events. For that he distinguishes four propositional instances: designation (reference and denotation), manifestation, signification (inference and demonstration) and expression (meaning). In the first instance, we could communicate something about the world; there we find denomination through pure designators – "empty" linguistic particles that would allow the selection of images in any case. The proper names would designate while building up material singularities. By relating the proposition to an external state of affairs – and linking the specifically linguistic entities not to objects in themselves, but to the image that represents them –, the designation would be richer than denotation. The designation criteria are here "true" and the "false".

According to Deleuze, a second propositional relationship would be that of the manifestation, which articulates the proposition with the subject that utters itself through language, evidencing the desires and beliefs of an image. The desire would be its internal causality considering the existence of a corresponding object or state of things, whereas belief would be the expectation of this object or state of things to be produced by external causality. In the manifestation, particles such as "I", "you", "tomorrow" give way to the notion of "veracity" and "illusion" rather than to the "truth" and "falsity" characteristic of designation. The primacy of manifestation only happens in the order of speech, where meanings are given tacitly. There the self has the primacy over concepts. It is in language that significations come first and give foundation to manifestation; meaning allows judgment to have universal validity.

Therefore, signification would be the third instance of the proposition and would establish the relation between propositional concepts that have a more universal scope. In this demonstration case, inferences would allow to distinguish new propositional content without any contact with a circumscribed reality and the meaning of the proposition would be found in its relation to other propositions from which it would be concluded. It is, in fact, the logical relation par excellence, in which logical value is the condition of truth – *i.e.*, conditions in which we make inferences that may be true. Here actually, the "false" can be concluded; its opposition would be the absurd, the meaningless.

Thus, language considers the relationship between a propositional and a corporeal dimension. In the context of vocational guidance, it exposes absurdity, not as an event that operates outside reason, detached from the dimensions of the self, but as something contingent to the relation established between propositions. Signification can then be understood as a goal in psychological career consultation if it also takes the absurd in the horizon of propositional possibilities. This absurd would play a role as relevant as truth, as it would expose new implications for the instantiation of the designation and manifestation considering the desideratum of the self. Deleuze makes it very clear how the self is neither sufficient nor the first one in the order of speech – it does just happen when involving significations developed by themselves at a language level. If these significations are not established, personal identity

may be questioned. So, the act of signification is conceived within a dialogical process that the vocational psychological guidance tries to hold through common sense, even facing an eventual disagreement of desires and intentions. But facing the paradox is not confronting a contradiction. Paradox is a thought-generating power, not a playful game. Paradox takes us to the threshold, *i.e.*, to an area where *what is there* can only be thought of. It can be thought, but not touched nor understood. Just thought. Hence the paradox does not correspond to an existence: it subsists in language. In the third propositional instance, the paradox is solvable through the two halves of doxa – good sense and common sense. But it is only in the fourth propositional instance that paradox constitutes thought.

What happens at a signification level is relevant to capture the uniqueness of the propositions set forth for the vocational experience. The resolution that takes place at this stage relates to common sense, which establishes a unique direction. So, it is at the level of signification that it becomes possible to design a time line – and consequently a personal project of life. Within this framework, past would be the most differentiated time category, from which we would construct articulable propositions, whose constitution would highlight the propositional relationship that made it possible. Here, events in the microsystemic level – with their power of proximity (*e.g.*, family, peers, teachers...) – and the more distal dimensions (*e.g.*, cultural systems of values, beliefs and lifestyles) organize a linguistic reality translated into possible futures. The future would be the least differentiated time category, but we would be able to try to anticipate it through common sense. So, vocational psychological guidance is expected to work at this propositional level: throughout the designation of critical dimensions for the construction of vocational identity, where the subject manifests him/herself through propositions. These preferred (interests) and evaluative (values, competencies, and sense of mastery) propositions can then be placed in a temporal line, where the individual pursues coherence and unity for the formulation of his/her past and manifests desire and belief towards possible futures.

Common sense does not report to direction, but rather to a function of regulation, where the noise is recognised as well as the consequent attempt of

preserving communicability. If we think under the Model of Communication suggested by Michel Serres (1967), we will understand the roles of sender and receiver trying to strengthen communicability, given the threat posed by noise in the game of communication. In this context, the subjective axis – where common sense operates – is horizontally reinforced, as the noise vertically passes through. Thus, during psychological career intervention, actors seek to confirm themselves as a community, resisting noise through signification, which, in turn, reinforces the subjective axis established among participants. Now we may understand it better why Mahoney (1998; 2003) sustains the importance of the psychologist for the results of the intervention or the dialogical perspectives in Psychology, such as those of Shotter (1984) – where language is conceived as something given in the combined action – and those of Gergen (1994; 2009) – for whom the continuous and emergent accomplishment of meaning is taking place in the relational process. Even if it operates in the subject individually, signification dwells in the linguistic practices that preserve it though common sense.

Thus, the psychological process of integration – which aims at signification –, brings the experiences of the temporal subject together, curbing him/her from the cut that noise inflicts upon common sense. Noise questions common sense being paradoxical and thus incommunicable. However, it plays a relevant role in the communication process as it gathers community for the defence of common sense; and as pure sense it brings the new under different formats (*e.g.*, literature). It is also noise that exposes the noncommunicative dimension of language and the indifference of thought towards communication in general. Noise is then able to turn language into a force that produces meaning, making it clearer why signification and sense run in different serial structures. Sense is not in propositions, it emerges from them, and that emergence is sense itself.

This understanding clarifies why the in-depth work around language is assumed as the strategic axis of the vocational psychological guidance. In this context, the psychologist knows he/she will always be at the mercy of the subject's willingness to block noise – so often taking the appearance of domains never conceived for the self – or his/her willingness to threa-

ten the comfort of all those propositional significations, moving the game towards sense. No one throws him/herself into propositions under penalty of losing his/her name.

SENSE OF AGENCY AND THE GENETICS OF SENSE

According to Deleuze, signification is of the tertiary order of language, given by good and common sense in individualised and distinct bodies. In the secondary order we would find sense. No longer the depths of bodies, but the surface, where bodies would blend with words: this signification level would be given by sense. The primary order of language would relate to the indistinct, to the "glorious and terrible" body, that of "pure schizophrenia."

This fourth propositional dimension – corresponding to the secondary order of language – may not be confused with the proposition itself: although it doesn't subsist outside it. Unlike the conditioned character of signification, meaning is unconditioned; it is the emergence of something new and it constitutes itself as a genetic power. At the signification level, we are constantly referred from the conditioned to the condition and vice versa. Signification would need something unconditioned to ensure other propositional instances. The condition of truth would no longer be a form of conceptual possibility, but rather an ideal matter, moving from signification to sense – and the latest being the incorporeal on the surface of things, which insists or subsists *in* and *by* the proposition.

Sense is pure effect, the attribute and not the quality: not the night darkness – sense is *to darken*, expressed in the becoming. It is an evanescence, a pure attribute of the state of things. And that is why sense is irreducible to that states of things, images, personal beliefs, mental activity or universal concepts. Hence, formulations for the vocational psychological guidance that take the idea of making sense as an agency of a subject cannot be accepted. Different series of things and propositions articulated may reveal pure sense where the vocational object finally happens.

Deleuze resumes Husserl's phenomenology to show how this disciple of Brentano already evoked the "sense of perception" as an incorporeal, unlike logical concepts, mental representations, psychological experience or physical objects. He exemplifies that however much the tree (the designated one) can burn or enter into mixtures, this does not happen to the *noema* of the tree. It has no sensible correlate, nor does it subsist outside its proposition; it is an objective ideal unity. Deleuze does even propose to take his notion of "surface effect" as Husserl's concept of "appearance". Since what is expressed is not outside its expression, it is not possible to accept the existence of sense, but rather to understand its subsistence or insistence on language. This attribute is not a proposition's attribute as a qualitative predicate; the attribute is always an attribute of the thing or state of affairs, reporting to the event expressed by this predicate. Therefore, the attribute is neither a being nor something that qualifies a being: in Deleuze's words, it is an extra-being. The attribute is, in fact, something that is said about the object, but that does not subsist outside that expression. Sense has therefore a dimension turned to things and another dimension turned to propositions and it only subsists being an attribute of the state of things and the expression of the proposition. This "event" must not be expected to be met in some spatial or temporal level. It is given fundamentally in language, subsisting in it, although it happens to things.

Thus, tings and propositions are on opposite sides, bordering sense. Instead of separating or mixing them, sense articulates their difference (it articulates body and language). Returning to Lewis Carroll's Alice, Humpty Dumpty seamlessly gives us the image of this articulation: he sits on the narrow wall, between the impassibility of events and the passions of bodies, between verbs and nouns, and he has everything at his pleasure and disposal.

Sense confronts us with plurality: (1) the series of physical things, where physical qualities and real relations are found, as well as logical, immaterial and ideal attributes and (2) the series of propositions, composed of names and adjectives that designate states of things and qualities and of verbs that express attributes, events themselves. Sense would have the power to articulate series, and, in so doing, a new one would be generated through the paradox of unlimited proliferation.

At a first level, we would have the thing itself, the "marker", from which a dimension of being, that is not reduced to its materiality, emanates. This already contains something linguistic, which relates to the world of that object; there is a bodily effect that is embedded in language. At a second level, we would have the word "marker", which would designate the object (which, in its objectivity, would be indifferent to the word). That word comprehends a set of characteristics that do not concern the marker; it has a sense that emerges from it. At a third level, we find the meaning of the object's name which, at a fourth level, would give rise to the name of sense and so on, in continuous ramifications. This paradox of indefinite proliferation, this genetic power of meaning, shows us how much sense is its own product. At the same time, it displays the greatest impotence of the person who expresses something (and its meaning) and the greatest power of language – its infinite power to speak about words.

At this point, we may understand how vocational psychological guidance may move between language propositions, under the framework of reconstructive exploration of investments, once this one considers discourse at the heart of consultation. This does not mean that working upon the discourse, even when there is a confluence with the discourses of significant other, can intentionally act upon meaning. It does, however, show why agency is totally at the intervention target's side and why consultation may only mediate the process of meaning.

Sense is as the wall in which Humpty Dumpty sits – it offers both an irreducible separation and the evidence of different orders that can, finally, be articulated. But as far as the vocational is concerned, the articulation is achievable through the subject that inhabits this wall. The personal significant elements are central to the process, being included as "influences". Its power operates precisely to the extent that they become an *event* of the vocational development. In fact, it is at the expression level that these people assume (or not) the status of "influences", giving room to pure sense. Hence, theories such as the Circumscription and Commitment of Linda Gottfredson (1996) reveal that personal dimensions taken as critical in the tradition of vocational development – and which are central to the theoretical tradition of this disci-

pline – as values, interests, and skills may be seen as peripheral with respect to notions of social position, gender identity and personal theories of intelligence. In fact, these dimensions segregate the surface, they segregate the attributes' level – the expressed – and not the qualities themselves (in the form of those personal dimensions). Their genetic power over the person lies in the event they may constitute, through which meaning is fulfilled. And that is why the relational experience that is relevant for the self doesn't appear clearly in ones' discourse: it is a difficult task to try to make explicit what the expression expresses, to grasp the meaning that crosses us.

Thus, neither vocational choices – even those that may be considered long-term investments – nor propositions that express "the sense" of a vocational project in a material form constitute "vocational events". This way we can understand vocational construct's epistemological path: now it is finally free from concepts such as "vocational discovery" and "moment of decision". And this is because meaning does not exist: it subsists in language (although it happens to things). If vocational development is marked by several relevant events, it is because the authorship of meaning is already assumed in the becoming. The vocational event involves then all the units and operators that articulate meaning in the individual experience. This is why individual chronology rarely responds to the externally determined moments for making choices that aim, for example, a progression through an academic journey. So, indecision plays a fundamental role in psychological vocational experience as it is a symptom of the investment in the experience of sense, which the subject cannot control, but which he begins to designate and manifest in psychological consultation.

In this approach, we have to recognise the autonomy of sense in relation to the agency of the psychological subject. Nevertheless, this perspective doesn't want to produce any idea of inability neither of randomness associated to the subject or the vocational experience. In fact, the drive of this paper was to explore how the recognition of propositional instances can be used as a guide for vocational psychological intervention. It also aimed at assisting the process of assessing a person's status towards choices at a given point in time, as well as the formulation of systematic objectives for the work to be developed.

We expect this formulation helps us to understand why we must include propositional work objectives that focus on the instance of designation, particularly when people come to the sessions by the hands of significant others, those that consider there's a "vocational problem" to be solved. In situations of a foreclosure vocational identity status, it is clear how the manifestation should occupy the consultation space, creating conditions for experiencing "veracity" or "illusion" (logical attributes of this propositional instance). This may reinforce "veracity" in the order of speech, favouring the transition to a discourse of authorship. Only then may we expect the person to be prepared to experience the complexity and richness of the dialogical space of intervention, engaging his/her own "vocational history" through significance.

During the vocational psychological sessions, chronology and characters are preserved through an intentional intervention strategic axis that targets common sense. Not as an option of the linguistic agents, but as a force, it is only when noise crosses good sense that the vocational experience meets sense and finally becomes through the event. Thus, meaning is not the insight that acts in favour of the last and exponential moment of a course of indecision; neither could choice be considered a "vocational event". Persisting in language, sense is what insists upon the subject through the anachronism of all the states of things and its qualities, all the attributes and propositions that soak the "empty house", enabling sense displacement through and between series.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF A PRAGMATIC INTERVENTION INTO LIFE?

It was not our intention to contribute to a misunderstanding that links meaning with the depths of complexity as this would relate to the complexity of the unfolding: *the crystals unfolding*, the vocational manifest and tacit dimensions that blend at the surface; the entanglement of others desires in personal will; meaning persistence upon our world connections and the incidence of noise on common sense and on signification layers. Actually, our intention

was to make it clear that the vocational event is made from all the cuts on common sense that are at the origin of the pure radicality of meaning. This is the novelty that affects the psychological subject and that opens another kind of bond with expression, in increasing levels of complexity. And, thus, reaffirming the legacy of phenomenology in psychological consultation, by recalling the identities of bodies as a basis, the person's identity as a substantiated agency and the power of language's identity.

Through this lens, events and time in vocational psychological guidance are reconsidered. But, as Guattari (2000) explained, this perspective on sense does not dissolve the relevance of a pragmatic intervention into a life – that intervention comprises one's engagement with now, an openness to novelty, to that *first time* around and within us. A narrative, dialogical intervention, would be here even more crucial as it could displace language towards new universes of *subjectification*. The intuition of the phenomenon – reported by the intentionality of the mind and once perceived by meaning – would preserve the genetics of language at the centre of the subject's production.

In conclusion, it seems to us important to recall the Kantian definition of "transcendental": "Although knowledge is perfectly adequate to the logical form, that means it does not contradict itself, it may nevertheless be in contradiction with the object "(Kant, 1989, p.94). Precisely because the transcendental is the kind of knowledge that focuses the knowledge of objects in general. This is the conception that Husserl extends decisively beyond the conditions of experience possibility. In Phenomenology, the transcendental is then the possibility of "seeing" what occurs in experience itself. It is not enough to have a transcendental subjectivity that gives account of an experience; it is necessary for that experience to "give account of itself", *ie.*, to speak as an "object invested with spirit" (Husserl, 1913).

Here, the whole specificity of the vocational psychological guidance can take the leap forward with respect to the Kantian premise: that premise which only allows the affirmation of the psychological object as a particular case of a general architecture of knowledge. The transition may spring forward to the singularity of a voice where the *vocational* speaks independently

of its psychological characterisation. The *vocational* is, perhaps, allowed to take a mode of "thing" that *speaks* in consultation; which becomes autonomous in this query. At least during the time of characterisation of his appearance. This could be the premise for another work on the *epoché* in psychological consultation.

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