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Analysis of Klavdii Semyonovich Nemeshaev's activities as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire

Abstract. *The article continues the series of publications devoted to the assessment of activities of the heads of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire. In this article, the authors attempt to systematize and analyze historical data on the activities of Klavdii Semyonovich Nemeshaev as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire. There are numerous biographical studies devoted to K. S. Nemeshaev, but little is known about his activities as a minister, and to date the data are scattered and not systematized. The analysis of archival materials, scientific publications, memoirs of Nemeshaev's contemporaries and colleagues allowed us to conduct a detailed assessment of his activities and ministerial policy. It has been found that despite his short term of office, Nemeshaev's consistent policy and extensive managerial experience allowed him to carry out two significant reforms in a short time. The first one involved redistribution of the state-owned railway lines between separate local administrations and merging them into larger groups, which was important in terms of improving their operations and facilitating the cost efficiency, as well as speeding up freight traffic. In opinion of the authors of this article, another important achievement of Nemeshaev as the Minister of Railways was the establishment in 1906 of the central, local and district committees regulating mass transportation of goods. This was the first centralized measure aimed at managing the rolling stock. Nemeshaev's extensive managerial experience, high erudition and energy also led to prominent outcomes in some other areas of the Ministry operation. Attempts were made to create syndicates of shipowners in river transport. Modernization of river and sea vessels was carried out. Works on projects for the development of the Northern Sea Route has begun. The article also assesses the development and construction of railway*



network in the Russian Empire during Nemshaev's office, in particular, of the Amur Line and Moscow Encircle Railway, as well as the increase in the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway. It has been found out that K. S. Nemshaev paid great attention to various social aspects of railway employees' activities. The article also highlights the legislative policy of the Ministry of Railways of that period. Nemshaev's participation in the preparation of the French scientist's Paul Pelliot and the Russian officer's Carl Gustaf Mannerheim joint trip to China has been analyzed. Due to the mass replacement of light and worn-out rails on state-owned railways with heavier ones and the need to discharge a significant number of steam locomotives built in the 1850s and 1860s, an introduction of more powerful steam locomotives was expedient. The article discusses K. S. Nemshaev's contribution to the development of technology and the introduction of a new type of freight steam locomotive for state-owned railways. Nemshaev's political views have also been assessed.

Keywords: *transport of the Russian Empire; railway; reforms; Sergey Yulievich Witte; Council of Ministers; SHCH class steam locomotive*

Introduction.

In 1905, the Russian Empire was on the verge of a political, economic, and social crisis. The industrial downturn, deterioration of money circulation, poor harvest, and huge national debt that had grown since the Russian-Turkish War, led to the urgent need to reform activities and authorities. The period characterized by significant importance of the natural economy has ended, and the intensive form of industrial methods' development that became widespread in the XIX century demanded radical innovations in administration and law. Following the abolition of serfdom and farms' transformation into industrial enterprises, an introduction of a new institution of legislative power was required. Dissatisfaction with the government police was exacerbated by military failures (the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905), low standard of living suffered by the majority of the population, poverty, as well as by discontent with the existing level of civil liberties; no freedom of speech and the press, equality before the law, or personal inviolability was allowed by the state.

The global economic crisis that worsened at the turn of the century contributed the most to the development of a pessimistic public opinion towards the state economy. The quality of life of the Russian Empire population rapidly deteriorated due to falling prices of grains, the main exported commodity. Finding the way out of the crisis required rapid growth of the industry, which entailed huge costs. This led to the impoverishment of a large peasant class. Population growth and advanced industrialization have deprived a significant portion of the population of any landholdings. 12–14 working hours a day, low wages and a strong influx of people to the cities caused a deterioration of public mood. The ever-growing level of corruption, bureaucracy, officials' negligence and inaction of the state bodies further contributed to the loss of faith in the existing tsarist regime. In addition, the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 undermined the international authority of the Russian

Empire and the people's confidence in the viability of the government. The aforementioned factors led to the 1905 revolution and mass protests breaking out from time to time until 1907.

At the beginning of 1905, Sergei Yulievich Witte held a position as the chairman of the Committee of Ministers. The position he held since 1903 was in fact an honorary retirement as the Committee of Ministers had no real significance before the 1905 revolution. He was transferred there from the influential post of the Minister of Finance under the pressure of the gentry-landowner members of the government (mainly V. K. Plehve). The Committee of Ministers authorities had little in common with the modern concept of the Cabinet of Ministers and its range of functions. All the ministers (and the heads of separate units) were acting independently of each other, held personal responsibility for the operation of their departments, and reported directly to the emperor. The Committee of Ministers was not responsible for the activities of separate ministries, nor for the coherence of their policies. Its authority has developed historically and covered various issues, most of which were trivial and unimportant. The detailed list of the matters within the Committee's power was changed continuously, with their total number gradually increasing. The most important area under the Committee's jurisdiction was railway affairs. Decisions on granting concessions for the construction of railways, establishment of railway companies, provision of state guarantees for their shares and bonds, state purchase of railways, etc., were of the highest state and economic importance.

In the summer of 1905, the emperor sent S. Yu. Witte to the United States to conclude the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth with Japan. For the successful conclusion of the peace treaty, he was granted the title of a count. Witte understood the gravity of the situation that occurred in the Russian Empire by the autumn of 1905. Therefore, reporting on the negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, he took the opportunity to present a note describing the urgent need for political reforms to the emperor Nicholas II. Witte was the initiator of preparing the *October Manifesto* granting basic civil liberties and introducing the State Duma, the institution for the representation of the people (Figure 1).

By the emperor's decree *On Measures to Strengthen Unity in the Activities of Ministries and Main Departments* of October 19, 1905 (Witte, 2003, p. 314.) a new government of the Russian Empire was established, namely the Council of Ministers. It was a single authority that united all ministers (as was mentioned above, before that each minister reported on the matters of his department directly to the emperor). Thus, all ministries and main departments now constituted parts of a single state administration. The Decree also stipulated clear separation of government power from the legislative power: "The Council of Ministers is not to decide on matters that are subject to the jurisdiction of the State Duma and the State Council" (Witte, 1924, pp. 513–514.). The Council comprised the Ministers of the Internal Affairs, Finance, Justice, Trade and Industry, Railways, Public Education, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Imperial Court, Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Chief Administration of Land

Organization and Agriculture, the State Controller and the Chief Prosecutor of the Synod. The heads of other departments only participated in the Council meetings regarding matters directly related to authority of their departments. The chairman of the Council of Ministers was not the emperor himself, as was the case before, but a person appointed by him from among the ministers. S. Yu. Witte was the first person to be appointed as the chairman of the Council of Ministers. He had previously held the honorary but still in-name-only position of the chairman of the Committee of Ministers.



Figure 1. The October Manifesto issued by Nicholas II of Russia in 1905 (Romanov, 1905).

On October 20, 1905, all major newspapers published His Imperial Majesty’s Rescript on the appointment of Count S. Yu. Witte as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Ilyin, 2012, p. 343). Witte started selecting the candidates for governmental positions even before the publication. All the reactionaries were dismissed. According to the plan of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which was approved by the emperor, the “enlightened” bureaucrats in the government were to be diluted with

liberal public figures. Klavdii Semyonovich Nemshaev, a railway administrator with considerable experience, was appointed as the Minister of Railways, coming to the post from the position of manager of the state-owned Southwestern Railways (S. V. Ilyin, 2012, p. 350). There is quite a lot of information available about K. S. Nemshaev, mostly regarding his service as a Southwestern Railways manager. However, the short but important period during which he was in charge of the Ministry of Railways, remains insufficiently explored. Scattered facts on the topic have never been properly systematized and analyzed.

The purpose of this article is to systematize and analyze historical data on the activities of Klavdii Semyonovich Nemshaev as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire.

Research methods.

The article continues the series of publications devoted to the assessment of activities of the heads of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire (Pylypchuk, & Strelko, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). In this article, the authors attempt to systematize and analyze historical data on the activities of Klavdii Semyonovich Nemshaev as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire. There are numerous biographical studies devoted to K. S. Nemshaev, but little is known about his activities as a minister, and to date the data are scattered and not systematized. The analysis of archival materials, scientific publications, memoirs of Nemshaev's contemporaries and colleagues allowed us to conduct a detailed assessment of his activities and ministerial policy.

Results and discussion.

Position of the Minister of Railways in S. Yu. Witte's government was the peak of Klavdii Semyonovich Nemshaev's railway career (Figure 2). He was officially appointed on October 28, 1905. Recalling the appointment, S. Yu. Witte wrote (Witte, 1924, pp. 859–860): “Even before moving to the palace house, I parted with the Minister of Railways, Duke Khilkov, a decent man, an excellent railway worker, but not really a minister of railways. He was a technician practitioner, a nice person, but not a manager at all. Instead, I offered the post of the Minister of Railways to the head of the Southwestern Roads Nemshaev. I didn't know him much personally, but he had a good reputation as a railway engineer and as an experienced railway manager. The Southwestern Roads were known as Russia's best railways in terms of personnel and commercial profitability, as a remunerative enterprise, and finally, as an example of perfect order. They were mostly created by myself during my service and management there, thus the results of appraisal of local managers were conveyed to me by my former subordinates when I had to meet them, and, consequently, I knew Nemshaev very well just by those appraisals. Furthermore, I chose Nemshaev because I knew that he would be pleasant to the emperor. In the old days, when the emperor took his trips along the Southwestern roads, he always praised them and spoke well of Nemshaev. His

Majesty immediately agreed to the dismissal of Duke Khilkov (with whom we had been friends for decades and remained friends until his death) and to the Nemshaev's appointment to the post of the Minister of Railways. All the strikes and disturbances on the railways occurred during Duke Khilkov's time at the office, and Nemshaev had to restore order on the railways, as well as restore traffic, which was managed quickly after October 17."

In his analysis of the activities of Witte's Council of Ministers, the famous statesman of the Russian Empire Vladimir Iosifovich Gurko, divided the new government into three groups (Ilyin, 2006, pp. 352–353). According to him, the first group consisted of the Prime minister's henchmen who did not dare to object to him. In his opinion, this group comprised I. P. Shylov, N. N. Kutler, and K. S. Nemshaev. The second group tried to show independence in managing their departments but in the Council of Ministers they invariably sided with the Prime minister. V. I. Gurko claims that I. I. Tolstoy, V. I. Timiryazev, D. A. Filosofov and V. N. Lamsdorff belonged to this category. The third group was constituted by ministers who were only pro forma members of the Council, namely A. F. Roediger, A. A. Birilyov and V. B. Fredericks. They were direct subordinates to the tsar, but tried not to break the unity of the Council of Ministers and attended its meetings regularly. Gurko concludes: "It is clear from the aforementioned that in the meetings of the Council, Witte was the complete master of the situation and had a well-secured majority on every issue." (Sidelnikov, 1980, pp. 69–70,).



Figure 2. Klavdii Semyonovich Nemshaev, the Minister of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire from October 28, 1905 to April 28, 1906 (Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation).

The meetings of the united government were held in the dining room at the state apartment of S. Yu. Witte at 30, Dvortsovaja Naberezhnaja street near the Hermitage (Ilyin, 2012, p. 353). In the middle of the room there was a long table covered with green cloth. The ministers sat down at it. They were seated without rank, randomly, with the exception of two members of the cabinet – the Minister of the Highest Court and Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister personally invited them to take a seat on his right hand. Duke Obolensky always sat after Lambsdorff, then Filosofov, Kutler, Timiryazev, Durnovo, Vuich, Manukhin, Tolstoy, Rediger, Nemeshaev, and Birilyov. When Kutler, Timiryazev, and Manukhin were made to leave the government, their successors, Nikolsky and Fedorov, took their places, and Manukhin's successor, Akimov, was seated between Birilyov and Shipov.

The first “official” meeting of the Government headed by Count S. Yu. Witte was held on October 29, and the last one was held on April 18 (Ilyin, 2012, p. 359–360). By months, they were distributed as follows: 2 meetings in October, 15 meetings in November, 8 meetings in December, 9 meetings in January, 7 meetings in February, 12 meetings in March, and 4 meetings in April. And this is not counting the three meetings in Tsarskoye Selo in December, February and April, which were dedicated to the electoral law, the establishment of the State Duma and the Council, as well as the basic laws of the Russian Empire. The main final government document was the memoria, or aide-memoire. It contained a summary of the issue and a summary of its discussion. At first, after the discussion that had already taken place, a rough draft of the memoria was drawn up. It was then agreed upon, typed out on a typewriter or in a printing office, signed by the ministers, and presented to the emperor. For the whole time of the office of the Government of S. Yu. Witte, 92 memorials were compiled. They were different in content and volume. Most often, they were accompanying documents to draft legislative acts.

The Council of Ministers was responsible for the legislative work and preliminary consideration of the proposals of ministries, departments, special meetings, committees and commissions on legislative issues submitted to the State Duma and the State Council; discussion of the proposals of ministers on the general ministerial structure and on the replacement of the main posts of higher and local management; consideration of state defense and foreign policy affairs, as well as the affairs of the Ministry of the Imperial Court and the principalities. In addition, the Council of Ministers had significant rights in the field of the state budget and credit. No management measure of general importance could be adopted by the heads of departments other than the Council of Ministers, but the affairs of State defense and foreign policy, as well as the affairs of the Ministry of the Imperial Court and Estates, were actually removed from the Council's jurisdiction. They were submitted to the Council of Ministers only by special orders of the emperor or by the heads of these departments. The audit activities of the National Audit Office, His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, and His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery for the Institutions of Empress Maria were also outside the competence of the Council of Ministers.

For the six months of work, the government under S. Yu. Witte has done a lot both in terms of temporary legislation and in the long term for the introduction of the State Duma for discussion. On January 24, 1906, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, it was decided to draw up a general government program for submitting it to the State Duma for discussion (Ilyin, 2006, p. 378). Each minister (excluding the ministers of the Imperial court and Foreign Affairs) was assigned the task of drawing up a program of legislative initiatives for their department. In March, they were discussed at the general meeting of the Council of Ministers. They reported in the following order: on March 7 the Minister of Finance reported, the Minister of Justice on March 8, the Minister of War on April 10, the Minister of Railways on April 14, the General Manager of Land Management and Agriculture on April 18.

The last Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire, Eduard Bronislavovich Krieger-Voynovsky served as the manager of the Operational Department of the Railways Administration of the Ministry of Railways from 1906, which at that time was then headed by K. S. Nemeshaev. Krieger-Voynovsky describes this period and his impressions of the service under Nemeshaev as follows: “I returned to my duties at the end of October, and two months later I received an urgent summon to St. Petersburg, where I was appointed to the post of manager of the Operational department of the Railway Administration. Besides purely technical, material, and legal issues, it was the most extensive and the most difficult department of the Ministry of Railways, and it was in charge, in fact, of all aspects of railway affairs on the entire network. It was especially difficult to organize the transportation of goods after the former strike, which affected employees and their discipline long after its end, and with the disorder that still continued throughout the Siberian railway due to the return of troops after the Japanese War. But I had excellent assistants in the person of D. N. Durnovo and A. A. Shebunevich and a number of skilled employees, with whom it was relatively easy to cope with the work. However, the work required our physical strength literally all day and night long, holidays and weekdays. During the first few months of my service in the Railway Administration, I was able to develop, bring through a number of interdepartmental meetings, and then, thanks to Nemeshaev's energy, legislate a very important measure to improve freight transportation, namely, the establishment of so-called District Committees to regulate mass cargo transportation. Until that time, no persons outside the Ministry of Railways had taken any part in these shipments, except for the transportation of mining goods in the Donetsk basin, where the distribution of wagons between the senders was carried out with the participation of industry representatives. The considerable estrangement of the Ministry of Railways and its local authorities, on the one hand, and the commercial and industrial organizations, on the other; almost complete ignorance of our merchants and industrialists of the railway apparatus, and the railway representatives of the main needs of the economic life of the country, the lack of transportation facilities during the period of increased grain exports and the lack of proper regulation of freight flows by the railways became the reason of constant complaints and misunderstandings

creating, in general, an unfavorable environment both for the work and development of our railway transport and ports, as well as for domestic industry and trade. It became absolutely necessary to bring together, mutually coordinate, and link the activities of railway institutions with the life of all those organizations and enterprises that were the main senders and recipients of transported goods. Since 1906 this general mutual work took place in the District Committees, where representatives of the railways, all local trade and industrial organizations, agricultural societies, zemstvos, cities and exchange committees participated. Since then, the district committees have played a very prominent role not only in the proper use of vehicles and the regulation of transportation, but also in the correct resolution of issues about the direction of new lines, the expedient strengthening and equipping existing roads, drawing up and changing various rules related to the transport of goods, tariff and other issues common to both railway transport and the interests of the economic life of the population. The first steps in the activities of this new institution required a lot of meetings, congresses, new correspondence, etc., but then this business was established quite quickly thanks to the efforts and concerns not only of my assistants mentioned above, but also of most of the committee chairmen, especially thanks to V. A. Gaevskii, M. A. Strizhevskii, A. G. Henrikhsen, I. N. Borisov, and A. V. Lukashevich.” (Krieger-Voynovsky & Spröge, 1999, p. 22–24.)

The department entrusted to Nemshaev was one of the fastest-growing in the Russian Empire at that time (Reichman, 1983). As of 1905, the number of employees of the railways of the Russian Empire reached 750,000 people. It should be mentioned that Nemshaev was the Minister of Railways for a very short time (from October 28, 1905 to April 28, 1906). And very little information is available about his activities as the Minister.

On the website of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation), it is reported that during Nemshaev's management of the Ministry of Railways, the Main Committee for the Protection of Railways was created and the Minister of Railways received the right to create local committees for the distribution of rolling stock for the transportation of bulk cargo of state-owned and private railways. Attempts were made to create syndicates of shipowners in river transport. There was a modernization of river and sea vessels. The development of projects for the development of the Northern Sea Route has begun.

Krieger-Voynovskii (Krieger-Voynovsky & Spröge, 1999, p. 53–54.) wrote the following about the K. S. Nemshaev's activities as the Minister of Railways: “...Duke Khilkov at the end of 1905 was replaced by the Head of the Southwestern Railways, engineer Nemshaev, who accepted a very heavy legacy since the railways were in poor condition because of the general discord that the 1905 revolution brought to the life of Russia, and the disorderly return of military units after the war with Japan. Despite this and the short period of his management of the department (for only 6 months), Nemshaev without doubts significantly changed this somewhat stationary department and managed to carry out two significant reforms. The first was regrouping

state-owned railway lines between individual local administrations and merging them into larger groups, which was important in terms of improving the cost efficacy of their operations and speeding up freight traffic. The second was, as it was called, a kind of “constitution” in the regulation of freight traffic. According to it, District committees for the management of mass cargo transportation throughout the road network were organized with the involvement of a broad public. The regulation on these committees, requiring legislative sanction was carried out by Nemeshaev in a few days through the old State Council in its last session before the opening of the new legislative chambers; if this had not been done like this, it is likely that these committees would appear only in a few years.”

Other scholars agree with Krieger-Voynovskii's conclusions. So, regarding the first conclusion, we find information that in 1905 the *Law On Measures to Attract Private Capital to the Railway Construction in Russia* was adopted (Pogrebinskii, p. 105). It provided new benefits for railway companies. In particular, the government's share of the profits of private companies was limited. They received the right to reimburse the treasury for the costs of improving the track facilities, building railway stations, various station buildings, etc. Among other benefits, railway companies were provided with government guarantees for the use of preferential tariffs for five years from the beginning of their activities, with monetary compensation for additional expenses. For example, this right was used by the Olonets Railway Company, which received compensation from the treasury for losses associated with the introduction of fixed tariffs, the difference between the ordinary commercial and preferential tariff (RSHA, F. 417. Op. 1. D. 33. L. 17). The government encouraged the formation of new private societies, but mainly in areas where large railway monopolies did not operate or new construction was not of interest to them. From 1905 to 1913, 23 new railway societies emerged (Pivovar, p. 151).

To understand the significance of the reform described by Krieger-Voynovskii in the second conclusion, it is necessary to consider the situation with the regulation of railway wagon fleets in the early 20th century in the Russian Empire. The need to regulate railway wagon fleets arose immediately with the commissioning of the first public railways and increased with the growth of traffic. The need for regulation was caused by the fact that as a result of the transportation of goods in some areas served by the railroad, an excess of wagons was formed, and in others, where loading was mainly carried out, their shortage was severe. Initially, the so-called closed regulation was used, which was carried out within the limits of the railroad, which had its own fleet of cars. At the junction points with other roads or waterways, the cargo was transhipped, and the empty wagons were sent to the place of the next loading. Wagons for loading were allocated by the station chief at the request of shippers. If there was a shortage of empty cars at this station, the applications were satisfied by the road traffic service according to the system of regulation of the car fleet. The constant requests of shippers served as the basis for planning and regulating transportation in the future. In case of a shortage of wagons on the road, the volume of loading was reduced or other

measures were taken in agreement with the committee of shippers. With the increase in the size of long-distance transportation, the shortcomings of the closed transport system became increasingly apparent, causing an excessive increase in wagon delays and the cost of transfer of goods at the junction points. These shortcomings were eliminated after the introduction of a direct non-unloading method of transportation under the condition of the urgent return of wagons to the owner road after unloading them. Violation of this condition caused huge penalties. The elimination of the overloading of goods at the junction points had a positive impact on the activities of the railways. However, an urgent return, usually of empty wagons, led to the fact that the following cargo was sent in other wagons.

Summing up this significant reform in the functioning of the system of cargo transportation by rail, sea and types of transport in the Russian Empire, Krieger-Voynovskii (Krieger-Voynovsky & Sproge, 1999, p. 35–36.) wrote the following lines: “Since the establishment of the District Committees for the Regulation of mass transportation in 1906, the situation with car fleets has only improved; significant mutual awareness and common work has been done to prepare and conduct “grain campaign” between grain merchants and railways, loading in different directions and to all ports was carried out systematically, depending on the carrying capacity of railway lines and the receiving capacity of ports, which eliminated the so-called traffic jams and delays in the way. But radical measures to improve this matter, namely, the arrangement of receiving elevators, the change of the General Charter of the Russian Railways, the law on the depersonalization of grain, the improvement of the equipment of ports, etc., were introduced shortly before the war, and this work is not over yet.”

In 1906, the third edition of the fundamental *General Charter of the Russian Railways* was prepared, which was first approved on June 12, 1885 by Emperor Alexander III in the status of the law of the Russian Empire (Verblovskii, 1886, p. 5). Employees of the Ministry of Railways, headed by K. S. Nemeshaev participated in the work on the provisions of this document. It was approved in the form of the basic railway law establishing unified legal norms for the economic operation of Russian railway transport, which met the requirements of the developing capitalist economy of the country. The General Charter of the Russian Railways, which regulated the relationship between the owners of private railways, society, and the state, was in force until October 1917, and its main provisions on transportation activities until 1928 were in the railway charters of 1922 and 1927 (Testov, 2009). The influence of its norms on railway law-making is still felt today.

Regarding the development and construction of the railway network in the Russian Empire, the short period of management of the Ministry of Railways by K. S. Nemeshaev was difficult. The defeat of Russia in the 1905 war with Japan led to the isolation of most of the Chinese-Eastern Railway, as a result of which the remaining part of this road was in danger of being lost. There was a need to return to the idea of building the Amur Line. Continuous exploration of the route began under the K. S. Nemeshaev management of the Ministry of Railways in 1906 (Kraskovskiy &

Uyezdin, 1994a, p. 160). Geological exploration and mapping work allowed them to find the most rational and reliable option for the direction of the line.

There is also information that under the leadership of the Ministry of Railways by K. S. Nemeshaev, the exploration of ways to increase the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway continued (Kraskovskiy & Uyezdin, 1994b, p. 163). As of January 1, 1906, there were 12,480 km of double-track lines in Russia, 20% of the total length of the rail network across the country. At the same time, in most developed countries, the share of railways that had two or more tracks was much greater. For instance, in England it was 55%, 36.5% in France, and more than 35% in Germany. And only Italy and the United States had just over 15% of the multi-track lines. Second tracks in Russia were built only on those lines where the capacity exceeded 20–25 trains per day (in the first decade of the XX century it was the limit for single-track railways), as well as on lines where for some reason the construction of passing tracks was difficult. At that time, the increase in railway capacity was mainly due to their reconstruction by softening the longitudinal profile of the track, unifying and reducing the maximum gradients along individual sections, as well as the construction of additional passing tracks on the longest stretches. However, for intensive cargo lines, especially in the central regions of the country, these reconstruction measures were not always sufficient to accommodate the growing traffic, and then it was necessary to build the second main track without any changes to the route of the existing line. At the same time, the second track was laid on the same level as the first, repeating its geometric outlines in the plan. This did not cause difficulties, because during the construction on a single-track line, a double-track bed was laid. This approach to reconstruction became a tradition and was used until the beginning of the XX century until the issue of the construction of second tracks on the Trans-Siberian Railway raised. The situation there was different due to less favorable terrain features and mountainous areas. In addition, transportation has increased dramatically due to the intensive development of Siberia. It was necessary to shift from the traditional to the most radical ways to increase the capacity of the lines. The search for these methods attracted the attention of scientists and engineers. The issue of improving tracks, as the core of the railway, became urgent. But changing tracks is associated with great difficulties and requires deep feasibility studies since even a small reconstruction affects the entire complex of structures and devices of the railway and causes significant costs. In this regard, the construction of the second track on the Trans-Siberian Railway was preceded by a thorough engineering, economic and technical study of many issues, including field explorations. In contrast to the existing practice, the design and construction of the second tracks on the Trans-Siberian Railway were carried out simultaneously with the radical reconstruction of the existing lines, which was due to the rapid growth in traffic. This was the main peculiarity of the reconstruction activities on the Trans-Siberian Railway. In the studies carried out by N. P. Petrov, the economic feasibility of rebuilding the existing line simultaneously with the construction of the second track was determined based on the generally accepted principle at that time: the equality of

losses associated with the operation of the road along the existing route and the percentage of the invested capital for its correction (Kraskovskiy & Uyezdin, 1994c, pp. 166–169). Calculations were made for three levels of capacity: 16, 34 and 48 pairs of trains per day. At the same time, it was planned to increase the radii of the curves in order to increase the speed of trains. As a result, it was proved that even with the movement of 16 pairs of trains per day, it would be better to reconstruct the route, plan, and profile. Based on the calculations, it was considered necessary to reconstruct the existing line simultaneously with the construction of the second track on the Middle-Siberian Line. It was taken into account that of the 1240 km of the line to be reconstructed, 835 km were built in mountainous landscape and had a limiting grade of 17.4% on straight lines and 15% on curves with a radius of 320 m (Achinsk – Nizhneudinsk, Zima – Polovina); 355 km were built across foothills with a limiting grade of 11% on straight lines. Due to the fact that a successful location of the route was chosen for construction, it became possible to change the slopes without significantly lengthening the route by tracing individual sections with a significant degree of straightness. Of the 36 sections where the track was moved to a new location, 17 moves either did not have an extension or were shorter than the original ones. During the construction of the second track with the removal of the route of the existing railway track on the sections that require significant costs, they did not stop before re-routing and on the adjacent sections with a lighter and “quite profitable” profile in terms of operation. In addition, to remove the speed limits, the radii of the steep curves were increased from 256 m to 320 m and 426 m.

By that time Moscow had already been a major railway junction with high intensity of traffic flows. It was necessary to develop bypass and adjacent lines to Moscow with the arrangement of interchanges at different levels. In 1905–1906, work continued on the construction of the Moscow Belt Railway (Kraskovskiy & Uyezdin, 1994d, p. 190). The entire route was divided between contractors into 10 sections. The line was being built from 1903 to 1908 as a double-track line, with the intersection of adjacent railway lines at different levels. In addition to the overpass interchanges, four bridges were built across the Moskva River. The construction of the road cost 42 million rubles. The Moscow Encircle Railway with a length of 54 km was put into operation in 1908. It had exits to all 9 directions adjacent to Moscow, and, in addition, 24 access roads to enterprises and warehouses located on the periphery of the city.

The increased demand for freight transportation in 1905, particularly as a result of the Russian-Japanese war, required the introduction of more powerful steam locomotives than the “normal type” locomotives of the O^v series on the state-owned railway network (Figure 3).

Due to the mass replacement of light and worn-out rails by heavier ones on state-owned railways and the need to discharge a significant number of 0-3-0 steam locomotives built in the 1850s and 1860s, it was reasonable to introduce more powerful steam locomotives (Proparovo.ru). Therefore, in 1905, Minister of Railways K. S. Nemeshaev instructed Professor N. L. Shchukin to prepare a design of a new type

of freight locomotive for state-owned railways. At this time, steam locomotives of the 0-5-0 type were already operating on some railways in Europe, but Professor N. L. Shchukin decided to stick only with the 1-4-0 type, taking the SH class steam locomotive of the Chinese-Eastern and Vladikavkaz Railways as the basis for the project.




Figure 3. O^v Series steam locomotive (Omsk steam locomotives) (Mib55 – Livejournal, 2013).



Figure 4. SHCH class steam locomotive. Steam locomotive series SHCH2067 (1931). Photo from the archive of A. A. Vasilyev-52. (TrainPix, 2017).

To gain experience of operating these locomotives on state-owned railways, 10 SH class locomotives of the were sent to Ekaterininsk Railways, and one to the South – Western Railways. However, this was done with a delay. After the work of various commissions, the technical bureau of the Kharkov Steam Locomotive Plant under the guidance of engineer A. S. Rayevsky in 1906 designed a freight steam locomotive with a two-cylinder machine compound type 1-4-0. In the technical documentation, the new locomotive was known as the “Chinese-Eastern Railway modified type 1-4-0” or “normal type 1905”. In the same 1906 Kharkiv plant built the first steam locomotive of the “normal type of 1905”, which received the designation Yuh3501 and was sent to the Ekaterinisk Railway. In 1912, such locomotives were designated as the SHCH class after the name of Professor N. L. Shchukin. Compared with the SH class locomotives, the SHCH class locomotives were heavier, had higher steam pressure (14 kgf/cm² instead of 13 kgf/cm²); block cylinders were replaced with stop cylinders, and piston spool valves were flat; the steam distribution mechanism, as in the O^V class locomotives, had a Gounod loop. In the draft design of the locomotive, the thickness of the steel sheets of the boiler drums was increased (from 17 to 17.5 mm) and the walls of the firebox were also slightly increased, as well as the frame and its mounting. The main dimensions of the machine, the diameter of the driving wheels and the grate area of the SHCH class steam locomotives (Figure 4) remained the same as those of the SH class steam locomotives. The maximum speed of the locomotive was set at 65 km/h. The SHCH class locomotives were produced by all the plants of the Russian Locomotive Building Society, and in 1911 by the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Plant. In total, 1910 locomotives of this series were built from private railways, and only the South-Eastern, Ryazan-Ural, and the North-Donetsk Railway, which was being built at that time (for the direction of Lgov – Osnova – Liman – Rodakovo – Likhaya), were ordered.

In 1906 while serving as the Minister of Railways, Nemeshaev took part in the preparation of the trip of the French scientist Paul Pelliot and the Russian officer Carl Gustav Mannerheim to China (Smirnov, 2012).

This trip is also known as the “Mannerheim's Asian Expedition”. It was a reconnaissance expedition to the north and west of the Qing Empire, organized by the Russian General Staff and carried out by the Colonel of the Russian army, Baron Carl Gustav Mannerheim (Lobycin, 2006), between March 29, 1906 and December 21, 1908. The purpose of the expedition of Baron Mannerheim was directly related to the failures of Russia in the recent war with Japan. After traveling through the Chinese provinces, Colonel Mannerheim had to get acquainted with the Chinese preparation of the defense, the training of troops, find out how much the reforms of the central government of China affected its northern provinces, what is the intensity of their colonization by the Chinese, attitudes of the indigenous population of these places towards Russia and how much Japanese influence is noticeable in these places. He was also instructed to explore the route to the cities of Kashgar, Lanzhou, and then to Beijing “to study the conditions of movement for our cavalry”. The military and

geographical objectives of the expedition were to describe the route from Kashgar to Uch-Turfan, as well as a military-statistical description of the Aksu oasis and the route to Kulja from there. It was also necessary to explore the valley of the Yulduza River. The last item of the extensive expedition task was “reconnaissance of the preparation of Lanzhou in terms of military”. In addition, by the Finno-Ugric Society Mannerheim was commissioned to collect, if possible, archaeological and ethnographic collections for the National Museum of Finland, which was being created in Helsingfors. All these tasks were not set for all the participants of the expedition, which Colonel Mannerheim led, but actually for him solely, since the expedition, in addition to its chief, included two escort cossacks and several “hired people” from local residents, including an interpreter.

According to Smirnov (Smirnov, 2012, p. 28–36), P. Pellio was a very practical person and for his cooperation, he negotiated a whole set of benefits. To begin with, he demanded to supply him with a military convoy. This was promised to him on the condition that he would command the Cossacks only through the Russian officer Mannerheim, who was included in the expedition. In addition, P. Pellio demanded duty-free transportation of all the baggage of the expedition, which was approved by the Ministry of Finance (Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Empire (FPARE), F. 148, op. 487, d. 190, l. 23). He also insisted on providing free 1st class travel to all members of the expedition across the Russian territory. This issue was agreed with the Minister of Railways K. S. Nemshaev, who, in turn, was forced to turn to the emperor. Regarding the results of the meeting with the Emperor, the Minister informed V. N. Lamsdorff that “according to my [i.e., Nemshaev's] most sincere report, on the 17th day of March this year, most graciously deigned to agree to the issuance of free tickets for the travel of members of the French expedition, ... as well as for the free transportation of their belongings weighing no more than 2500 kg from Libava to Andijan” (FPARE. F. 148, Op. 487, D. 190, L. 27).

Various social aspects related to the activities of employees and workers of railways were also important for K. S. Nemshaev. This is evidenced by the following lines from the Order (Anonymous, 1906, February 20, p. 3): “The work of the railways is the achievement of the whole state and its population, as the continuous and correct movement of the rail network is the main factor in the economic and cultural life of the country”. The words of the minister, which have not lost their significance even now, show that the Ministry of Railways, local road administrations and their leaders should strive to ensure, first of all, the solution of business problems, so the formation of corporate culture should be based on a system of relations between employees and workers regarding the conduct of official activities – first of all, ensuring the safety of locomotive traffic.

As the Minister, Nemshaev did not forget about his trusteeship towards railway workers and their families. He tried his best to contribute to their development and the improvement of their life. The railway department reasonably believed that the development of the socio-cultural sphere affects the success of the implemented

activities. The war and the turbulent political events in the country in 1904–1906 had a negative impact on all educational institutions related to the railways. Since 1906, a period of stabilization of their work began. On January 13, 1906, K. S. Nemeshaev, the Minister of Railways, approved the new “Rules on Committees and Local Trustees for the Management of Educational Institutions on State-owned Railways” (Gordienko, 2013). This document expanded the authority of the higher agency for educational institutions in the field and led to the organization of the entire system, assigning the management to a special Committee under the management of each road and to local guardianship (Serdyuk, 2014, p. 97). On February 7, 1906 K. S. Nemeshaev approved Order No. 16 (State Archives of the Tomsk Region (SATR), F. 215. Op. 5. D. 11. L. 665, 666). In accordance with this Order, the Committee chaired by the head of the road, was entrusted with the welfare, material support, arrangement, proper development and improvement of the activities of the educational institutions of the road: general education and vocational schools, vocational courses for workers and technical and general education courses for other employees, libraries, museums, student dormitories, kindergartens, and other similar institutions. The local trustees, under the chairmanship of the trustee (“Honorary Guardian”), were charged with: supervision of educational institutions, expenses within the approved budget, the care of material support, the appointment and dismissal of employees, the permission to give them leave, etc. The heads of railway sections were usually appointed as Honorary guardians, who, in addition to their main duties, had to take care of all educational institutions located within the boundaries of their subordinate sections.

Another illustrative example of the social orientation of actions under the management of the Ministry by Nemeshaev is the establishment of the institute of sanitary doctors in railway transport. Due to the growing level of morbidity and mortality of the population in the medical railway environment, it was concluded that in order to successfully combat the spread of diseases, it is necessary to pay close attention to the problems of sanitation. In 1897, the post of inspector for the sanitary condition of railways of the Ministry of Railways was introduced (At'kov & Cfasman, pp. 127–128). Since the scope of the doctor's responsibilities for monitoring the implementation and compliance with sanitary standards was quite wide, in order to achieve these goals, doctors were required to create a separate category of medical personnel. At the Third Consultative Congress of Railway Doctors, the doctors came to a unanimous decision “to have sanitary doctors on the railways” (Mezavtsev, 1903, p. 212). This proposal was approved by the Ministry of Railways, which was headed by K. S. Nemeshaev, and in 1906, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. The Russian Railways Management Committee established the Institute of Sanitary Doctors (RSIA. F. 273. Op. 8. D. 123. L. 25). For their more effective work in the field, sanitary and hygienic laboratories were organized, and staff of paramedics-disinfectants was introduced. The introduction of the post of sanitary doctors and a special staff of lower medical workers, as well as the formation of a specialized sanitary and hygienic infrastructure, became the beginning of the formation of a system of

sanitary and epidemiological control on the railways. The sanitary doctor was appointed by the head of the road, the candidates for which were provided to him by the senior doctor. According to the objects, the control of the sanitary doctor extended to 1 – medical infrastructure, which included hospitals and emergency rooms; 2 – schools and dormitories; 3 – station and train buffets; 4 – rolling stock; 5 – a system for cleaning soil and water sources along the railway line; 6 – apartments of workers and employees of the railway. All these institutions and buildings were in the area of attention of the sanitary doctor and were subject to regular inspections in order to identify and eliminate violations. When constructing new public buildings erected in the railway exclusion zone, it was necessary to obtain a doctor's opinion on the sanitary well-being of the structure (Shupikova, 2014).

At the turn of the XIX–XX centuries, two main approaches to the creation of a transit trade route from Siberia to Europe were identified: the supporters of the first approach proposed various options for connecting the Siberian river basins with the river systems of the Pechora, Northern Dvina, Volkhov, Ladoga and Neva by means of channels and/or rail tracks, in order to ensure the delivery of Siberian goods to the Baltic ports; the supporters of the second approach proposed to establish a connection between these rivers through the Kara Sea (Agapov, 2018). In 1898, the regime of duty-free trade on the Northern Sea Route was curtailed (only some goods were allowed to be carried at reduced rates) (Dolidovich, Fedorova, & Zhulaeva, 2019). Goods traffic with Europe via the Northern Sea Route has virtually ceased to exist. Until 1905, the government's policy towards Porto Franco at the mouth of the Siberian rivers did not change, which could not but affect the growth of political opposition to the local bourgeoisie. Among the Siberian merchants, there were people directly accusing the central government of one-sided economic policy, and ignoring the economic interests of the regions. S. V. Vostrotin, through the press, did not hesitate to blame the authorities for all the troubles of the Siberians: “Siberia owes its backwardness and the slow development of its cultural and economic life entirely to the Russian bureaucracy. Every initiative and attempt to raise the slow pace of Siberian life in any way, was ruined by the bureaucracy” (Vostrotin, 1906, p. 190). It is no accident that during the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907, most of the Siberian bourgeoisie found themselves in the ranks of the Cadet Party, putting forward through its program the idea of liberalizing economic policy in regions, including Siberia. However, the events of the Russian-Japanese War became a much stronger factor that influenced the change in the position of the authorities on the issue of the Northern Sea Route. They showed that it is wrong to rely only on the Trans-Siberian Railway, without developing alternative logistics directions, because due to the increased flows of military purposes, a transport crisis has arisen. Under the pressure of the Ministry of Railways, in 1905 the government restored the port-franco regime in the mouths of the Siberian rivers, and also allocated 3 million rubles for the purchase of river vessels for organizing transportation along the Yenisei (Shilovskii, 2005). The rapid development of the colonization of Siberia, the growth of the Siberian efficient farming, and, not least, the

experience of the Russian-Japanese War required the early overcoming of the Siberian isolation (Agapov, 2018). At a Special meeting on the ways of communication in Siberia held in 1906 in Irkutsk, the old project of a single Siberian water highway from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean with a subsequent connection to the river network of European Russia was put forward. It was assumed that such a line could be built by 1920. At the same time, local entrepreneurs advocated the restoration of regular merchant shipping from Siberia to Europe via the Kara Sea (Baikalov, 1913, p. 2). Contemporaries noticed the transnational importance of all trans-Siberian transport routes, but first and foremost it was connected with the Northern Sea Route (Agapov, 2018). At the same time, after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the Russian ruling circles increasingly saw it as a national communication system that had not only economic, but also military-strategic importance. Before the First World War, the idea of the Northern Sea Route as an international line, which was typical for the end of the XIX century, was replaced by the idea of it being a kind of “natural monopoly” of the Russian state.

It should be mentioned that the revolutionary events of 1905 and the tense political situation in the Russian Empire of those years did not allow a statesman of such magnitude as the Minister of Railways to remain politically neutral for a long time. Nemshaev's political views were rather liberal. Gurko in his book (Gurko, 2000, p. 469.) describes it this way: “...at the beginning of November, the state Comptroller D. A. Filosofov and the Minister of Railways K. S. Nemshaev spoke in favor of the introduction of common suffrage. It was only thanks to Witte's intervention that these heads of departments abandoned such radical demands.” The data on Nemshaev's loyalty is confirmed by his telegram to all railways of December 5, 1905, forbidding employees to join communities for the purpose of organizing strikes (State Archives of the Tomsk Region (SATR). F. 215. Op. 1. D. 257. L. 126).

However, the very position of the Minister of Railways obliged to act defending the interests of the state first and above all. Defending the need for firm and decisive measures to end the strike on the railways (up to the dismissal of civil servants involved in the protest actions), the Minister of Railways K. S. Nemshaev believed that without such measures it was “impossible to fully implement the principles of the manifesto of October 17” (Novoselsky, 2020, p. 338.). Thus, at the turn of 1905–1906 the “reaction first, reform next” became the leading principle in the government policy, and the leading role in its implementation was played by P. N. Durnovo. On December 16, 1905, the Minister of Internal Affairs appealed to all governors and mayors to dismiss zemstvo and city employees (especially doctors, teachers, and statisticians) without waiting for cases to be brought against them, if they were engaged in illegal agitation.”

Confirmation of Nemshaev's consistency in his attitude to the strike movement is a note in *The Railroader* journal (Anonymous, 1906, April 13). It says that “...when the railway voters were ready to leave the house to go to the place where the elections were held, they were stopped. Dispatch No. 497 “To Protect the Kursk-Kharkiv-Sevastopol Railway in court” of March 6 signed by Schaufus with Nemshaev's order

was received. It said that “the law does not give employees the right to interrupt the performance of their duties to participate in elections and they can participate in elections only in their free time.”

K. S. Nemeshaev believed that the main reason for the strike movement on the railways of the Russian Empire in 1905 had been the low level of culture of relations between managers and subordinates on the railway lines. In his Order of February 9, 1906, he wrote (Anonymous, 1906, February 20, p. 3): “After going there and getting acquainted with the conditions under which these strikes of 1905 arose and took place and having ascertained the reasons why on some roads external propaganda was completely ineffective, and on others, it was easily spread, I came to the conclusion that this must be largely explained by the mutual relations that existed between the junior and senior railway employees and, undoubtedly, depended on the views and beliefs of the higher rank employees on the road and on the degree of moral authority that the immediate superiors had in the eyes of the lower railway agents. Where the superiors were conscious of their official duty and were close to their subordinates, knew their needs and, along with strict demands for the performance of their official duties, showed reasonable care for the possible improvement of their working and living conditions, these relations were normal and were based on mutual trust and respect. If correct relations were built and existed for a long time, they have become traditions. Most employees clearly understood their duties to the people and the state, and external factors and agitation did not succeed at all, or the strike movement, breaking out in individual points, was immediately stopped. As it was personally evidenced, on the roads where the strikes were particularly widespread, either a strictly utilitarian attitude towards lower-level employees or a formalism that excluded the possibility of live communication prevailed. On these roads, the junior employees were left to themselves, easily succumbed to any outside influence; the superiors, not having the authority and trust among their subordinates, could not exert any influence on them [...]. At the same time, there are numerous examples when, at certain railway stations that went on strike in December, the lower employees, thanks to the reasonable and sobering influence of their immediate supervisor, refused to join the strikes and continued their work. It proves the importance of the moral authority of individuals and the possibility of strengthening a clear understanding of the lower railway personnel's official duty.

Witte and his government were dismissed on April 22, 1906. Witte wrote about his own resignation and the resignation of his Council of Ministers (Witte, 2010, pp. 922–924): “I heard almost every day from people who were to some extent loyal to me or sympathizing with me that the emperor was constantly being served, mostly through General Trepov, with denunciations and various notes, and, as the calm went on and cowardice decreased, these notes had more and more weight at the court. In January, the Minister of Railways made an inspection trip across the railways, and when he returned to St. Petersburg, he told me that there was a note circulating across Russia for the signature by large landowners. It made charges against Kutler, the

Minister of Finance Shipov (who was absolutely right in his convictions, but certainly not a black-hundredist), Putilov (his deputy, the manager of a Noble and Peasant Bank) with revolutionary designs, and a demand for a change of my ministry. At this time, my relations with His Majesty were already strained to the extreme, and I remained in my post only out of loyalty to the monarchical principle; all this will be clearer if I manage to finish these sketches. But what my relations really were, is evident from the following letter, which I have saved as a copy of what I wrote to the emperor: “I have the honor to present to your Imperial Majesty a petition (which can be found in my archives), which goes through the hands of landowners to collect signatures. It is printed in Kyiv, although the initiative for its appearance, definitely, comes from St. Petersburg. I had been informed of the intentions of this petition a few weeks ago, and now it was handed to me by K. S. Nemeshaev, who had come from the south. Of course, I could find out about its authors and its initiators, but I consider it as a waste of time matter, especially since I, like everyone living in public, know that the initiative of this case comes from the so-called “Black Hundred of the State Council”. And then the fruitful thought of such a petition belongs to Count A. P. Ignatiev, Stishinsky, or Sturmer, or Goremykin, or Abaza, which I do not care at all. However, I think that this respectable company does not seek to become in power, because they do not want to put their own persons in the game, and therefore they prefer to act and spread all sorts of lies from behind the bushes in St. Petersburg drawing rooms and through the press devoted to them.”

Conclusions.

The systematization and analysis of historical data made it possible to recreate the historical picture of the activities of Klavdii Semyonovich Nemeshaev as Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire.

We consider the establishment in 1906 of central, local and district committees for the regulation of mass transportation of goods to be one of the most important achievements of Nemeshaev as Minister of Railways. These committees were given the right to send wagons from the railways that had a surplus of them to the railways that needed them. This was the first centralized measure to regulate the car fleet, but it was mandatory for state-owned roads, and as a recommendation for private ones.

The legislative policy of the Ministry of Railways, under the leadership of K. S. Nemeshaev has been considered.

The article dwells on K. S. Nemeshaev's contribution in the development and creation of a new type of freight locomotive for state-owned railways.

The social policy of the Ministry of Railways, during the leadership of K. S. Nemeshaev, has been analyzed. The successes in streamlining and establishing the work of railway educational institutions and sanitary railway inspectors have been noted.

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The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Аналіз діяльності Клавдія Семеновича Немішаєва на посаді Міністра шляхів сполучення Російської імперії

***Анотація.** Стаття продовжує цикл статей авторів, присвячений оцінці діяльності керівників Міністерства шляхів сполучення Російської імперії. У даній статті автори зробили спробу систематизувати та проаналізувати історичні дані про діяльність Клавдія Семеновича Немішаєва на посаді Міністра шляхів сполучення Російської імперії. На відміну від численних біографічних досліджень, присвячених К. С. Немішаєву, про його діяльність на посаді міністра відомостей мало, і вони до сих пір носили розрізнений і не систематизований характер. Аналіз архівних матеріалів, наукових публікацій, мемуарів сучасників і колег Немішаєва, дозволили провести детальну оцінку його діяльності і політики управління міністерством. Показано, що незважаючи на короткий термін керівництвом відомством, послідовна політика Немішаєва і великий досвід роботи на керівних посадах, дозволили йому в стислі терміни провести дві значні реформи. Перша полягала в перегрупуванні казенних залізничних ліній між окремими місцевими управліннями та об'єднанні їх в більш великі групи, що мало важливе значення як для поліпшення і здешевлення їх експлуатації, так і для прискорення товарного руху. Ще одним з найважливіших досягнень Немішаєва на посаді Міністра шляхів сполучення, автори даної статті вважають створення в 1906 році центральних, місцевих та порайонних комітетів з регулювання масових перевезень вантажів. Це була перша централізована міра з регулювання вагонного парку. Великий управлінський досвід, висока ерудованість і енергійність Немішаєва, обумовлювали також окремі успіхи на інших напрямках роботи ввіреного йому відомства. Були спроби створення синдикатів судновласників на річковому транспорті. Відбувалася модернізація річкових і морських судів. Почалася розробка проектів освоєння Північного морського шляху. Дана оцінка розвитку і будівництва мережі залізниць в Російській імперії, під час керування міністерством Немішаєва, зокрема Амурської лінії і Московської окружної залізниці, збільшення пропускної здатності Транссибу. Показано, що далеко не на останньому місці для*

К. С. Немішаєва були різні соціальні аспекти, що стосуються діяльності службовців залізниць. Також в статті розглянута законотворча політика Міністерства шляхів сполучення тих років. Розглянуто участь Немішаєве в підготовці подорожі французького вченого Поля Пеллі і російського офіцера Карла Густава Маннергейма в Китай. У зв'язку з масовою заміною на казенних залізницях легких і зношених рейок важчими, і необхідністю списання з інвентарю значної кількості паровозів споруди 1850-х і 1860-х років, доцільно було ввести паровози більш потужного типу. Показаний внесок К. С. Немішаєва в розвиток техніки і створення нового типу товарного паровоза для казенних залізниць. Дана оцінка політичними поглядами Немішаєва.

Ключові слова: транспорт Російської імперії; залізниця; реформи; Сергій Юлійович Вітте; Рада міністрів; паровоз серії Щ

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Анализ деятельности Клавдия Семеновича Немешаева на посту Министра путей сообщения Российской империи

***Аннотация.** Стаття продовжує цикл статей авторів, посвящений оцінці діяльності керівників Міністерства шляхів сполучення Російської імперії. В даній статті автори зробили спробу систематизувати і проаналізувати історичні дані про діяльність Клавдія Семеновича Немешаєва на посту Міністра шляхів сполучення Російської імперії. В отличие от многочисленных биографических исследований, посвященных К. С. Немешаеву, о его деятельности на посту министра сведений мало, и они до сих пор носили разрозненный и не систематизированный характер. Анализ архивных материалов, научных публикаций, мемуаров современников и коллег Немешаева, позволили провести детальную оценку его деятельности и политики управления министерством. Показано, что несмотря на короткий срок руководством ведомством, последовательная политика Немешаева и большой опыт руководящей работы, позволили ему в сжатые сроки провести две значительные реформы. Первая заключалась в перегруппировке казенных железнодорожных линий между отдельными местными управлениями и объединении их в более крупные группы, что имело важное значение как для улучшения и удешевления их эксплуатации, так и для ускорения товарного движения. Еще одним из важнейших достижений Немешаева на посту Министра путей сообщения, авторы данной статьи считают учреждение в 1906 году центральных, местных и порайонных*

комитетов по регулированию массовых перевозок грузов. Это была первая централизованная мера по регулированию вагонного парка. Большой управленческий опыт, высокая эрудированность и энергичность Немешаева, обуславливали также отдельные успехи на других направлениях работы вверенного ему ведомства. Предпринимались попытки создания синдикатов судовладельцев на речном транспорте. Происходила модернизация речных и морских судов. Началась разработка проектов освоения Северного морского пути. Дана оценка развития и строительства сети железных дорог в Российской империи, во время управления министерством Немешаева, в частности Амурской линии и Московской окружной железной дороги, увеличения пропускной способности Транссиба. Показано, что далеко не на последнем месте для К. С. Немешаева были различные социальные аспекты, касающиеся деятельности служащих железных дорог. Также в статье рассмотрена законодательная политика Министерства путей сообщения тех лет. Рассмотрено участие Немешаева в подготовке путешествия французского ученого Поля Пеллио и российского офицера Карла Густава Маннергейма в Китай. В связи с массовой заменой на казенных железных дорогах легких и износившихся рельсов более тяжелыми и необходимостью списания с инвентаря значительного количества паровозов постройки 1850-х и 1860-х годов целесообразно было ввести паровозы более мощного типа. Показан вклад К. С. Немешаева в развитие техники и создание нового типа товарного паровоза для казенных железных дорог. Дана оценка политическим взглядам Немешаева.

Ключевые слова: транспорт Российской империи; железная дорога; реформы; Сергей Юльевич Витте; Совет министров; паровоз серии Щ

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