

Joanna Siekiera

University of Bergen (Norway)

ORCID: 0000-0003-0125-9121

e-mail: joanna.siekiera@uib.no

Maritime Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) from the French Perspective

Abstract: Sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea became a key topic for the negotiations since the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. Ocean change is now the most significant threat facing humanity, especially those living in coastal areas. The possible and already observed loss of territory, and thus sovereignty of the submerged states, is not the only legal consequence of ocean change happening now, in the 21st century. Another factor is the downsizing of Exclusive Economic Zones, which implies political tensions between the neighboring countries, both sovereign and dependent territories of the former colonial powers. France is present in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean via its overseas collectivities. Thus, instead of being at the 45th position in the world's ranking of the ocean powers, the Republic of France comes in the second position, straight after the United States of America. This high and indeed precious position, both geostrategically and economically, affects its views toward the United Nations negotiations process on biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction.

Keywords: *biodiversity, maritime, maritime biodiversity, BBNJ, France, ocean*

Introduction

France¹ remains one of the largest economies and the most influential states both in the European Union and globally. In addition, it is still an ocean power. Despite the fact (both historical and legal) that the colonial metropolises do not exist anymore, since the United

¹ The author was granted the Norwegian research grant from the Norwegian University Centre in Paris (NUCP) in March 2020. She has worked in two French institutions, where most of the materials for this article come from: Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques and Institut du Pacifique.

Nations Special Committee on Decolonization does not function anymore², France keeps its overseas territories. Only in the Pacific basin, the French State governs New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna. The government considers French overseas collectivities in the Indo-Pacific region in Paris as a geostrategic area. It comes from the fact of the indeed enormous maritime territories. 93% of the French Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are located in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The region itself is home to 1.5 million French citizens and 8,000 soldiers stationed in the region. After the global pivot shift from the Euro-Atlantic to the Pacific, the latter became a strategical and global economy's center of gravity. Additionally, the maritime trade routes linking Europe and the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, up to the Pacific Ocean, have become essential for global economy and security.

Ocean change, in turn, is now the most significant threat facing humanity, especially those living on islands and in delta countries. The predicted and expected (very often already observed) loss of territory and sovereignty of the submerged states is yet the problem, especially in the Pacific. France possesses 11 million km² overseas EEZs, which gives it second place on the list of the largest ocean powers, following only the United States of America (USA). Interestingly enough, without its former colonies and contemporary dependencies, the French position would be “only” 45th. The downsizing of the French EEZs will hit the French State and cause political tensions between Paris and its collectivities.

At the beginning of this article, what needs to be underlined is the distinction between climate change and its narrower, usually neglected consequence, being ocean change. The legal consequences of the potential loss of sovereignty due to environmental changes and proposed solutions at the international law level require further analysis and discussion in both academia and multilateral diplomacy. This article also serves as a modest attempt to focus on threats affecting all of us eventually, regardless of how closely or far we live from the ocean. Why? Climate changes affect sea level and contribute to land loss, relocation of maritime zones, and general uncertainty and instability. The ocean is now enormously impacted by increasing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from human activities. That, in consequence, causes changes in water temperature, ocean acidification, and deoxygenation. These chemical reactions lead in turn to changes in oceanic circulation and its chemistry, as well as to sea-level rise, increased storm intensity, and irrevocably changes in the diversity or even abundance of marine species (Gerrard & Wannier, 2013). That also affects food security, primarily in the coastal areas. From the economic security vantage point, it is similarly important to be aware of the degradation of coastal and marine ecosystems. Ocean change weakens the ability of the ocean (with its coasts) to provide critical services such as food, carbon storage, oxygen generation, as well as to support nature-based solutions to climate change adaptation, only to mention the powerful three: coral reefs, seagrass, and mangroves (Guannel et al., 2016). According

² De facto it does not function, but de iure it is still an existing organ of the UN.

to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), around 1 million species are today threatened with extinction, especially in the coming decades, which has never happened before in the history of mankind. Regarding the marine environment, nearly 33% of coral reefs, sharks, and related species and more than third of marine mammals are threatened (Grosmolard, 2019).

What cannot be forgotten is the fact that the oceans provide most of the oxygen we breathe. They have absorbed more than 90% of the warming created by humans since the 1970s. Regrettably, there must be a limit to how much the ocean can absorb, and according to scientists, such a limit is beginning to show (Laffoley & Baxter, 2016).

Maritime Biodiversity and What Beyond?

The French EEZs are the second-largest, following only the US. France possesses exactly 10,754,858 km² overseas zones. Its Pacific collectivities sum up to over 7 million: New Caledonia has 1,240,601 km² of EEZs (where total maritime space is 1,440,161 km²), French Polynesia – 4,537,730 km² of EEZs (total maritime space – 4,787,978 km²), Wallis and Futuna – 256,644 km² of EEZs (total maritime space of 262,465 km²) (Tableau des superficies, 2019)³.

The main source of the sea law, being the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from December 10, 1982, provides a principal advantage for France. Mainland France possesses “modest” 297,123 km² of EEZs in Europe (total maritime space 371,096 km²). Thus, after adding its overseas collectivities (fr. *collectivités d’outre-mer*, COM) in the Pacific, the sum is almost 11 mln km². France is unwilling to give away its high in the rank position of ocean power, not only due to purely geostrategic reasons (Redon, 2019). French officials are aware of the high significance and affordability of their EEZs, but not only when it comes to living marine resources. By stating this, one needs to realize that due to the harsh geophysical conditions of islands and coastal areas, the main source of protein comes from the sea through tuna. 67% of the world’s tuna stock lives in the Pacific. From the other, economic perspective, Oceania microstates rely strongly on their EEZs, where 80% of the national budgets come from tuna fishing (Jędrusik, 2005; Sibert et al., 2012).

The ocean, especially the Pacific, hides enormous mineral maritime resources, mostly seabed minerals and gas reserves. There is also reef biodiversity, which might have enormous potential in chemistry, petroleum, and pharmaceutical industries. Predictably, many public and private agencies from France perceive and use the Pacific as their “laboratory”. That situation may remind the time of the French nuclear testing in 1966-1996. Among three “atomic powers” who were carrying out tests in the Pacific, the USA, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of France, the third one discontinued doing so as the last. Through three decades, the French State has been making the most out of the possibility to experiment outside of

³ Calculations made by the author.

its European territory. The obvious destruction of nature and human health were anyhow an obstacle (Firth & von Strokirch, 1997). Besides French business elites, there are also other groups of metropolitan citizens benefiting from the maritime biodiversity of the French COM. Those are bureaucrats working in the islands' administration, military, transnational corporation clerks, and high managers, all aware of profits from the external European trade. Another aspect is deep-sea exploitation. Currently, agencies with their headquarters in Paris see their chances in initiatives connected with energy, climate geoengineering, pharmaceuticals, and aqua business. Noteworthy is the phenomenon of (mis)using the overseas resources by metropolitan states is nothing new (Bonnemain, 2008), but due to the lack of explicit international norms, it is monitored, measured, limited, or sanctioned.

Researchers, politicians, activists, and legal advisers agree that UNCLOS was not prepared for the case of ocean change consequences, mostly of downsizing or even disappearing land⁴. Consequently, the Convention does not provide any provisions when the maritime components of the ocean nations may be lost due to the sea level rise. Here, we also need to recall another source of international law, which defines a state: the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of December 26, 1933. This agreement enumerates the obligatory conditions for a country to become a state in the international arena in its Art. 1. Those are: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. As the ocean change effects are unprecedented, this situation has never been touched upon or regulated by the hard law. UNCLOS, drafted after World War II, signed in 1982, but entered into force in 1994, was neither prepared for the legal effects of climate change. Thus, when the main document of the sea law does not codify the procedure of what to do when an island is submerged or when its EEZ is downsizing, the soft law methods need to be accomplished. Negotiations among sovereign states on the international forum seem to be the most efficient and effective way to achieve a consensus on pressing and urgent legal and actual situations.

The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) has launched negotiations over EEZs within the UN, called Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ). The full title of this mechanism is "International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction"⁵. It was the effect of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, commonly known as the Rio+20, being a follow up to the 1992 Earth Summit also in the same city. For the first time in international legal history, the largest intergovernmental organization has decided to codify the subject of

⁴ Especially four of low-lying countries of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu are projected to lose most or even whole of their territory by the end of the 21st century.

⁵ Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2017: International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (A/72/L.7).

climate change (Objective & Themes, 2012). The legal mechanism, called now BBNJ, is being developed through an intergovernmental conference (IGC). The first three sessions of the IGC took place in the UN headquarter in New York (4-17 September 2018, 25 March-5 April 2019, 19-30 August 2019). The fourth session was supposed to occur between 23 March-3 April 2020, but due to the covid-19 epidemic, it was postponed to “the earliest possible available date to be decided by the General Assembly” (Fourth session of the Intergovernmental Conference, 2020).

BBNJ negotiations require a series of resources and tools for both negotiators, advisers, and lobbyists involved in the discussions. Here is worth underlining that not only the sovereign states, being the UN members, take part in the process of negotiations. Those are also observers of the UN. The whole complexity and variety of the entities taking part in this and their limited legal capability and very often mutually contradictory interests do not ease the legislative process. The merit aspects of BBNJ can be separated into four main elements: 1) marine genetic resources, including benefits sharing; 2) measures such as area-based management tools, along with marine protected areas (MPA); 3) environmental impact assessments; 4) capacity building with the marine technology transfer. A non-governmental organization – the International Union for Conservation of Nature (L’Union internationale pour la conservation de la nature, IUCN), also addresses issues such as general principles, definitions, responsibility, compensation, and institutional and financial arrangements. It is engaged with the UN negotiations through advice and logistics, like organizing workshops and capacity building. IUCN provides technical input to the ongoing BBNJ discussions and supports the official, intergovernmental UN decision-making process (BBNJ, 2020).

Reaching an international deal during negotiations is indeed hard, especially when it comes to the Pacific Ocean. Overall, this area is the crossroad for the global trade trails, fishing territories, and neighboring superpowers such as the USA, China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. Another aspect touched upon when discussing legal aspects of ocean change is overfishing and illegal fishing (Urbina, 2019). The problem of overfishing is known for decades, but no international measure was ever taken to prevent or stop it (Koop, 2020). As it was already presented in this article, a large amount of the national budget comes from fishing (sometimes even more than 80%), while the biggest stocks of tuna live in the Pacific Ocean (University of British Columbia, 2019). That is why the EEZs are a matter of concern, especially in Pacific island countries and territories (PICT). When losing or even downsizing EEZs, a state loses its only source of income and the very existence of the whole nation.

SIDS is experiencing ocean change damage, while the islanders are the “world’s climate change frontline” (Hviding, 2003). They contribute the least to global warming but are set to suffer the most from its effects. For those islanders, the future climate crisis is already here. Their spatial sovereignty and financial viability are grounded primarily in the vast ocean expanses of EEZs. As they call themselves “people of the sea”, Oceania islanders perceive the ocean not only as their home but also as the foundation of their survival, mainly in terms of migratory maritime sources, being tuna (D’Arcy, 2006). They do not harm its environment,

which they entirely rely on, and second – they do not have many vessels or high technology, unlike bigger and more prosperous countries. Thus, they are unable to compete with Russian, Chinese, or Vietnamese vessels overfishing natural resources in the ocean⁶.

French Maritime Raison D'état

From the law of the sea perspective, the undeniable question arises regarding the 200-nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone. The French head of states and other decision-makers keep underlining the vast importance of the overseas territories for the governments in Paris. Regardless of their political affiliation, they all highlighted the French role in the Pacific region, being undeniable. Such a role has been presented as the only reliable and responsible sheriff, ensuring stability, security (military, energy, and food), and law obedience. All this concerns the EEZs too. Former President of the Republic of France Nicolas Sarkozy said in 2010 that French COM will always remain French. He added that he should never accept French Polynesia's independence (Sarkozy, 2010). His successor, François Hollande, made a speech in 2016 on the largest island of French Polynesia – Tahiti. He said to his audience: “You are not far from France, because you are France. (...) We have to ensure our presence so that no one can come to exploit the EEZ without our consent or authorization” (Hollande, 2016). This argumentation continues under President Emmanuel Macron, “who presents himself as a champion on climate and oceans policy” (Maclellan, 2018).

Sébastien Lecornu, former Secretary of State to the Ministry for the Ecological and Inclusive Transition⁷ in the Macron administration: “[T]here are several large nations which address the issue of climate change and global warming, but without as much enthusiasm, as much energy and maybe even courage as France. (...) France, which is a large Pacific nation, will henceforth be the only member nation of the EU in the region. The three overseas collectivities French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna – the *pays et territoires d'outre-mer* [PTOM] as we call them – are the incarnation of Europe in this part of the world”⁸.

As it was already mentioned, UNCLOS was not drafted in order to find solutions to the 21st century's legal dilemmas. Losing parts of the territory, and thus parts or whole of EEZs, applies more complex cases. Only to mention a few of them, which the author considers urgent: Does a nation without a (land) territory can be still called a state? Or has it got rights and obligations of a state under the 1933 Montevideo Convention? What will happen to a state's EEZ when there will not be anymore any baseline in relation to which 200 nautical

⁶ Interview made by the author with Bastien Alex, a researcher at Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques in Paris, France on 28.01.2020.

⁷ *Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire* was created in 1971 as Ministry of the Environment (known now and then as Ministry of Ecology).

⁸ Maclellan, *op. cit.* based on S. Lecornu, unpublished data, interview from 2017.

miles⁹ could be measured? What will happen to a dependent territory's EEZ? Would the population of such submerged state/country lose its citizenship in a hosting country? Or would it be given (dual)citizenship of that hosting state per se? What would be the legal scope of protection of those displaced people (sometimes called "ecological refugees" or "climate refugees")? Should the UN draft a new international agreement and reach its binding ratifications? Or, due to over-fragmentation of legal procedures, long process of ratification and implementation into domestic legal orders, is it better to rely on existing norms? Is it quicker and more effective to create hard law, or perhaps become more flexible and use customary law, which in turn would require exceptional interpretation and an extraordinary approach toward legal culture?

France has been promoting itself as a stable state of inclusive and stabilizing mediating power towards the overseas territories (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2020). The Pacific region is a priority due to its EEZs and a crucial partner for French diplomacy. French regional engagement since 2018¹⁰ can be summed up to 4 pillars: 1) involvement in settling regional crises (shipping routes, counterterrorism, radicalization, organized crime); 2) strengthening strategic global partnerships in the region with an increasing partnership with China (du Chéné, 2002); 3) maintaining the development of multilateralism through a greater role in regional organizations; 4) promoting climate change, biodiversity, healthcare, education, digital technology, high-quality infrastructure.

French ocean policy can also be summed up to the words said by the former Minister of Overseas George Pau-Langevin in 2014: "France has been a world leader in the strategic domains of nuclear power, nuclear weapons, aeronautics and space technology, and telecommunications. It must be, and the government shares and promotes this ambition, a leader around oceans policy. I am convinced that France can be a world leader in the global development of sustainable growth – "blue growth" (...) As well as traditional economic activities (fisheries and aquaculture, maritime transport), other activities can take place in the same domain: offshore renewable energy, offshore exploration for hydrocarbons, deep water seabed mineral resources, blue biotechnologies and more" (Pau-Langevin, 2014).

The key idea during the BBNJ negotiations is the proposition of transferring international legal rights over the so-called "high seas pockets". Such transfer of rights could be done for the sole use of the Pacific island states. Nevertheless, this proposal is controversial across the different UN members, who would also be voters at the further stage of the resolution draft. The only beneficiary parties would be islands, where they would be given fishing access to the areas between their EEZs. Such an idea would protect their food security and financial stability, regardless of the shape of the zones, obviously affected by the ocean change processes. According to Art 1(1) of UNCLOS, such maritime territories beyond the scope of national

⁹ UNCLOS Art. 56: "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured".

¹⁰ Since the speech of Emmanuel Macron in Garden Island naval base in Sydney, 2 May 2018.

jurisdiction are called “the Area”, or colloquially “open seas”, “high seas”. The area is now de iure accessible for all humankind. According to UNCLOS, every state has the right to use open seas (Art 141), even those countries from outside the region or land-locked states (Art 69), as well as geographically disadvantaged states (Art 79). France agrees with the old, literal interpretation of the Convention. It is unwilling to support the idea of high seas pockets. The main argument from the French State perspective is that this proposed resolution shall eventually open “Pandora’s box”. Other states would most likely put forward other regional new claims, struggling with political or geographical issues with their neighbors¹¹.

Here is worth mentioning other key players’ positions in BBNJ. China warned that the rapid drafting of an international agreement would cause the lack of its universal acceptance. Russia agreed with that tone and reminded the plenary forum of due diligence in legislative work. The USA underlined the big difference between developing and developed states whose voting decisions might be equally varied and lead to resolution rejection. Even the principle of the ocean, being a “common heritage of humanity” (Leary, 2019), proclaimed by the least developed states, including the island states, was not put to the draft. France and other European countries are collectively represented by a European Union spokesperson (Turcat, 2019). However, the membership in the EU is being used by France as an excuse to postpone issuing any official statement regarding the ocean policy¹². The French decision-makers and politicians constantly repeat this legal bondage as BBNJ or high seas pockets, being legal dilemmas, are not “on the table” of the European agenda. Thus, France shall not risk its reputations or allies in order to initiate any talk regarding EEZs. The government in Paris is also fully aware that at this moment of international relations across the EU, most of its members are not interested in discussing the ocean issues when struggling with socio-economic difficulties. Hence, France will not launch discussion over deep sea and fishing in the EU forum having no ally in overseas matters¹³.

The legal arguments against the active participation in BBNJ by the French party, which should eventually lead to a more flexible approach toward EEZs, and high sea pockets, can be explained by other explanations. The principle of freedom of the seas belonging to the whole of humankind, not only the legal owners of the particular EEZ, cannot be undermined. Secondly, the freedom of states to conduct scientific research under the UNCLOS (Thambisetty, 2018) is very often put forward as a counterargument. Still, to make the argumentation of this article clear, there was, until now, no clear and direct discussion of what the official positions of the particular UN member states during BBNJ are. Thus, the presented arguments are of the analytical basic, while not (yet) presented on the forum. In

¹¹ Interview with the author made with Serge Segura, Ambassador of the Republic of France to the Oceans, Paris 12.03.2020.

¹² Conference organized by Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire, *Ensemble, protéger la biodiversité marine! Connaître pour agir*, Paris, 12 March 2020.

¹³ Interview with the author made with Serge Segura...

other words, states, including France, shall wait with discovering their *raison d'états* until the official UN indication during BBNJ.

Another already presented geopolitical fact is that France has the second-largest EEZs worldwide. Thus, it gives the French State a label of the ocean empire across rich developed states and poor developing countries, sovereign ones and dependencies. Also, after Brexit, where the United Kingdom has left the European Union, France became the only ocean power in the old continent. Therefore, it shall not be surprising that France does not push the issue of disappearing EEZs to the international fora¹⁴. As indeed, this state can afford to lose some of its islands and their EEZs. Rising sea level will not, at this time or scope, obstacle or make severe problems for economy or strategic matters to Paris¹⁵.

As for the formal matter, according to Serge Segura, Ambassador of the Republic of France to the Oceans (Ambassadeur chargé des océans), negotiation [political decisions are not legally binding, unlike signing an international treaty – J.S.] format within the UN was readily accepted by the international community. Nonetheless, states, dependent territories, IGOs, and NGOs were left with no concrete legal question when it came to the factual consultations and political discussions. According to Serge Segura, various legal matters connected to the sea level rise and EEZs were not specified or delivered in the form of a treaty draft, an executive agreement, or even minutes. In other words, there is, according to the French State, nothing to refer to when it comes to decision making and drafting internationally binding norms of the law of the sea. Another legal solution presented by some researchers and politicians is to amend the UNCLOS itself. Again here, the Ambassador is skeptical: “It is out of the question today to touch the Convention. The situation of the international community and the criticisms formulated by certain states concerning specific provisions of the UNCLOS means that if a single article were to be modified, a certain number of states would like to see revised other articles” (Entretien exclusif avec Serge Segura, 2019). Precisely for the same reason, the idea of establishing an arbitration authority, an organ of the UNCLOS dealing with the water outside¹⁶ the areas under national jurisdiction, seems indeed improbable.

Last but not least, from the sole economic perspective, France is aware of the benefits stemming from the high sea minerals, especially for the French pharmaceutical companies¹⁷.

¹⁴ Interview with the author made with Serge Segura...

¹⁵ Interviews made by the author during her research stay at Institut du Pacifique and Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in March 2020.

¹⁶ The International Seabed Authority is the organization established on the basis of the UNCLOS in order to “organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area.” Art 157(1).

¹⁷ Within the European states, other two being present during the BBNJ negotiations are Germany and Switzerland. The latter, not being an EU member, is represented by itself, while the French and German position is presented by the joint European Union mission.

Thus, it cannot surprise that so many French governmental institutions are deeply engaged in BBNJ. Those are, to name only the main ones, the General Secretariat of the Sea (Secrétariat Général de la Mer, SGMER), the Ministry of Ecological, the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture of the Ministry of Agriculture, various departments of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (of legal affairs and general direction of globalization), and the Ministry of Overseas.

Conclusion

According to the process of the global negotiations, called Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction, a negotiation calendar was set into four rounds: September 2018, the first half of 2019, then the second half of 2019 and, still been in uphold, in 2020. Four themes were defined as: marine genetic resources including benefit-sharing, tools for protecting marine biodiversity, in particular, Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), environmental impact assessments of new human activities, and conclusively, capacity building and transfer of marine technology for the benefit of developing states. The French perception, according to officially published data, can be seen as upholding. Its membership in the European Union is used as a political excuse no to present its own, rather strict, position regarding EEZs and proposed high seas pockets. France is present in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean via its overseas collectivities and holds the proud second position of the largest EEZs worldwide. This geostrategically and economically efficient position affects its views toward the United Nations BBNJ negotiations process. Thus, it can be expected that at the moment of crystallizing the international benefits or possible losses of certain states stemming from giving fishing rights solely to the poor developing island states, France will most likely veto. Even the codification as an international legal norm of the ocean, being as the common heritage of humankind, does any good for this old colonial power. French heads of state keep repeating the inseparable and lasting bond with its overseas territories. Thus, it should not be surprising that France will be reluctant to give away access to the rich maritime biodiversity.

References:

- Bonnemain, B. (2008). Colonisation et pharmacie (1830-1962): une présence diversifiée de 130 ans des pharmaciens français. *Revue d'Histoire de la Pharmacie*, 359.
- D'Arcy, P. (2006). *The People of the Sea: Environment, Identity, and History in Oceania*. University of Hawai'i Press.
- du Chéné, A. (2002). Le Pacifique et la France. *Hèrmes, La Revue*, 32-33.
- Gerrard, M.B., & Wannier, G.E. (2013). *Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate*. Cambridge University Press.
- Guannel, G., et al., (2016). The Power of Three: Coral Reefs, Seagrasses and Mangroves Protect Coastal Regions and Increase Their Resilience. *PLoS ONE*, 11(7).

- Hviding, E. (2003). Both Sides of the Beach: Knowledges of Nature in Oceania. In H. Selin (Ed.), *Nature Across Cultures: Non-Western Views of the Environment and Nature*. Kluwer Academic.
- Hollande, F. (2016, February 22). *Speech to the Elected Members of the Assembly of French Polynesia*.
- Jędrusik, M. (2005). *Wyspy tropikalne. W poszukiwaniu dobrobytu*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Laffoley, D., & Baxter, J.M. (2016). *Explaining ocean warming: causes, scale, effects and consequences*. IUCN Publication.
- Leary, D. (2019). Agreeing to disagree on what we have or have not agreed on: The current state of play of the BBNJ negotiations on the status of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction. *Marine Policy*, 99.
- MacLellan, N. (2018). France and the Blue Pacific. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 5(3).
- Pau-Langevin, G. (2014, June 18). *Speech to French Senate Debate on "les Zones Économiques Exclusives Ultramarines"*.
- Redon, M. (2019). *Géopolitique des îles*. Le Cavalier Bleu.
- Sarkozy, N. (2010, January 19). *Voeux à la France d'Outre-mer. Saint Denis de la Réunion*.
- Sibert, J., et al. (2012). Shifting from marine reserves to maritime zoning for conservation of Pacific bigeye tuna (*Thunnus obesus*). *PNAS*, 109(44).
- Firth, S., & von Strokirch, K. (1997). A Nuclear Pacific. In D. Denoon, & M. Meleisea (Eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders*. Cambridge University Press.
- Urbina, I. (2019). *La jungle des océans: crimes impunis esclavage ultraviolence pêche illégale*. Payot.

Electronic Resources:

- Biodiversité en haute mer: troisième session de négociations. (2019). <https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/secteurs-activites/environnement/34782-biodiversite-en-haute-mer-3eme-session-de-negociations>
- Entretien exclusif avec Serge Segura, Ambassadeur chargé des océans. (2019). <http://fimes-france.org/tag/bbnj>
- Fourth session of the Intergovernmental Conference. (2020). <https://www.un.org/bbnj>
- Grosmolard, A-L. (2019, May 6). *La biodiversité face à un « dangereux déclin » selon l'IPBES*. Le marin. <https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/secteurs-activites/environnement/34163-la-biodiversite-face-un-dangereux-declin-selon-lipbes>
- Koop, F. (2020, January 24). *Will Shape the Future of the Oceans*. The Maritime Executive. <https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/2020-will-shape-the-future-of-the-oceans>
- Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ). (2020). <https://www.iucn.org/fr/node/30600>
- Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères. (2019). *La zone indopacifique: une priorité pour la France*. France diplomatie. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/asie-oceanie/la-zone-indopacifique-une-priorite-pour-la-france>
- Objective & Themes. (2012). <https://web.archive.org/web/20110501093629/http://www.unccd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=61>
- Tableau des superficies. (2019). <https://limitesmaritimes.gouv.fr/ressources/tableau-des-superficies>
- Turcat, A. (2019, August 21). *Biodiversité en haute mer: troisième session de négociations*. Le marin. <https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/secteurs-activites/environnement/34782-biodiversite-en-haute-mer-3eme-session-de-negociations>
- University of British Columbia. (2019, October 1). *How sustainable is tuna? New global catch database exposes dangerous fishing trends*. ScienceDaily. [www.sciencedaily.com/relea\(ses/2019/10/191001132650.htm](http://www.sciencedaily.com/relea(ses/2019/10/191001132650.htm)

