I. *ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ*

REVISTING HUSSERL'S ACCOUNT OF LANGUAGE IN *LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS**

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The main aim of this paper is to revisit and reassess the account of language at the origins of Husserl's phenomenology specifically focusing on *Logical Investigations*. I would like to argue that there is an ambivalence in Husserl's discussion of language in *Logical Investigations*: on the one hand, Husserl is concerned with language as one of the most important symbolic systems and a requisite for scientific knowledge, and he emphasizes the role of linguistic discussions as the philosophically indispensable preparations for constructing pure logic; on the other hand, he applies the idea of the fundamental distinction between the realm of ideal and real being to his views of logic, science and language, which finally causes him to interpret the relation between logic, science and language as the inessential one. The paper begins with discussing Husserl's view of symbolic methods and sign systems in *Prolegomena*. The second section is focused on the idea of the necessity of linguistic investigations for pure logic presented in the *Introduction* to the second volume of *Logical Investigations*. In the final section I make an analysis of the 4th *Logical Investigation* with the special emphasis put on the idea of pure logical grammar.

Key words: Functions of language, symbolic thought, pure grammar, phenomenology, early Husserl, linguistic investigations, theory of science.

ПЕРЕОСМЫСЛЯЯ ГУССЕРЛЕВСКОЕ ВОЗЗРЕНИЕ НА ЯЗЫК В «ЛОГИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯХ»

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Главная цель данной статьи состоит в том, чтобы снова обратиться и осуществить переоценку воззрения на язык, характерного для ранней гуссерлевской феноменологии, особенно фокусируясь на «Логических исследованиях». Я хочу обосновать тезис о том, что имеет место определенная амбивалентность в гуссерлевском обсуждении языка. С одной стороны, Гуссерль занимается языком как одной из наиболее важных символических систем, необходимой для научного знания. И он подчеркивает роль лингвистических дискуссий как неотъемлемой философской подготовки для построения чистой логики. С другой стороны, он применяет свою идею фундаментального различия идеального и реального бытия к своим взглядам на логику, науку и язык, что в итоге ведет его к тому, чтобы интерпретировать отношения между логикой, наукой и языком как несущественные. Статья начинается обсуждением воззрения Гуссерля на символические методы и знаковые системы в *Пролегоменах*. Вторая часть статьи сосредотачивается на идее необходимости лингвистических исследований, представленной во *Введении* ко второму тому «Логических исследований». В заключительном разделе я провожу анализ *Четвертого Логического Исследования*, ставя особый акцент на идее чистой логической грамматики.

Ключевые слова: Функции языка, символическое мышление, чистая грамматика, феноменология, ранний Гуссерль, лингвистические исследования, теория науки.

SYMBOLIC THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND SCIENCE

On the path along which Husserl gives form to the idea of pure logic as a theory that is meant to explore and clarify the basic building blocks of all scientific knowledge, research into sign systems and symbolic thought and knowledge plays an important role. This theme, which Husserl had introduced in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and his semiotic investigations written shortly before its publication (Husserl, 1994a); (Husserl, 2003)[1], is taken up fully in the *Logical Investigations.*

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl underlines the enormous importance of symbolic systems in overcoming the natural limits of human intellectual dispositions, and couples the topic with reflections on the possibilities and conditions of science:

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[1] See especially Husserl's frequently overlooked 1890 manuscript *On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)* (Husserl, 1994b). For a recent discussion of this remarkable text see Byrne (Byrne, 2017a); (Byrne, 2017b).

> Men's intellectual powers are severely limited …. We are also similarly restricted in our genuine grasp of the sense of even moderately complex propositional combinations, and even more restricted in our power to grasp and genuinely carry out deductions of even moderate complexity. The sphere in which active research originally moves in full comprehension, and operating with the thoughts themselves, is *a fortiori* a small one. When all these facts are considered, it is quite astonishing that the more comprehensive rational theories and sciences should have been developed at all. (Husserl, 2001a, 126)

The existence of the sciences, according to Husserl, rests upon the invention and use of a wide range of 'devices which economize thought' (Husserl, 2001a, 126), various artificial aids and methods. Clarifying how these methods function and accounting logically for their efficiency — that is, accounting for the fact that the results of such methods must agree exactly, or at least approximately, with the truth — proves to be a task that cannot renounce any real consideration of the possibilities and conditions of science. In the *Prolegomena*, Husserl even proclaims that "to analyse these and like types of method, and fully to clarify their achievement, is perhaps the most beautiful and least developed field in the theory of science" (Husserl, 2001a, 128).

For a more precise understanding of the role that Husserl assigned to *language* in the context of these thoughts on symbolic methods and sign systems, a brief consideration of the 9th section of the *Prolegomena* will be illuminating. In this section, Husserl distinguishes different kinds of methodical scientific devices, drawing a distinction between *validation*, as one of the basic methodological devices of the sciences, and all others, which only have the character of auxiliary methodological devices and cannot claim to be as important as real validations. He divides auxiliary methodological devices into two groups: 1) *abbreviations and substitutes* for validation that represent the performance of self-justification and play a key role from the perspective of mental efficiency (Husserl apparently refers to the methods that use signs as representatives and substitutes for one's own ideas, concepts and thoughts; and 2) *aids* for validation that serve to prepare, facilitate, secure or make possible future validations.

As an example of the second group of methodological devices, Husserl points to "…an important prerequisite […] that one's thoughts are adequately expressed by readily distinguishable, unambiguous signs. Language", Husserl continues,

> offers the investigator a widely applicable sign-system to express his thoughts, but, though no one can do without it, it represents a most imperfect aid towards strict research. […] The careful thinker will not therefore use language without artificial precautions; to the extent that the terms he uses are not unambiguous and lack sharp meaning, he must define them. (Husserl, 2001a, 23)

This passage is, in a certain sense, ambiguous. It is not fully clear whether it should be taken to mean that language itself is an auxiliary methodical device and an aid towards validation, or whether what is meant by such an aid is the artificial methodical measures that the scientist must apply to language in its natural form in order to make it usable for scientific purposes (an example of such measures would be the introduction of unequivocal terminology and the use of nominal definitions). But these two possible interpretations are not obviously incompatible: language, as a natural sign system that enables each speaker to express thoughts, plays the role of an indispensable methodological tool in the context of science and scientific research. As such, it is nevertheless so imperfect that without additional precautions it cannot actually serve to conceive, facilitate or ensure scientific explanation. In this context, Husserl speaks of the *idea* of unequivocal and perfectly adequate linguistic expression as the ideal that every *scientific* use of natural language should approach with the aid of 'artificial precautions'.

Besides, the *Logical Investigations* note the importance of language for science and scientific research as a medium of *documentation, communication* and *tradition* of knowledge and the research findings:

> All theoretical research, though by no means solely conducted in acts of verbal expression or complete statement, none the less terminates in such a statement. Only in this form can truth, and in particular the truth of theory, become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available treasure for knowledge and advancing research. (Husserl, 2001a, 166)

> Science exists objectively only in its literature, only in written work has it a rich relational being limited to men and their intellectual activities: in this form it is propagated down the millennia, and survives individuals, generations and nations. It therefore represents a set of external arrangements, which, just as they arose out of the knowledge-acts of many individuals, can again pass over into just such acts of countless individuals. (Husserl, 2001a, 17)

Knowledge-acts and the knowledge that constitute science in a subjective sense are, according to Husserl, psychological events that arise and disappear in the consciousness of individuals. Expressing ideas using language thus provides researchers with the means to bring their current knowledge-acts to a culmination; as a result, even when the current knowledge-acts are interrupted, they can return to their results and build upon them. The culminating linguistic statement confers an availability to scientific views and knowledge in which they transcend their original momentary currency and become 'an abiding possession'. Without the contribution of language, no systematic, unitary context of knowledge could ever arise.

Moreover, language bestows a permanent availability upon knowledge not only for individual researchers, but also for the scientific community as a whole. The current views of individuals, if they are expressed and documented with the help of linguistic signs, can go on to participate in the actions of any other individual at any moment, precisely because they have encountered appropriate linguistic expression and a proper understanding of their meaning. In this way, on their journey of knowledge researchers can build on the knowledge of their predecessors without themselves having to travel the entire length of the road that led to the original view and its linguistic expression.

Also noteworthy here is Husserl's emphasis on writing and the role it plays in making the scientific tradition possible. Linguistic expression and the communication of knowledge among researchers can take on a *verbal* form — even then it fulfils the above function. Nevertheless, the linguistic expression and documentation of knowledge that is independent of the continuity of an oral tradition and makes it possible for researchers who might be separated by hundreds of years and dozens of generations to actualise the relevant views is only possible thanks to the *written form* of the language. Only through a literature does science ensure 'objective existence' in the form of a scientific tradition that transcends not only individuals, but nations and generations. In the sense, science is conditional not only on the possibility of linguistic expression as such, but particularly on the possibility of linguistic expression with the help of written symbols (cf. Derrida, 1978).

NECESSITY OF LINGUISTIC DUSCUSSIONS FOR PURE LOGIC

The relationships indicated above between knowledge, its contents and language reveals to be very complex through the phenomenological analyses put forward in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*. That becomes also manifested in the very introduction to the second volume, which Husserl opens up by considering "the necessity that we should begin logic with linguistic discussions" (Husserl, 2001a, 165). Husserl's motivation for beginning the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* with a consideration of the necessity of linguistic discussions seems easy to understand. All one has to do is look at the titles and topics of the six investigations that make up the second volume: the first and fourth of the logical investigations (as well as a considerable part of the sixth) deal in depth with issues of language.

But why do such investigations arise in the context of pure logic and its epistemological foundation at all? That is precisely the subject of Husserl's Introduction. Husserl claims that

the linguistic discussions are certainly among the philosophically indispensable preparations for the building of pure logic: only by their aid can the true objects of logical research — and, following thereon, the essential species and differentiae of such objects — be refined to a clarity that excludes all misunderstanding. (Husserl, 2001a, 165)

The reasons Husserl gives to back up this claim can be encapsulated in two theses: 1) the logical contents with which the study of pure logic concerns itself are first given to us in connection with linguistic expressions; and 2) the structures and differentiae of language (grammar) represent an important guide for the revelation of structures and differentiae in the field of logic (in the field of truths and meanings).

The introduction to the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* brings a new motive, which is very important in our context. Husserl clearly states that the realisation of logical objects in subjective acts is at first connected with *linguistic expressions*:

The objects which pure logic seeks to examine are, in the first instance, […] given to it in grammatical clothing. Or, more precisely, they come before us embedded in concrete mental states which further function either as the *meaning-intention* or *meaning-fulfilment* of certain verbal expressions […] and forming a *phenomenological unity* with such expressions. (Husserl, 2001a, 167)

In the Introduction Husserl also argues in support of the necessity of linguistic discussions by pointing to the role of grammatical analyses of language as a possible guide for logical analyses. Husserl refers to the common experience with linguistic practice, from which we know that certain meanings correspond to words and certain relationships between meanings correspond to the relationships between words (or sentences). How far does this 'parallelism between speaking and thinking', as he calls it, extend? To what extent is the structure of language parallel to the structure and architecture of the field of meanings?

Traditionally, there have been two antithetical ways to answer these questions: 1) No real parallelism between language and thinking or the field of meanings exists; or 2) the parallelism between language and thinking or the field of meanings is fundamental and total. The grammatical and semantic analyses of language would thus be in the first instance two quite unrelated undertakings, whereas in the second case the analyses would overlap.

Husserl rejects both of these antithetical positions and attempts to give grounds for a middle position according to which grammatical structures and differentiae both *partially* overlap with and *partially* diverge from structures and differentiae of meanings. From this perspective, it is plausible to say that some of the differences that we find on the language side correspond to *logically essential* differences, whereas oth-

er correspond to *logically inessential* differences and some of them correspond to *no* differences on the side of meanings. To illustrate this last case, Husserl notes a group of grammatical differences that he believes only reflect "aesthetic tendencies which fight against any bare uniformity of expression, or against discord in speech-sound or rhythm" (Husserl, 2001a, 173) (such as differences in tone, intonation, etc.).

TWO SIDES OF SCIENCE AND LANGUAGE

As we interpret Husserl's account of language in the *Logical Investigations*, we should not overlook the key role played in the end by Husserl's application of the 'fundamental difference' between the realms of ideal and real being (cf. (Mensch, 1981); (Mensch, 2003)).

In the above-mentioned passages of the *Prolegomena* Husserl speaks of science as an *anthropological unity* — that is, a product of *human* thought- and knowledge-acts, as a cultural and historical structure whose history is part and parcel with the history of humankind. All methodical knowledge aids and methods discussed above are rooted "… in our general human constitution, in the main in our mental constitution […] but also in part in our physical constitution" (Husserl, 2001a, 106). Such aids are invented and implemented in order to overcome limitations that are specific to our *human* intellectual capabilities and can be determined by empirical observations falling — to a considerable degree — within the field of psychology. For this reason, Husserl designates all of these "auxiliary devices or substitutes for proofs" (Husserl, 2001a, 106) as *empirical* and assigns them to the field of that which "relates essentially to the specifically human side of the science" (Husserl, 2001a, 106).

For this reason, a theory of science which is concerns itself with analysing these aids and methods and providing the logical grounding for them cannot be a theory of science in a purely logical sense, but only a theory of science in the sense of a 'technology' (Husserl, 2001a, 13) (*Kunstlehre*) of scientific knowledge. Pure logic, on the contrary, focuses exclusively on the objective, theoretical contents of science, on science in the sense of a systematic unity of truths concerning a particular field of objects (cf. Fisette, 2003).

By the same token, discussions devoted to the 'specifically human side of the science' have, according to the *Logical Investigations*, no fundamental relevance to the theory of knowledge, whose task is the epistemological clarification and foundation of an objectively oriented pure logic: "It is plainly an undertaking of great scientific import to show up […] the psychological ways and means through which an objectively adequate Idea of a unified experience should have grown up in the minds of scientific

research-workers" (Husserl, 2001a, 130). Nonetheless, as Husserl goes on, "this whole investigation is […] irrelevant to epistemology. […] The question is not how experience, whether naïve or scientific, arises, but what must be its content if it is to have objective validity" (Husserl, 2001a, 130 ff.).

Husserl's view of the two aspects of science, the anthropological or psychological aspect and the logical aspect, as well as the corresponding distinction between the types of theoretical and scientific investigation is doubtless a result of Husserl's applying of the fundamental distinction between the real and the ideal. If the *Logical Investigations* conceive of the contrast between the real and the ideal as exclusive and impervious to mediation, and if they distinguish the objective, theoretical content of science as an ideal context of truths from the subjective context of knowledge as real psychological processes, it follows that a theory of science based on pure logic should demarcate itself as an "a priori, theoretical, nomological science which deals with the ideal essence of science as such" (Husserl, 2001a, 152).

Now, language is conceived in the *Logical Investigations* in the end as a necessary condition for the possibility of science in the sense of an *anthropological* unity, as an indispensable means for *psychologically* ensuring and preparing scientific explanations. What Husserl has primarily in mind is the *empirical* relationship and the conditionality that holds between language and scientific knowledge. As regards the objective, theoretical contents of science, the systematic context of truths as a unity of validity, he considers the role of language as inessential: "There is, however, no intrinsic connection between the ideal unities which in fact operate as meanings, and the signs to which they are tied, i.e., through which they become real in human mental life. We cannot therefore say that all ideal unities of this sort are expressed meanings" (Husserl, 2001a, 233).

Husserl's contention that the (partial) parallelism between speaking and thinking is not only a haphazard concurrence of structures of a certain sign system and structures in the field of truths and meanings, may be explained by reference to the fact that language in the *Logical Investigations* is understood primarily as a *device* and *instrument*. Each device serves a particular purpose and is what it is thanks to its suitability to that purpose. This is no less true, according to Husserl, for symbolic systems and methods as devices and tools that facilitate, support and potentially even substitute for one's own acts of thinking.

This idea becomes reflected in the manner in which Husserl discusses the parallelism between speaking and thinking in *the fourth Logical Investigation*. The manner is distinctly *teleological.* The following quotation illustrates this idea nicely: "if the verbal resources of language are to be *a faithful mirror* of all meanings possible *a*

priori, then language must have grammatical forms at its disposal which give distinct expression, i.e. sensibly distinct symbolization, to all distinguishable meaning-forms" (Husserl, 2001b, 55). The telos this discourse is referring to is "the ideal of a logically adequate language" (Husserl, 2001b, 311) that the *Sixth Logical Investigation* characterises as "…that of a language which can give unambiguous expression to all possible matters and all possible categorical forms" (Husserl, 2001b, 311). It is an ideal because we are always far removed from it, which Husserl is well aware of. Nevertheless, as an ideal it stipulates certain requisites that must be satisfied by each individual case. The telos of a logically adequate language demarcates a 'framework' (Husserl, 2001b, 74) that, as Husserl believes, every actual empirical language must abide by if it is to be designated a language.

The actual realisations of such a sign system (i.e., different empirical languages) may differ in a variety of ways. If, however, we are dealing with a *language*, its inner structure and architecture must, as Husserl claims, mirror a certain number of fundamental logical structures and laws. Sign systems that do not show evidence of these minimal fundamental logical structures and differences in their verbal and grammatical 'repertoire' either simply are not languages or are languages that remain at a primitive stage of linguistic development.

Thus an investigation into the core of language, according to the *Fourth Logical Investigation*, overlaps with an investigation into the elementary relationships and laws of the field of logic. Such an investigation falls within the purview of pure logic. With a view to the role this layer of pure logic plays in the clarification of 'the ideal essence of all language as such', Husserl introduces the term *pure grammar*[2]. The idea of pure grammar formulated in the *Fourth Logical Investigation* is not the idea of a science of empirical language but the idea of a fundamental part of pure logic, which is itself independent of any empirical linguistic investigation. Linguistic investigations that are characterized in the introduction to the *second volume* of the *Logical Investigations* as a necessary preparation for the construction of a pure logic are thus not the study of any given language or a disinterested description of natural language use. On the contrary, they are "discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider sphere of an objective *theory of knowledge* and, closely linked with this last, the *pure phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing*" (Husserl, 2001a, 166).

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[2]   For a discussion of the historical context of Husserl's idea of pure grammar see e.g. (Schmit, 1992).

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