Bartłomiej H. Toszek
University of Szczecin (Poland)

Political Dimension
of Welsh Identity after Devolution:

Fact or Fiction?

Abstract: The Welsh identity is undisputable in national (i.e. ethnic), social, cultural and even economic dimensions however it is doubtful in political sphere because vast majority of the Welsh still cannot decide if they are more Welsh or British. The 'double identity' dilemma was visible especially during devolution referendums voting in 1979, 1997 and 2011 when non-political motives were often much more determinative then the factor of belonging to the Welsh community in political meaning. Thus, answering to the question about devolution referendum role in shaping political dimension of Welshness requires thoroughly analyse of the mentioned referendums results as an evident figures of public support for establishing legal and institutional guarantees of maintaining and developing all aspects of national identity. In the article has been contained description how the Welsh relations to the idea of self-determination (in frames of the wide internal autonomy) have changed by last 35 years. An author shows also barriers and factors fostering this process.

Keywords: *Wales; United Kingdom; national identity; Welshness; devolution; Welsh language*

The conventional definition of national identity includes elements allowing to differ one nation from the others: "a historical territory, or homeland; common myths and historical memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; a common economy with territorial mobility for members" (Smith, 1991, p. 14). On these bases some nations are recognized and considered to

maintain their separate character despite of being stateless and/or existing in frames of multinational states. That is what the Welsh are. For generations they have lived in homeland bordered from the North, West and South by the Irish Sea and the Bristol Channel and from the East roughly by Offa's Dyke[1]. They have memories of proud history which goes back to the Roman times. Their rich culture "has defined Wales over the centuries and […] has sought to define the country at the beginning of the 21st century" (Edwards, 2007, p. 1). There are also 562 000 people in Wales who can speak native language, representing 19% of the population (Welsh Government, 2014). Like in the past "the first indications to a traveller that he has crossed from England into Wales are the sound of a different language, a change in looks of the people, and a different tune in the voice even when he hears English spoken" (Griffith, 1946, p. 1).

Economic differences between Wales and other parts of the United Kingdom are not so obvious but still visible. The decline of traditional industries (coal mining and metallurgy) in 1980s has irreversibly transformed the country's economic profile. Although today Welsh economy is dominated by the service, the industrial production still is important and it contributes almost 1/3 of total GVA what is about 10% more than the national average (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009, p. 6). Welsh people represent many characteristics typical for industrial society such as strong affection to the country and the nation, wariness in relationship with outer world and dislike for their way of life changes. But cultural, social and economic differences still are not compatible with the sense of national identity in the political sphere. Strong and long-term influences of bigger, more powerful and richer England finally turned Wales into "small country, unfavourably situated for commercial purposes, with an indifferent soil, and inhabited by an unenterprising people" (Parker, 2007, p. 85). This unflattering image started to change at the beginning of the 20th century. However, despite of creating political organizations representing Welsh interests (i.e. *Plaid Cymru*) and governmental offices responsible for Welsh affairs (i.e. Council of Wales and Monmouthshire, Ministry for Welsh Affairs, Welsh Office), vast majority of Welsh people still could not decide themselves if they were more Welsh or British. The "double identity" dilemma was visible especially during devolution referendums voting in 1979, 1997 and 2011 when non-political motives were often much more determinative than the factor of belonging to the Welsh community in political meaning. In this article an answer for the question about devolution referendums role

---

[1] Offa's Dyke is a linear earthwork 2,5 m high, 20 m wide and 283 km long that roughly follows current border between England and Wales. It is named after 8th century Mercian king Offa who is thought to have ordered this construction.

in shaping political dimension of Welshness is given. The answer has been based on the analysis of referendums results as evident figures of public support for establishing legal and institutional guarantees of maintaining and developing all aspects of national identity.

Table 1. Results of 1979 devolution referendum in Wales

Counties	Turnout	Yes vote		No vote	
	(%)	Number	%	Number	%
Clwyd	51.1	3 1384	11.0	114 119	40.1
Gwynedd	63.4	37 363	21.8	71 157	41.6
Dyfed	64.6	44 849	18.1	114 947	46.5
Powys	66.0	9 843	12.2	43 502	53.8
West Glamorgan	57.5	29 663	10.8	128 843	46.7
Mid Glamorgan	58.5	46 747	11.8	184 196	46.7
South Glamorgan	58.7	21 830	7.7	144 186	51.0
Gwent	55.3	21 309	6.7	155 389	48.7
WALES	**58.3**	**243 048**	**11.8**	**956 330**	**46.5**

Source: Jones, Wilford, 1983, p. 138.

First referendum on the devolution processes implementation in Wales was held on 1 March 1979. Positive result would have meant that the Welsh Assembly had been created with 72 members elected by the first past the post system for four-year period. The Assembly would have had no primary legislative or tax raising powers but only ability to pass secondary legislation in relation to defined fields, i.e. housing, health, education, management of the Welsh Development Agency (responsible for furthering the economic development, promoting industrial efficiency and international competitiveness, creating and safeguarding employment, improving the environment), co-operation with non-governmental organizations (i.e. quangos). The Assembly would have been able to provide financial support for development of Welsh language, museums and galleries, libraries, arts and crafts, sport, culture and recreation. All ministerial functions under acts listed in the Schedule 2 to the Wales Act 1978 "were to have been exercised by the Assembly. Where an area of government was not to be devolved for example national taxation, social security, and sea fishing, then no statutes relating to those matters were listed in the Schedule. An area of administration was therefore excluded from devolution by omission from the Schedule" (Foulkes, 1983, p. 70). According to the Wales Act 1978 provisions "the

UK Government was authorized to intervene in the exercise powers if they impinged on reserved powers by directing that the action should not be taken, or certain action should be taken. These override powers could be used if the Secretary of State [for Wales] thought it desirable in the public interest or, in the case of subsidiary legislation, if it was considered to be incompatible with the UK's Community or international obligations" (Gay, 1997, p. 11).

Not surprisingly, the people of Wales had little or no interests in creating the Assembly without primary legislative powers, limited areas of competences and weak position in relation to the UK Government. In result "on St. David's Day 1979, the government's devolution policy was rejected more decisively than even most pessimistic of the devolutionists could have imagined" (Davies, 2007, p. 651). In referendum took part 1 202 687 of 2 038 048 registered voters of Wales (58.3%). From total sum of valid voices (1 199 378) almost 4/5 (79.7%) were against the Wales Act 1978 implementation and only 1/5 (20.2%) in favour. The referendum's result meant that devolution reform was supported only by 11.8% of a total number of the electors of Wales. 'There was negative majority in every one of the eight counties[2], varying from 33.1% in Gwynedd to 75.8% in Gwent. As the assembly had received the support of only one in five of those who had voted, John Morris[3], the Secretary of State, was obliged to acknowledge the immensity of the defeat. When you see an elephant on your doorstep – he said – you know that it's there (Davies, 2007, p. 651–652).

The BBC Wales-Abacus polls in May 1978 and February 1979 showed that implementation of the Wales Act 1978 was supported mainly by men, of the age 18–34, semiskilled or unskilled workers, speaking Welsh, living in North West and North Wales, the Plaid Cymru voters. In contrast, the most of devolution reform's opponents were women, of the age 35–54, middle class, non-Welsh speakers, living in South Wales (1978) and North East and Mid Wales (1979), the Conservative Party voters.

The figures in the Table 2 shows dramatic fall of support for the devolution in the year running up to the polling day (from 4.8 to 29.8% in various groups). This

---

[2] Eight counties (enlisted in Table 1) were created under the Local Government Act 1972 and used for local government and other purposes between 1974 and 1996. The new administrative division (involving 22 administrative counties) has been implemented under Local Government (Wales) Act 1994 but former counties have been still used for ceremonial purposes of lieutenancy and shrievalty.

[3] John Morris, Baron Morris of Aberavon (born 1931) is a retired Labour politician. He was Member of Parliament between 1959 and 2001, Secretary of State for Wales between 1974 and 1979, Attorney General for England and Wales and Attorney General for Northern Ireland between 1997 and 1999.

situation was caused mainly (but not only) by crystalizing the vision of the future Welsh Assembly lacking in real powers and subjected to strict control of the Secretary of State for Wales, as stated in the Wales Act 1978 (which received the Royal Assent in 31 July 1978). In BBC Wales-Abacus poll in February 1979 other factors were showed as well. From total number of surveyed ca. 1/5 stated they view the Assembly as another tier of government bureaucracy, involving extra money and being first step towards the break-up of the UK (Balsom, 1983, p. 208). After the 1979 referendum there were no doubts the Welsh people rejected not only devolution proposal based on the Wales Act 1978, but the idea of the devolution at all.

The second devolution referendum in Wales was held on 18 September 1997. The Welsh were given the opportunity to decide whether they want the National Assembly for Wales to be established or not. It was worth to mention that in the

Table 2. Support for the devolution reform in Wales in 1978 and 1979

Social group		May 1978	February 1979
by sex	male	45.1%	26.0%
	female	54.3%	23.7%
by age	18–34	59.4%	32.6%
	35–54	44.9%	21.9%
	55+	46.0%	23.8%
by socio-economic conditions	middle class	30.0%	25.2%
	lower middle	37.7%	17.4%
	skilled working	56.0%	26.2%
	semi/unskilled working	59.1%	31.9%
by language	Welsh speakers	62.8%	38.8%
	non Welsh speakers	44.2%	20.3%
by region	South Wales	44.6%	26.0%
	North West & North Wales	53.0%	27.1%
	North East & Mid Wales	45.0%	19.9%
by voting intention	Labour	64.7%	31.8%
	Conservative	23.6%	8.1%
	Liberal	30.0%	21.4%
	Plaid Cymru	86.8%	88.0%
WALES		**50.0%**	**25.6%**

Source: Balsom, 1983, p. 206.

same day Scots could decide not only about the Scottish Parliament creation but also about this body competencies level. That difference might be the principal reason why in the Welsh referendum took part only 50.1% of entitled to vote (8.2% less than in 1979) and before votes counting ended on 19 September it was difficult to determine whether referendum's results would be binding. Finally it was stated that the Assembly establishing project was supported by minimal majority of voters (50.3%), which meant that implementation of the devolution reform in Wales became possible thanks to barely 6721 (0.6%) of the total number of people entitled to vote in the referendum (2 218 850).

The speculations about influence of political preferences, sense of national identity and place of living on referendum's results were confirmed. The spread of votes showed that the devolution reform was the most popular in West Wales (except Pembrokeshire) dominated by the Labour Party and the Plaid Cymru supporters. In areas inhabited by people preferring the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats more votes were against than in favour of devolution idea (Jones & Trystan, 1999, p. 66). The factor of national identity was especially important in North and North West Wales where the term "Welshness" meant not only ethnic, cultural and linguistic separateness but also political support to the idea of autonomy or even independence of the country. Many of "enthusiastic devolutionists were to be found in […] Gwynedd, Carmarthenshire, Neath Port Talbot and the south Wales valleys[4] – where the socio-economic repercussions of Conservatism had been most keenly felt" (Jenkins, 2007, p. 297). Moreover geographical location of these areas made them in a lesser degree subject of English socio-economic and political influences than East Wales' shires lying alongside the Offa Dyke. In consequence voting preferences of the South Wales' inhabitants were motivated mostly by their commitment to the traditional (i.e. Welsh) way of life closely connected to the national culture. The only exception was the "Little England" in southern Pembrokeshire which remained strongly linked with the English culture patterns since the Middle Ages. The similar situation was on the anglicized borderland (especially in Flintshire, Monmouthshire, Newport and Vale of Glamorgan) where the vast majority of people from both economic and cultural reasons were uninterested in establishing the Welsh "parliament" with any legal powers and voted against devolution.

---

[4] South Wales Valleys are the number of industrialised valleys in South Wales between eastern Carmarthenshire and western Monmouthshire.

Table 3. Results of 1997 devolution referendum in Wales

Counties	Turnout	Yes vote		No vote	
	(%)	Number	%	Number	%
Anglesey	56.9	15 649	50.9	15 095	49.1
Blaenau Gwent	49.3	15 237	56.1	11 928	43.9
Bridgend	50.6	27 632	54.4	23 172	45.6
Caerphilly	49.3	34 830	54.7	28 841	45.3
Cardiff	46.9	47 527	44.4	59 589	55.6
Carmarthenshire	56.4	49 115	65.3	26 119	34.7
Ceredigion	56.8	18 304	59.2	12 614	40.8
Conwy	51.5	18 369	40.9	26 521	59.1
Denbighshire	49.7	14 271	40.8	20 732	59.2
Flintshire	41.0	17 746	38.2	28 707	61.8
Gwynedd	59.8	35 425	64.1	19 859	35.9
Merthyr Tydfil	49.5	12 707	58.2	9 121	41.8
Monmouthshire	50.5	10 592	32.1	22 403	67.9
Neath Port Talbot	51.9	36 730	66.5	18 463	33.5
Newport	45.9	16 172	37.4	27 017	62.6
Pembrokeshire	52.6	19 979	42.8	26 712	57.2
Powys	56.2	23 038	42.7	30 966	57.3
Rhondda Cynon Taff	49.9	51 201	58.5	36 362	41.5
Swansea	47.1	42 789	52.0	39 561	48.0
Torfaen	45.5	15 756	49.8	15 854	50.2
Vale of Glamorgan	54.3	17 776	36.7	30 613	63.3
Wrexham	42.4	18 574	45.3	22 449	54.7
WALES	**50.1**	**559 419**	**50.3**	**552 698**	**49.7**

Source: Electoral Geography 2.0, 2015.

The main group of devolution reform supporters were both men and women of the age 25–44, working class, fluent Welsh-speaking, with strong sense of Welsh identity, living in South Wales Valleys, Carmarthenshire and West Wales, the Plaid Cymru voters. In opposite against voted mainly people of the age 45–54 and 65+, middle class, non-Welsh speakers, feeling British not Welsh, living in East Wales and Pembrokeshire, the Conservative Party electorate.

Table 4. Social groups in favour and against devolution in Wales in 1997

	Social group	Yes	No
by age	18–24	19%	15%
	25–34	31%	21%
	35–44	33%	23%
	45–54	31%	43%
	55–64	36%	37%
	65+	32%	40%
by socio-economic conditions	middle class	30%	43%
	working class	32%	29%
by language	fluent Welsh speakers	61%	18%
	non-fluent Welsh speakers	31%	34%
	non-Welsh speakers	24%	33%
by national identity	Welsh not British	43%	23%
	rather Welsh than British	43%	25%
	equally Welsh and British	25%	34%
	rather British than Welsh	16%	37%
	British not Welsh	13%	45%
by voting intention	Labour	34%	24%
	Conservative	7%	62%
	Liberal Democrat	18%	45%
	Plaid Cymru	71%	6%
WALES		50.3%	49.7%

Source: Author's elaboration based on Jones, Trystan, 1999, p. 66–79; Evans, Trystan, 1999, p. 98–103.

The 1979 and 1997 Welsh devolution referendums – the first of which caused fall of the UK Government's project of establishing the Welsh Assembly and the second one which went down in history as "the little yes referendum" – arose reasonable doubts on existing the Welsh sense of identity in political dimension. It was obvious the creation of modern Welshness based mainly on economic factors. The privatisation and liquidation of government's enterprises in frames of monetarists' policies after 1979 caused "drastic reduction of workers in the steel industry, where […] two thirds of the 63 000 employees of the British Steel Corporation lost their job. […] The coal miners, now organised in the South Wales branch of the National Union

of Mineworkers, forewarned of the closure of seven pits, went on strike in 1981, the action spreading from south Wales to the rest of Britain. […] The crisis came in 1984–85, with a mineworkers' strike that began in March 1984 and lasted for a year. Always a most militant of the coalfields, the miners of south Wales had not failed to notice that virtually no investment was planned for development of their area's reserves. […] In 1984 they numbered 20.000, down by over four-fifths in twenty years. Their future was at stake, and they knew it. […] On 1 March 1985, the miners voted to return to work, having nothing for a year of painful endurance. […] By the end of 1986, more than half of them had been declared redundant, and nine more pits had closed" (Ross, 2005, p. 250–251).

The fall of most important Welsh industries caused rapid household impoverishment to a degree comparable to their economic situation in 1930s. The UK Government's monetarist policy caused public discontent headed into the Conservative Party. Decreasing support for the Tories in 1980s gradually turned into over-Wales antipathy which gave the Labour Party spectacular success in 1997 general elections. In Wales "of the 40 constituencies […] 34 went to Labour, 4 to Plaid Cymru and 2 to the Liberal Democrats; the Conservatives failed to win a single seat" (Davies, 2007, p. 671). By the way of mass voting for the Labours, the Welsh people automatically expressed their support for the idea of creating the national assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – the postulate covered in the Labour Party's electoral manifesto. By considering such context the second devolution referendum's result could not be presumed measure of the Welsh positive attitude to the project putted to vote but only to the authors of this project. In result the level of public approval for implementing the devolution reform in Wales was still difficult to determine.

Table 5. Results of 2011 devolution referendum in Wales

Counties	Turnout	Yes vote		No vote	
	(%)	Number	%	Number	%
Anglesey	43.8	14 011	64.8	7 620	35.2
Blaenau Gwent	32.4	11 869	68.9	5 366	31.1
Bridgend	35.6	25 063	68.1	11 736	31.9
Caerphilly	34.6	28 431	64.3	15 751	35.7
Cardiff	35.2	53 427	61.4	33 606	38.6
Carmarthenshire	44.4	42 979	70.8	17 712	29.2
Ceredigion	44.1	16 505	66.2	8 412	33.8

Counties	Turnout	Yes vote		No vote	
	(%)	Number	%	Number	%
Conwy	33.8	18 368	59.7	12 390	40.3
Denbighshire	34.5	15 793	61.8	9 742	38.2
Flintshire	29.4	21 119	62.1	12 913	37.9
Gwynedd	43.4	28 200	76.0	8 891	24.0
Merthyr Tydfil	30.1	9 136	68.9	4 132	31.1
Monmouthshire	35.8	12 381	49.4	12 701	50.6
Neath Port Talbot	38.0	29 957	73.0	11 079	27.0
Newport	27.9	15 983	54.8	13 204	45.2
Pembrokeshire	38.7	19 600	55.0	16 050	45.0
Powys	39.7	21 072	51.6	19 730	48.4
Rhondda Cynon Taff	34.6	43 051	70.7	17 834	29.3
Swansea	32.9	38 496	63.2	22 409	36.8
Torfaen	33.8	14 655	62.8	8 688	37.2
Vale of Glamorgan	40.1	19 430	52.5	17 551	47.5
Wrexham	27.0	17 606	64.1	9 863	35.9
WALES	**35.6**	**517 132**	**63.5**	**297 380**	**35.6**

Source: Jones, Scully, 2012, p. 110.

The third devolution referendum in Wales was held on 3 March 2011. The voters were informed, by short description on the ballot papers, that the National Assembly for Wales made laws only on 20 areas (such as agriculture, education, the environment, health, housing, local government) on some matters. To made law of any other matter the Assembly had to ask the UK Parliament for its agreement each time. To change this system the majority of Welsh electorate should gave positive answer for the question: "do you want the Assembly now to be able to make laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for?" (Dorey, 2014, p. 194). However, despite a far-reaching campaign to urge people to vote, only 35.6% of entitled to vote (14.5% less than in 1997) went to the polls on the referendum day. As expected the highest turnout was in West Wales – from 43.39% in Gwynedd to 44.36% in Carmarthenshire – excluding Pembrokeshire. In contrast, the lowest numbers of voters were noticed in far apart shires, i.e. Wrexham (27.04%), Newport (27.90%) and Merthyr Tydfil (30.12%). The idea of equipping the Assembly with primary legislative powers supported 517 132 of 814 512 (63.49%) of voters, especially in West Wales (from 66.24% in Ceredigion to 76.03% in Gwynedd) and western part of the South Wales Valleys (from 68.11% in

Bridgend to 73% in Neath Port Talbot). Only in Monmouthshire most of electorate (50.64%) voted against changing the existing political system.

Comparison of the results of 1979 and 2011 referendums showed tremendous growth of the support for the devolution reform: from 30% in Pembrokeshire to almost 60% in Blaenau Gwent. But between 1997 and 2011 the average growth rate slowed to 12% and on the area including Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and Powys it dropped even below 10%.

Table 6. Public support for devolution growth in Wales 1979–2011

Counties		Support growth (%)		
1974–1996	**Since 1996**	**1979–1997**	**1997–2011**	**Total**
Clwyd	Conwy	28.8	18.8	47.6
	Denbighshire	28.7	21.0	49.7
	Flintshire	26.1	23.9	50.0
	Wrexham	33.2	18.8	52.0
Gwynedd	Anglesey	16.5	14.0	30.5
	Gwynedd	29.7	11.9	41.6
Dyfed	Carmarthenshire	37.2	5.5	42.7
	Ceredigion	31.1	2.0	33.1
	Pembrokeshire	14.7	12.2	26.9
Powys	Powys	24.0	8.9	32.9
West Glamorgan	Neath Port Talbot	47.8	6.5	54.3
	Swansea	33.3	11.2	44.5
Mid Glamorgan	Bridgend	34.2	13.7	47.9
	Caerphilly	34.5	9.6	44.1
	Merthyr Tydfil	38.0	10.7	48.7
	Rhondda Cynon Taff	38.3	12.5	50.8
South Glamorgan	Cardiff	31.3	17.0	48.3
	Vale of Glamorgan	23.6	15.8	39.4
Gwent	Blaenau Gwent	44.0	12.8	56.8
	Monmouthshire	20.0	17.3	37.3
	Newport	25.3	17.4	42.7
	Torfaen	37.7	13.0	50.7

Source: Author's elaboration based on Jones, Wilford, 1983, p. 138; Jones & Trystan, 1999, p. 69; Electoral Geography 2.0, 2015.

The social characteristic of devolution supporters did not change much since 1997. In vast majority they were people of the age 25–44, rather working than middle class, both fluent and non-fluent Welsh speakers, feeling Welsh not British and rather Welsh than British, living in West Wales and biggest part of the South Wales Valleys, the Plaid Cymru voters. Moreover, between 1997 and 2011 increased total number of people supporting devolution in each social group. In consequence the disparities dividing people younger and older, workers and middle class, Welsh and non-Welsh speakers, with strong and weak sense of Welsh identity, living in different parts of the country and supporting different political parties, gradually erased. Decreasing but still existing group of "no" voters was composed mainly of elder people (i.e. 65+), middle class, non-speaking Welsh, feeling British not Welsh, living in East and South East Wales (most of them in Monmouthshire), the Conservatives electorate.

Table 7. Social groups in favour of devolution in Wales in 2011

Social group		Yes*
by age	18–24	68%
	25–34	74%
	35–44	71%
	45–54	67%
	55–64	64%
	65+	56%
by socio-economic conditions	middle class	64%
	working class	67%
by language	fluent Welsh speakers	88%
	non-fluent Welsh speakers	70%
	non-Welsh speakers	59%
by national identity	Welsh not British	85%
	rather Welsh than British	84%
	equally Welsh and British	63%
	rather British than Welsh	48%
	British not Welsh	39%
by voting intention	Labour	77%
	Conservative	29%
	Liberal Democrat	80%
	Plaid Cymru	97%

* among those who voted

Source: Author's elaboration based on Jones, Scully, 2012, pp. 150–153.

Taking the level of public support for the implementation and development of the devolution reform as a measure of the national identity sense, it was obvious that each of the Welsh devolution referendums was essential for awakening the Welsh identity sense in political dimension. This process was at the beginning in 1979. Welsh people often manifested their ethnic, cultural and linguistic separateness and expressed their dissatisfaction of the Wales economic position in the United Kingdom but never formulated serious political postulates. The situation changed just after rejection of the Welsh Assembly project in the first devolution referendum. In the 1980s and 1990s the need of establishing national "parliament" was signalized in official papers of the Welsh Labour Party as well as by the Labours and the Plaid Cymru politicians in the UK Parliament.

The 1997 devolution referendum showed huge progress in shaping political dimension of the Welsh identity. After 18 years of austerity the Welsh people (in vast majority) were unified through common expectations of political solutions and became the force which could not be ignored by any political party. On the wave of enthusiastic support for the Labours in 1997 general election, the Welsh accepted proposals of changing the UK political system in the second devolution referendum. This opened the new phase of shaping the Welsh identity in modern sense. Continual and evolutionary development of the Welsh authorities in organizational and functional aspects in 2000s and 2010s caused systematic growth of the Welsh public interest in possibilities of political activity. But this tendency has been diluted as the low turnout and persistent divisions amongst east and west parts of the country during the last devolution referendum has shown. The process of moving the Welsh identity towards the political dimension is well advanced but still in the progress. There are no doubts "it is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end, but it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning" (Churchill Society, 2015).

References:

Balsom, D. (1983). Public Opinion and Welsh Devolution. In Foulkes D., Jones J.B., Wilford R.A. (eds.), *The Welsh Veto. The Wales Act 1978 and the Referendum* (p. 197–215). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Churchill Society (2015, December 10). The End of the Beginning Speech. The Lord Mayor's Luncheon (Mansion House). November 10, 1942. *The Churchill Society in London*. Retrieved from: http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk?EndoBegn.html.

Davies, J. (2007). *A History of Wales*. London–New York: Penguin Books.

Dorey, P. (2014). *Policy Making in Britain*. London–New Delhi–Thousand Oaks–Singapore: SAGE.

Edwards, H. (2007). Foreword. In D. Fflur, *Welsh Icons* (p. 1). Llandysul: Gomer Press.

Electoral Geography 2.0 (2015, December 10). Wales. Devolution Referendum 1997. *Electoral Geography*. Retrieved from: http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/w/wales/wales-devolution-referendum-2007.html.

Evans, G., & Trystan, D. (1999). Why was 1997 different? A comparative analysis of voting behaviour in the 1979 and 1997 Welsh referendums. In B. Taylor & K. Thomson (Eds.), *Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?* (p. 95–118). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Foulkes, D. (1983). An Analysis of the Wales Act 1978. In D. Foulkes, J. B. Jones & R. A. Wilford (Eds.), *The Welsh Veto. The Wales Act 1978 and the Referendum* (p. 62–108). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Gay, O. (1997). Wales and Devolution. *House of Commons' Research Paper, 97* (60).

Griffith, W. (1946). *The voice of Wales*. London–New York–Toronto: Longmans Green & Co.

Jenkins, G. H. (2007). *A Concise History of Wales*. Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, J. B., & Wilford, R. A. (1983). The Referendum Campaign: 8 February–1 March 1979. In D. Foulkes, J. B. Jones & R.A. Wilford (Eds.), *The Welsh Veto. The Wales Act 1978 and the Referendum* (p. 118–152). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Jones, R. W., & Scully R. (2012). *Wales Says Yes. Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum*. Cardiff: University of Cardiff Press.

Jones, R. W., & Trystan D. (1999). The 1997 Welsh referendum vote. In B. Taylor & K. Thomson (Eds.), *Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?* (p. 65–94). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Parker, M. (2007). *Neighbours from Hell?* Talybont: Y Lolfa Cyf.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014, November 5). The future of UK manufacturing: Reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. Observations, analysis and recommendations – April 2009. *PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited*. Retrieved from: http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/ukmanufacturing-300309.pdf.

Ross, D. (2005). *Wales. A History of a Nation*. New Lanark: Geddes & Grosset.

Smith, A.D. (1991). *National identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Welsh Government (2014, November 17). Welsh Language. Statistics. *The Welsh Government*. Retrieved from: http://wales.gov.uk/topics/welshlanguage/statistics/?lang=en.

Author

Dr Bartłomiej H. Toszek

University of Szczecin, Institute of Political Science and European Studies. Contact details: ul. Krakowska 71/79, 71–017 Szczecin, Poland; e-mail: clermont@wp.pl.