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THE EU/CFSP AND NATO: POSSIBILITY OF A CO-EXISTENCE AS BROTHERS-IN-ARMS?

Mete Kaan Kaynar¹, Gökhan AK^{*2}

¹ Department of Political Science, Hacettepe University, Turkey

^{*2} Department of Political Science, Nişantaşı University, Turkey

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Abstract

At the outset, Europe needed to develop its defense policy and structure in line with its foreign policy while the Union was evolving in institutional enlargement process during every other 10 years of time. The reason was not behind it, but in the façade of the Union building. Otherwise the Union would not be able to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs while the ‘security’ was gaining a key-role in the international politics and relations. Since there was a security vacuum in Europe after WW’, the US urged European states to create a sort of defence structure embedded to already-formed NATO or integrated with NATO, but including German Army in both cases. Decades had passed and in the late 1990s the European Security Defence Identity and Policy was formed up as a parallel structure to NATO systems. Eventually in the start of 2000s, the EU system turned into a Common Security and Defence Policy for member states only. This research tries to explore and analyze the effects, paradigms, prospects and coexistence possibilities of this two polar-defence-system in the Europe, that’s to say between NATO and the CFSP.

Keywords: NATO; EU; ESDI; ESDP; CFSP; European Security.

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1. Introduction

“No nation alone can adequately address these threats to our security. Quite simply, we need an international framework. In this effort, Europe and North America must be partners, not rivals – not counterweights.” - Hon. Doug BEREUTER¹

¹ “Spring Session Address” by Hon. Doug BEREUTER, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NAA), Prague, 28 May 2003, p.3, from the web-page <http://www.naa.be/default.asp?TAB=388> consulted at Dec., 12, 2014.

Before looking at current developments, one ought to recall briefly how security and defence evolved after 1945 in Europe. Initially, in spite of the rather obvious bipolar confrontation between East and West that ran through the centre of the continent, it took Western governments a full decade to forge a lasting defence structure for Europe. The 1948 Brussels Treaty of the Western European Union (WEU), initially perceived as a mutual defence pact against any future repetition of German aggression, provided a political nucleus that helped to convince the United States (US) to launch the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), re-strengthen US military presence in Europe and thus provide protection to its European Allies.

In this context, the multinational military headquarters SHAPE, kept in place after World War II, was transferred from WEU to NATO, from British to American hands. As a complement and symbol of European political control, the post of NATO Secretary-General was (and still is) reserved for Europeans. With West Germany's inclusion in NATO as an equal partner in 1955 after the rejection of the premature and misconceived European Defence Community by France, an arrangement was established that fundamentally remained unchanged until the 1990s, marked by indisputable, beneficial US dominance that provided a stable framework for Europe's process of economic growth and integration.²

When the Eisenhower administration pulled the carpet from under their British and French Allies in the Suez intervention of 1956, the leading military powers of Europe learned, among other things, that there was no longer any room for their independent military role in a world of US-Soviet antagonism and an Alliance dominated by US leaders, who regarded NATO as vitally important to US interests. Since then, the international use of force has never been an area, where any European NATO country felt it advisable to take initiatives at odds with US interests. This, of course, led not only to a culture of dependency in military affairs but, above all, often to the marginalisation of defence aspects in national and, by extension, European foreign and security policy-making.

Since the early 1970s, European integration proceeded slowly, but with remarkable steadiness, from the Werner plan to Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro as common currency and from the Davignon plan to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the G-7, a new forum was developed that allowed Europeans to strengthen their international political voice, based on their economic weight. Defence, however, remained entirely outside the scope of this European integration process, and available energies went into securing sufficient influence within NATO.

This line of development culminated in NATO's decisions to set up flexible Combined Joint Task Force command structures and to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. Franco-German bilateral approaches since the 1980s had helped to conceptualize the possibilities of closer co-operation between Europeans in defence and armaments. Like the attempted revitalization of WEU, however, it never acquired more than marginal operational relevance, mainly because defence establishments remained focused on NATO as the only serious show in town.

² Klaus Becher, "EU Defence Policy: Evolution, Prospects and Implications", December 2001, consulted on Dec., 20, 2014 at <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/feher5.pdf>.

As to be expected, the security and defence calculus of European nations has been changing in several dimensions since the end of the Soviet Union (SU). One element was the considerable reduction in force sizes and defence budgets that convinced not just the smaller countries that they could no longer organize and pay for a high-quality, all-round national defence without decisive efforts to pool their resources. This was also reflected in a reorganization of NATO that favored the establishment of new multinational units, in part with US participation, in part just European, like the European Corps (EUROCORPS) and, in the South, European Force (EUROFOR) and European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). Rationalization of national defence structures went even further in some cases, as with the Dutch-Belgian integration of navies and air task force.

Since the inception of the campaign toward European unity in the aftermath of World War II, the United States has actively recognized that a united Europe is a stronger Europe and that a strong Europe is fundamentally in the interests of the United States. Since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 as the first step toward the present-day EU, the United States has strongly supported the process of European integration, based on the rationale that closer cooperation among former foes would bring stability and economic growth to Europe, greatly reducing the likelihood that the nations of Europe would ever again engage in armed conflict against one another. As Robert Kagan has observed, the EU democracies have realized Kant's "Perpetual Peace" insofar as war among EU members is unthinkable today.³

2. Methodology

At the outset, Europe needed to develop its defense policy and structure in line with its foreign policy while the Union was evolving in institutional enlargement process during every other 10 years of time. The reason was not behind it, but in the façade of the Union building. Otherwise the Union would not be able to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs while the 'security' was gaining a key-role in the international politics and relations. Since there was a security vacuum in Europe after WW', the US urged European states to create a sort of defence structure embedded to already-formed NATO or integrated with NATO, but including German Army in both cases. Decades had passed and in the late 1990s the European Security Defence Identity and Policy was formed up as a parallel structure to NATO systems. Eventually in the start of 2000s, the EU system turned into a Common Security and Defence Policy for member states only. In this research our goal is to explore and analyze the effects, paradigms, prospects and coexistence possibilities of this two polar-defence-system in the Europe, that's to say between NATO and the CFSP.

The data collection of the study mainly stands on primary and secondary literature works related to the issues of this study. Thus, data have been obtained from that literature in order to make our conclusions, comments and proposals.

³ Doug Bereuter and John Lis, "Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2003-04, 27:1 pp. 147-162, by The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), consulted at <http://www.naa.be/default.asp?shortcut=466>.

3. Findings

A Short Snap-Shot to Organizational Security Structure in Europe

Security in Europe is the realm of several regional international organizations, mainly the European Union (EU), WEU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe, creating a patchwork of regional security institutions that is unique in the world. These main actors on the European security stage, which interact in many ways and are mutually reinforcing,⁴ can be briefly introduced as follows.

On 1 August 1975 the participating States to the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the Final Act of Helsinki. This Act, a political document which was not meant to be legally binding, contained the basic principles for East-West dialogue and coexistence. It was also one of the first official documents that recognized a broad security concept: the 'human dimension' was an integral part of the Final Act.⁵ Further, it was the start of a process which increasingly led from co-existence to co-operation and to a gradual institutionalization. The latter process led to the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE.⁶ The OSCE is characterized by its broad security concept, its large membership (55 States) and its political character (OSCE decisions and documents are of a political rather than a legal nature, e.g. the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, with some notable exceptions, such as the CFE Treaty⁷) and consensual nature (decisions require unanimity, though exceptionally unanimity 'minus one' - a State grossly violating its OSCE commitments- or 'minus two' - the parties to a conflict - is possible). At present the OSCE has a number of permanent institutions, of which the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre ('CPC'), the High Commissioner for National Minorities ('HCNM') and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ('ODIHR') are the most important ones for our study. Further, the Chairman-in-Office plays a great role in day-to-day management. It is claimed that OSCE is mostly responsible for the establishment of democracy and freedom in post-crises countries and areas, including regarding consequent management.

NATO was established in 1949 as a collective defence organization.⁸ While maintaining collective defence as its primary task, it now - i.e., after the Cold War - attaches great importance to co-operation with other States and organizations and to crisis management, as is stated in NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept.⁹ The former mainly takes place through the North-Atlantic Co-operation Council ('NACC'), which has been transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

⁴ Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert, How Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo, Catholic University Leuven Faculty of Law, Institute for International Law Working Paper No: 6, May 2001, p. 3, consulted at <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/eng/wp/WP6e.pdf>.

⁵ See Principle VII and the 'basket' titled 'Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields'. See also the European Security Charter (Istanbul, 19 November 1999, (2000) 39 I.L.M. 255, para. 9.

⁶ CSCE, 'Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era', Budapest, 6 December 1994. We will hereafter always use 'OSCE', even when reference could be made to the CSCE.

⁷ Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Paris, 19 November 1990 (thoroughly amended at Istanbul on 19 November 1999, but the amendment has not yet entered into force).

⁸ See North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4 April 1949).

⁹ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, 23-24 April 1999 (para. 10).

Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).¹⁰ NATO's crisis management is very visible through cases such as Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO has also responded to WEU/EU developments through the development of an "ESDI within NATO" and close co-operation with the WEU (and recently also with the EU).¹¹

The WEU was established successively in 1948 and 1954. Like NATO, its original security task was collective defense.¹² Since its other tasks were increasingly carried out in other organizations, it is turned into becoming a dormant organization by the EU.¹³ A reactivation of this institution has taken place since 1984. But only after the EU's CFSP was introduced by the Treaty of the EU (TEU), this reactivation became really significant. Since then, WEU has been functioning as a bridge between the EU (of which it is the defense component) and NATO (within which it was to be the European pillar) and has developed closer co-operation with both organizations.¹⁴ It was also given the competence for the 'Petersberg' tasks. Given the current developments in the EU, WEU is likely to disappear, or at least to have its tasks seriously reduced.

The EU, established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and founded on the European Communities, has as its so-called 'second pillar' a CFSP that includes all areas of foreign policy, including defense, though for decisions with military implications the EU had to act through WEU.¹⁵ The inclusion of defense was a major breakthrough, largely abolishing the taboo on defense that existed since the failure of the European Defense Community in the 1950's.¹⁶ The Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened the CFSP institutions and decision-making procedures, and incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the TEU but brought about no fundamental changes.¹⁷

¹⁰ See the Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Sintra, 30 May 1997); the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (Brussels, 10-11 January 1994) *juncto* Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century. The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership (25 April 1999 - it includes the Political-Military Framework Document for NATO-led PfP Operations) and Woodliffe, *The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe* (1998) 93 I.C.L.Q., pp. 176-180.

¹¹ NATO's main decisions on ESDI were taken at the North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels (17-18 December 1990 and 10-11 January 1994) and Berlin (3 June 1996).

¹² See article V, Brussels Treaty (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948, as amended in Paris on 23 October 1954).

¹³ For this internal operation in the EU, the reason lying behind the decision of a dormant WEU is the position Turkey, with a great possibility. Because Turkey, as a full member in NATO, wishes to be in the military staff and bodies of the EU, such as EUMS, EUMC and the others. By making the WEU in a dormant position, the EU wished to prevent Turkey's penetration into the EU military bodies from the back-door, that is to say.

¹⁴ See the Declaration [of the members of the WEU and of the EU] on The Role of the [WEU] and its Relations with the [EU] and with [NATO] (Maastricht, 10 December 1991); Declaration of the WEU on the Role of [WEU] and its Relations with the [EU] and with [NATO] (Brussels, 22 July 1997) and Protocol (No 1) on Article 17 [TEU] (Amsterdam, 2 October 1997).

¹⁵ See Title V TEU, especially art. 11 *juncto* art. 17, para. 1 (ex articles J.1 and J.7).

¹⁶ Earlier, Article 30(6) Single European Act had granted the European Political Co-operation the competence for political and economic aspects of security.

¹⁷ The Secretary-General of the Council is now also 'High Representative for the CFSP', the Council can conclude international agreements, 'constructive abstention' is possible, common strategies and qualified majority voting have been introduced (though in the end a Member State retains a veto right), and a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was created.

Since the end of 1998, however, things have been going very fast and major progress has been achieved at the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Council meetings.¹⁸ The Cologne declaration states that the EU should have the capacity to act autonomously, backed up by credible military forces, in order to be able to take the full range of decisions regarding the 'Petersberg-tasks'.¹⁹ This will require enhanced military capacities, co-operation in the defence industry and the transfer of several functions from WEU to the EU. The necessary decisions should be taken by the end of the year 2000. In Helsinki a concrete target was set as far as military capabilities are concerned and considerable attention was paid to civilian crisis management capabilities (meanwhile, a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been established). Secondly, it was agreed that a number of new military and political bodies would be created within the Council. Thirdly, a number of decisions were taken with regard to the relationship with WEU, NATO and the involvement of non-EU Member States. At Santa Maria da Feira, more detailed provisions were adopted with regard to military capabilities (a capability commitment conference is to be held), participation by Third States to EU crisis management operations, principles for EU-NATO co-operation and consultation and civilian crisis management, with special attention for police forces (by 2003 the EU Member States must be capable of deploying 5000 police officers for international missions, including a 1000 within 30 days).²⁰

The Council of Europe, established in 1949, is regarded as a security organization for the purposes of this article in the light of the broad notion of security, which has become generally accepted in Europe today; with its broad membership (41 members), the organization is particularly active in the field of human rights, democracy and the establishment and consolidation of the rule of law.

The Post-Cold War Era until 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO had lost its *raison d'être*. Accordingly, following the end of Cold War, NATO had been a military Alliance groping for a cause, an army in search of an enemy. The US had been left in the world arena as the sole super-power. There was a uni-polar world order, a new international system. It was something like a gap. We are not sure if the US authorities were ready for a world situation like that. The Soviet threat that bound together Europe and North America has disappeared. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated; the threats of the Cold War have ended. It was even argued that Alliances between free nations do not survive the disappearance of the threat that brought them together. NATO disproved that argument. Because, NATO had to meet the contemporary needs of its members, on both sides of the Atlantic, if it was to remain at the core of our security and defence policies.

However, not lately, new threats, which never existed before or were forgotten in the past or considered as domestic problems, began to emerge with a changing feature. With the end of Cold War, we suddenly found ourselves confronted with new threats, risks and challenges, quite

¹⁸ Respectively held on 3-4 June 1999; 10-11 December 1999 and 19-20 June 2000.

¹⁹ European Council Conclusions and presidency report on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence.

²⁰ European Council Conclusions and Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

unlike the traditional ones which we were used to. The Gulf and Balkan Crisis entailed the Alliance to alter its threat perceptions. The later-on 9/11 terrorist attacks were also as great a galvanizing force as the end of the Cold War or the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and gave the Alliance the opportunity to adapt its new concept to be able to confront the new threats of the post-9/11 world.

Although NATO has become the preeminent, most trusted organization for conducting peace-enforcement operations, it of course is not primarily a peacekeeping organization. The US and the North Atlantic Alliance had this role thrust on them in the mid-1990s because of European and UN inadequacies. Only NATO, backed by US power, had the military capability and credibility to guarantee the Dayton peace accords that ended the four-year, genocidal Bosnian war. The peace operations in which NATO is currently engaged - Bosnia and Kosovo - contribute positively to the security of its members. Recognizing that such operations do not constitute the core mission of the Alliance, they nevertheless should be undertaken for a while when they are in the interest of NATO members, and when NATO is the organization best equipped to perform them effectively.

NATO's core mission of defending the nations of the Alliance with the plans focused solely on defence of Europe remained intact, but less active, even though the first step in NATO's response one day after 9/11 was the invocation of Article 5. Rather, since the new risks that threaten order and stability were growing, NATO primarily retooled itself, first to help spread security and stability Eastwards across Europe with an excellent record of effective non-Article-5 interventions in the Balkans, then to use its unique multinational military capabilities to deal with Afghanistan today before its problems would come to us.

The politico-military environment and thus concepts and structures changed. Non-Article-5, as we call them, gained importance with the introduction of such new terminology as peace support, peace-keeping, peace-making, crises response, etc. Another organization, the EU, wanted to assume responsibility in security matters, suggesting that NATO should only deal with Art.5 missions. However, at the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO, while maintaining its ability for collective defense, also assumed the responsibility for the Non-Art-5 missions. The EU, on the other hand, would be able to use NATO's assets and capabilities to conduct EU-led operations, via Berlin Plus arrangements agreed in December 2002, where NATO did not wish to engage as a whole.

To be certain, security threats have changed dramatically during the past half century. NATO was founded to deter a Soviet-led military invasion. Today, its members face threats from international terrorism, WMD, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups to use against our countries and to kill our citizens.

Promote Common Interests Globally: NATO and the EU Relations

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book "The Grand Chessboard" (1997), defines the North Atlantic alliance as part of an integrated, comprehensive, and long-term strategy for all of Eurasia in which NATO would eventually reach Asia, where another military alliance would connect

Pacific and South East Asia states. The prediction is coming true. Today, most of Europe is at peace. The threats to that peace come not from strong states within Europe, but from unstable failed states and terrorist organizations far from Europe's borders.

The European Union is a newcomer in the business of peace support operations. True, its member states have long been involved in almost any sort of non - Article 5 (NATO/WEU) or Chapter VI - VII (UNO) mission in the past, and they still are today. Yet they have normally done so under other flags than the EU's proper. The rift that developed within Europe itself over the issue of support for the United States demonstrated that most Europeans do not want to choose between Europe and the United States, nor should the United States force such a choice on them. As long as Europe is a partner or counterpart to the United States and not a counterweight, a strong, united Europe is in U.S. interests.

Americans welcomed the overdue decision by the EU nations to admit more democracies into its union, eight of which were ruled by Communist dictatorships during the Cold War. Next spring, the EU's zone of prosperity and stability will shift eastward, further erasing the lines of division that were drawn at Yalta. Additional enlargement is envisioned this decade, with Romania and Bulgaria projected to join in 2007 and with Turkey a candidate for eventual membership. With the unity of much of the continent thus charted, a largely integrated Europe is foreseeable. By enlarging to include most European countries, the EU is expanding the zone of peaceful cooperation on the continent, further reducing the chances that U.S. soldiers will ever again have to fight in a European war. At the same time, the new democracies joining the EU have recent, vivid memories of dictatorship and command economies; their firm commitment to democracy and free markets will reinvigorate Europe's dedication to these core values that are shared on both sides of the Atlantic.

The greatest change in the nature of the transatlantic relationship in the past few years has been the broadening of shared U.S. and European interests. During the Cold War and the 1990s, U.S.-European relations generally focused on the Euro-Atlantic space. The post-September 11 security environment and the growing role of the EU as an economic superpower have forced both sides to look beyond their common space to the challenges and opportunities in the world beyond. Most of these challenges and opportunities are shared; by working together in the following key areas where cooperation already has been established, the United States and Europe can advance each side's security and prosperity as well as contribute to global well-being.

Although the Soviet threat that bound together Europe and North America has disappeared, the September 11 attacks obviously demonstrated that security challenges remain. The draft EU security strategy prepared by Solana in June is a positive step toward bringing U.S. and European threat perceptions and strategic agendas closer together by explicitly stating that Europe faces three key threats: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and failed states.⁹ Because these are multifaceted threats, we must address them through diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and economic means -all areas in which transatlantic cooperation is generally good and improving. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, however, demonstrate that the military dimension in the war on terrorism is also essential, and

the challenge now for Europe and North America is to improve military cooperation and capabilities to meet these new threats.

4. Discussions

Transform NATO to Meet Today's Threats

Few fallacies are more absurd than the erroneous assertions that NATO is dying and that the United States no longer cares about NATO and Europe. Last spring, as coalition forces moved to oust the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein, experienced observers on each side of the Atlantic rushed to pronounce NATO dead. The French analyst Guillaume Parmentier claimed “*NATO is finished*” while the U.S. scholar Charles Kupchan proclaimed that “*the Atlantic [A]lliance now lies in the rubble of Baghdad.*” Their conclusions, however, simply are not validated by an examination of the facts. NATO remains the organization that can most effectively defend the nations of Europe and North America against serious threats to their security today. Most of the European members of NATO still regard the Atlantic Alliance as the best guarantee of their security. NATO is also demonstrably far more effective than the UN in peace enforcement, a field in which the EU is only beginning to gain experience.

To U.S. legislators involved with NATO and Europe, the claim that the United States is preparing to walk away seems especially incredible. Such statements disregard the continued support for, and additional emphasis on NATO by, the Bush administration and Congress. In the run-up to the November 2002 Prague summit, the administration devoted intense and effective effort toward developing and refining ideas such as the NATO Response Force, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and the transformation of NATO's command structure. If implemented, these reforms will enable NATO to undertake timely and successful expeditionary missions anywhere in the world where future threats to the security of the alliance might arise.

The House, by a vote of 358-9 in October 2002, declared that “[NATO] *should remain the primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern.*” In May 2003, the Senate unanimously approved U.S. ratification of NATO enlargement, finding that “*NATO enhances the security of the United States*” and that U.S. membership in NATO “*remains a vital national security interest*” because “*the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity.*” Both chambers in July 2003, without opposition, approved amendments calling on President George W. Bush to consider making a formal request for NATO to raise a force for deployment in Iraq. To be certain, security threats have changed dramatically during the past half century. NATO was founded to deter a Soviet-led military invasion.

Today, its members face threats from international terrorism, WMD, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups to use against our countries and to kill our citizens. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has cited the need for “NATO to play the lead role in addressing the central security challenge of our time.”¹⁶ Although recognizing that collective defense remains the core mission of NATO, Lugar wrote: “If we fail to defend our societies from a major

terrorist attack involving WMD, the alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations.”

Meanwhile, many of NATO’s doomsayers cite the campaign in Afghanistan as proof of U.S. indifference toward the alliance when, in fact, they do not understand how that war was fought. Although the administration could have made better political use of NATO’s Article 5 declaration that the September 11 attacks constituted an attack on the entire alliance, the conventional land combat forces of NATO countries simply were not urgently required in the type of military campaign conducted. Operation Enduring Freedom relied predominantly on the use of Special Forces and paramilitary intelligence assets, in effective combination with precision-guided munitions. Several allies, including some NATO countries that had able Special Forces did in fact assist the United States, consistent with the invocation of Article 5. Even so, the warfare in Afghanistan made it clear that NATO needed new capabilities to confront some of the gravest and most difficult threats we now face.

Far from closing up shop, NATO, with U.S. leadership, chose at the November 2002 Prague summit to transform itself to meet these challenges. In the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO members pledged to provide the assets that are most critical for performing alliance missions. These capabilities will enable development of the NATO Response Force, which will give the alliance a rapidly deployable, high-end military capability - precisely the kind of capability that was needed in Afghanistan. Finally, at the defense ministers meeting in June 2003, the Alliance approved a new command structure that erases regional designations for territorial defense and emphasizes that NATO must have the ability to quickly deploy and command forces anywhere in the world. This last point was underlined by the North Atlantic Council’s decision to have NATO assume command, coordination, and planning of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in August 2003, the first time that NATO has undertaken an operation outside of Europe or North America. This decision also illustrates how NATO can undertake non–Article 5 missions that enhance security and stability on its periphery and thus help address direct or indirect threats to its member nations.

Similarly, NATO’s decision to provide planning, force generation, logistics, and communications support to the Polish-led multinational force in Iraq was an excellent first step toward a greater alliance role. The Bush administration should now consider whether assuming command of the entire military operation in Iraq would be appropriate for NATO. Of course, as both houses of Congress have recommended, the administration also should request assistance from the UN in civilian fields where it has the expertise needed to stabilize and build a new Iraq. One can hope that the time also may come to consider whether NATO might have a role to play in helping to monitor a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Although the United States and its NATO allies certainly have some sharp attitudinal and policy differences on the Middle East, all share a stated commitment to a secure Israel and a democratic Palestinian state. If a NATO peace operation could help alleviate security concerns on both sides in that conflict, our countries surely should consider underpinning a peace agreement with a peace-enforcement mission. In addition to its military missions, NATO since 1991 has reached out to the former Communist lands of central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have helped these nations work more closely with NATO and have helped many of them

establish parliamentary democracies, market-oriented economies, and civilian control over their militaries. Europe and North America must continue to work with these states to expand the zone of security and prosperity enjoyed by NATO members. With the same goals in mind, NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly should enhance their ongoing dialogues with the states of North Africa and the Middle East. As long as threats remain to the security of Europe and North America, NATO will be the primary institution through which its members provide for their common defense. At the same time, its external partnerships and peace operations enhance security for its members and partners.

Ensure that ESDP Complements NATO Although NATO has become the preeminent, most trusted organization for conducting peace-enforcement operations, it of course is not primarily a peacekeeping organization. The United States and the North Atlantic alliance had this role thrust on them in the mid-1990s because of European and UN inadequacies. Only NATO, backed by U.S. power, had the military capability and credibility to guarantee the Dayton peace accords that ended the four-year, genocidal Bosnian war. The peace operations in which NATO is currently engaged - Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan - contribute positively to the security of its members. Recognizing that such operations do not constitute the core mission of the alliance, they nevertheless should be undertaken when they are in the interest of NATO members and when NATO is the organization best equipped to perform them effectively.

When the EU nations in 1999 initiated efforts to create the long-sought European defense pillar within the EU instead of NATO, Washington was surprised. From a U.S. perspective, the EU had little reason to move into the defense field, given that most EU members are also members of NATO. Reluctant U.S. acceptance came when it became clear that our European allies supported the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). European leaders offered assurances that ESDP would not compete with NATO. Today, the Bush administration and congressional leaders have come to support ESDP conditionally if it works closely with NATO to undertake crisis management operations in and around Europe in those situations when NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged. Yet, the United States must view with great concern any efforts to turn ESDP into a collective defense organization that duplicates the role of NATO, a concern that is, daresay, shared by most European members of NATO. The inclusion of a "mutual defense" provision in the draft constitution for Europe is therefore disturbing. An effort to create a collective defense commitment in the EU is troubling because it would undoubtedly undermine the commitment of European nations to NATO while adding no additional military capability to Europe's defense, which might lead some Americans to question the U.S. commitment to the alliance. Although the draft language suggests that an EU mutual defense commitment would be optional, it would permit unnecessary duplication. It also would draw resources and attention away from an ESDP that otherwise could complement NATO and contribute meaningfully to European defense.

NATO remains the best guarantee of the security of its European members, and an ESDP that complements NATO will enhance transatlantic security. The EU would do better to focus its efforts on creating its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops with complementary air and naval assets that could be rapidly deployed and sustained for one year for crisis management, peacekeeping, rescue, or humanitarian operations. If the RRF becomes fully operational, the EU will be the logical institution to assume peacekeeping in the Balkans from

NATO, as some EU countries have proposed. An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as the EU's work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. In that fashion, the ESDP can be an important part of a comprehensive spectrum of capabilities for crisis management in Europe.

Strong Partners Needed, Not Counterweights

At this point, one should neither underestimate nor exaggerate the damage that was done to the transatlantic relationship last winter during the dispute over the impending conflict in Iraq. Yet in the dozen years since the end of the Cold War, during which the drift in attitude and perception between the United States and Europe had begun to accelerate, this particular dispute may have served as a necessary wake-up call. It should alert us to the need to reinvigorate a transatlantic relationship that is based on a shared commitment to personal liberties, democratic government, and free markets. Absent the Soviet threat to focus our thinking, the perception at times of relatively minor political differences as something larger was perhaps inevitable. The dispute over Iraq, however, forced us to confront the fact that some aspects of transatlantic relations indeed have changed. The United States and Europe must have a sound relationship that will permit each to move from a narrow focus on the Euro-Atlantic space to a greater focus on how to deal collectively with the broader world around us.

Together, Europe and the United States can work together to advance common interests and address common challenges in the global arena, including bringing Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. Furthermore, Europeans and North Americans should redouble their commitment to NATO so that the alliance, complemented by an EU crisis-management component, has the capabilities and structures it needs to act wherever security threats to our nations arise. President Bush perhaps said it best when he noted, "*When Europe and America are divided, history tends to tragedy. When Europe and America are partners, no trouble or tyranny can stand against us.*"

So how can we get rid of this anxiety in the NATO-EU relationship? How can we inject real life in it, and perhaps even some passion? What we believe is that we need, first and foremost, is a change in mindsets, on both sides. And we emphasize here that this change must be fed by a healthy dose of realism. Realism, first of all, regarding NATO;

I have never liked Americans bad-mouthing NATO as "war by committee". I have made that quite clear throughout my tenure, including when I visited Washington two weeks ago. But I have never cared much either for those Europeans who view NATO simply as a pawn of the US. Because the reality is so very clearly different. Like no other institution, the Alliance is able to translate the military and political potential of Europe and North America into concrete action. Like no other institution, NATO is able to square the circle of multilateralism and effectiveness. We have proved it in the Balkans, we are proving it in Afghanistan, and who can say – we may well be called upon to prove it in Iraq as well. I am not saying NATO must be used for each and every crisis. Some problems might be better addressed by the EU, or by a coalition of the willing. In some cases, a division of labour will turn out to be the most practical solution. Berlin+ is meant

to facilitate such options, and it should be respected. But I concede that we in NATO could also be more positive about the EU doing more. And we must certainly recognise it is not merely an international organisation, but a very special animal. I have been a convinced and active European long before I became Defence Secretary in the UK, or NATO Secretary General. ESDP is a strategic imperative and I have done my share to make it a reality. When I was Defence Secretary, my ministry started what became the St. Malo initiative. But we all must be realistic about ESDP. It cannot work as an alternative to NATO, or a counterweight to the United States. An EU that rivals the US is militarily impossible, financially unaffordable, and politically unsustainable. NATO's new command structure includes a new Allied Command Transformation, aimed specifically at ensuring that all Allies participate in the transformation of our forces. There has been a lot of talk this year about Americans being from Venus and European from Mars. As someone pointed out to me lately, according to Roman mythology, Venus and Mars did actually have a very long love affair. Now that may be reassuring to some, but when it comes to managing transatlantic security, I prefer something a little less emotional and a little more tangible. The time has come to put realism over rhetoric again. Realism that makes full use of the possibilities offered by a NATO that is very much alive. Realism regarding the inevitability and intrinsic value of ESDP. Realism that fully exploits the potential of NATO-EU cooperation. And realism that faces the challenge of military transformation head-on. Your role in generating that kind of realism, and sustaining it, is crucial.²¹

The Development and Aim of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

The ambition and the commitment to engage the EU as such in crisis management operations, in fact, were first formulated at the Cologne European Council of June 1999, which marks the beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a distinctive part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Until then, the potential resort to civilian and especially military means in common external action had been either conferred to other organizations (the Western European Union, WEU) or rather confined to an unspecified future (Art. J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, TEU). At Amsterdam, in 1997, an odd convergence of old and new member states (the initiative was taken by Sweden and Finland) led to the incorporation in the Treaty (Art. 17 TEU) of the so-called 'Petersberg tasks', defined as "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping". They were literally taken from the WEU conceptual toolbox and covered a very wide range of potential missions, thus meeting the still quite differing expectations of the then EU-15.

Since Cologne, the implementation of ESDP followed two main paths. On the one hand, the Union set the so-called Headline Goals for military (Helsinki, December 1999) and police (Feira, June 2000) forces and struggled to meet them through voluntary contributions of personnel and assets by the members states (and additional ones by candidates). By May 2003 they were considered as met by the Union, although considerable shortfalls remain - and are expected to be tackled - in the domain of strategic military capabilities. In addition, some 'doctrinal' elements

²¹ Closing remarks <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031125a.htm> by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, at the 2nd European Parliament meetings on Defence, 25 Nov 03.

were tentatively sketched, including operational scenarios and planning assumptions. Accordingly, for instance, the geographical radius for EU-led missions would go as far as 4,000 Km from Brussels; such radius would be extended to 10,000 km. for purely humanitarian operations. At that time (spring 2000), however, the common feeling was that EU-led peacekeepers would be deployed mainly, if not exclusively, “in and around Europe”, most notably in the Western Balkans. When they did so much further away, for instance in East Timor, they acted under a UN flag.

On the other hand, new political and military bodies - the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff - were set up in Brussels to deal with the new tasks: eventually, the PSC and its role in crisis management were also incorporated in the 2000 Nice Treaty (Art.25 TEU). What remained unsolved at that level was, first, the link to the Atlantic Alliance, that was already acting in the same functional and geographical area: a (missing) link that mattered for both political and operational reasons, and that was then complicated by tortuous negotiations with Turkey over the so-called ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement for the access to, use and release of NATO assets for EU-led operations. The other unsolved issue was internal to the EU and affected the relationship between the CFSP/ESDP bodies and the other institutional actors in European external relations - from the Commission to the member states themselves.

The ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement was eventually finalized in December 2002, in the wake of the radical political change that had occurred in Turkey the month before. Accordingly, the Union is now assured to have access to NATO planning capabilities and can assume to have Access to NATO capabilities if necessary, although that will be decided on a case-by-case basis. However partial, the deal has somewhat ‘freed’ ESDP of an important constraint and at last made the ‘devolution’ of some NATO activities to the EU possible. There have been moments of transatlantic tension before. But recent events reflect a deeper and more far-reaching challenge than was experienced before. The fundamental changes in the “international system” that the world has experienced since the fall of the Berlin wall and the accelerating pace of globalization with its threats and opportunities, require new thinking and decisive actions. What are the basic “stylized facts” that define the new reality? Here are some of them:

- Europe is no longer divided by an iron curtain and is no longer threatened from the east. It no longer needs American protection the way it did until the 1990’s.
- Nonetheless the world remains a very dangerous place as driven home to all of us by the terrible tragedy of September 11. Globalization increases the potentially catastrophic dangers from terror, organized crime, contagious disease and environmental degradation. The world economy also remains fragile with a widening of the gap between the richest and the poorest, and between expectations and actual achievements, even in the advanced countries. Global interdependence has increased the potential benefits from coordination and from the joint management of global public goods and bads.
- The United States has and, for decades, will continue to have overwhelming military superiority compared to any potential competitor. Europe’s GDP will be larger than that of the United States, but the United States is “united” while Europe is debating the degree of cohesion it wants to develop in foreign and security policy. The United States will be

in a position to project power worldwide and to bloc any development that it does not approve of in the domain of international security or economic architecture.

- Despite this strength, however, the world has become far too complex for the United States to be able to “manage” globalization successfully on its own. To be effective, US leadership has to be able to count on the active cooperation of other major players, both because the United States economic resources alone cannot suffice and because, in today’s world, thankfully, there is need for a sense of moral and democratic legitimacy. Television, the internet and the progress of democratic and value based politics constrain the use of power.²²

The Treaty of Amsterdam and the subsequent decisions taken in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice on the development of a common ESDP all aim at rendering the EU able to contribute to international security, thus further advancing the EU on its way towards a political union that is truly able to act. Once these decisions will have been fully implemented, the EU will dispose of a considerable range of both civil and military means to engage autonomously and efficiently in crisis prevention and crisis-management. However, to emphasize it right away, European collective defense is and will remain only a matter of NATO. The European Council in Helsinki 1999 clearly spells out that EU-led operations shall only take place “where the Alliance on a whole is not engaged”. U.S. security policy dominance is not set to diminish in the foreseeable future - even after the successful launch of a common ESDP. Germany supports the strengthening of the EU in security and defense policy, not to cut ties between Europe and the USA but to ensure Europe remains fit for a true partnership with the U.S.

While some in the U.S. eye the ESDP with suspicion - particular with regard to France - there are also calls for Europeans, above all from Congress, to finally operate a system of real burden-sharing, to take more responsibility for crisis management in Europe and not to simply always call for American leadership in an emergency. Because the very Europeans, who call for Europe’s greater autonomy from the US are also those who demand that the U.S. defend Europe when the going gets tough. And the very Americans who harbor reservations about the ESDP often call upon Europeans to play a greater role in joint operations in and around Europe or even to tackle European crises on their own. This shows that differences in analysis often do not just exist between Europe and America but also within Europe and the U.S. The development of a common ESDP was only possible because firstly the Balkans crises showed that such a policy was needed to complement the task of collective defense as covered by NATO, and secondly because the non-Alliance EU members redefined their own security identity in such a way that they could subscribe to the Petersberg tasks themselves.²³

One, like the majority of Americans, may want an America that abides by international law, that is a constructive partner in international institutions, and that can work cooperatively to solve world social and economic problems. This part of America sees Europe as its political partner in

²² “Europe and the United States facing the Challenges of the New Century”. http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/9/2753/Kemal_Dervis, Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 2-3/5/03: Contribution on the issue of EU-USA Relations by Kemal Dervis.

²³ “ESDP and NATO: a German perspective on the new transatlantic bargain”, Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Address before CSIS, Washington, 01/24/01 p. 2, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r010124a.pdf>.

an effort to bring a degree of genuine internationalism and common sense to American foreign policy thinking. Europe is important because it offers an alternative multi-lateralist policy approach that reflects both European and American interests. If Europe fails to actively promote such an alternative or worse seems to be accepting the fallacies of current U.S. policy, it weakens those in the United States who are pushing for a more enlightened policy and reduces the prospects for a new transatlantic partnership.

In fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, Europe enjoys an attractive position vis-a-vis the United States in that Washington needs the help and support of Europe much more than Europe needs the United States. If looked at objectively, Europe no longer needs the United States for any real security or defense needs. Indeed, the European nations of NATO and the European Union now have primacy over their own security and over the security of the immediate European Rim region stretching from the Ukraine in the north to the Balkans in the south. Indeed, Europe's main security worry vis-a-vis the United States today is of entirely different nature - not that Washington will abandon Europe but that it will use its power in the Greater Middle East region in a way that will destabilize the region and create greater Western-Islamic tensions.

Washington depends upon European Union members for peacekeeping and nation-building not just in the Balkans but in Afghanistan and most likely soon in Iraq, and it benefits from European assistance for other U.S. security-related concerns, such as support for the Palestinian Authority. It needs Europe's active cooperation in tracking international terrorists and disrupting their networks and in dealing with countries suspected of having nuclear ambitions. It is dependent upon European as well as East Asian capital to fuel U.S. growth and to pay for its international policies. In addition, the European Union now has as much or more influence with other key members of the international community--such as Brazil, Russia and Turkey--and often better reflects their interests in world policy issues.

The true test of transatlantic relations in the coming months will be whether Europe and the United States can develop a common policy toward peace in the Middle East and toward the modernization of the Arab world. This will not be an easy task especially given Washington's decidedly pro-Israeli leanings and the desire of some leading foreign U.S. policy figures to limit European influence in this part of the world. Yet EU members have no choice in my view but to come to grips with the fact that the center of American foreign policy has moved from Europe (and East Asia) to the Middle East and that this represents both a danger and an opportunity for them. The danger stems from the fact that the United States is determined to redraw the political map of the Middle East and that its policies could easily destabilize the current order in a way that harms European economic and security interests. Indeed, if the current position in Washington continues to prevail, there are likely to be bitter differences between Europe and the United States over policy toward Iran, Syria, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

On the other hand, the opportunity for Europe lies in the fact that the United States will soon recognize that it has taken on more than it can handle in the greater Middle East and that it lacks the legitimacy to promote democratic change in this part of the world. The Bush administration is correct that the current order in the Middle East is neither acceptable nor viable but it is wrong that it alone can steer a process of reform in the region or that its Likud-like policies will

succeed. Certain U.S. groups may not welcome Europe's participation but if the United States wants peace in the region and democratic modernization then it will need Europe's critical help and more balanced perspective.²⁴

The EU on the US Radar Screen

The U.S. is very much focused on Europe because Europe is its sole serious economic and political counterweight and potential rival. This American administration is particularly concerned by the implications of European popular opposition as well as French, Belgian and German governmental resistance to American policy on Iraq, which it takes as a signal that a common European foreign policy might in the future become a serious constraint on U.S. freedom of action. It will do all that it can to prevent this.²⁵

America remains our friend and partner. The transatlantic community is based on a unique foundation of shared values, similar civil societies and the will to ensure that democracy, human rights, individual freedom and the market economy prevail all over the world. The European Union and the USA are, globally, the economic areas most closely interconnected by trade and investments – and thus also the most highly interdependent.

The transatlantic community can, however, only fulfill its function if it constantly adapts to the changing circumstances and challenges. In order to meet the new global challenges, Europe and America need a common global agenda. To achieve this, the Europeans and the Americans must, step by step, create a more efficient mechanism, allowing closer and more continuous consultation and cooperation. Issues on the common global agenda should include: the Middle East peace process, the stabilization of south-eastern Europe, the transformation in the successor states of the Soviet Union, the fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, environmental protection, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as questions relating to economic growth, the creation of jobs through the dismantling of trade barriers, future provision in the energy sector, the battle against poverty and the reinforcement of the WTO. Where close cooperation already exists in these areas, it must be intensified.

One vital aim with regard to strengthening relations between the EU and the USA must be to revive NATO. Europe can only counter the new threats to its security effectively together with America. Thus, NATO will have to be the decisive stabilizing force in the conflicts of today and tomorrow. So it is only logical that NATO is to take on the leading role in Afghanistan. It was for the same reason that it is called, even before the end of the Iraq war, for NATO to take on the leading role, under the auspices of the United Nations, in the tasks of military stabilization in Iraq.

²⁴ "Note to the EU Presidency and EU Foreign Ministers", Sherle R. Schwenninger Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute Director, Global Economic Policy Program, New America Foundation, [http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2629/Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 2-3/5/03: Contribution on the issue of EU-USA Relations by Sherle R. Schwenninger](http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2629/Informal%20General%20Affairs%20and%20External%20Relations%20Council%202-3/5/03%3A%20Contribution%20on%20the%20issue%20of%20EU-USA%20Relations%20by%20Sherle%20R.%20Schwenninger).

²⁵ The Hon. George A. Papandreou, The Hellenic European Union Presidency, [http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2630/Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 2-3/5/03: Contribution on the issue of EU-USA Relations by William Pfaff](http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2630/Informal%20General%20Affairs%20and%20External%20Relations%20Council%202-3/5/03%3A%20Contribution%20on%20the%20issue%20of%20EU-USA%20Relations%20by%20William%20Pfaff).

Yet the revival of NATO will only be achieved if Europe increases its efforts to narrow the widening gap between American and European capabilities. The numerous declarations of intent must finally be followed by action: in other words, the EU must actually create the necessary capabilities! It will be crucial that the EU meets its commitment to ensure the planned rapid reaction force is ready for deployment on time. All attempts to establish Europe as a counterweight to the USA should be avoided, though. Europe needs America more than America needs Europe. For Europe will, in the foreseeable future, remain dependent on the USA for essential aspects of its security. The grave deficits which exist in the area of strategic transport, together with those in the areas of reconnaissance, communication and armaments, must be eliminated. These gaps in capability cannot be bridged through additional financing alone. Defence measures must also be coordinated more closely and potential synergies fully exploited.²⁶

In the world emerging since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Europe have strikingly common global security and economic interests. But their ability to advance those interests, together, depends on the willingness of Europe to take on greater responsibilities, the willingness of the United States to share leadership, and the vision of both to form a far more ambitious partnership than the one of today's official policies. Individual essays develop and apply this idea in the areas of free trade; NATO reform; joint "Atlantic" strategies toward the former Soviet Union and the greater Middle East; and other shifts in American and European policies toward one another and the world at large. The work will interest policy and research audiences in world affairs, global business readers, and others engaged in or thinking about America's international role and relations.²⁷

The war in Iraq did more than starkly illustrate political differences between the United States and some of its NATO allies; it also reinforced perceptions about their relative military capabilities. Some who observed the rapid success of the invasion and the subsequent difficulties of the stabilization concluded that the United States should focus on winning wars quickly and then turn to its allies to ensure security afterward. Others, like the European Union's (EU's) top general, drew the lesson that European defense should become less reliant on NATO and increasingly independent from the United States.

Both of these conclusions are erroneous. It would be a mistake for NATO to become an alliance where, it has been said, the Americans do the cooking and the Europeans and Canadians do the dishes.²⁸ We should consider an organizational division of labor between NATO and the European Union. The European Union is in the midst of developing a rapid-reaction force to undertake crisis management operations in and around Europe in those situations when NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged. Ultimately, the European Union should assume primary responsibility for what could be characterized as intra-European crisis management; that is, for

²⁶ Strengthening Transatlantic Relations Statement for the Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Greece, 2/3 May 2003 by Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, [http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2631/Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 2-3/5/03: Contribution on the issue of EU-USA Relations by Dr. Friedbert Pflüger](http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2631/Informal%20General%20Affairs%20and%20External%20Relations%20Council%202-3/5/03%3A%20Contribution%20on%20the%20issue%20of%20EU-USA%20Relations%20by%20Dr.%20Friedbert%20Pfl%C3%BCger).

²⁷ "America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era", edited by David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

²⁸ <http://www.naa.be/default.asp?shortcut=478>, "Division of Labor: NATO, EU Can Separate Missions", Protect Unity 8 March 2004 - Editorial by NATO PA President Doug Bereuter in Defense News.

undertaking military operations in Europe when the security of the continent is threatened by domestic instability or civil war. The Balkans conflicts, of course, are the best example of such crises. Ideally, NATO should not have to intervene in such conflicts in the future.

But the European Union should not seek to usurp NATO's responsibility to defend its members' territories against outside threats, as suggested last month by Gen. Gustav Hagglund, chairman of the EU Military Committee. Appearances can be deceiving, especially in international affairs. Ten years ago, when the Cold War had come to an end, and our institutions started to grapple with the realities of the post-Cold War period, some predicted, and quite a few believed, that we were entering an era of institutional rivalry. Today, we see much more clearly. Our institutions are not rivals. They have become partners "partners in peace", to quote the title of this conference. There is still much work for each of our organizations to do, in order to further develop our common potential for continued effective cooperation in the future. Because one thing is crystal clear: closer institutional cooperation will be needed. It will be needed to deal with regional crises which have been the focus of the project that culminates at this conference. But cooperation will also be crucial if we want to deal effectively with new threats to our security and stability, in particular terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Europe must be able to play a more concrete role in maintaining stability on its own continent. Other demands, including the global fight against terrorism, mean that the United States may no longer be willing or able to always take the lead in every future crisis on the European continent. Europe itself, of course, also needs to play a security role more in line with its political and economic stature. To put aside political theology and look at problem and solving from a practical not a dogmatic perspective. Ensuring peace, security and stability is not a zero-sum game. A role for the EU need not be at the expense of NATO interests, and vice versa. We have learned this at every stage in our Balkans engagement. Throughout the Balkans, our two organizations are working together efficiently and effectively towards a common goal. However, as one of the godfathers of the St-Malo agreement which launched the European Security and Defence Policy, we truly believe that there is potential for more. We must make an additional effort to build solid arrangements for NATO-EU cooperation on crisis management.

This past decade, our countries and our institutions have shown a remarkable common sense of purpose in dealing with a wide variety of regional crises. We have shown open-mindedness and flexibility, in recognizing each other's strengths, and learning from past experiences. And we have shown a growing willingness and ability to complement and to reinforce each other's efforts. We need that same approach now. To work together constructively towards a common goal. To present a united front against the threat of terrorism. Because if we want to remain partners in peace, and to strengthen our partnership, we must be prepared to address all the different threats to that peace, now and in the future: Together.²⁹

This effort began one year ago in Reykjavik, where our foreign ministers agreed "*that NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain*

²⁹ "Meeting today's security challenges", Speech by the Secretary General at the conference "The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors: Partners in Peace?" Paris, dated 11 October 2002, http://www.paginedidifesa.it/2002/natosg_021011.html.

operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.” In other words, there is no longer an “out-of-area” debate. Of course, we are all aware of the difficulties that NATO has faced in the past concerning defense capabilities, and at the Prague Summit, Alliance leaders launched several initiatives to deal with those difficulties. The most important for enabling the Alliance to confront today’s security threats are the NATO Response Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitment.

We would also like to acknowledge the role that the European Union is playing in the struggle against terrorism. The collective effort by the EU in vigorously pursuing terrorists and improving international co-operation in law enforcement has facilitated international cooperation. This has been substantial and important. Given the common challenges that we face, efforts to turn the European Union into a counterweight to the United States are neither in the interest of Europe or the United States. We cannot waste energy and effort on diplomatic struggles with one another. The problems of terrorism, proliferation, and terrorist states are global, and thus our response must be international, with the widest level of participation possible.

NATO’s support in Iraq, coupled with its growing role in Afghanistan, signals NATO’s willingness to take on out-of-area operations, and more importantly, its vital role in the global war on terrorism. While many commentators are searching for new missions to NATO, its original mission - the collective defense of its members - must remain its primary purpose, albeit with a changed focus on terrorism, WMD proliferation, and terrorist states. At the same time, NATO can undertake related missions that will enhance security and stability on its periphery and help contain the main threats to its member nations. But military capabilities alone do not define NATO. While this is undeniably a Trans-Atlantic drift between the European and the American in attitudes and perceptions, the foundations of the Alliance are shared core values and beliefs. These include a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Given the common threats that Europe and North America face and the common values that we hold, we must remain committed to our common defense.³⁰

Shared Risks/No Division of Labor

At the same time, there needs to be reaffirmation -by all the allies, and at the moment especially by the United States - of the cardinal NATO principle that risks are to be shared by all allies; and that there must not emerge, formally or informally, a “division of labor” be - 150 The European Security and Defense Policy between NATO and the EU/ESDP or implicitly in regard to particular allies. French Minister of Defense Alain Richard met this point head on in a July 2001 speech in Washington: Does the development of a European reaction force create the very situation we want to avoid? Does it open the way for a division of labor with the United States taking care of the high end of the risk and conflict spectrum, and the Europeans focusing on the fire brigade function of local peace restoration in their vicinity? We believe such a division of labor, whether intended or accidental, would damage transatlantic relations and reduce our overall capacity to deter and manage new crises.³¹

³⁰ <http://www.naa.be/default.asp?TAB=388> Municipal House, Prague, Czech Republic - Wednesday 28 May 2003. 28 May 2003, Prague - SPRING SESSION ADDRESS by Hon. Doug BEREUTER, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

³¹ http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1463/MR1463.ch19.pdf.

Avoiding a division of labor is not just about what the EU nations do in regard to ESDP and, especially, both the structure and practical operation of the rapid reaction force and collective attitudes toward the Petersberg Tasks. Also critical is U.S. willingness (and, by implication, NATO's readiness) to be engaged in operations that fall below the threshold of "Article 5 operations" or what is sometimes called the "robust" end of the overall conflict spectrum. Specifically, U.S. reluctance to be engaged in future peacekeeping or peacemaking in Europe - operations such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo in recent years - could, in practice, tend to leave such tasks to EU/ESDP and would, per force, lead to at least a perception of a division of labor - and of risk - within the alliance.

How the George W. Bush administration develops policies toward (a) the Balkans and (b) peacekeeping/peacemaking roles for U.S. forces, in general, cannot be separated from its hopes for an ESDP that is compatible with its hopes for NATO. In short, U.S. reluctance to share such risks and tasks, especially in the Balkans, the most serious area of instability in today's Europe, would be incompatible with an effort to keep ESDP as simply a second-choice option for dealing with crisis and conflict in Europe. Indeed, compared with ESDP developments, far more is at stake for the NATO Alliance from the Bush administration's reluctance in 2001 to be equally engaged with other allies in a NATO-led Macedonian military peace force.

U.S. interests and concerns about the EU's ventures in foreign policy and defense a mutually reinforcing relationship between the European Union, acting Looking to the Future through ESDP, and NATO that works for all and for overall security in the transatlantic region. The alliance perforce is now engaged "outside of area," meaning beyond Europe, because of the effects of international terrorism on the United States, if not also on other allied states.⁷ The principle of the "outside of area" debate was thus settled by circumstances.³²

The Euro-Atlantic relationship for the 21st century is as important as the destinies linked to security, democracy and prosperity. It could be described as a three-faceted partnership of mutual security, democracy and continued prosperity, supported by NATO, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the European Union as America's proposed strategy to meet U.S.-European commitments. The European Union is key to the third component of the transatlantic relationship, promoting prosperity. It is acknowledged that, while Europe is America's greatest trading partner, it is also America's greatest competitor. But in our view, Europe and the United States need to act more like partners than rivals. When they work together, it could be able to set the agenda for global prosperity. So both organizations should bear a special responsibility to sustain their own growth, maintain open markets, and ensure that the forces of protectionism do not overwhelm economic liberalization.

Therefore, the triple crown of U.S.-EU Partnership could be described as security, democracy and prosperity. US welcome the EU's efforts to develop the Common European Security and Defense Policy as a way to increase Europe's contribution to their common security. As U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright said; "*Our interest is clear: we want a Europe that can act. We want a Europe with modern, flexible military forces that are capable of putting out fires in*

³² After Helsinki: Getting the NATO-EU Relationship Right, Chpt 11, <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1463/MR1463.ch11.pdf>, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor? by Robert E. Hunter, 2002.

Europe's backyard and working with us through the Alliance to defend our common interests." So what will the future hold for our transatlantic partnership? US Ambassador Hall adds;

In response I would like to quote an American baseball player of some renown, Yogi Berra, who said, "The future ain't what it used to be." We see many exciting opportunities on the horizon, and daunting challenges as well. America and Europe are linked to a common destiny of shared democratic ideals and free markets. We, like you in Europe, have been blessed with great natural and human resources, and we are committed to expanding the wealth and freedoms our citizens enjoy throughout the world. A three-faceted partnership of mutual security, democracy and continued prosperity, supported by NATO, the OSCE and the European Union, is America's proposed strategy to meet this commitment. We want to work with our European partners to construct a partnership for the 21st century -- one in which counterproductive walls of separation, perceived or real - have no place.³³

Potential Strategic Implications of ESDP

The implications of European defense autonomy for the future of the transatlantic relationship, and by extension for other parts of the world such as the Middle East, are open. The issue is unavoidably linked with other elements in the overall transatlantic political and intellectual environment, and thus interacts with themes such as missile defense and trade disputes. In particular, emotional, value-based differences like on genetically modified food, global climate change, the death penalty, and possibly nuclear energy could potentially, if mishandled politically, create an atmosphere of estrangement that could drive a wedge between NATO and ESDP.

There are also some concerns that a substantive bifurcation of the notion of security could result from the US focus on military superiority and advanced technology for shaping and preserving international security on the one hand, and the European focus on countering different, not essentially military kinds of security threats to their societies, such as large-scale migration, primarily with political, diplomatic and economic means and through coordinated law enforcement. There is at this time a strong intellectual tendency in Europe, not just in France, to say that the end of the East-West conflict will unavoidably lead to an erosion of common perceptions between the US and Europe. While this approach appears to be popular among those whose political consciousness was shaped around 1968, based on resentment of Europe's domination by two outside superpowers, many older or younger Europeans would not as easily sign on to the doctrine that without a unifying threat Europe and the US will drift apart, feeling that the alliance between affluent individualist democracies is above all based on their shared interest in preserving the basic conditions for free market economies and individual liberty.

³³ Amb. Kathryn Walt Hall on U.S.-European Relationship, <http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/walt0127.html>, dated January 27, 2000, Summary : Vienna; "Working together, Europeans and Americans need to complete the transition in Europe that began in 1989," U.S. Ambassador to Austria Kathryn Walt Hall said January 27. "We must continue to strengthen and expand the key institutions of the transatlantic region that reflect our common values."

Preserving NATO through ESDP

For the nearer term, though, European security concerns are likely to be seen closer to home: in the Balkans and with regard to Russia. The new NATO that was formed in the 1990s provides an anchor to continued US engagement and provides stability beyond the EU members' territory, expected to expand eastwards, at the same time reaching out to Russia and Ukraine to shape a lasting relationship of co-operation and partnership. One yardstick of success with respect to ESDP will be if, in conjunction with NATO, it will be able to preserve this strategic role for NATO after a potential US force retreat from Europe. In spite of the fact that the EU chose both Russia and nonproliferation as early targets of the CFSP's new instruments – common strategies and common action – it must be clear that an integrated, politically and strategically cohesive and well-focused overall EU approach to Russia that includes all relevant aspects across the spectrum of issues, including arms control, co-operative threat reduction, defense, and international security, is still far away.

In the past, NATO was invaluable to Europeans because it provided an opportunity to plug into and sometimes even influence US policy-making vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (and indirectly also vis-à-vis the Middle East). In the future, with European economic power and sustained political engagement more and more important for common stability-building efforts, it may well be a matured EU strategy toward Russia (and at some time potentially also the Middle East) that would provide the anchor, through NATO and the G-8, for US power in these regions. Looking at it this way, the EU's young defense policy may after all not be quite as esoteric a topic as initially believed, and more countries might have an interest in its success than is apparent at first glance.

5. Conclusions & Recommendations

We would like to put “open questions” here as conclusions and recommendations. Among these questions and unresolved issues that remain at this stage, there is still concern that the conduct of European foreign policy, involving sovereign nations, the EU Council, and the Commission is still too unfocused and unpredictable for the optimal employment of military means in the service of political and strategic goals. It is neither a secret nor a surprise that a security and defense culture that would facilitate responsible decision-making on defense matters and the conduct of operations does not yet exist within the EU. However, the tangible shift towards a Brussels-based common security and defense policy has already produced a remarkably open mindset and removed previously-held mental barriers between a “civilian” EU and the world of defense, building on the widespread experience of practitioners in the Balkans and elsewhere that military protection and involvement was in fact an indispensable, though missing element for a successful pursuit of the EU's international efforts.

Another fundamental question that meets varying answers is which benchmarks should be employed to measure success or failure of ESDP: Is it the degree of autonomy it delivers, the amount of capabilities it creates, its impact on defense budgets, or the quality of performance in the first European-only operation? With regard to the latter, it is likely that the EU would prefer to take this test in some simple, compelling, affordable, low-risk and limited crisis within easy reach.

One central problem that has not been completely resolved is the proper place and manner of planning for European operations on the force-planning, operational and strategic level. After a public confrontation between the French and British at Nice, it has been made clearer that there is not to be a separate European military planning capability outside NATO's established planning structures. Separate force planning and operational planning would be duplicative, and thereby could jeopardize the coherence of joint military efforts in NATO, given the differences in focus and mandate between NATO and the EU. NATO is expected to grant the EU permanent, guaranteed Access to NATO's planning structures. But France remains skittish about how close EU and NATO consultation should be. The French role has been hard to read. On the one hand, the nation's defense establishment and armed forces have clearly adopted a pragmatic stance towards NATO since the experience of the 1990/91 Gulf War and the active involvement in the Balkans. On the other hand, the language and attitude of French exceptionalism remain mostly unchanged, and there should be no hope that French diplomats will be prepared to sacrifice this aspect of national identity on the altar of pragmatism. The relationship between ESDP outside NATO and ESDI inside NATO will therefore most likely remain ambiguous.

A number of NATO Members outside the EU, including Canada, are concerned that ESDP could undermine their interests. After the Feira meeting in June 2000, the six European but non-EU NATO members called for concrete mechanisms for regular political consultation and practical cooperation on ESDP matters. The EU has offered a wide-ranging set of measures, ranging from semi-annual ministerial meetings and routine involvement in the preparation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC, or COPS) meetings to permanent liaison with the EU military staff and intensified consultation on all levels before decisions are taken on EU-led operations. Nevertheless, Turkey has continued to impede the process of EU-NATO harmonization and blocked arrangements that would make pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities available for EU-led operations, insisting that Turkey must first be granted decision-making input by the EU.

This Turkish attitude caused considerable headache not only to the EU but also to NATO and the US. It is not yet clear to which degree ESDI arrangements on using NATO structures under the (European) Deputy SACEUR for EU operations will actually be available, or whether the EU will have to resort to augmented lead-nation structures instead that would essentially take away from the advanced level of multinational military integration achieved in Europe within NATO in the past. Also, it is not clear how exercises for EU operations under the "headline goal" should be organized. As an interim solution, this will fall in the responsibility of leading European nations, a term generally seen as referring to Britain, France, Germany, and potentially Italy.

The U.S.-EU toolbox available for the achievement of both security and stability must be kept large enough to avoid war, wage it as a matter of last resort, win it at the least possible cost, and end it after it has been won. Military power wins wars, even if it may no longer be enough to deter them. But to end those wars after they have been won, the tools of reconstruction and rehabilitation rely on tasks that neither side of the Atlantic alone can attend to more effectively than both sides can together.³⁴ The United States and the EU cannot be expected to do everything together, but together it must be expected that they can and will do everything. There cannot be more US-EU unity without more unity within the EU.

³⁴ <http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v9n3.pdf>, Euro-Focus, volume 9, number 3, April 11, 2003, EU-U.S.. Relations Beyond Iraq: Setting the Terms of Complementarity by Simon Serfaty.

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*Corresponding author.

E-mail address: gak2081@yahoo.co.uk