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The Influence of Television Owners on Program Content in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

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Abstract

In Indonesia, the downfall of the last authoritarian ruler in May 1998 marked the beginning of the transition to democracy in the country. Before 1998, the autocratic government monitored firmly the media content for decades. With the current broadcast liberalization, Indonesian televisions can produce almost any kind of program contents. However, a question arises, who actually controls media content in the era of liberalization. How political and economic factors influence television workers in shaping content? The literature review indicates a number of political and economic factors that may affect the television content, including owners, advertisers, audiences, regulators, politicians, etc. However, this empirical research intends to focus on the role of television owners in influencing the program content. The research question is: how do television owners influence television workers in shaping their content? The question needs a qualitative descriptive answer from various sources, including interviews with around 100 television workers, participant observations, documents, television reports, and other data sources. This research reveals important findings. Television owners control, directly or indirectly, television workers in shaping the program content. The indirect control was made through senior executives who hold strategic positions in the programming department and especially in the media editorial board. Owners sometimes involved directly in shaping content, especially entertainment program. The owners used to come to a programming meeting where they lead and direct television workers. Owners evaluated the performance of the ongoing program and giving suggestions about what should be done to sustain the program success.

Key Words: influence, television, owners, program, content, Indonesia

1. Introduction: The fall of the last authoritarian government in Indonesia in 1998 allowed the rise of freedom followed by the process of transition to democracy in the country. For decades, the autocratic government monitored firmly the media. At the time of authoritarian era, the media that dared to ignore or underestimate government controls, they would face

fatal consequences. Media permits were frequently revoked, subject to bans, and even closed down without gaining access to open trial.

For more than 50 years, two leaders, Sukarno and Suharto, who run their governments in an authoritarian manner, ruled Indonesia. Sukarno, who led the struggle for independence of Indonesia from the Netherlands, was the country's first President from 1945 to 1967. During his rule, and with the backing of the military, Sukarno disbanded political parties, arrested and imprisoned political opponents, used martial law to closed-down mass media criticism of the government's policies, and other repressive actions.

During the initial decade of independence in 1945, Indonesian media was dubbed by founding President Sukarno a 'toll of the Revolution', responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion (Hill 2007, p.14). Sukarno determined to rein in renegade media for a range of political reasons such as considered lending editorial support for regional movements against the central government, or offending the president or senior political or military figures. Sukarno closed down newspapers, and he was adamant that, whatever the international odium associated with the press suppression, he would not allow destructive criticism of his leadership (Hill 2007, p.30).

As part of an effort by government to mobilize the mass media in forging a strong and unified nation, the government established the state controlled television station TVRI in 1962; it was the first and the only television in Indonesia for 26 years since its inception.

With the transition of government after the coup d'état against Sukarno in 1 October 1965 and the transfer of power to Major-General Suharto on 11 March 1966, the new government called the press to safeguard national security against internal and external threats. In promoting adherence to the state ideology, the Suharto Government sought to eliminate critical papers, domesticate the vociferous press, and ensure that press workers and management were ultimately loyal to the government. By 1969, savage bans, by the regime cut the number of newspapers and magazines, and their total circulation, to less than half (Dhakidae 1991, p. 551).

During the authoritarian era, the government had created political barriers to entry in the media industry. The policy was aimed at producing domination by the government with the power to grant and to revoke media licenses. Through its power, the regime was able to limit market players to politically favorable parties. This was especially visible in the television industry, when in 1988 the government granted licenses to the first private commercial television Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI) owned by Suharto's son. Another three private commercial televisions, which follow suit in the nineties: Indosiar, Surabaya Citra Televisi (SCTV), and Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI, now MNC) were also under the control of giant enterprises owned by Suharto's circle.

The restriction imposed on media prevailed until Suharto came down from power on May 21, 1998. It was a day of great importance in the Indonesian history. The day when President Suharto –pressured by waves of demonstrations due to economic meltdown- was

forced to step down after more than 30 years in power. From that day, the country started its path to democracy, which also paves the way for freedom of the press.

The downfall of President Suharto allows the media to appreciate the new circumstance of being free from the government strict control and the media flourished aggressively. Currently, Indonesia, the world's fourth-largest population, becomes the new emerging democratic country. After the shift of political power, various reforms in almost all aspects of life developed, particularly the media and press that relished the freedom the most.

Under heavy pressures from the civil society and the market, a series of liberalization policies were taken by the post-Suharto governments. The new broadcast law was enacted in 2002 and one year later, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), an independent state regulatory body, was established. KPI is responsible to regulate and provide recommendations in the area of broadcasting. With the current broadcast liberalization, Indonesian televisions can produce almost any kind of program contents.

When democratization removes state censorship, and the media enjoy freedom of expression, we have to deal with the following questions: Who controls the content in the media? Who actually shapes the news and entertainment content that we see or hear? How political and economic factors influence television workers in shaping content? In particular, this research intends to investigate the role of media owners in shaping television content in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

This research will look at the forces at work within television organizations, especially the role of Indonesian television owners in shaping program content. So, the key research question: How do television owners in Indonesia influence television workers in shaping the program content?

2. Literature Review

2.1. Factors that Shape Media Content: According to Mc Quail (2000), the media organization, where media content is made, is an essential link in the process of mediation by which society addresses itself. In this regard, structural features of media organization such as size, forms of ownership and media, industrial function can be seen as having direct consequences for the conduct of the particular media organization. McQuail refers conduct to all the system activities that in turn affect performance, in the sense of the type and relative amount of media content produced and offered to audiences. According to this model, we need to look not only at internal features of media organizations, but also in their relations with other organizations and with the wider society.

McQuail said, the theories, which have been formulated based on research into media organizations, have been consistent. They support the view that organizational routines, practices and goals systematically and distinctively influence content.

The questions about the degree of freedom media organization possesses in relation to the wider society, and how much freedom is possible within the organization and media-organizational routines and procedures for selecting and processing content lead to

consideration of the tension. The following oppositions reflect the tension at the heart of media-making: 1) constraint versus autonomy; 2) routine production versus creativity; 3) commerce versus art and ; 4) profit versus social purpose (McQuail, 2000)

The broad range of issues, which arise, can be appreciated when one takes an overview of theoretical perspectives organized around the question of influence on media content, as posed by Shoemaker and Reese (1991) who suggest five main hypotheses: 1) Content reflects social reality (mass media as mirror of society); 2) Content is influenced by media workers' socialization and attitudes (including advice from owners); 3) Content is influenced by media-organizational routines; 4) Content is influenced by social institution and forces; 5) Content is a function of ideological positions and maintains the status quo (the hegemonic approach)

McQuail (2000) identify five main kinds of relationship, which need to be examined in order to gain some understanding of the conditions affecting media organizational activity and the mass communicator role: 1) Relationship with society; 2) Relationship with owners, clients and suppliers; 3) Relationship with pressure groups; 4) Relationship with internal organization and; 5) Relationship with audience

According to Marx and Engels (Marx, 1977; Marx and Engels, 1974), media content influence and media power relations discussed above relate to mass media as a 'means of production', which in capitalist society are in the ownership of the ruling class. According to this idea, the mass media simply disseminate the ideas and worldviews of the ruling class, and deny or defuse alternative ideas. This is very much in accord with Marx's argument that.

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. (Marx & Engels: *The German Ideology*, cited in Curran *et al.* 1982: 22).

From this perspective the mass media disseminate the dominant ideology: the values of the class, which owns and controls the media. The mass media worked to create 'false awareness' in the average workers. This prompts a compelling position whereby media content are seen as undiversified expressions of decision class values, which disregards any differing qualities inside the decision class and inside the media, and the likelihood of oppositional readings by audiences of media.

A number of different relationships within and across the boundaries of media organization must be taken into account in any theoretical account of media organizations and occupations. These relationships are often active negotiations and exchanges and sometimes conflicts, latent or actual.

Gerbner (1969) depicted communicators in mass media as working under pressure from different external 'power roles', including audience, competitors (other media in the main),

clients (such as sponsors and advertisers), authorities (especially legal and political), experts, and other institutions.

According to Pringle and Starr (2005, p.102), all broadcast station content (programs) is determined by four influences: audience, broadcaster, advertiser and regulator.

The audience, which seeks out a station for its programs. Listeners or viewers may be exposed to other content, such as commercials and public service and promotional announcements, but their principal goals to hear or view program content that satisfies their need at a particular time. Programs that fail to attract listeners or viewers, or fail to satisfy their needs, are imperiled. So are the financial fortunes of the station.

The broadcaster, who is responsible for operating the station profitably for its owners. The greater the audience, the greater the likelihood that a profit can be realized. Accordingly, the broadcaster selects and schedules programs to attract as many people as possible among the targeted audience.

The advertiser, whose principal interest in using a radio or television is to bring a product or service to the attention of those most likely to use it. Programs that attract potential customers stand the best chance of attracting advertising revenues, especially if the number of people is large and the cost of delivering the commercial to them is competitive.

The regulator, or government and its agencies, whose goal is to ensure that the station is operated in a way that serves the public interest. The regulator take actions aimed at compelling or encouraging broadcasters to engage in certain programming practices to satisfy that goal.

Lewis (1969) used responses from 301 stations in the United States to determine influences in television station programming. He developed eight categories, in no particular order of priority: 1) Direct feedback from the audience, including letters, telephone calls, and conversations; 2) Regulations, or rules and standards of practice, such as commitments to the FCC, its rules and regulations, and the station's own policy statement (including advice from owners); 3) Inferential feedback, or ratings; 4) Conditional, a mix of factors, including comments about critics and opinions of friends outside the station; 5) Production staff, the opinions of station personnel with production responsibilities; 6) Personal or subjective judgment, including instinct, common sense, and knowledge of the community; 7) Financial, or factors related to the station's income and expenditures, such as sales potential, sales manager's opinion, and cost; 8) Tactical, that is, methods of program planning, the arrangement of the schedule, and viewing trends.

Commercial radio and television stations air thousands of hours of programs each year. Individual programs may be produced by the stations itself or obtained from another source. They may be designed chiefly to entertain, inform, or educate. Pringle and Starr (2005:102) write about these influences: "Much is said and written about broadcast programming. However, it would be unwise to identify any one influence for praise or condemnation. The

programming we hear and see results from the interaction of all four forces.” (Pringle & Starr, 2005:102)

2.2 Media Owners: It is difficult not to conclude that most media companies work in the interests of owners – as opposed to the interests of audiences or the community at large. Owners occupy the top command posts of media organizations, and they or their appointed top executives eventually have the final say in what the organization does. If the employees don't like it they can quit. Others will be found to take their place, and routines can always be changed. Questions remain about how media owners have lived up to this responsibility. In many developed countries, this responsibility has become greatly diffused. However, in Indonesia many independent owners run their own media organizations, some of them have become part of the larger corporate fabric.

The key issue with regard to the relation between media workers and owners is the extent to which the workers can claim to exercise autonomy in relation to their owners. According to Altschull (1984), the interests of those who finance the press were always reflected in the content of news media. The notion is fairly clear and also consistent with the principles of free 'market' press theory. However, there is usually some degree of autonomy on the part of media workers employed by media owners, especially freedom based on professionalism or the requirements for creating.

Owners in market-based media have ultimate power over content, and there is no doubt that they can ask for what they want to be included or left out in the production of content. Even so, there are quite strong conventions relating to journalism, which protect the decision-making autonomy of editors on particular news stories. It is not too surprising that journalists should claim more autonomy even though they are reluctant to admit being told what to do by the proprietors.

Nevertheless, there is an unavoidable tendency for those who own news media to set broad lines of policy, which are likely to be followed by the editorial staff they employ. There may also be informal and indirect pressure on particular issues that matter to owners. For instance, relating to their other business interest (Turow, 1994).

Change in ownership shows its influence most clearly. According to Shoemaker & Reese (1991), this may come in the form of a corporate takeover, which often brings different values, objectives, culture, and ultimately content. Indeed, in recent years the buying and selling of large newspaper and broadcasting companies have become a big story in its own right. Ownership changes in big media were used to be covered by other media. The new media owners clearly imposed a new policy with far-reaching effects. The news was to be treated like their other business, expected to support itself, a departure from the traditional view that network news is a loss-leader public service supported by the entertainment side of the enterprise. These changes have direct implications for content.

Another important feature of ownership patterns today is the sheer size of a media conglomerate. The number of publications on newsstands and radio and television stations,

as well as new communication channels, makes it appear that ownership is widely distributed. In truth, though, most media are owned by a handful of corporate media giants. Tracing the organizational connections among media reveals greater reasons for concern over the homogenization of media content and ownership.

The strongest effect of ownership usually comes up when owners try to impose their views on media content. This is of particular concern in the news media that occasionally endorse certain political candidates. One may assume that these endorsements provide a direct measure of the owner's or publisher's political attitude or that of the editorial board. To what extent do these attitudes find their way into the more objective news report? Several studies have examined the extent to which a medium slants its news reporting to conform to its editorial voice. Doing so would indicate that decisions at the top levels of the organization has superseded the content dictated by the routines of objective news gathering (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991).

3. Research Methods: Most of research methods used to examine various factors affecting television contents are 'media-centric', which means taking, or recording the view from within the media. The reason for this is because only by knowing how the media operate and assess themselves can we understand how society influences the media and vice versa (McQuail, 2000).

The other reason is that data about media strategies and their money related undertakings is rare for reasons of classification information about media policies and their financial affairs is hard to come by for reasons of confidentiality (Golding & Murdock, 2000).

This empirical research examines the influence of television owners on television program content in Indonesia during the period of 1998 – 2014. The research focus is established based on the research questions: How do media owners influence television workers in shaping content? The research question needs a qualitative descriptive answer from various sources, including interview transcripts, notes made while observing in the field, diaries, journal, documents, media and television reports.

Television workers would be the center of attention of this research (subject of study), and answers to the above research question would depend on their opinions, comments, and responses, which will be collected through intensive interviewing. The interviews with television workers and other data sources are expected to reveal a number of cases, which illustrate how media owners influence television content directly or indirectly.

This research focus on ten Jakarta-based free-to-air national television stations whose content compositions are not exactly similar. The ten stations are: Indosiar, SCTV, RCTI, MNCV TV, Global TV, Metro TV, ANTV, TVOne, Trans TV and Trans 7.

4. Findings and Discussion: After the downfall of Suharto regime in 1998, the political and media atmosphere in the country changed altogether from tyrant and tight state control to the circumstance characterized by freedom and liberalization, a highly aggressive

business sector, and essentially less intervention from state (Heryanto and Adi, 2001). The Renaissance of Indonesian media was at first stamped by the abolishment of the press permitting procedure (SIUPP) during the presidency of B.J. Habibie in 1999, followed by the destruction of the information ministry blamed for its tough measures in closing down some media during the New Order era, and the passing of Press Law No 40/1999 and Broadcast Law No 32/2002 by former president Abdurrahman Wahid. The later advised that an independent body, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), be established. The KPI will function as a partner to the government for managing broadcast media. There was a dramatic increment in the quantity of media, not long after the nullification of the press permitting framework.¹

After 1998, when the authoritarian government disappeared and control over media, press permit and content checks were abolished, the media industry grew exponentially. Advertising holds as the very backbone of the private TV station's existence. The country's liberalization and democratization process combined with a huge consumer market with increasing amounts of money to spend inspired large companies to increase their investments and promotions as they put the greater part of corporate advertising budget into television.²

A year after Suharto withdrew the number of print media soared six folds to 1687 (although half of these numbers disappeared later due to lack of business viability)³. In early 2000s, five large new television channels were opened: Global TV, TV 7, Metro TV, Trans TV, and Lativi competing on a national basis with five stations set up earlier during Suharto's era. Some of these stations changed names later due to ownership changes.

4.1. Television Key Players: Currently at least there are five key players in the Indonesian media industry consisting of five large diversified business groups. The five-business group currently controls 10 largest private national television stations, which also control other types of media. They are: Media Group, Para Group, MNC Group, Bakrie Group, and Emtek Group.

Media Group. The group controls an all-news TV channel, Metro TV, which has over 53 transmission sites all over the country. Based in West Jakarta, Metro TV is the country's first 24-hour news channel. The television channel began to broadcast in the capital in November, 2000. Besides its predominant programming in Indonesian, it is the only TV station to offer Mandarin news. It carried programs in Mandarin to cater Chinese audience reflecting the easing of restrictions on Chinese language and cultural media imposed during

¹ 873 radio stations in 2002, 11 television stations, 279 tabloids, 242 magazines, 186 daily newspapers, 245 weekly newspapers, and 5 bulletins in 2003. Gobel, R & Escborn, N 2005, Indonesia: KAF democracy report 2005 dalam Lukman Hakim, *Media Democratization in Indonesia Post-New Order Regime*, 2008

² Indonesian Press Reference. Look at <http://www.pressreference.com/Gu-Ku/Indonesia.html>

³ Wikrama Iryans Abidin, member of Indonesian Press Council as quoted by media, February 14, 2008.

the authoritarian era. Metro broadcast no sinetron (soap opera) programs, but the station airs entertainment talk show programs. Media group and its television station belong to the businessperson, Surya Paloh, who also owns a national newspaper Media Indonesia daily. Media Group also controls other local newspapers distributed in different parts of Indonesia.⁴

Para Group. The group controls Trans Media Corporation, which manages Trans TV, one of the quickest developing TV stations in Indonesia. The station began broadcasting on 15 December 2001, and it has been successful with its entertaining programs in capturing audience interest. Para Group originally focused on three business sectors — finance, property and multimedia. Para Group, controlled by businessman Chairul Tanjung, acquired Bank Mega in 1996.

Tanjung started his business in 1987 when he and his three companions built up PT Pariarti Shindutama, which manufactured kids' footwear. Tanjung pulled back not long after from the company and built up Para Group, which developed into one of the fastest-growing business conglomerates, and Tanjung became one of Indonesia's wealthiest men in the country. On December 2011, Tanjung changed the name of his business group to CT Corporation or CT Corp., (initial of his name).

The initial success prompted Trans Media to acquire the controlling stake of languishing TV 7 owned by an Indonesian giant publisher Kompas Gramedia Group in 2006. The latter is controlled by Jakob Oetama whose reputable daily paper Kompas has been the market leader in Indonesia for decades. However, Kompas Gramedia failed to manage TV 7 successfully prompting the company to sell TV 7 to Trans Media which then changed the station's name to Trans7.

Chairul Tanjung is close to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 2007, he coordinated several well-known entrepreneurs, and senior government official to launch the 'Visi Indonesia 2030' (Indonesian Vision 2030) project which mapped out how Indonesia could achieve 'developed status' by the year 2030. Tanjung chaired the project and since then he and his team have become unofficial Presidential advisors.

Bakrie Group. Based in East Jakarta, TVOne is an Indonesian privately owned national television station. Aburizal Bakrie, who controlled private nationwide television station ANTV, expanded his venture in the television industry by buying shares in Latvia, another nationwide TV station grappled with financial difficulties. Latvia was established amid booming on national TV in early 2000's. Lativi was initially owned by Abdul Latief, a famous businessman and former minister under Suharto. Latief established the station in 1999, and it commenced broadcasting in 2002. The ownership of the network was changed to Aburizal Bakrie and Erick Tohir by the year 2007 due to debt and poor network management. The station is currently owned by PT Visi Media Asia, Tbk controlled by Bakrie Group.

⁴ Indonesian Press Reference. Look at <http://www.pressreference.com/Gu-Ku/Indonesia.html>
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The launching of TV One was made on 14th February 2008. Aburizal Bakrie and his son Anindya Bakrie continue to dominate shares in Latvia (now TVOne) and ANTV. Anindya, and Tohir were appointed as Chief Commissioner and Pesident Director respectively. Aburizal was once a senior minister in President Yudhoyono's cabinet for the period of 2004-2009. In October 2009, Bakrie was elected chairperson of Golkar, the political party which held power throughout the New Order and which has survived as a key player in the post-Suharto political landscape.

Meanwhile, there has been significant change among the owners of television stations associated with Suharto's family and cronies. The fall of the president Suharto in 1998 pulled down the business empires of his sons and daughters. People like Suharto's second son, Bambang Trihatmojo, and Sudono Salim (also known Liem Sioe Liong, a close Suharto crony) are no longer major owners at their respective televisions.

MNC Group. The group manages media subsidiaries under Bhakti Investama Group, another holding company, which have widely varied business units mainly in the financial service sector. This company group was established by Bambang Hary Tanoesoedibjo, better known as Hary Tanoe, who began gaining popularity in 2002 after he purchased 24.5% shares in PT. Bimantara Citra Tbk from Bambang Trihatmojo, Suharto's third child. In the same year, Bimantara Citra also took over a US\$ 15 million debt of a television station, TPI, controlled by Suharto's second child, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana or Tutut. The debt takeover allowed Bimantara to control 75% of TPI through a subsidiary PT Berkas Karya Bersama.⁵

Since 2002, Hary Tanoe has held a major share of Bimantara Citra and been its CEO. Bimantara Citra holds 100 per cent of PT Media Nusantara Citra (MNC), a holding company which manages media subsidiaries, including nationwide private television channels TPI, RCTI and Global TV, and the principal permits of three national cable television networks⁶ MNC also controls major print media and radio stations. In May 2007, Bhakti Investama increased its stake in Bimantara to 52.85%, and at the same time the name of the company was changed to PT. Global Mediacom Tbk, and become a sub holding of Bhakti Investama in the mass media including broadcasting sector.

Emtek Group. Since 2004, the two brothers, Fofa and Eddy Sariaatmadja, through their own holding company PT Elang Mahkota Teknologi (Emtek Group), purchased shares of PT Surya Citra Media (SCM), which controlled the nationwide private television station SCTV, from Henry Pribadi and Sudwikatmono (Suharto's cousin). However, Suharto's second daughter, Titik Suharto (through her joint share with Sariaatmadjaja's brothers) and Suharto's grandson, Dandy Rukmana, remain members of the SCTV shareholder board (Ida, 2011, p.14). In 2001, Emtek Group also acquired 85% shares at PT Indosiar Karya

⁵ Industry report by Goliath: Business Knowledge on Demand. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/page_about

⁶ The three networks are Indovision, Oke TV and Top TV.

Media Tbk, which controls a television station Indosiar, one of major national television channels in Indonesia.

Apart from the ten private television stations discussed above, which are based in the capital city and broadcast throughout the country, a number of private local TV stations have entered the market. Available data indicate that in 2008 there were 60 commercial television stations on local and national basis throughout the country. Currently, there are more than 1,000 print media (magazines, tabloids and newspapers), 2,000 radio stations, 115 television stations and a growing number of online news portals, most of them operating in the local level (Lutfia, 2010).

4.2 The Influence of Television Owners: Those who own or control a media outlet or corporation is frequently considered to hold a very powerful position, since their positions may enable them to control information and shape content. Media owners are often seen an intriguing factor in understanding the programming content, either entertainment or information. Studies showed that ownership, to a certain degree, has influence on how media workers produce content. As described earlier, this research will attempt to answer and describe the question: How do Indonesian media owners influence television workers in shaping content? The key question which has been raised during interview with selected television workers: “Can you give some cases based on your experience which illustrate how owners influence your work that eventually affect your television content?”

This section will reveal the rules of television owners in Indonesia, and examine their influence on workers and their content. As explained earlier, Indonesia right now has 10 private free-to-air TVs with across the nation scope controlled by the following five individuals:

- 1) Hary Tanoesoedibjo, through his holding company PT Media Nusantara Citra (MNC), owns and controls three private national TV stations RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV
- 2) The Bakrie family has interests in the Viva Group, which operates two televisions: TV One and ANTV.
- 3) Surya Paloh, through Media Group, controls MetroTV.
- 4) Chairul Tandjung, through his holding company CT Corp, owns two televisions: Trans TV and Trans7.
- 5) Fofa and Eddy Sariaatmadja, through his company PT Elang Mahkota Teknologi (Emtek), has two televisions: SCTV and Indosiar.

This part will cite, based on research findings, several examples of how Indonesian television owners influence television workers in shaping the content. Television workers interviewed during this study explained that the influence of media owners may take various forms, and one of them is in the form of negotiation or compromise made between owners and television workers.

According to Dandhy Dwi Laksono, a former senior producer at RCTI, the owner of his television station, Hary Tanoesoedibjo, once negotiated and compromised on news content with his television workers. Laksono said in a hearing at the Constitutional Court in 2011. The hearing was part of a judicial review of articles in the 2002 Broadcasting Law. During the court hearing, Laksono said Tanoesoedibjo once invited the station's editorial staffs to his office to discuss the news coverage of an aircraft accident of a privately-owned carrier, Adam Air (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).⁷

Hary Tanoesoedibjo is the president director of PT Media Nusantara Citra (MNC) which owns and controls three private national TV stations RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV. An aircraft of Boeing 737, operated by Adam Air, crashed into the sea of South Sulawesi on January 1, 2007 after departing from a Djuanda airport in Surabaya for Manado in North Sulawesi killing all 102 people on board (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

Along with the accident, Hary Tanoesoedibjo was considering to venture into the airline industry, and his another holding company PT Bhakti Investama was in talks to buy a stake in PT Adam Sky Connection Airlines which owns Adam Air. In March 2007, Hary Tanoesoedibjo purchased 50% shares of Adam Sky Connection through Bhakti Investama. Hary said he was planning to improve Adam Air which has been plagued by several accidents (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

According to Dandhy Dwi Laksono, during the meeting between MNC management and RCTI's editorial board, Hary Tanoesoedibjo said that the news programming of the station "must give an opportunity to the new management of Adam Air to make improvements with regard to its flight safety, and services to the passengers." (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011). Hary stressed it was not every day he used RCTI's screen for the sake of his business interests.

Laksono said, a negotiation took place between Hary and RCTI's news team about how the television should report the crash. Finally, the agreement reached, RCTI will report just the latest and official news about the crash, and only from the ministry of transportations, or The National Commission on Transportation Safety (KNKT) in the station's news programmings. In other words, in the case of Adam Air, RCTI was not allowed to develop stories taken from the non-governmental sources. The news content must be official driven stories, not customer or public driven news (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011)

However, this type of owner-worker negotiation on news content didn't last long when Hary Tanoesoedibjo and his brother Hartono Tanoesoedibjo in 2008 were implicated in a graft scandal at the Justice and Human Rights Ministry, popularly called Sisminbakum case. "The prior precedent of form of compromise (in Adam Air case) was proposed again in the Sisminbakum case, a year later, but it was rejected," Dandhy Dwi Laksono said (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

⁷ AJI stands for *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (Independent Journalists Alliance)

In another case involving former President Suharto and his family, Hary Tanoesoedibjo briefed RCTI's executive editors to delay a report about the legal case implicating the former authoritarian ruler. Dandhy Dwi Laksono gave other accounts of how the airing of his investigative reports on RCTI which had been prepared for two months should be adjourned for one year waiting for Hary Tanoesoedibjo to complete his business deal with Soeharto's family. Hary intended to purchase shares of Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI) from Siti Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana (known as Mbak Tutut), Soeharto's oldest daughter (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

Soeharto and his family (popularly known as a Cendana family because Soeharto lived on Cendana street in central Jakarta) aggregated colossal measures of riches amid his influence and constructed an incomprehensible rent-seeking network in the form of extensive number of philanthropic magnanimous establishments. There were no less than 40 establishments connected to Soeharto and his gang, with the largest three being the Dharmais, Dakab and Supersemar foundations. Jakarta's local court's rejected the administration's corruption argument against Soeharto in late September, 2000, announcing him therapeutically unfit to stand trial. However, after being suspended for several years, the public prosecutor demanded the continuation of legitimate procedures against the former leader after the doctors reporting Soeharto's health was improving (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

Amid media rising attention about Soeharto's legal case, Dandhy Dwi Laksono was preparing to produce a six-episode television report with a comprehensive perspective about how Soeharto's family accumulated wealth through his various foundations. In order to get a complete picture about the issue, Dwi Laksono and his news team visited Soeharto's foundations one by one, verifying documents, delineating fund transfers and cash flow, meeting with those who received financial aids including interview with scholarship recipients from the foundations. Unfortunately, when the report was completed, Dwi Laksono was told that the report cannot be aired immediately, and Dwi Laksono (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011) said:

When the report was ready to go on air, the executives of the editorial board requested that the airing of the program be delayed for a reason that the owner of MNC/RCTI was negotiating an acquisition deal of TPI's remaining shares with Cendana family. The airing of a serial report consisting of at least six episodes was worried to disturb the relationship and spoil the atmosphere of negotiation with Cendana family (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011)

Dwi Laksono also gave another account which implicated Hary Tanoesoedibjo who was reported involved in the issuance of Negotiable-Certificate-of-Deposit (NCD) worth over US\$28 million published by Unibank. The holder of the certificate, PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP), could not exchange the NCD for the amount of money it was worth. It turned out later that the certificates were faked. CMNP had bought the problematic certificate-of-deposit from Drosophila Enterprise through a brokerage service Bhakti

Investama owned by Hary Tanoesoedibjo. CMNP said if it turned out the certificates were fake, then the broker should have also played some bogus role (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

According to DWI Laksono, the national media were paying attention to the issue since it implicated a businessman and a media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo, and it was the reason why he and other members of RCTI's editorial board were instructed in 2012 to produce a special programming in the format of talk shows in a bid to clarify the issue. Hary Tanoesoedibjo himself showed up and spoke on the talk show along with other four invited speakers who mostly supported his stance on the issue. Dwi Laksono said, as a senior producer, he tried to suggest that RCTI used external host, a host from outside the station, in an attempt to keep the neutrality of its programming content, but his idea was rejected, and RCTI remained using its internal host. Dwi Laksono added that the imbalances and one-sided information presented in the talk show have pushed the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) to release a letter of reprimand to RCTI (AJI et al. v. Indonesia, 2011).

Adjat Wiratama, a News Producer at Global TV -another television station, which also owned by Hary Tanoesoedibjo- said that the television owner through his executives warned him with regard to news implicated Hary Tanoesoedibjo or his family. Adjat Wiratama said he was warned against not being careful in running a story about Rudijanto Tanoesoedibjo who were involved in a corruption case. Rudijanto Tanoesoedibjo is an older brother of Hary Tanoesoedibjo (Adjat Wiratama, personal communication, Juli 21, 2013). In March 2011, Media reported Rudijanto Tanoesoedibjo who was questioned by the anti-graft body Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as part of its examination concerning a corruption case focusing on asserted markups of a 2006 acquirement of health instrument for bird-flu patients. Rudijanto was the executive of PT Prasasti Mitra which collaborated with state-possessed PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia in securing the health equipment for relieving bird-flu flare-ups, which happened in Indonesia from 2005 to 2006.

Owners influence also persisted in other television stations owned by Bakrie family. The family controls diversified business companies including two national television stations, TV One and ANTV, and other media. The family was mentioned to have influenced their media content. In October 2009, the family's patron Aburizal Bakrie was elected the new chairman of the Golkar Party --currently the country's second largest political party-- replacing Jusuf Kalla after defeating his main rival Surya Paloh. On June 2012, the party's declared Aburizal Bakrie the single presidential hopeful from the party. However, his presidential candidate was marred by an accident made by one of the Bakrie's companies six years ago. Bakrie is affiliated with oil and gas company PT Lapindo Brantas, a company accused of being responsible for the worst mud flow disaster in Indonesia.

In 2006, an eruption of mud took place in Sidoarjo regency, East Java, in the area where a mining company owned by Bakrie family PT Lapindo Brantas was drilling a well for natural gas. The company contends that the gush of mud from the well was triggered by a distant earthquake in Central Java three days before although many geologists dismissed the explanation. The mud flow was unstoppable, and it has since flooded and swamped

many villages, factories and surrounding areas, displacing thousands of people. Bakrie family, and their company PT Lapindo Brantas, were seen as having been responsible for the disaster.

Reporters who work at both stations admitted that they were given special instructions with regard to the reports of mud flow. For instance, they must quote just authority Lapindo sources at each opportunity when reporting the mud stream, and had started to self-edit. They were told about how stories ought to be worded. Editors were to allude to the mud stream as the 'Sidoarjo mudflow', instead of the 'Lapindo mud spring of gushing lava', the term most normally utilized in other media. As indicated by sources who worked at both stations, journalists were agonized over their future livelihood in the event that they composed stories about the mud stream case in a negative tone as the same number of other media by and large did.

A police investigation on whether or not Lapindo Brantas should be responsible for the mud flow limped along for more than three years. The case was dropped not long after a government examination in August 2008 proclaimed that the mud stream was a natural catastrophe and Lapindo Brantas cannot be reprimanded for such mishap.

In another case, television workers at Metro TV said they were instructed to broadcast any events that involved their station owner, Surya Paloh, especially whenever the boss was giving a speech. Surya Paloh seemed to always enjoy the advantage of full coverage from his television. The news programming on Metro TV broadcasts any ceremonies in which Surya Paloh delivered a speech, much like a head of state. The lengthy coverage of his speech continued despite mounting criticism about the way he used his television for his personal interest.

Surya Paloh has been active in politics since the New Order era. He was head of the Advisory Council of the Golkar Party, one of the greatest political party in the country. Paloh left the Golkar Party not long after he was crushed by Aburizal Bakrie in the race for the party's leader in 2009. A political scientist, Aleksius Jemadu, commented: "He wanted so much to become the party's chairman, but was defeated by Aburizal Bakrie, who commanded far bigger financial resources," (Jemadu, 2013).

In 2010, shortly after he lost his bid for Golkar Party chairman, Paloh called a national movement by establishing a mass organization Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem) in order to answer the call to adjust the country's condition, and to answer the demand of the country's rebuilding. Paloh claimed that Nasdem was a civil association and it would not change into a political party. The development has quickly drawn positive reactions from the country's important figures.⁸ Nasdem's establishment on February 1 was advertised in several national newspapers and on Paloh's MetroTV station.

Pioneered by several Nasdem's members, the civil organization, then gave birth to a new political party, Nasdem Party, in 2011⁹. "When Surya Paloh came up with an idea that Indonesia needed a new political party to bring restoration in Indonesian politics, he was smart enough to create a public impression that he had no personal ambition behind the establishment of the National Democratic Party, or NasDem. Thus, he was satisfied enough to become the chief patron of the party. Instead of right away becoming the party chairman, Surya focused more on leading the expansion of Nasdem as a mass organization" Jemadu (2013) said.

Surya Paloh's move in Nasdem apparently attracted another media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo to the political party which invited the latter to become a member, and after a lengthy talks, Hary joined the newly established Nasdem Party with a position as chairman of the party's council of experts. Hary controls Media Nusantara Citra (MNC) Group whose business incorporate an assortment of media outlets, from daily papers, radio, TV, magazines, tabloids and the Internet.

The vicinity of Hary Tanoesoedibjo in Nasdem alongside media big shot Surya Paloh, the proprietor of Media Group, which runs Metro TV and Media Indonesia daily, enhances Nasdem's political influence. Just in a couple of months after its introduction to the world and still in the enlistment process, Nasdem turned into the main political gathering in Indonesia with the most grounded connections to media.

⁸ Those figures who are interested to become member including, to name a few, Governor and King of Yogyakarta Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, Golkar senior politician Siswono Yudohusodo, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) politician Budiman Sujatmiko, former Muhammadiyah chairman Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif, politician Khofifah Indar Parawansa, and Paramadina University rector Anies Baswedan.

⁹ The move was protested by Nasdem's renowned members including Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who pioneered other members to renounce their membership in the organization. Sultan said that he exited the association on the grounds that he felt baffled when Paloh and other Nasional Demokrat individuals set up Nasdem party, which used to be a shortened form for the mass association. Those who disappointed saw the civil organization Nasdem, whose objectives were noble, had been used as an instrument to give birth to a new political party controlled by those who have a strong political ambitions.

With his media power, much larger than Paloh's, Hary played a very significant role in helping Nasdem became the only new political party declared by the General Election Commission (KPU) eligible for the 2014 election.

According to Aleksius Jemadu (2013), it was quite clear from the very beginning that building up a civil organization was not Surya Paloh's ultimate goal. It was just a political strategy to justify the real motive behind the whole construction of his political ambitions. Now that the Nasdem Party has been declared eligible to participate in the 2014 polls, Paloh has to recalculate his position in order to pave the way for the next episode of his struggle for power. Paloh also feared that the newcomer Hary Tanoesoedibjo, whose financial resources were larger than him, would use his wealth to buy influence within the party. The first step he has to do is to make sure that he has a complete control over the party. The only way to make this happen is by replacing the party chairman, Patrice Rio Capella, with himself.

Surya Paloh's move to seize control of the party was rejected by some other members, including Hary Tanoesoedibjo who said that the majority of the party's members were young people, and he wanted young cadres to keep handling the party's management, not Paloh. Talks between the two media mogul ended fruitlessly prompting Hary to resign from the party in protest over Paloh's intention to take over the party's leadership. Following the power struggle in the party which led to the exit of its most valuable member, the party held a national congress in January 2013 which unanimously elected Paloh as the party's new chairman.

Television workers at Metro TV said Surya Paloh controlled program content, especially news, through his trusted men who held strategic positions at Metro's editorial board. After being briefed by Surya Paloh, Chief Editor or other senior members of the editorial board were used to rebrief news producers and their assistants with regard to the latest editorial policy which must be obeyed by all television workers involved in news production. The news producers were briefed during the daily meeting of news evaluation and planning. Senior members of editorial board delivered the instructions they got from Surya Paloh about his up-to-date instructions, about who or which issues should be developed, strengthened, or abandoned.

Mohammad Hafizni, a senior news producer at Metro TV, said Surya Paloh never spoke directly to television workers in giving his instructions with regard to news content. "Not directly" Hafizni said when he was asked whether or not media owners gave their opinions in determining news content. He further said (M. Hafizni, personal communication, July 20, 2013):

Surya Paloh never got down directly to the level of producers in order to make us realized about which news items must be broadcast or left out, but those leaders at the editorial board frequently briefed us about our policy, they gave us opinions about news selection. We discussed all those things during the meeting.

Meanwhile, after leaving the Nasdem Party following his internal rift with the party's patron Surya Paloh, Hary Tanoesoedibjo joined the People's Conscience Party (Hanura), a middle-scale party led by Wiranto, a retired Indonesian army General. Wiranto was the military commander when Soeharto decided to step down from power. He ran unsuccessfully for president and vice-presidency in the previous elections.

As Indonesian media reported, in July 2013, Hanura surprised people in general when the political party declared its official assignment of its chairman Wiranto and media big shot Hary Tanoesoedibyo as president and VP applicants for the up and coming 2014 presidential race. Wiranto said his bid with Hary is the representation to pluralism, since he was a Muslim and Javanese while Hary was ethnic Chinese and Christian. Hanura is the first political gathering to unhesitatingly pronounce its ticket for the 2014 elections ("Hanura declares", 2013).¹⁰ The announcement of their candidacies in Jakarta on July 2 was broadcast live across the country in breaking news on three national terrestrial televisions –RCTI, Global TV, and MNC TV- owned by Hary Tanoesoedibjo.

Television workers at Global TV responded calmly to the political maneuver by Hary Tanoesoedibjo. The workers were aware the consequence of Harry's political move that they have to shift their support to another political party, Hanura Party, from the previously Nasdem Party. They also understood completely that the owner will certainly use the media to meet his political goals, especially after the declaration.

A producer of news and talk show on Global TV, Adjat Wiratama, said he was aware the consequence of working in a medium whose owner showed blatantly his or her political ambitions (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 20, 2013). Wiratama said the television's leadership may turn down a report if it was against the television's policy especially if it involved Hary Tanoesoedibjo. Adjat Wiratama said he could not choose any topics nor the sources for his talk show program based on his free will since they must be verified to make sure that the program content wouldn't go against Hary Tanoesoedibjo's political goal. Wiratama said sources for talk show must be approved by the management. He was once reprimanded by the television executives when a source of his talk show program, spoke something which attacked the station's business group and the media owner. He further said (A. Wiratama, personal communication, July 20, 2013):

When I was holding a talk show program, the topics of dialogue must be adjusted with the groups' interest, or at least, the topics didn't attack the media owner. Some sources must be approved whether they can be invited or not to the show. I was once warned when the invited sources showed a different view with the media policy

¹⁰ In the 2009 general election, Hanura just got 3.8 percent of the vote, getting just 18 seats at the House of Representatives, while in the meantime race regulation obliged 20 percent of the vote in favor of a political party to have the capacity to name its own presidential hopeful.

Agate also said he was also obliged to pay attention to news that may offend top executives at other companies but still under the same holding company. Adjust cited an example, when Global TV was banned from broadcasting news about Panda Nababan, a senior politician and member of parliament, who was inflicted in a corruption case. The news was banned because Panda Nababan was a father of RCTI's chief editor, Putra Nababan. RCTI was a sister company of Global TV. The corruption case drew media attention in mid-2012 since it involved many politicians from several political parties.

Meanwhile, television workers at two private stations, Trans TV and Trans 7, owned by business tycoon Chairul Tandjung, said that the owner involved directly in the programming content, either entertainment or news. They said Chairul Tandjung used to come to programming, planning and evaluation meeting at the television stations attended by television workers such as: producers, executive producers, managers, and other staffs involved. In the meeting, Chairul Tandjung himself led the discussing sessions with his television workers. He evaluated the performance of the ongoing program and giving suggestions about what should be done to improve the content, especially if a program in the downturn in term of rating vis-à-vis competitors of similar program. Compared to other television owners, Chairul Tandjung was the most involved in the day-to-day works in preparing programming content.

Mardatillah, an executive producer at Trans 7, reported that Chairul Tandjung was a real television businessman whose mission was to take commercial advantages from every programming his television stations broadcast (Mardatillah, personal communication, July 21, 2013). In an effort to accomplish this commercial goal, Tandjung was building up an intensive communication with his television workers, from his top executives all the way down to producer's level. They were invited to a weekly meeting with him to talk about how to improve programming content. Unlike other large television owners who tend to be reluctant to talk with their lower rank staffs, Chairul Tandjung would rather discuss television content directly with program producers than other staffs who are more senior or close to him in term of job hierarchy. Mardatillah said in an interview (Mardatillah, personal communication, July 21, 2013):

As a media owner or a leader, he always gave his insight [into programming] through the weekly meeting, he even gave instructions which are mandatory, or an order about the direction of a programming, or where does the programming concept should go.

Zudarlis Elfira, an Executive Producer at Trans TV, who supervised celebrity news programs (infotainment show) used to report the latest celebrity gossips in the entertainment industry said that Chairul Tandjung were concerned about infotainment programs on televisions which tended to sensationalize celebrities' personal life. Tandjung advised Elfira against sensationalizing and started to instill educational values instead into the infotainment programs. Elfira said (Z. Elfira, personal communication, July 23, 2013):

He gave his opinions and directions for the program [infotainment] under my supervision; [he said] a television program must educate and entertain their viewers.

Mardatillah gave an example; it is Chairul Tandjung who suggested that Trans 7 should maintain its popular talk show *Hitam Putih* (Black and White) in prime time when most viewers flocked in front of their television set. Tandjung said the programming was unique and it was not necessary for Trans TV and Trans 7 to broadcast *Sinetron* -an Indonesian popular term for television drama- during prime time just to emulate its key competitors. *Hitam Putih* featured a host Deddy Corbuzier, a master illusionist, who played up the mysterious and somewhat arrogant side of his stage persona with his distinctive bald head, arched eyebrows, and all-black clothing. Deddy has always played up the mysterious and somewhat arrogant side of his stage persona. As it turns out, he has proven a smart and intelligent interviewer on an interesting talk show (Emond, 2013).

Haryo Wicaksono, a producer of a talk show program at Trans TV, said Chairul Tandjung involved in the birth of *Dokter Oz*, a program that he produced. The program discussed about the health imitating similar program in America (H. Wicaksono, personal communication, July 19, 2013). He said Tandjung contributed his idea into the program content, especially in the process of preparing a new program. For example, in selecting a host for the program, Tandjung suggested some names he considered appropriate to guide the show. Wicaksono said when a program had been produced and went on air, Chairul Tandjung used to follow its performance development in term of ratings or shares, and he used to advise the producer about how to improve the program performance in an effort to boost its ratings. He said (H. Wicaksono, personal communication, July 19, 2013):

Yes, we used to have a weekly or monthly meeting, when a program share declined we were told to lift up the share. The media owner gave us instructions about how content should be. For example, in selecting a host program, and at the beginning of preparing a program.

Mardatillah said Chairul Tandjung sometimes reprimanded his television workers to maintain decency in their program content, especially those which received many criticisms from the public. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) frequently reprimanded Tandjung's television stations, especially Trans TV, for airing indecent programs which included intruding into people's privacy, promoting excessive sexuality, giving details on how to mix illegal drugs, and other improper content. KPI revealed that Trans TV in 2012 topped the list of television stations breaching broadcasting norms and regulations ("Commission reprimands", 2012). However, despite mounting criticism from the public, Chairul Tandjung were rarely scrapped a program from the list just because of its indecent content. The program would still be maintained with some corrections as long as it was still commercially viable.

Mardatillah added that Chairul Tandjung once instructed his television workers not to use a rock star and popular musician, Ahmad Dhani, in every program on Trans TV or

Trans 7 after the musician seemed to have accused him of having an affair with his wife. “There was a celebrity who was rumored that she had an affair with him, and then the celebrity and her family was banned from Trans Corp,” Mardatillah said. Ahamd Dhani and his wife, a singer-song writer, Maia Estianty divorced in 2008. They have three children who became members of a children band. Rumor has it that Maia had an affair with Chairul Tandjung following a statement made by the outspoken Ahamd Dhani, who said that one of high rank officials at Trans TV had an intimate communication through *short message service* with his wife.

Television workers at SCTV and Indosiar owned by Fofa and Eddy Sariaatmadja said during interview that the media owner through his management staffs sometimes stepped into the program content by suggesting news people about events that need to be covered but very rarely with regard to political occurrence. They said owners occasionally demanded news team to cover activities pertaining to their business just for the sake of publicity.

Fasmi Berry, a News Producer at Indosiar, said the station’s owners placed their personnel in the television company’s board of directors, and they also even placed personnel in the television news department (F. Berry, personal communication, July 23, 2013). However, the involvement of owners in the program content was still minimal since they only asked to cover something considered trivial. Fasmi Berry said he was once asked to make coverage about Indosiar’s public and community development services of relocating street vendors who sold mainly nourishment in their food stalls along the street which became the entrance to the television station.

Indosiar management felt the growing number of food stalls along the street sidelines had disturbed the traffic into the television station, especially when materials for production must be carried into the station compound. However, the management needed the street vendors since most their employees were their consumers. Fasmi Berry said (F. Berry, personal communication, July 23, 2013):

They (the management) contributed ideas [into the program], and one of them is street vendors development in Indosiar. They used to insert [the story] as one of program content in Fokus, [the story] is about relocating street vendors at Damai Street, Daan Mogot, West Jakarta to another location which was more comfortable and hygienic, the event was expected to become sustainable in order to create a nice urban development as well as establishing the media’s positive image in the public eye.

The Sariaatmadja family through their company Elang Mahkota is not the only conglomerate in the country that manages more than one television station. By 2013 the majority of television owners discussed earlier controlled at least two private stations with nationwide coverage. Except for Surya Paloh who had only one television, Hary Tanoesoedibjo owned the most with three televisions while Chairul Tandjung, Bakrie, and Sariaatmadja families have respectively two televisions. There are about 300 private local

stations spreading across Indonesia by 2013. Around 200 of them are managed by Jakarta-based television stations, which are controlled by these five conglomerates (Sipahutar, 2013).

A media analyst who was former Deputy Chief Editor at RCTI, Atmadji Sumarkidjo, said in an interview that businessmen who owned television could be classified into three categories based on their business background (Atmadji Sumarkidjo, personal communication, July 12, 2013). The background of the owner, in a certain degree, might play a role in influencing how television workers shaped their program content. The first category is a businessman who came into television with a previous background in the media industry. This type of businessmen put media service as their main focus and they have companies involved in various media businesses. Hary Tanoesoedibjo was one good example of this category with his business included newspaper, radio, Internet provider, cable TV, and network TV (Atmadji Sumarkidjo, personal communication, July 12, 2013)

The second category is television owners whose background in various industries but not media. Chairul Tandjung could be placed into this category. Before coming into the television business and became a conglomerate, Chairul Tandjung was a moderate businessman who had business in various fields including banking, retailer and food industry. Sariaatmadja family had experience in the plantation business for quite a long time, while they also had a computer-related-company, before they made stock purchase which allowed them to jump into the television industry by owning SCTV and Indosiar. The business shift was made possible after they sold their ownership in the plantation company (Atmadji Sumarkidjo, personal communication, July 12, 2013).

The third category is television owners who jumped into the television business driven mainly by political motives. According to Atmadji Sumarkidjo, this type of businessmen intentionally placed themselves in the television industry by owning television stations since they could use them as an instrument to achieve their political goal and aspirations (Atmadji Sumarkidjo, personal communication, July 12, 2013). Surya Paloh was the best example for this category as he used his media, newspaper and television, to funnel his political idea, and later to promote his new political party. Bakrie family was another good example in this category as they used their two televisions to consistently support their patron, Aburizal Bakrie, in every political maneuver he made as a chairman of Golkar Party -the country's second largest political party- and the party's candidate in the presidential election in 2014 (Atmadji Sumarkidjo, personal communication, July 12, 2013).

Atmadji Sumarkidjo added that owners usually also acted as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who involved in day-to-day television operations. The reason for this high involvement was because television industry was a high-cost business and the owner would do everything to reduce costs and shorten turnaround times. An owner-cum-CEO was certainly granted a full access to control program content as he or she could intervene easily into programming. Atmadji Sumarkidjo said his observations indicated that owner intervention in program content was varied from one television to another. However, he

concluded that the intervention was very dominant at televisions whose owners were also politicians like Metro TV and TV One. He said the intervention was obvious, especially because the televisions were a 24-hour news televisions.

5. Conclusion: Television owners control, directly or indirectly, television workers in shaping the program content. The indirect control was made through senior executives who hold strategic positions in the programming department and especially in the media editorial board. The owners brief their editorial executives about any rule they wish to impose. The executives then talk to reporters and other television workers about the owners' will which must be obeyed by those who involved in news production. Reporters were advised about how stories should be worded. Owners-cum-politician enjoy the advantage of full coverage of their media. Television workers were instructed to broadcast any events that involved the owners. Owners sometimes involved directly in shaping content, especially entertainment program. The owners used to come to a programming meeting where they lead and direct television workers. Owners evaluated the performance of the ongoing program and giving suggestions about what should be done to sustain the program success.

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