Defence Strategic Communications

20

Authors: David Loyn

NA

32

Authors: David Betz, Vaughan Phillips

Strategic communications has vaulted to the top of the agenda for governments in the West in the vain hope that it might solve a seemingly intractable conflict with jihadist groups, an adversary whose ideology seems to be an essential part of its life-force. However, these governments have failed to grasp why these groups are more adept at using stories to animate their adherents toward the achievement of strategic ends. Unlike Western governments, jihadists use communication to support their use of force. They treat strategic communications as an intrinsic element of war. Consequently, the internal coherence of their messages is greater and more persuasive. Moreover, their propaganda cadres are also nimbler; while they form a loose, decentralised network, they act in accordance with mission command principles, galvanised by a clear sense of the commander’s intent and a higher tolerance for risk. Indeed, the West’s failed use of strategic communications reveals a startling ignorance of several of Carl Von Clausewitz’s principles and arguments, not least the importance of understanding the kind of war upon which one embarks.

34

Authors: Chiyuki Aoi

Despite rising tensions in East Asia, the Japanese government has not adopted a comprehensive policy, doctrine, or institution for strategic communication (StratCom) to date. The lack of a formal StratCom concept or framework, however, does not mean that Japan is not engaged in strategic communication. The review provided in this article reveals the heavy reliance of the government on the machineries of public diplomacy to communicate its policy and intent, through which it wishes to integrate its messages. Moreover, Japan is an avid practitioner of ‘messaging via deeds’, an aspect hitherto not understood as a Japanese StratCom practice. Japan’s de facto practice of strategic communication reflects the fundamentally political nature of strategic communication, building as it must upon the particular political and historical landscape of the nation, in which the rise of China is a central factor. The analysis outlines the key challenges for Japanese StratCom practice, namely, the danger of miscalculations occurring as a result of uncoordinated messaging, especially via deeds; the ‘say-do gap’ as the government struggles to fulfil some of its aspirations under the rubric of ‘proactive contribution to peace’, and the difficulty of sending coherent messages and avoiding unintended messaging.

38

Authors: Pablo de Orellana

How did North African states depict their nomadic minorities to the US during the War on Terror in the 2000s? How did this shape American policy in the region? Focusing on Malian-American diplomacy and drawing on post-structuralist analytics of identity-formation, this paper first examines how Malian diplomacy represented nomadic minorities in communication with US diplomatic and military envoys during the period 2002–2010. It is found that Mali consistently branded Saharan nomads as lawless subjects that make territory ungovernable, compromise security, and facilitate terrorism. Second, this paper deploys intertextual analysis to measure the success of these strategic communications efforts. It is found that, despite the advice of some American diplomats on the ground, by the end of 2008 Mali’s depiction of Saharan nomadism had been absorbed into US diplomacy. This subsumed Northern Malian subjects into the categories of the War on Terror, which privileged military control of subjects and territory over development and reconciliation efforts. This policy shift granted Mali influence over US policy and diplomatic support to ignore nomadic grievances. Analysis reveals the key role of identity-making and name-calling in Mali-US relations and in diplomatic communication more broadly, showcasing the potential of textual analysis methods to evaluate strategic communications outcomes.