Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

21-34

Authors: Masumi Nagasaka

In New phenomenology in France, László Tengelyi invites us to think about the transformed relationship between the notions of possibility and reality in the contemporary French phenomenology. To justify his thesis, he proposes to examine Marc Richir’s criticism of «transcendental Ideals» in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology. In considering, next to Tengelyi, Richir’s revisit of phenomenology as an extension of the Kantian criticism of ontotheological metaphysics, the present study aims to develop three main ideas. First, it scrutinizes Kantian criticism of the ontological argument in Critique of Pure Reason. The ontological argument considers transcendental Ideal as a reality, with there being confusion between an object of pure thinking and one of knowledge. Second, this study aims to clarify the way in which Richir also applies Kantian criticism to Husserl’s transcendental eidetics as well as to Heidegger’s existential analytic, in Experience of Thinking – Phenomenology, Philosophy, Mythology and Phantasia, Imagination, Affecitivity. On the one hand, by analyzing Husserlian manuscripts on transcendental intersubjectivity, Richir uncovers a disguised form of the transcendental Ideal, incorporated in the notion of form of essence or «Eidos» of the existing I; this notion is presupposed as a condition of passage from the possibility to the reality of the Other. On the other hand, Richir discovers in the Heideggerian description of «anticipation of death» in Being and Time, a dissimulated concept of the transcendental Ideal that takes a form of the Dasein’s «ownmost» [eigenst] factual possibility. Ultimately, the main purpose of the current study is to show that contemporary French phenomenology intends to transcendental Ideal, which is considered a reality that presupposes the total sum of possibilities. Key words Marc Richir, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, ontological argument, transcendental Ideal, anticipation of death, transcendental intersubjectivity, ontotheological metaphysics.

55-70

Authors: Annabelle Dufourcq

This article exposes a tension within Sartre's Philosophy and his concept of praxis in relation with the role to be played by the flesh and the dimension of passivity. Our guideline will be the theory of passive activity that Sartre develops in The Family Idiot. We will wonder how action may emerge at the heart of a flesh that is inseparable from a familial and social milieu whose power of conditioning is so profound that Sartre calls it a destiny. Is the specific form taken by praxis in Flaubert's existence – namely a passive activity – to be regarded as a weakened form of praxis? Should we contrast passive activity and sheer praxis? Secondary and primary praxis? Parasitism and revolt? We will first show in this article, by studying Sartre's analyses regarding the flesh in Being and Nothingness and in The Family Idiot, that the capacity for action cannot be reduced to a metaphysical nothingness: the temporal ek-stasis that defines every existent becomes a capacity for praxis only from within the flesh, a flesh that is still prior to the separation between the mother and the child. According to Sartre, a process of polarization and attunement, the institution of rhythms and dynamisms then give birth to a subject capable either of outright praxis or, as in Flaubert's case, only of passive praxis. The discovery of an essential link between praxis and fleshly dynamism will lead us, secondly, to question the role that passivity may always play in activity and to reappraise passive activity. In this regard Sartre's reflections develop along two different directions and pose a problem. On the one hand, Sartre makes clearly known his disagreement with Flaubert's thesis that praxis is impossible and revolt useless. On the other hand, he demonstrates that Flaubert invented a passive activity that possesses a genuine power of subversion. We will contend that the tendency to apprehend passive and active activities in terms of dualism and hierarchy is to be overcome. There must be an essential continuity between them, to such an extent that passive activity is the key for all revolution. Key words Existentialism, ethics, politics, flesh, activity, passivity, praxis, revolution, Flaubert, Sartre.

81-98

Authors: Guillermo Ferrer

This paper aims to research the different views of Leibniz, Kant and Husserl concerning the immortality of the «I». For this purpose I will read the Monadology from a phenomenological perspective, but taking into account Kants exposition of the Paralogismes in the Critic of Pure Reason. There he points out the illusion which consists in taking the identical, but finally empty representation of the «I» for the givenness of his real substantiality, even his possible persistency after death. Because of this appearance which arises again and again from our very self-awareness we trend to assert that the «I» could persist indefinitely, besides that he couldn’t be annihilated at all due to internal causes or to an antagonism with circumstances of the external world. But in spite of the force of this critic, we can find in Leibniz‘ Monadology and somehow in Husserls‘ writings drafts of another conception of the self- awareness which includes the experience on an organical continuity of the body. In the face of Kants‘ critic, this conception could perhaps raise new phenomenological questions about the relationship of self-awareness, mortality and even immortality of the «I». Thereby I want to show to what extent the question about the giveness or not-giveness of a certain infinity contribute to renew the meaning of a phenomenology of the death and the experience of mortality. Key words Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, monad, self-awareness, infinity, immortality.

114-117

Authors: Andrei Patkul

The paper is the first translation of one of the major articles by Oskar Becker into Russian. The article contains the basic points of his philosophy in the tabloid form. The brief scientific commentary accompanies the publication of this translation. Becker believes that one cannot to limit metaphysics only by ontology. It also has to include paraontology. He treats paraontology as the doctrine of essence and the eternal stay of the things. In accordance with the philosopher, the principle of paraontology is so called paraontological indifference (opposed to the Heidegger's ontological difference), i.e. the equality of essence and existence. Basing on this principle, Becker states that a human being exists not only as an existence but also as a paraexistence. Both unconscious (prehistoric) and superconsciuos (superhistoric) belong to the paraexistential dimension of a human being in Becker's opinion. In this context, he provides a detailed analysis of the difference between the historic and extrahistoric types of the being in terms of phenomenology. It is possible to characterize the extrahistoric dimension by the terms beginning, repetition, rhythm, order and seamlessness and so on. Becker declares his understanding of the concrete relationship between view of paraexistence and M. Heidegger's existential analytics. He believes that it is impossible to describe the paraexistential dimension of a human being as reductive privation of ontology of Dasein, as Heidegger did. Becker also attacks Heidegger's view that the nature is only extreme case of the being of the entities in the world in its Heideggerian sense. Nature is cosmos but not a result of «de-worlding» of the world. Thus, Becker retrieves the notions of birth and polis opposing them to Heidegger's notion of death. He also introduces the term paratranscendence (the «other-nothingness») which he treats as the whole universe. Becker tries to rehabilitate the paraontological significance of the eidetic dimension, where essence and existence are the same. The author of the brief scientific commentary to the translation emphasizes the basic theoretical points of Becker's article as well as discusses translation variants of Becker's terms Dasein, Dawesen and Getragenheit given by the article's translator, comparing them to the former versions of their translations into Russian. Key words Dasein, Dawesen, paraexistence, existence, paraontology, paraontological indifference, the unconscious, the superconscious, cosmos, essence, actual being.

140-143

Authors: Anna Khakhalova

The research is concentrated on the translation of the chapter of E. Spinelli's book «The Interpreted World». The issues discussed here interest contemporary researchers and need to be studied profoundly: what is essential in studying human being today in comparison with the classical view of humanities and existential philosophical is absolutely foreign in the view of natural science; which approaches in contemporary psychotherapy can satisfy the most important principles of humanitarian inquiry; whether they assimilate the very idea of phenomenological-existential method in its variations and its language of description etc. properly. The author starts with an observation on differences between scientific approach and phenomenological one. It is the latter which could be more appropriate for psychologists, due to its concentrating on uniqueness, singularity and changing nature of human reality. This paper studies such criteria as trustworthiness, credibility, personal experience in the works of many contemporary researchers. What is more, phenomenological method reconsiders the notions of objectivity and ausality, demonstrating another orientation for researcher. Namely, one of its significant achievements consist in assurance of fundamentally inter-relational (inter-subjective), or dialogical character of psychic reality, which is the corner stone of therapeutic practice. Another important principle of phenomenologically-oriented study suggests the accomplishment of unbiased vision, which approximates us to the very nature of the phenomenon of the other's reality. Addressing several experimental studies, Spinelli demonstrates the benefits of phenomenological technology, its fitness and adequacy in psychotherapeutic practice. Key words Inter-relationality, co-constitutionality, meaning, co-researcher, bracketing, final statement, psychotherapeutic experience.

159-161

Authors: Elena Zolotuhina-Abolina

In Introduction M. Dufrenne describes the specificity of his approach to the aesthetic experience and sets the objectives of the work. Following phenomenological tradition, he realizes an eidetic analysis of aesthetic experience. He considers it as an experience of a spectator, not as that of an artist. Its main object is a work of art. So Dufrenne wants to break the vicious circle of mutual definition of object and experience, but he does not manage to. He thinks that the work of art is not defined by aesthetic experience, it provokes this experience. According to Dufrenne, a work of art has a common noema with an aesthetic object, but their noeses are different. It can be perceived as an object without aesthetic qualities. At the same time the work of art, when perceived skillfully and rightly, is an aesthetic object. Aesthetic quality can be realized only by adequate aesthetic perception. Phenomenology becomes deontology. So object and experience are mutually defined. To describe pure aesthetic experience of the spectator M.Dufrenne proposes to look at prominent, universally recognized works of art. And he poses the question: what is the authentic criterion that makes them prominent? The author thinks that it cannot be a subjective judgement of taste because it leads either to underestimation of some works, to placing them beyond the sphere of “the beautiful” or to levelling of aesthetically valuable works and fakes. According to Dufrenne, the aesthetical object cannot be measured outwards. It gives a measure itself and becomes imperfect when it cannot be that to what it strives for. Aesthetic object isn't only self-legislative, it gives a norm to its creator. Anyway, M.Dufrenne says, for being a chef-d'oeuvre a work of art must have a full sensual being and sense. It is possible when the artist is himself authentic. The goal of spectator's aesthetic perception is to constituently open the object. Key words Aesthetic experience, aesthetic object, experience of spectator, work of art, noema, noesis, subjectivismus, judgement of taste, authentic work.

177-185

Authors: D. Fedchuk

The response gives answers to some questions and objections which were formulated by A. Patkul in his review. Among them it is possible to point out following: 1) the meaning of understanding and thinking by Heidegger; 2) the differences between these two modes of existence in the context of traditional idealism; 3) the meaning of logos as of something that expicates the sense of being; 4) the connection between being and time and the explanation of the structure of temporality; 5) whether the philosophy of Heidegger deals with the univocal sense of being. The article also tries to explain that the essence of time roots in the mode of «present». Praesence unites all ecstasies of temporality and constitutes present in its fullness. In the view of ontology, now funds the modes of the past and of the future. This thesis is justified in the Heidegger’s article «Was heißtDenken?» where he shows that unveiling and present belong each other and constitute the essence of time. Key words Essence, existence, distinction in being, ontological difference, temporality, Dasein, Duns Scotus, Martin Heidegger.

192-200

Authors: G. Mažeikis

The article is devoted to the problem of identification of philosophy, which was discussed at the international conference in Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University. Contemporary philosophy exists along with rapid development of consumer society, new forms of communication, publicity, and interprets itself as based on cumulative historical experience and live memory connected with Perestroika, disappearance of censorship and attempts to develop a democratic society. The review emphasizes the topics devoted to the main metaphor of the conference, namely, the experience which matured in the room of kitchen–smoking-corner–public space and impliied critical response, a political, and playfulness of the philosopher. Key words Sociality, publicity, Sophrosyne, responsibility, paradox, trickstering, development, Critical Theory.

210-210

Authors: NN

ANNOUNCE

212-213

Authors: NN

ANNOUNCE