Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

495-512

Authors: JEFF MITSCHERLING

After briefly remarking on previous treatments of empathy in the philosophical and psychological literature, I outline Stein’s treatment of this concept in On the Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, illustrating the problematic breadth of her application of the term ‘empathy,’ a breadth that Stein herself calls to our attention. After a brief discussion of Stein’s treatment of empathy and the experience of value, I turn to certain features of Roman Ingarden’s analyses of aesthetic experience found in The Literary Work of Art and The Cognition of the Work of Art that deal with what he refers to as the reader’s ‘emotional coexperience’ of situations and events represented in the work of art. I conclude by comparing Stein’s account of empathy with Ingarden’s account of aesthetic experience, both of which deal at length with the subjective activities of “feeling with” and emotional coexperience.

532-551

Authors: MAREK PIWOWARCZYK

In this paper I present the Ingardenian distinction between inseparability and dependence. My considerations are both historical and systematic. The historical part of the paper accomplishes two goals. First, I show that in the Brentanian tradition the problem of existential (or broadly: ontological) conditioning was entangled into parts—whole theories. The best examples of such an approach are Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of the object and Edmund Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes. Second, I exhibit the context within which Ingarden distinguished inseparability and dependence. Moreover, Ingarden’s motivations are presented: the problem of understanding the Husserlian concept of “immanent transcendence,” the issue of the existence of purely intentional objects, and finally the problem of the relationship between individual objects and ideas. The systematic part deals with the ambiguity of Ingarden’s definition of inseparability. I seek to improve this definition by reference to the distinction(made by Ingarden himself) between absolute and summative wholes. I also present some divisions of inseparability and dependence and investigate whether these types of existential conditioning are reflexive, symmetric, or transitive.

579-600

Authors: SIMONA BERTOLINI

As is well known, Roman Ingarden and Edith Stein had a deep intellectual relationship and friendship, which began during their stay in Göttingen and Freiburg. The time spent together during this period and the correspondence that they maintained over the following years allowed them to be in close contact with their respective philosophies and to influence each other. This article aims at illustrating the affinities between Ingarden’s description of soul in § 78 of Controversy over the Existence of the World and the analysis of soul and psyche developed by Stein between 1916 and 1922. Furthermore, it aims at presenting the hypothesis that this analysis influenced the formal anthropology elaborated by the Polish philosopher many years later. Both the depiction of the soul as a personal nucleus tha manifests itself in human lived experiences and the description of this manifestation through the notion of “force” are theoretical elements that are essential in Ingarden’s mature ontology of man and that already played a crucial role in Stein’s early writings. Both thinkers, within several years of one another, elaborated an anthropological view that does not have the life of consciousness as a primary guideline, but that brings to light the ontological relevance of the unitary psychic source of human dispositions, of human character, and of consciousness itself.

619-639

Authors: BARTOLOMIEJ SKOWRON

From an ontological point of view, virtuality is generally considered a simulation: i.e. not a case of true being, and never more than an illusory copy, referring in each instance to its real original. It is treated as something imagined — and, phenomenologically speaking, as an intentional object. It is also often characterized as fictive. On the other hand, the virtual world itself is extremely rich, and thanks to new technologies is growing with unbelievable speed, so that it now influences the real world in quite unexpected ways. Thus, it is also sometimes considered real. In this paper, against those who would regard virtuality as fictional or as real, I claim that the virtual world straddles the boundary between these two ways of existence: that it becomes real. I appeal to Roman Ingarden’s existential ontology to show that virtual objects become existentially autonomous, and so can be attributed a form of actuality and causal efficaciousness. I conclude that the existential autonomy and actuality of virtual objects makes them count as real objects, but also means that they undergo a change in their mode of existence.

662-682

Authors: ANASTASIA MEDOVA, ANNA KIRICHENKO

Phenomenology of music has been a perspective trend of phenomenological aesthetics for more than a hundred years. The topic of the paper is fixation the main problems and vectors of development of phenomenology of music. The authors execute an analysis of Roman Ingarden’s position in the discussions concerning the methodological and ontological problems of phenomenology of music. The paper aims at revealing succession in Roman Ingarden’s solutions to the phenomenology of music problems. The other aim is reflection on the originality of Ingarden’s ideas in the context of phenomenological interpretations of music in 20th and 21st centuries. The solution to these tasks allows the authors to fix key problems and identify the principal positions of phenomenology of music. The main sources of the comparative and historical analysis are the studies carried out by Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Clifton, and Ihde. The most important ontological problems of phenomenology of music are: spatiotemporal constitution of music, reduction of a work of music to its performance, and ontological status of a work of music. The analysis of Ingarden’s position on these problems allows us to characterize it as something different from the existing versions. According to the conception, the time of music is a special type of time, that is, quasi-time. A piece of music is a purely intentional, heteronomous, and intersubjective object. There are a number of methodological specificities of Ingarden’s approach: a refusal of reduction of musical theoretical data, a tendency for independence of a piece of music from conscious and mental processes, and an interpretation of a piece of music as a non-sounding phenomenon. In conclusion, the authors demonstrate how the originality and radical nature of Ingarden’s conclusions made his position defenseless against critique and simultaneously marked the tendency in the contemporary phenomenological studies of music.

703-728

Authors: HEATH WILLIAMS

Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetics is characterised primarily as a realist ontological approach which is secondarily concerned with acts of consciousness. This approach leads to a stark contrast between spatiotemporal objects and literary objects. Ontologically, the former is autonomous, totally determined, and in possession of infinite attributes, whilst the latter is a heteronomous intentional object that has only limited determinations and infinitely many “spots of indeterminacy.” Although spots of indeterminacy are often discussed, the role they play in contrasting the real and literary object is not often disputed. Through a close reading of Ingarden’s ontological works and texts on aesthetics, this essay contests the purity of Ingarden’s ontological approach and the ensuing disparity between real and literary object, particularly on the question of spots of indeterminacy. I do this by demonstrating the following five theses: 1) Ingarden’s claim that the real object has an infinitude of properties belies an epistemology, and we should instead conclude that ontologically the real object’s properties are finite. 2) Ingarden’s a priori argument that absent properties of real objects are ontologically determined is unsound. 3) The radical difference between the infinitude and finitude of givenness and absence of the real and the literary object ought to be relativised. 4) Indeterminacies within the novel are concretised in much the same way that absent properties of real objects are intended. 5) Literature makes claims that have a truth value that we can attribute to their author.

749-759

Authors: DENIS MIKHAYLOV

This paper is a presentation of Russian translation of the article « La Défenestration » (1971) by Marc Richir. In this paper we depict the philosophical context in which the article was written and define its place in the totality of Richir’s works. Our main goal is to help the reader to understand the features of Richir’s complex thought and to give explicit definition to the term “defenestration.” The defenestration, understood as a philosophical concept, is a process of reconsideration of major phenomenological presuppositions. Thus, we distinguish three main steps of defenestration basing on Richir’s critique of previous phenomenologists: 1) the abolition of the transcendental ego as a structure external to “the world”; 2) the rejection of the universe of beings as the one and only universe people inhabit (moreover, such a universe of beings should not be anymore considered as homogenous space of representation); 3) rethinking the phenomenalisation on the basis of “nothing” (rien) as a primary universe and, therefore, overcoming the classical dualism of the sensible and the intelligible. We conclude that by analyzing systems of previous philosophers through the concept of defenestration Richir in this early work determines the direction of his future philosophical research.