

## **An Adequate Conception of the Human Good, a Preface to Alisdair MacIntyre**

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### **Abstract**

*Some think that Virtue ethics by A. MacIntyre was the only solution to the moral vacuum in society. Responsibility as an essential. And what is a virtue? To know and understand the modern development of virtue ethics by Alisdair MacIntyre, learning objective the best way to fill the moral vacuum is to chart our moral virtues. We believe the same thing. Alisdair Chalmers MacIntyre (born 1929) is a Scottish philosopher primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy. He is an extremely influential Catholic philosopher. The thinker directed toward metaphysics, because modern ethical study has lost its way. Since the enlightenment ethics has been dominated by normative theories. The thinker moreover, he understands that there is no past to which we might return. The philosophical task of Alisdair MacIntyre is to account both for the dysfunctional quality of moral discourse within modern society and rehabilitate what he takes to be a forgotten alternative in the teleological rationality of Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre's thought is revolutionary as it articulates a politics of self-defence for local communities that aspire to protect their practices and sustain their way of life from corrosive effects of the capitalist economy. The theory of virtue in this respect is open to God. Theory of virtue, being a person with a certain quality of character. As, however, the civilizational progress, higher and higher forms of self-love guide our morality. Civilized man does not act so wickedly, above all that he too much self respect has. Though his respect for himself also produces the appropriate attitude to morality. Virtue ethics refers primarily to the nature of the person. Here I have to be honest, happy, I know how to behave. Due to this process we need to understand each other, we need to practice. We need to reach a certain capacity. Thus need more rules. I gained knowledge of certain principles, it owned a habitual. Whereas the defense of morality the "ethics of dilemma" approach to morality forgets an essential part of ethics - the Person's character and how personal moral growth is encouraged, A. MacIntyre noticed. Saint Thomas but gave bad person narration, which is different from the narrative people by MacIntyre. In the midst of human feelings and common disputes, we are looking for the ultimate truth. A natural morality is forged by people over time through trial and error. For MacIntyre, the practices necessary for training in practical reason through which we acquire the ability to act intelligibly requires the systematic growth of human potential by acquired excellence that cannot help but challenge the character of modern moral practice and theory. We must learn to respond to the feelings that accompany all of us, and are formed preferably in small communities. MacIntyre has sought to help us repair our lives by locating those forms of life that make possible moral excellence. Alisdair MacIntyre convincingly proves that rationality and ethics are inseparable; that it is impossible for the unjust person to think rationally, or for the irrational person to be just. According to MacIntyre's moral language expresses no*

*feeling, but the attitude. We need to find the means to realize the virtues, shape different attitudes and dispositions. Virtue ethics is different from the ethics act. The act is like at the beginning of the great task of shaping a complete man. You have to open up to life, which is good! Make your best. Today, the state of well-being is sought, it is therefore necessary to achieve appropriate social institutions. Virtues as understood by MacIntyre, as some features acquired; as a response to the need for historical descent into the depths of human feelings, they remain inevitable, tighter say, unavoidable for the growth of the human family. This is contemporary virtue ethics Alisdair MacIntyre.*

**Keywords:** *internal, external, narrative, practical reason, virtue ethics*

## **1. Introduction**

Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (born 1929) is a Scottish philosopher primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy. He is an extremely influential Catholic philosopher. MacIntyre converted to Roman Catholicism in the early 1980s. He is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame and Duke University, and has also taught at Oxford, Yale, and Princeton. His most influential book, 'After Virtue,'(1981) was recognized as a significant critique of contemporary moral philosophy. The task of 'After Virtue' is to account both for the dysfunctional quality of moral discourse within modern society and rehabilitate what MacIntyre takes to be a forgotten alternative in the teleological rationality of Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre's thought is revolutionary as it articulates a politics of self-defence for local communities that aspire to protect their practices and sustain their way of life from corrosive effects of the capitalist economy. MacIntyre's second major work of his mature period, 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,' 1988) takes up the problem of giving an account of philosophical rationality within the context of his notion of "traditions,". The latter "is an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined" in terms of both internal and external debates.(A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, in: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, p.12)MacIntyre argues that despite their incommensurability there are various ways in which alien traditions might engage one another rationally – most especially via a form of immanent critique which makes use of empathetic imagination to then put the rival tradition into "epistemic crisis" but also by being able to solve shared or analogous problems and dilemmas from within one's own tradition which remain insoluble from the rival approach. (ibid. p.361-362)

Alisdair MacIntyre's aim in 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry' (third major book, 1990)is to examine three major rival traditions of moral inquiry on the intellectual scene today. While 'After Virtue' attempted to give an account of the virtues exclusively by recourse to social practices and the understanding of individual selves in light of "quests" and "traditions,". Alasdair MacIntyre believes the history of philosophy is profoundly relevant to contemporary life and thought. For MacIntyre, the history of philosophy is not necessarily a history of progress in which our grasp of truth is improving. My text is to focus on MacIntyre's radical heritage. Its particular strength is its sustained focus on Alasdair MacIntyre's political thought. MacIntyre from his early Marxism went to Aristotle. "Politics" is the aristotelian name for the set of activities through which goods are ordered in the life of the community. Though his criticisms of modernity are often thought to reflect

a nostalgic and unjustified preference for the Middle Ages, for a life like in medieval communes. It appears the reception of MacIntyre within political philosophy has largely been reductive and one-sided, namely, that he is simply viewed as a conservative communitarian- and this is not true. 'Dependent Rational Animals' (fourth major book, 1999) was a self-conscious effort by MacIntyre to ground virtues in an account of biology. "Human vulnerability and disability" are the "central features of human life", and Thomistic "virtues of dependency" are needed for individual human beings to flourish in their passage from stages of infancy to adulthood and old age.(see, A. MacIntyre, *The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays*, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. VIII)

I shall try to present the most salient points of MacIntyre's argument here regarding adequate conception of human good. MacIntyre convincingly proves that rationality and ethics are inseparable; that it is impossible for the unjust person to think rationally, or for the irrational person to be just. We can now say in terms of A. MacIntyre's an adequate conception of human good that the virtues genuinely flourish. And it was the aim of his articles: we have to live wisely, with intelligent life. Alasdair MacIntyre's writings on ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the social sciences and the history of philosophy have established him as one of the philosophical giants of the last fifty years. MacIntyre, unlike so many of his contemporaries, has exerted a deep influence beyond the bounds of academic philosophy.

## **2. The intelligibility of action**

Alasdair MacIntyre introduces anew truly remarkable work of scholarship with the following succinct summary of its purpose: "I promised a book in which I should attempt to say what makes it rational to act in one way rather than another and what makes it rational to advance and defend one conception of practical rationality rather than another. Here it is" (see, A. MacIntyre, *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, p.IX; cfr. Andy Blunden, *Alasdair MacIntyre: Review of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, May 2003, in: <http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/macintyre.htm>). And his advice to the reader who wishes to continue the investigation is: "We, whoever we are, can only begin enquiry from the vantage point afforded by our relationship to some specific social and intellectual past through which we have affiliated ourselves to some particular tradition of enquiry, extending the history of that enquiry into the present ..." (*Whose justice? Which rationality?* p. 401) "For each of us, therefore, the question now is: To what issues does that particular history bring us in contemporary debate? What resources does our particular tradition afford in this situation? Can we by means of those resources understand the achievements and successes, and the failures and sterilities, of rival traditions more adequately than their own adherents can? More adequately by our own standards? More adequately also by theirs? It is insofar as the histories narrated in this book lead on to answers to these questions that they also hold promise on answering the questions: *Whose justice? Which rationality?*" (*ibid.*, p.402) We do not intend to recapitulate here all what MacIntyre has said. The main target of his critique is liberal individualism and the challenges posed to all of us, by a world in which liberalism is the dominant governmental and social power.

Though, we are in the grip of a kind of liberal philosophy, at the same time we want our actions serve people. Essential to our learning to act is that we learn to behave in a way that others can construe our actions as intelligible.(see, A. MacIntyre, *The Intelligibility of Action*, 1986) In 'After

virtue' thinker even said: "the concept of an intelligible action is a more fundamental concept than that of an action." (After Virtue, 1981) Let's look at a work of philosophical MacIntyre, his work on the philosophy of action, his development of key arguments from Wittgenstein concerning the conditions necessary for our actions to be intelligible to others as well as ourselves. So, by thinker intelligibility of an action depends on the narrative continuities in an agent's life. Yet the ability to narrate my life depends on having narratives available that make my peculiar life fit within narratives of a community that direct me toward an end that is not of my own making. The intelligibility of my life, therefore, depends on the stock of descriptions at a particular time, place, and culture. I am, at best, no more than a co-author of my life.

At the beginning we are particularly taken with his distinction between action and behavior as crucial for understanding MacIntyre's entire project. Human behaviour seen as action of agents who desire and are moved, who have goals and aspirations, necessarily offers a purchase for descriptions in terms of meaning what thinker have called "experiential meaning". Behavior is rational "if, and only if, it can be influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically relevant consideration." (see 'Determinism and Rational Behaviour,' in *Mind*, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy New Series, Vol. 68, No. 271 (Jul., 1959), pp. 28-41, Published by: Oxford University Press) We have already given the definition for rational behavior, but in this definition we find a point which must be clarified, that of a logically relevant consideration. What exactly is a logically relevant consideration? Well, that is logically relevant will necessarily vary from case to case. And it can vary so much that MacIntyre even goes as far as saying that the "task of philosophy might almost be defined as the task of defining 'logical relevance'." (ibid.) A. MacIntyre tries to show us that rational behavior is not causally determined, but that it comes out of our free will.

A. MacIntyre is highlighting an important point: human actions reflect purposes, beliefs, emotions, meanings, and solidarities that cannot be directly observed. And human practices are composed of the actions and thoughts of individual human actors with exactly this range of hermeneutic possibilities and indeterminacies. So the explanation of human action and practice presupposes some level of interpretation. There is no formula, no universal key to human agency, that permits us to "code" human behavior without the trouble of interpretation. So, in A. MacIntyre 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?' (1988) is to review of a comparative history of three influential Western 'traditions' of moral and ethical theory that manages to stage a surprisingly strong and honest defence of Catholic Aristotelianism... Recall, *Ethics Nikomachean* presents the theory for the fulfillment of human beings, what makes a man happy. This book shows a direct relationship between the virtuous and happy life. A. MacIntyre makes Aristotle, the Christian. He unfolds several different rationalities at odds with one another, confronting modern society with the unrecognized depth of the disagreement between different "views."

Alasdair MacIntyre argues that Freud's conception of the unconscious is complicated by his tendency to use the term in two different ways. MacIntyre shows how Freud uses the term "unconscious" both as a straightforward description of psychological phenomena, and as an evaluative notion to explain the links between childhood events and adult behavior. In his work A. MacIntyre discusses repression, determinism, transference, and "practical rationality," and offers a rare comparison of Aristotle and Lacan on the concept of desire. (A. MacIntyre, *The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis*)

Note the explanation of human action: whether we can find reasons for actions in the modern world that would not only enable us to act effectively but also move us to act in a manner that who we are and what we do are of a piece.(see also A. MacIntyre, *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, 1971, also, in *After Virtue*, “Fact, Explanation, and Expertise” and the “Character of Generalization in the Social Sciences.”) In ‘Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre,’ Thomas D. D’Andrea provides a helpful overview that rightly directs attention to MacIntyre’s engagement with psychoanalysis and the philosophy of social science. Behaviorist and deterministic accounts of action, as well as his development of Wittgenstein’s distinction between description and explanation all of which is crucial for the constructive account ‘After Virtue’ gives of practical reason and the virtues.

We see A. MacIntyre attempt to provide an account of the human good in social terms directed him to metaphysics. For this account was inadequate without a metaphysical grounding. In ‘The Task of Philosophy,’ where he argues that first principles are not simply given before our engagement in a mode of inquiry. We have to ourselves to undergo a transformation amounting to a conversion if we are to understand “that it is only by participation in a rational practice-based community that one becomes rational.” MacIntyre provides a rich account of such a conversion in ‘Edith Stein’ by a close analysis not only of Stein’s conversion but also Rosenzweig’s and Lukacs’ conversions. MacIntyre indicates in the prologue to the third edition of ‘After Virtue,’ that he came to recognize that “what historical enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all enquiry, the extent to which what are taken to be the standards of truth and of rational justification in the contexts of practice vary from one time to another.”

MacIntyre certainly holds that it is undeniable that many culturally embodied systems of thought and action exist with their own standards of excellence. Moreover, adherents of these systems come to conclusions that are incompatible with other systems. In the history of philosophy were what fragmented and largely transformed also morality, A. MacIntyre noticed. Philosophers as Kant and Mill attempt to develop accounts of morality in the name of some impersonal standard was an understandable response to the loss of shared practices necessary for the discovery of goods in common. Modern moral philosophy becomes part of the problem, for its stress on autonomy, like its corresponding attempt to free ethics from history, produces people incapable of living lives that have narrative coherence. Through the development of subplots and the introduction of new characters, the story MacIntyre tells is thickened and made more complex. The current morality portrayed in history already it is not satisfied for him, A. MacIntyre sees the inadequacies of Marxism. The first involves the nature of moral judgment and the meaning of such key evaluative words as good, right, virtue, justice, duty, and happiness(see, a short essay in *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, 1971) A. MacIntyre observes that it is exactly at the level of language that the moral inadequacies and corruptions of our age are evident.

Other causes that hinder compliance moral judgments are a source not only in the language, in the psychology, or generally in the absence of education, upbringing, but also in a variety of theories and philosophical problems, for example regarding the status of general concepts (cfr. a dispute about universals of Middle Age, or theory of the concreteness to the idea of mental by G. Berkeley). In ‘After Virtue’ philosopher confronts the emotivism. The latter says: ethical reflection, and the resulting provisions are merely the expression of subjective sensations and feelings of the

individual. Emotivism considered evaluation and standards for pseudo-sentences that apparently show the state of things, in fact, but are an expression of irrational and emotional posture leaning to take a similar position on the matter. (see, A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 1981)

### **3. Epistemological crisis and dramatic narrative**

In an article first published in 1982, wonderfully titled 'How Moral Agents Became Ghosts, or, Why the History of Ethics Diverged from That of the Philosophy of Mind,' MacIntyre writes, "At the beginning of modern moral philosophy which I date in the 1780s the moral agent as traditionally understood almost, if not quite, disappeared from view. The moral agent's character, the structure of his desires and dispositions, became at best a peripheral rather than a central topic for moral philosophy, thus losing the place assigned to it by the vast majority of moral philosophers from Plato to Hume." Choice, as MacIntyre thought Stanley Hauerwas comments, "conceived by Kant and Reid as deciding between desire and the requirements of morality and later by Sartre as the condition of an individual's authenticity" replaced character as crucial for moral agency. And the rest, as the story goes, is history. (see, S. Hauerwas, *The virtues of A. MacIntyre*, in: *First Things*, October 2007) By taking the active study of philosophical traditions A. MacIntyre even concludes, crucial for him is the historical fact that one tradition of inquiry can put another tradition into an epistemological crisis. (For his account of such crises, see the chapter in A. MacIntyre, *The Tasks of Philosophy* entitled "Epistemological Crisis and Dramatic Narrative.") In an extraordinary essay, "Colors, Cultures, and Practices" in *The Tasks of Philosophy*, MacIntyre draws explicitly on Wittgenstein's arguments against a private language, to argue that our judgments of color are socially established standards. He then provides a fascinating account of how painters such as Hals and Turner discovered through the practice of their painting color discriminations that established standards of excellence that make impossible relativistic judgments. The subtitle of his 1999 book, *Dependent Rational Animals*, is *Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, which makes clear that MacIntyre thinks that we are necessarily teleological beings who must learn to trust one another. The "plain person" is the character MacIntyre has identified to display the unavoidability of the virtues. Plain persons are those characterized by everyday practices such as sustaining families, schools, and local forms of political community. They engage in trades and professions that have required them to learn skills constitutive of a craft.

And so we have concepts such as fact, value. A. MacIntyre sees the assumed impossibility to move logically from an is to an ought. A. MacIntyre likewise insists on the importance of avoiding the tendency to treat philosophers as though they all held the same worldview-presuppositions. They did not. They occupied radically different social, cultural and historical contexts, and their presuppositions about the nature of reality were oftentimes radically different from, and at odds with, each other A. MacIntyre argues that political institutions and practices are themselves very much dependent on local political attitudes.(A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*. London, UK, New York, 2011, NY. Bloomsbury Publishing, Plc, p.13)

After finishing the War in Vietnam, the American public could not take an official stance regarding this war. So different dimensions of human had been entangled in reality. And today also commonly have to deal with the fragmentation, but of a human life *sensu stricto*. What is the theory of a common society by Alisdair MacIntyre? This Scottish thinker seems to say: "I'll be better." He shows a good, a rule, a virtue, as a result which we acquire practice of (cf. an article by A.

MacIntyre, Plain Persons and moral theory). What are the right play ball? Gaining efficiency. In MacIntyre terms 'a good' shows what we get in experience. One must be able to distinguish between what generally makes me happy than what currently makes me happy. We want that, so we should rely on a good trial, or opinion (phronesis- good Judgement). We have to do (it), which we consider to be the most tenable, rational. Alisdair MacIntyre also relies on human inclinations and natural law, which is not going to change. Unlike emotivism by Jean-Paul Sartre (referencing only on doing the decision), utilitarianism (we recognize life), Kantian deontology duty (doing what is necessary), Scottish thinker is based on the authority of Aristotle's virtues.

The main work of MacIntyre gives rise to a new way of thinking in ethics, but rather an attempt to renew Aristotle's moral philosophy. MacIntyre opposes the philosophy of postmodernism traditionalist anti-modernism. He questions the ways of thinking derived from the dominant culture in our own philosophical enlightenment. MacIntyre's views are inspired by the Marxist critique of liberalism and weave the moral values that constitute intellectual Christianity in its Catholic variant. At a conference in 2009 in Notre Dame, Indiana, entitled "Catholicism instead of what," he recalled the French poet Charles Péguy (1873-1914), who is the author of such sayings as: "We must always tell what we see. Above all, and this is more difficult, we must always see what we see/.../ "It will never be known what acts of cowardice have been committed for fear of not looking sufficiently progressive/.../ Everything begins in mystery and ends in politics." The conference Alisdair MacIntyre talked about the narrative of people, on their progress and regress, but most of all he read in the thinking of students and encouraged them to cultivate the values in the Christian children education. Because here is not so much about morality as the viability of their parents. And what is the capacity of the church to improve this situation,? MacIntyre rhetorical question was. Thinker pointed to the correction of the education system, the development of societies: evoking civil America war he gave on it as the most destructive war up. The conflict between societies. So you have to put in the end the question: how good are we? Here a narrative of life is in conflict with the secular mind. Let's put on our personal development, but also the development of institutions that protect people, also a certain stability is very important now, for human rationalization of public life.

All the people are invidious, Alisdair MacIntyre expressed that at some point. The Thinker relied on our personal "madness", "madness person." God is a Jew, as if we often agree with this argument. Child- it becomes after his birth. A rational look at the lives that depend on our feelings and choices is important, we need to take this into account. You have to finally ask about how we improve our lives, memory of which we keep in our societies? How people work together? In the face of the various dimensions of our humanity, we must confront mercy and justice. Alisdair MacIntyre invoked here poetry and life narrative. If we believe in the power of meaning, we should ask about the quality of the opportunities of the Christian liberty. Quite to the current show nothingness, and that one we are being wasted, to admit that our metaphysical procedure entails political behavior often. The paradox of our potentiality lies in the fact that we need politicians. And as we pray, so we are. There are daily depravity and poverty of everyday life, we need schools, Catholic workshops we need not only for Christians. Do not Isolate moral order of the richness of life. According to our internal tensions must be built in this view our political answer.

Virtue ethics by Alisdair MacIntyre, it's about ordering goods, setting them in the most accurate series, arranging of the goods. Is not bad, good deeds. Compare the pair: ignorance- evil, knowledge- good. So, good people do good things. For these goods come through experience, phronesis- good recognition. In this context, Thomas would say: I wish you, Jesus. Alisdair MacIntyre is not so much an arbitrary position of Saint Thomas, what the attitude of practical reason (practical reasoning). What is good for me, considering it first. But above all a question of only seeing the other person. I am curious. For example person A-is good, person Y is needed. As a result, the reaction can be particular or universal. Hence Y has finally realized, was made an act (action). Otherwise how emotivism, that is incorrect theory, according to Virtue Ethics, make decision, that is, it would make others people able to make someone happy. So, I do not have money, it means, I do not have money as a value that MacIntyre called the Good. It means, that is earn money gradually wise life that money has become a virtue. I think.

Acquire MacIntyre virtues: flourishing, happiness, excellence , relationship, justice, patience, courage (facing fear), temperance, honor, contemplation, the mean, relevance, revival of interest, pleasures, career(having career, różne od having job), freedom, money, wealth, emotions, prestige, respect (which responsibility), to choose proportional life, industrious (pilny), whole life. Avoid extreme to find golden mean. Courage is among excess and deficiency. You need moderation, for we are individual. We are utilitarian, because we can recognize life. Virtues as habit. Mamy czynić z cnót nasz codzienny habit. You do desire freedom, pleasure. Why?

Because it leads to something very important, the friendship, the greater ability. In demonstrating the complete person (see article, Plain Persons and Moral Theory) MacIntyre distinguishes three social roles of men, I already mentioned, which we realize. And so, in life we can be an esthete (Aesthete), manager (Menager) or therapist (therapist). And even if we do not know how to try it and created it, in our choices alot the roles of moral inconsistencies. We can see the difference one's, for example, in distinguishing between the words 'meaning,' that is, the meaning of what you say, and 'use' - in expressing something, of the preferences and the emotions. MacIntyre argues that, in this respect, emotivism is not consistent, correct, because sometimes we can make bad decisions.

The function of human is to utilize a life. Let's note, my particular happy decision is different from your happy particularistic decision. St. Thomas gave bad person narration, which is different from the narrative people by MacIntyre (ordinary Plain Persons). In this view, the history of man seems to be dangerous something. I choose some fear, etc. Mostly people are not rational rules regarding appointment. Do you know how to take correct decision (right way). MacIntyre would want to tell us: "I'll be better." But how we are good now, as people? Here's a question that ultimately emerges from these analyzes Scottish thinker. We need to find the means to realize the virtues, shape different attitudes and dispositions. Virtue ethics is different from the ethics act. The act is like at the beginning of the great task of shaping a complete man.

The theory of virtue in this respect is open to God. Virtue ethics refers primarily to the nature of the person. Here I have to be honest, happy, I know how to behave. Due to this process we need to understand each other, we need to practice. And so when baking cakes need to know the technology of baking the cake, to tast, but also, for example, you must collect the ingredients for the baking, eggs, flavorings. We need to reach a certain capacity. Thus need more rules. I gained knowledge of certain principles, it owned a habitual. And now I know better, for example, what it means 'not to

kill'. And you too. "You flourishing," that is- you're happy. In various situations, in our decisions Bible Revelation is ver helpful. And justice, here you are, it seems to have constantly a great job for us. But what to say, for example, for extreme cases, in making moral decisions? MacIntyre seems to prompt us one solution to this issue: if the practice of virtue is worthy, that is, the most sensible approach to the virtue is always possible. This is not idealism.

#### **4. The unavailability of the virtues**

G.E.M. Anscombe believed that Virtue ethics by A. MacIntyre was the only solution to the moral vacuum in society. Responsibility as an essential... What is a virtue? To know and understand the modern development of virtue ethics by Alasdair MacIntyre, learning objective the best way to fill the moral vacuum is to chart our moral virtues. A. MacIntyre believed the same thing. Overview the best way to fill the moral vacuum is to chart our moral virtues. The virtues help us overcome the effects of the three groups of people: atehste, menager, therapist. Throughout history they have been important because they help ordinary people be moral. There are internal and external goods. It is too concerned with normative rules or the reality of those normative rules. This has not helped fill the moral vacuum of society. MacIntyre directed toward metaphysics, because modern ethical study has lost its way. Since the enlightenment ethics has been dominated by normative theories. These theories give a moral answer to a problem based on different circumstances.

Virtue ethics before the 20th century had died out. However it was noticed that there was a distinct gap in the moral mindset that normative ethics was not fulfilling. A fresh approach was needed. In 'After virtue' A. MacIntyre traced the history of virtue ethics and tried to establish a system of virtue ethics for the modern age. His basic complaint was that modern ethics put too much emphasis on reason and not enough stress on people, their characters and the contexts of their lives. History is important, MacIntyre noticed that as societies developed 2,500 years ago, so different virtues developed too. In the age of Homer a poet who told the story of (the Iliad and the Odyssey), the following virtues were paramount; Physical strength, Courage, Cunning, Friendship. These are known as the Homeric Virtues. Eventually, as cities (the polis) developed, life slowly became more civilized. Aristotle developed his theory of virtues for the city of Athens and his virtues became known as the Athenian Virtues. They were (briefly) as follows: Courage, Friendship, Justice: retributive (getting what you deserve) and distributive (making sure that the goods of society are fairly distributed), Temperance, Wisdom. The emphasis on strength and cunning, needed in time of war, was gone.

MacIntyre argued that the Athenian virtues of Aristotle were the most complete. Athenian virtues For MacIntyre, the problems with ethics began during the Enlightenment, a period of time during the 17th and 18th Centuries when Science became more important for discovering truth. It was thought that a single, rational cause for morality could be discovered and thinkers such as Hume and Kant attempted to do this. MacIntyre argued that despite the theories of people like Kant and Hume, the virtues have lived on. What's more, society depends for its very existence, upon people who exhibit the virtues. The virtues MacIntyre argued that living a virtuous life depended upon getting into the habit of being moral and of striving towards being virtuous. He argued that this can give life an overall purpose and meaning. The virtues for MacIntyre, are any human quality which helps us to achieve the 'goods' in life.

So, Alisdair MacIntyre argues that modern ethical theory, as it has developed since the seventeenth century, has been exposed by contemporary as conceptually bankrupt. To find an alternative, he looks to ancient Greece and especially to Aristotle's concept of virtue. Although his critics consider this alternative to be something of an impossible dream, MacIntyre argues that it is central to a recovery of ethics. So, we are trying to in the text to explore the core ideas of MacIntyre's ethics and politics in order to present a coherent vision of his intellectual and practical project. The reader will discover how the evolution of MacIntyre's teachings has led him to a position that the authors convincingly label 'Revolutionary Aristotelianism,' a doctrine that unites the many concerns and interests evinced by him over a half-century or more.

So, A. MacIntyre writes, "There seem to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture." (After Virtue, 1981, ch.2) What to do in this situation. In 'After Virtue' Alisdair MacIntyre sought to address a crisis in moral language that he traced back to a European Enlightenment that had made the formulation of moral principles increasingly difficult. In the search for a way out of this impasse, MacIntyre returns to an earlier strand of ethical thinking, that of Aristotle, who emphasised the importance of 'virtue' to the ethical life.

Whereas the defense of morality the "ethics of dilemma" approach to morality forgets an essential part of ethics - the Person's character and how personal moral growth is encouraged, A. MacIntyre noticed. (Agent-Centered, Not Act-Centered, see the first chapter of this article) We are not concerned to know what goodness is but how to become good people, since otherwise our enquiry would be useless. (see, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II 1103b 27-9) Among the most important messages of the Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics are the opinions: "Happiness is the reward of virtue/.../ Moral virtue is an outcome of habit/.../ Since the early years of shaping the habits of one kind or another, depends quite a lot, depends very much depends almost everything." (ibid.) According to Aristotle a virtue is a skill to learn to be virtues. Learning to be virtues. Courage is neither cowardly nor foolhardy, is like second nature. To take Golden mean by Aristotle is very important. Aristotle provided MacIntyre with an account of why our actions require a conception of an end as well as the social and political conditions necessary to sustain a life formed by the virtues constitutive of that end that is simply lacking in modern moral practice and theory. We are for MacIntyre's critique of modern ethics as a disastrous fetishism of rules detached from community like Atheists, Manager, Therapist etc. For example managerism is an inappropriate form of corporate leadership and management culture that is characterized by a self-serving management biased toward capital markets and apathetic toward employees; it mostly occurs in publicly traded companies.

MacIntyre's moral philosophy is shown to provide the resources for a powerful critique of liberalism. His discussion of the managerist and emotivist roots of modern culture is very interesting, it seems to be the inspiration for a critical social science of Modernity. Conservatives and liberals, moreover, both try to employ the power of the modern state to support their positions in a manner alien to MacIntyre's understanding of the social practices necessary for the common good. Liberalism, opponent to it the thinking by MacIntyre derives from a judgment that the best type of human life, that in which the tradition of the virtues is most adequately embodied, is lived by those engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community directed towards the shared achievement of those common goods without which the ultimate human good cannot be achieved.

A. MacIntyre 'Ethics and Politics' ends with a fascinating defense of the virtue of toleration and free speech.

The thinker moreover, he understands that there is no past to which we might return. He notes that we are all "inescapably inhabitants of advanced modernity, bearing its social and cultural marks." Accordingly he acknowledges that his understanding of the tradition of the virtues and the consequences for modernity of the rejection of that tradition is one that is possible only on this side of modernity. We can gain some understanding of the moral character of modernity only from the standpoint of a different traditions. But as personal activity necessary to achieve an excellent learning, so research activity necessary for the discovery of the first principles. The Thinker from Aristotle goes out to Saint Thomas, who writes: we know the essence of things only by the effects.

Alisdair MacIntyre's understanding of practical reason and the virtues are secular...In his important chapter called "Aquinas on Practical Rationality and Justice" in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, MacIntyre does acknowledge that Thomas Aquinas' account of practical reason does have a "theological dimension," because it requires knowledge of God. But he appeals to Thomas himself for evidence that such knowledge does not require -revelation. Thus, as if following the indications of A. MacIntyre, as our mentor, at the threshold of the third millennium, we open ourselves to a strong family, also on a human weakness, I would say, in the midst of human feelings and common disputes, looking for the ultimate truth. In 'Edith Stein' A. MacIntyre writes: "We do not begin with some adequate grasp of the concepts of knowledge and truth and in the light of these pass judgment on whether or not we know something of God or whether or not it is true God exists, but rather it is from our encounters with God and with the world and with human beings that we learn what it is to have knowledge of what truth is."

The ethical condition is not the condition of having a certain right theory; rather the ethical condition is having a certain character. This observation from 'Ethics and Politics' makes clear his view that a natural morality is forged by people over time through trial and error. For MacIntyre, the practices necessary for training in practical reason through which we acquire the ability to act intelligibly requires the systematic growth of human potential by acquired excellence that cannot help but challenge the character of modern moral practice and theory. This is contemporary virtue ethics Alisdair MacIntyre.

## **5. Conclusion**

In fact, MacIntyre's work is extreme, but we live in extreme times, as Stanley Hauerwas noticed it. MacIntyre has sought to help us repair our lives by locating those forms of life that make possible moral excellence. Alisdair MacIntyre convincingly proves that rationality and ethics are inseparable; that it is impossible for the unjust person to think rationally, or for the irrational person to be just. We can now say in terms of A. MacIntyre's an adequate conception of human good that the virtues genuinely flourish. And it was the aim of his articles: we have to live wisely, with intelligent life. And it also became our goal, we were better.

"The rights of property are absolute. There is and can be no standard external to them in the light of which some particular distribution of property could be evaluated as just or unjust. Justice on this view serves the ends of property and not vice versa," citing D. Hume MacIntyre said. (Whose

Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, p. 295) A. MacIntyre also shows that no conception of justice and ethical life is possible outside of some real community in some place at some time. How to proceed against the way of life in which human relations are governed by the world market? As remarked above, MacIntyre advises each of his readers to look to their own tradition for the resources to take such a challenge forward.

Let us try to live wisely now in the families, in our communities. So we drew attention to the A. MacIntyre understandings of the centrality of practical reason, the significance of the body for agency, why the teleological character of our lives must be displayed through narrative, the character of rationality, the nature of the virtues, why training in a craft is paradigmatic of learning to think as well as live, his understanding of why the Enlightenment project had to fail, his particular way of being a historicist, and why the plain person is the necessary subject of philosophy.

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