FORECAST CHANGES IN THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, THEIR IMPACT ON THE STATE SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Adam RADOMYSKI
Witold MATERAK
National Defence University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract

The contents of this article refer to theoretical considerations that concern the forecasting of strategic changes in the state security system, including the events taking place in its macroeconomic environment. In this regard, the authors have emphasised the complexity of modifications to the state security system, which should take into account not only the resources, but also changes in various spheres of its macroeconomic environment. The authors draw attention to the fact that, in practice, in the functioning of the state security system, any change of strategic (long-term) plans and their rational implementation requires the development of future scenarios. Their development allows for early identification of future threats to national security that might arise with changes in economic, political, technical, social and international spheres or be consequential. It is undoubtedly a very complex process requiring, first and foremost, a very good knowledge of the basic principles of strategic management, understanding the essence of national security and the ability to perceive opportunities and risks in turbulent environments. In this respect, the key importance is growing strategic thinking ability, which is just as important for a small country, as well as global hegemony.

Keywords: system of state security, defense, macroeconomics, future armed conflict, demographic change, the threat of terrorism, and economic threats, vision, local conflict, future concepts of war, globalisation

Introduction

When making predictions of changes in the macro surroundings of the state security system, the key issue is to identify the opportunities and threats that may contribute to its development or to create barriers to interfere with its functioning.

Of particular importance is the correct transformation of the security system, which should constitute a permanent and natural process that reflects changes in both the global and regional security environment. This transformation should be aimed at improving the existing capacity of the state security system in dealing with the whole spectrum of military and non-military threats[1].

Scientific considerations on the present and future state security system have largely a leading character and stretch the imagination.

Due to the complexity of the state security system, forecasting directions for its development should take into account possible changes in the environment in which it operates. This applies mainly to economic, legal, political, technical and international spheres.

Theoretical considerations and scientific studies (including research) in this area conclude that the requirements for state security are real transformation and modifications. The possibility of their fulfillment depends on the pace and rhythm of development of the system that shapes the events that take place in its surroundings. On the other hand, the development of the system has an internal tempo and rhythm resulting from the joint or individual experiences and preferences of individual countries in the use of emerging development opportunities.

In this regard, a prognostic approach can provide an interpretation defining the condition, shape and capacity of the state security system in a specific time horizon.

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1 More information: M. Kobuz, *World security in the early decades of the twenty-first century*, [in] *the contemporary dimension of terrorism*, ed. Z. Piątek, the National Security Office, Warsaw 2006.

At least several years' perspective has been adopted for the development of the state security system and raises the question: *Is Poland going to need the same security system as now, of the same capacity, structure and potential?*

There is no doubt that this is a very complex issue and the difficulty of solving it increases with the growing turbulence of the global environment.

When analysing the state security system forecasts, attention must be paid to each country's specifics, unique only to them, which result from ongoing goals and objectives or tradition. Nevertheless, in spite of their very nature, these systems have many properties in common.

Bearing in mind such a problematic situation, it was assumed that the legitimate will present the synthesis of research results that may indicate at least the broad lines of changes which may be subject to the state security system in the future.

It was assumed that with such a specific problem situation, the following objective had been achieved: *to identify the main areas of the general surroundings of the polish security system determining its changes including the possibility of future development.*

In connection with the adopted goal of the research, the main research problem took the form of questions as follows: *What kinds of factors from these macro surroundings have an impact on the state security system, and the shape and development opportunities of the future?*

It is assumed that the main solution to the research problem occurs as a result of finding answers to the following issues - Specific questions:

• What factors can be identified in the macro surroundings of the state security system?
• What threat to the state security system can induce changes in its macro surroundings?
• What changes in surroundings of the system of state security can have the greatest impact on its future design and development?

Identification of the macro surroundings of the state security system

Leading scientific considerations in the field of security of the state in terms of the system suggest that the surroundings comprise all the rest of the reality after the part defined as a security system has been separated from it. Generally, it can be said that the surroundings of the state security system are all that is outside of it and what: influences it (now), can affect it (now and / or in the future) and what affects the security system (at present) and may interact with it (now and / or in the future).

Thus, the surroundings of the system comprise a space outside of its structure, but are indirectly connected with it, influence it and subject to its influence. In other words, the surroundings of the state security system consist of the whole phenomena, processes and institutions shaping its internal relations, opportunities to implement tasks (to achieve the objective), scope of activity and growth prospects. It is not possible to isolate the security system from the surroundings, because they come out of it with all the necessary supply of life that is necessary to ensure that it can function.

While retaining the current line of reasoning, , due to the type and strength of interaction, including the possibility of (interaction) two basic types of state security system can be pointed out: the macro (general) and micro (deliberate).

The article, as suggested in the title, will focus on the forecast changes in the macro surroundings of the state security system.

To simplify macro surroundings (general), the state security system is a set of conditions for its functioning resulting from the fact that it operates in a specific country or region in the political system, legal system, social, and even the specific climate zone. It is important that macro surroundings very strongly determine the conditions for the functioning and development of the security system, but the system itself is not able to change these conditions. From the point of view of the security system, the conditions created by the different spheres of macro surroundings may provide opportunities or threats that one should know and be able to anticipate. In other words, the security system should read the stimuli from the surroundings as an opportunity or a threat and actively respond.

Forecast changes in the macro surroundings and their influence on the state security system

The starting point in designing the future shape of the state security system in the next 20-30 years is a forecast of changes and trends in its further surroundings. These changes have been presented in the form of a general forecast, with particular emphasis on the opportunities and threats that can promote or inhibit the development of the security system in the twenty-first century.

Expected changes oscillate around the spheres belonging to the macro surroundings, such as socio-demographic, political, economic, technical and international changes. It was assumed that factors occurring within these spheres of factors will be the same as now, so convenient or inconvenient conditions for the operation and development of the state the security system will be created in the future. The future challenges facing the security system in the form of specific requirements can thus be determined. They also blend into the global trend of dynamic development of safety systems by imposing change on those countries that want to stay in the mainstream of modernity.

Thinking about the future, taking into account the existence of these challenges to the security system is of fundamental importance because it allows smooth functioning in a changing, turbulent environment to be prepared for in advance. This ability provides a starting point for creating a future for the state security system. In this regard, the ability to adapt system solutions to emerging challenges has (in terms of formulating its own strategy for individual countries) been fundamental, both in terms of realising that these processes actually occur, as well as adoption of a rational position[2]. This principle applies in its entirety to the Polish security system, which, for several years, has been looking for ways to solve the key problems resulting from technological backwardness, organisational paralysis and other factors[3]. This translates into the scale and detail of projected changes in its interior, which make it increasingly and anxiously look at Polish security problems.

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2 J. Stacewicz, *Megatrends and strategy and policy development*, Publishing Ellipse, Warsaw 1996.
3 A. Targowski, *Catch up with time,* Publishing Ellipse, Warsaw 1993.

The forecast development of the political-military situation included, inter alia, in Poland's Security Strategy and Vision of the Armed Forces in 2030 indicate a low probability of occurrence of war in forthcoming years, which would force the Polish armed forces to defend on a strategic scale. Nevertheless, the risk of a local conflict[4] (with limited scale) still seems to be realistic, which is reflected in the current situation in Ukraine. A similar statement can be reached after analysis of the armed conflicts of the last decade of the twentieth and early twenty-first century, where you can observe the gradual disappearance of inter-state character, while increasing their internal structure intra. The intensity and complex nature of these conflicts and their negative impact on the situation in certain regions of the world will force the international organisations (responsible for the maintenance of peace in the world) to take more and more activities of a preventive nature, stabilisation or intervention in the future. The nature of the activities, in our opinion, should be regarded as dominant in the coming decades of the twenty-first century[5]. The next decades may bring an intensification of military operations other than war and activities on a small-scale run with high dynamics. Long term operations with a more police or supervisory nature than purely military may appear. These international, regional and civilisation situations generate a great demand for a highly flexible and mobile armed force. Of growing importance are the Air Force, Special Forces, and military reconnaissance. In addition, the very nature of war may change. In the future, primarily, it will be dominated by the pursuit to achieve information superiority at least, then Air Supremacy. Only later will it be possible to conduct land operations. The Air Force will play a major role here, and not, as previously, a supporting role. These changes can be so significant that the demands of pioneers of the use of air forces: the Italian, Giulio

4   A local armed conflict - is an armed clash that will involve limited potential of our armed forces and will not result in a general mobilisation of the country's defence system, primarily its economic and defence potential ", [in:] B. Zdrodowski, *Theory air defense*, National Defense Academy, Warsaw 1996, p. 59.

5   The main threats to the representatives of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty are ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights abuses, the disintegration of states, acts of terrorism, waves of refugees, the spread of organised crime, as well as environmental pollution, epidemics, disasters (natural) natural and so on. R. Rosa, *Philosophy and education for security in the face of opportunities, threats and challenges of the turn of the century* [in], *Human security and social communities* (ed. sciences. W. J Maliszewski), Publishing House of the Academy of Bydgoszcz, Bydgoszcz 2005, p . 19.

Douhet (1869-1930), the American, Billy Mitchell (1879-1936) and the British, Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956) may be fully realized in the future.

Operations of a different nature, scale and intensity, where the influence of force will be deprived of the use of force in the military sphere to achieve political goals, will be as important as warfare. I have in mind the influence of force in other areas of international life (e.g. the economic, social).

Based on the key assumptions for a vision of the future and associated forecasts for the evolution of the international environment, it can be said that the world of the twenty-first century there will be more stable and secure than ever before[6]. Phenomena occurring in the world will bring a high risk and uncertainty of events, creating new barriers, dilemmas and risks that require a broad perspective, comprehensive analysis and make constant choices. Based on the most important demands presented in the "visions" of the twenty-first century world, one is tempted to generalise about the projected nature of the international security environment and the directions of its evolution. In this regard, with a high degree of probability, we can assume that the world will remain an arena, with international relations taking place in all areas of operations (political economic, legal, demographic and technical). On the basis of the emerging international order, problems can increase on a regional or sub regional level, which will be one of the main causes and sources of disputes. These will generate new wars and armed conflicts in the twenty first century.

6   The authors have in mind, primarily, three theories:
• S. Huntington's "clash of civilisations" assumes, among other things, multipolarity and multi civilisations global politics and progressive changes in the balance of power between civilisations. More information. S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Ed. Literary Muse, Warsaw 1998.
• Brzezinski, Theory "playing field" or the "great chessboard" assuming the idea of intensifying conflict and instability on different scales. More information. Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, Bertelsmann i S-ka, Warsaw 2000.
• Toffler, "Waves of civilisation", the essence of which is dividing the world into contrasting and competing civilisations, with associated countries, of which the first two have already arisen in the past and are declining, and the third (information) is just developing, being used as a source of information advantage and a tool to obtain all goods. More information. A. Toffler, *The Third Wave*, PIW, Warszawa 1986.

Source: own.

Fig. 1. The model of war generation

Summing up the current discussion, one can formulate a thesis that it is not to be expected in the future, even in the next few years, that the world will be more secure and more stable than it is now. Events observed in the last decade allow us to assume that the world is becoming more unstable. Therefore, it can be assumed, as Samuel Huntington said, that the escalation of military conflicts and wars is still possible, even in the short term.

Conflicts between states are likely to continue. They will be caused by unresolved conflicts, territorial, ethnic, cultural and religious disputes[7]. These new conflicts will probably not jeopardise peace on a global scale, although in many regions may cause significant destabilisation, and the emergence of new inflammatory foci including new threats. In situations of rising terrorist threats or real symptoms of

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7   See. J. Gotowala, *Safety in the airspace*, National Defense University, Warsaw 2002.

its presence, it will likely change the current paradigm[8] of war. These changes will also be the result of further development of military technologies including new methods of struggle.

Source: Own elaboration based on: The role of Technology in the Transformation of Warfare, 4 August 2002.

Fig 2. Changing the paradigm of warfare

The beginning of the twenty-first century it also seeing escalating threats of an asymmetric character, which after exceeding a certain level of risk in the future, may lead to the outbreak of new conflicts[9]. In this situation, it may be that national security can seriously be exposed to the destructive activities of various non-state actors, supranational or religious.

It should be noted that in previous periods, the warring parties were able to count on strong partisanship or real material help from other countries e.g. coalitions.

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8   In Oxford English Dictionary, paradigm is defined as a pattern or most general model or as a model example. This term is used in many sciences in the above sense, but it applies only to their underlying assumptions.
9   S. Metz, *Armed Conflict in the 21 st. Century: The information revolution and post-modern warfare,* Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, April 2000, p. 9.

It meant there was a high risk of the conflict spreading and each of them could be the hotbed of confrontation on a wider scale.

In the future, the conflicting parties will be rather more often left to themselves. They may seek support from much weaker allies[10]. More often they are organisations and non-state groups rather than legitimate governments. There is no doubt that globalisation will foster this, which will be the progressive trend in the world in the future. It can be assumed that, even more so than at present, it will be shaped by other factors: economic, economic, or political. The reversal of this trend could have quite dramatic consequences leading to a deepening of the diversity in the development of individual countries and instability in the economic growth of particular regions in the world. The tendencies (trends) in this area can be seen in forecasts relating to changes in the participation of countries from various continents of the world in gross national income, as shown in Figure 3.

Source: Own elaboration based on: Joint Operating Environment Trends & Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030, Joint Force Command, December 2007.

Fig. 3. Projected changes in the share of each region in the creation of the world's gross national product

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10 M. Kozub, *Conflicts beginning of the XXI century. The use of the Air Force*, National Defense University, Warsaw 2007, pp. 22-23.

Globalisation as a transnational network of links in both business and culture can also carry certain risks. In the aspect of national security these can lead to a blurring of the boundaries between the internal and external dimension. In such a situation, emerging threats and risks will be global and non-state entities will be able to easily disturb the security of entire regions. On the other hand, they may produce more and better opportunities for development of individual countries and regions of the world and wider cooperation between countries in the prevention of any threat[11]. Additional problems in the area of international security can result from high population growth, which could be about 2 billion by 2025 and already 3.2 billion by 2030. It is worth noting that 56% of this number will be accounted for by Asian countries. This may initiate a large migration of labour to ageing and economically developing countries.

At this point, one should pay attention to the asymmetrical distribution of resources, especially strategic, which may in the future provide a strong impetus to initiate new wars. The economic and resources dimension in the wars of the future will be closely connected with the sphere of politics, and the lust for power and profit, manifesting itself in the form of various types of autocratic rule, repressive regimes, limiting freedom, or links with the criminal world[12].

Another source of danger, mentioned especially often by doomsayers, is the ecological threat. In this regard, Thomas Homer-Dixon, political scientist at the University of Toronto, argues that upcoming ecological disasters will force the migration of hundreds of millions of people. This can lead to collapse of state borders under the onslaught of newcomers-refugees. On the other hand, Robert D. Kaplan and historian, Martin van Creveld, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem believe that highly organised nation-states of the world will lead to anarchy and misery, epidemics and war will force local population migrations on a scale not seen since the great migrations in Eurasia.

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11   S. Metz, *Armed Conflict in the 21 st Century: The information revolution and post-modern warfare...*, op.cit., p. 7.
12   M. Fryc, *War - modern face*, Publisher MADO, Torun 2009, p. 51.

Source: Own elaboration based on: Madison and IMF/World Bank projections.

Fig. 4. Forecast of changes in the world economy in the years 1820 to 2040

At the same time, we will have to deal with the huge advancement of education and increasing awareness of whole nations and civilisations. This will exacerbate the effect of universal access to information and knowledge[13]. On the one hand, this can create a kind of reluctance among a large part of humanity to solve problems and international disputes by war[14].

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13 S. Metz, *the Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The information revolution and post-modern warfare ...*, ibid, p.13.
14 See. Norman C. Davis, *An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs*, in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997, p. 83 and further.

Source: Strategic Trends Program. Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, Fourth Edition, Ministry of Defence, January 2010, p. 67.

Fig. 5. The most likely arenas (regions) of armed conflicts to 2040

This may stimulate the emergence of new opportunities for the effective application of violence, in a form other than killing people and physical destruction of the material achievements of civilisation[15]. Despite the absence of evidence regarding the threat of global conflict, hotbeds of new regional conflicts that will be a significant source of casualties and destruction will still be created. In this regard, despite the scenarios countering threats, all potential dangers cannot be seen. A clear example of this were the terrorist attacks in the United States (World Trade Centre, the Pentagon) in 2001, which shattered the myth of a safe land surrounded by two oceans.

15   Compare: R. Szpyra, *Environment future air combat against global civilisation changes on the threshold of the twenty-first century, developed study ...*, ibid, p. 29. SP Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, p. 20.

In this regard, you might ask yourself whether we can expect yet another type of threat in the future. It seems that the answer to this question is relatively simple: because, in our opinion, we should expect changes that are even more violent and surprising. These changes, as we have tried to demonstrate, shape, without exception, all the spheres of reality around us that are inextricably linked with the problem of the safety of everything. Therefore, this will change the Clausewitzian paradigm of victory - victory by destroying, because more and more perfect technique will allow Super Precision to hit carefully selected targets whose selective destruction will lead to breaking and subjugating the enemy. The more damage on a large scale, the more total destruction will become obsolete.

The war will become in this way more limited[16] (but not spatially). Limiting the damage and minimising one's own losses and the enemy's leads more and more to the rank of fundamental principle. This can be seen already in the last few armed conflicts. New concepts have become commonplace when describing the wars of the future: information warfare, cyber war, asymmetrical, virtual, hybrid and crawling. Network-centric war[17] occupies an increasingly prominent place in the doctrinal assumptions. An important role in network war is played by two factors: sharing information and situational awareness. The aim of the implementation of Network Centric War assumptions will be to create an environment in which sensors collecting data and decision-makers will be integrated within one, common super-network[18]. The benefit would be an ability to build situational awareness, which is accurate knowledge about the locations of enemy forces, our own at the theatre of war, carrying out skilful high-precision activities and that the ability to react quickly to a variable strategic and operational situation[19].

16　See. J. Świniarski. M. Wind. *Strategic and operational concepts*, "Military Thought", 1998, No. 4.
17　D. Alberts, J. Garstka, F. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program*, Washington D. C. 2000, p. 88.
18　S. Zajas, *Twenty-first century security environment and the transformation of the armed forces, command automation in the creation of operational awareness*, Vol. I. Operational and - tactical grounds and reasons for automating processes the command and control of troops fighting agents, PIT, Warsaw 2010, p. 14.
19　More information. R. Szpakowicz, R. Hoffman, *Network-centric concept of war as a response to the needs of the Air Force XXI century on information support of combat operations*, "Overview of the Air Force and Air Defense", 2003, No. 8, pp. 3-16.

Fig. 6. Meta-Internet Network

This will be done through the adoption of appropriate combinations, strategies, tactics, techniques and procedures, which in the course of the armed forces will generate the desired effects (effect-based operations -EBO)[20]. As a result of achieving them, they shape the behaviour of adversaries, allies, and neutral actors during peace, crisis and war.

In projections about future wars, including Toffler's concept based on a "world divided into three" one should not forget the historically proven truth that: if there are new forms of war, the old forms do not disappear yet for long time. It should be emphasised that the war against the "third wave" will, however, differ from that currently known, both in the method and the tools used, and methods for their operation in the use of a wide spectrum of information. This value in military operations will translate into an increase in momentum and efficiency and increase the resistance (ability to survive)[21].

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20 See. *Effect Based Operations Discussion Paper*, Australia Defense Force, 2003, p. 15.
21 E.A. Smith, *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network – Centric Warfare in Peace Crisis and War,* Washington DC, DoD CCRP, 2002, p. 108.

Summary

Summing up the current discussion, it can be said that the main message of the forecast put forward in the article is the ability to use the development of national security's broadly understood knowledge - efficiently generated from a variety of sources widely publicised, wisely protected, effectively used to foster innovation and improve the State security system. This is possible to achieve provided that there is a single, coherent and long-term vision for the future. Only on that basis can a sensible mission, strategy, plans and programmes aimed at improving the safety system be formulated. It is very important that the current state of this system demands a long-term vision that can provide the basis for developing rational development plans.

In the history of Poland, one can find many painful examples of negligence in the field of state security. The vision does not cost much, but unfortunately the plans require a significant financial investment that must be skillfully placed. The essence of this approach is to initiate changes without looking at what can happen, but from what we want to happen. In this situation, the quintessence of the desired change is to think how best to lead. This is possible by creating a vision of the state security system as close as possible to our dreams, expectations, aspirations and abilities.

It should be stipulated that this vision is not a dogma, but an exploration of the aspirations and dreams. In other words, it is an image of the future at which the security system should aim – a picture of the future system we would like. This may be an idealised image, even unreachable, but capable to activate and spur us into action.

The modern knowledge sector (education, research, innovation) has become an important element of the rationalization of the development of the security system. An important aspect of the success of these activities is to achieve strong and stable public support for such a policy, which may require an increase in the budget for areas of safety. The key to achieving society's support is clever dialogue and social consultation, increasing the quality of the military structure, following through the idea of a safe state to the effective promotion of the armed forces as a key and creative guarantor of the fulfillment of this idea.

Based on the collected facts, it can thus be assumed that in the future, like today, it will be difficult enough to clearly identify the structure, shape, or form of socio-military conflict and military action. This is essentially due to the fact that these areas are constantly evolving, changing with the transformations that occur in the political, economic, social, technological or cultural domain. This idea can be justified after analysing the evolution of the armed struggle that took place over the last half century.

In this regard, the facts discovered indicate a strong correlation between armed struggle and the changes in the aforementioned areas of the surroundings of the state security system. Based on this, it can be presumed that further surroundings of the state security system in the future will also affect the functioning of that system.

In contrast to natural systems with the ability to self-regulate, the state security system has been created by man as a whole: logical, social, economic, organisational, military, technical and technological. This system requires constant monitoring and intervention to operate reliably and without interruption. We believe, therefore, that the facts gathered during the scientific considerations discussed confirm that the safety system of each country has its own, unique characteristics resulting from ongoing goals and objectives. But, in spite of their specific nature, these systems have many properties in common with other systems.

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