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The Role of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Case of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

Abstract: As Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the 2004 presidential election, it marked the end of Indonesia's democratic transition era and experienced a dynamic change in foreign policy. The new international identity that viewed Islam as an asset was introduced by SBY, emphasizing the importance of moderate Islam as opposing extremism. The phenomenon of Islamic influence was not only the result of democratic consolidation domestically but also external factors such as the aftermath of 9/11 that portrayed Muslims as potential terrorists. For this reason, Indonesian foreign policy attempted to diminish such misconceptions and tried to be a peacemaker or a mediator in Muslim-related issues globally. To contextualize the analysis, the study focuses on the influence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Pakistan. The mutual aspirations on the Palestinian statehood shared by both the government and the Muslim elements in society could be found, while religious sentiments were noticeable, as shown by the Muslim groups. In contrast, the influence of Islam in Indonesia-Pakistan relations, especially regarding the Kashmir dispute, was absent due to the difference in views of the government and the Muslim groups and constraining factors, including Indonesia's national interest priority.

Keywords: *democracy, national interest, Indonesian foreign policy, Islam in foreign policy, political Islam*

After successfully deepening democracy at home, the SBY administration had a strong interest in international issues to advance his foreign policy that was done by promoting a harmonious relationship between democracy and Islam (Sulistiyanto, 2010, p. 125). This concept was introduced by him in 2005 at Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) that moderate Islam¹ as Indonesia's international identity must be shown through foreign policy

¹ The optimism towards moderate Islam implemented by SBY's administration was considered as

and hence became the model of the rest of the world (Anwar, 2010). Although Indonesia is known as the world's largest populous Muslim country, this phenomenon was perceived as new and unique (Al-Anshori, 2016) as opposed to the previous eras where Islam was marginalized.

The increase of Islamic influence as the result of 9/11 brought Indonesia to these changes in its foreign policy, which was reflected in more active engagement in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Islamic-related issues worldwide (Murphy, 2012) as well as the continuous promotion of interfaith discussion programmes both nationally and internationally (Fanani, 2012). It aimed to reduce the negative perceptions towards Islam that has been portrayed as the terrorists' belief by the Western media (Al-Ansori, 2016; Anwar, 2010; Fanani, 2012). However, using Islam in the foreign policy was challenged by whether or not it was implemented both in form and substance. Consequently, this article attempts to answer the research question: to what extent does Islam influence Indonesian foreign policy? It is done by exploring and discerning how much weight it has on the Palestine-Israeli conflict and relations with Pakistan as the major case studies. Although Indonesian foreign policy maintains the component of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, it continues to demonstrate responses toward humanitarian issues, especially when Muslims are involved. Hence, the Palestine issue, which has been a cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy since the first Indonesian presidency, is substantial due to the Islamic principle that encourages Muslim identity to be more active and more vocal.

Literature Review

Many studies have been carried out regarding the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy, particularly during the SBY era where experts and scholars discuss and observe interrelated aspects and dimensions between Islam and world politics in Indonesia, including how Islam can be embedded in foreign policy, how to reflect it with the ideology of *Pancasila*, and others challenge the discourse. Furthermore, the works applied various empirical case studies to support their claims and different methods to test their arguments.

Some scholars emphasized the birth of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy was merely as a result of democratic consolidation where all groups and parties have a say on issues they are concerned about (Anwar, 2010; Al-Ansori, 2016), others specifically focus on the linkage between Islam, democracy, and *Pancasila* and how it suits Indonesian foreign policy (Fanani, 2012; Purwono, 2016) in which these three have common grounds to be used as fundamental and universal values relating with humanity, justice, and unity, etc. Another

a strategy to express the stance amid the opposition discourse between the West and Islam (Falahi, 2013). Schmid (2017) further explains that moderate Islam seeks the middle ground and balance as well as “manages conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, compromise and reform rather than through violent and confrontations that viewing others with good vs. evil terms” (p. 10).

conclusion drawn is that domestic politics is influenced by the Muslim groups that have been stirring the wheel of foreign policymaking on Islamic-related issues (Wicaksana, 2012; Christian & Putri, 2012). Sukma (2004) concludes that Islam in Indonesian foreign policy has been secondary since the independence era; the difference is only in packaging it as an international identity. In contrast, some scholars view that SBY has included Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy as proven by organizing global interfaith dialogues, becoming a mediator in the Muslim majority countries, and involving the Muslim groups in foreign policymaking such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU).

Other scholars see the new international identity of Indonesia proposed by SBY as a challenge. Embracing the status as the world's third-largest democracy and the largest Muslim nation is considered to be an advantage for Indonesian foreign policy in which according to Anwar (2010), it should be able to "promote Indonesia's interests; mediate international conflicts where Muslim interests are involved or provide an alternative model of modern Islamic society" (p. 49). In addition to that, some studies found that the reality is still far beyond that as it is necessary to see whether or not Islam is needed in entire foreign policy or only towards the Middle East (Falahi, 2013). For this reason, this paper tries to provide an analysis that may help understand how Islam plays its role in Indonesian foreign policy and whether or not it assists in achieving national interests and Muslim interests worldwide.

Theoretical Approach

Foreign policy study has been greatly influenced by realism and its branches, including neo-realism (Gindarsah, 2012), in which it shares the assumption that all states view each other as a potential enemy who pursues their national interest in an uncertain world (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009) to constantly ensure the survival of the state and the security of its people (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). In addition, the role of domestic politics plays an insignificant role in foreign policy. Instead, it focuses more on power maximization without interfering with domestic factors such as religion, ideology, and culture (Haque, 2003). Unlike neorealism, constructivism indicates openness to states' social identities that are believed to determine state behavior, relations, among others, etc. The identity of a country "shapes the process determining the way states interact according to their national interest" (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 223), and the power of norms and values cannot be neglected in the world politics. State behavior cannot be separated from domestic aspects where it develops (Hill, 2003). In other words, neorealism theorists argue that nothing can dictate state behavior even if it is internal and external factors as no states cannot be fully trusted, while constructivism theorists acknowledge the diversity of national interests that have been influenced by the state's identity, norms, and cultures.

With that in mind, the role of religion began to challenge secularism since 9/11 took place (Philpott, 2002). This moment started to raise awareness of the importance of religion and marked the return of religion to world politics. In this context, its return is "not to

change the political paradigm, but instead to include it as a variable” (Fox & Sandler, 2004; Philpott, 2002). They consider that religion should not be ignored as it is “an attribute of individuals and communities that have a role in institutional relations within a state” (Philpott, 2002), particularly “religious legitimacy and religion as a human worldview; both need to be taken into account” (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Religion is considered to have the ability to influence and shape public opinion, so it can influence international relations and “generate soft power characteristics” (Haynes, 2008). Although there have been limited discourses on the linkages between religion and foreign policy, several works of literature can be based on this regard. It has been argued that “religion has a potent power in foreign policy where it contains many core elements of identity” (Al-Anshori, 2016, p. 10) that is not only found in Islamic countries but also Western countries (Croft, 2009), such as the USA² and Russia³. In the US foreign policy, religion is used as “an instrument to provide moral justification and legitimation” (Bacevich & Prodromou, 2004), while in Russia, the concept of spirituality has been implemented in domestic politics, national security policy, and foreign policy (Blitt, 2010).

Talking about the linkage between Islam and foreign policy, Muslim majority countries can be divided into two categories: Islamic states and Muslim secular states. Islamic states like Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia reflect the belief and understanding that religion and state are inseparable. It is understood as a religion that teaches humans how to live life, including politics. Furthermore, Islam is believed “to contain the comprehensive holistic manner teachings” (A. Azra, 2006, p. 7) where “Islam offers a solution to all problems including socio-cultural, economic and political matters” (Effendy, 2003, p. 34). In contrast, secular Muslim states, i.e., Turkey and Malaysia, institutionally separate Islam and politics. This separation does not break the relationship between the two. In fact, Islamic values and principles, to some extent, are used in these states’ policies and legislation (Al-Anshori, 2016, p. 12). However, the states’ neutrality for not showing favoritism over one specific religion is extremely important. An-Na’im (2008) explains that “by following these principles, Muslim secular states will not forcefully implement Islamic law”.

Secular Muslim states such as Turkey and Malaysia can be used to show how Islam plays its role in foreign policy. Some studies have found that the role of Islam in Turkey’s foreign policy has gradually changed. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the government excluded religions from politics and thus had a limited role in foreign policy

² The 9/11 tragedy has made President George W. Bush reconsider the place of religion in giving a significant contribution to international politics. This has led to his successor, President Barack Obama, to employ religion in optimizing domestic support for foreign policy initiatives, such as on Middle Eastern issues (Marsden, 2011).

³ Russian Orthodox Church (ROS) has successfully influenced Russian foreign policy by demanding the government to reassess the state’s secular constitutional status and state-church relations (Marsden, 2011).

(Dikici Bilgin, 2008). However, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan came into power, he reorients and emphasizes strengthening relations with neighbors, including the Middle East and other Muslim majority countries (Cornell, 2012). Incorporating Islamic values and Muslimhood are considered as a way to fulfill the national interest and wealth and, in fact, viewed as “a historical asset in which its drive to become a regional leader and a respectable state within existing global power relations” (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2014, p. 308). As a result, Muslim-oriented considerations contribute and influence its foreign policymaking.

Meanwhile, Islam greatly influences the Malaysian political landscape, including foreign policy, as it is also the official religion. It is evident that Malaysia has shown its concern for and solidarity with Muslim causes on the Palestinian issue. Kutaisha (2006) asserts that “Islam is not only a crucial driving force in foreign policy but also an important factor in enhancing economic relations.” It becomes more salient after the 9/11 attack, which caused the world’s misperception of Islam, and Malaysia’s foreign policy “has placed Islam in the center of its public diplomacy” (Saravanamutu, 2010). Thus, it can be seen how governments utilize religion for power, legitimacy, and justification.

It is expected that Islam in Indonesian foreign policy shares a similar form with the secular Muslim states, with the exception that Islam is not always present in foreign policies like Turkish and Malaysian unless it is researched on a case-by-case basis. The challenge frequently faced by the state is that it needs to delicately find a balance in attaining national interest, maintaining a status of secular identity, and accommodating the Muslim group’s aspirations. Consequently, it is noteworthy to define what Islam refers to in foreign policy and to what degree it has to be; is it represented in rhetoric or substance?; is it used to legitimize and justify Indonesian foreign policy?; or is it only as a political purpose? Therefore, instead of seeing Islam as an idea or ideology, this article views it as a movement represented by the Muslim groups and Islamic parties and their influence in shaping Indonesian foreign policy. It is not possible to neglect the role of the Muslim groups and their moral responsibility to contribute and vocalize on the issues they are concerned about, which is more related to Muslim issues, both domestically and globally.

Methodology and Case Selection

A case study is an approach that was adopted in this study. It refers to “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within real-life context”, including individual life, organization behavior, social change, and international relations (Yin, 2003, p. 2). It is believed to be suitable for this study as it allows “the researcher to trace historical events, causes, consequences, and provide an insightful explanation” (Mayan, An introduction to qualitative methods: A training for students and professionals, 2001) and to discern how “human beings interpret the world and their social phenomena” (Willis, Jost, and Nilakanta, 2007) as well as “to explore a phenomenon using a variety of data sources” (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Therefore, a case study is selected because it is instrumental in providing deep insight

into an issue (Stake, 1995). This article attempts to explore the role of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy.

SBY's administration was particularly selected as it was when Islam was viewed as an asset as opposed to his predecessors. He projected democracy and Islam "as the two elements of soft power in Indonesian diplomacy" (Sukma, 2011), as Indonesia is known as the world's biggest Muslim country and the world's third-largest democracy. As a result, during his two leadership terms, 2004–2009 and 2009–2014, SBY gained support from all Islamic political parties and thus was considered that SBY had taken Islam into consideration (Al-Anshori, 2016).

In relation to the cases, this article has chosen Indonesian foreign policy towards the Palestine-Israel conflict and its relations with Pakistan to explore the role of Islam represented by the Muslim groups in Indonesia's foreign policy. The following are the reasons why these cases are selected respectively. Since the independence era, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been continuously the main interest in the foreign policy to Indonesian Muslims, proven by the shared position among Muslim groups and the government; given the fact that it is a sensitive issue to the Indonesian majority as it involves the US and Israel, this issue requires substantial support and initiatives made by the government to help the Palestine statehood as demanded by the Muslim community (Al-Anshori, 2016). As for the case of Pakistan, firstly, two countries' demographic background as the world's highest Muslim population; 87% and 96% of the total population⁴ would theoretically involve their Islamic identity in the interaction and relationship; secondly, apart from the historical aspect where Pakistan and Indonesia relation were well-established before gaining independence, and some streets in Pakistan were dedicated for the first Indonesian president, the partnership started to re-grow during Soeharto's era over Kashmir and even stronger when SBY came to power marked by the defense cooperation (Qureshi, 2018).

Role of Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy under SBY

It is noteworthy to include the role theory in foreign policy in the article since it helps understand Indonesian foreign policy. As discussed by scholars, there are four concepts used to analyze foreign policy that was introduced by Holsti (1970), namely "role conception (declared), role performance (enacted), role prescription (expected) and the state's position" (Grzywacz, 2020, p. 730). Holsti's role theory emphasizes the importance of the internal condition of a state and the perceptions of them given by the international environment.

In the Indonesian context, the role conception formulized by SBY was somewhat unique. He had a strong desire to establish a new image of Indonesia's national identity to other nations, which differs from the previous eras. Through independent and active foreign policy, the national identity of Indonesia that is open, confident, tolerant, moderate, and

⁴ Reported by Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia and Pakistan in 2010 and 2011, respectively.

outward-looking should be well-projected. This Indonesia's international identity, according to SBY, should be deeply rooted in a strong sense of "who we are, what we believe in, and project them in our foreign policy". The following is the portion of his speech:

"We are the fourth most populous nation in the world. We are home to the world's largest Muslim population. We are the world's third-largest democracy. We are also a country where democracy, Islam, and modernity go hand in hand. We will stay our course with ASEAN as the cornerstone of our foreign policy. And our heart is always with the developing world to which we belong. These are things that define who we are and what we do in the community of nations" (Anwar, 2010).

This speech illustrates that there was a desire to transform the country's new international identity. From the speech, there is a distinction between the foreign policy under SBY and his predecessors, which lies on the cornerstone of political situations that either took place at home or in international arenas. For instance, Murphy (2009) explains that in the Soekarno era, "Indonesia's legitimacy and international role were based on nationalism, advocating third world solidarity, successful economic development and its role in the regional order" (p. 85). It indicated that Soekarno established international identity through the relationship with the outside world. Meanwhile, for SBY, it was based on "utilizing its status as the world's third-largest democracy and largest Muslim nation" (Murphy, 2009, p. 65), which was derived from the domestic transformation and what Indonesia possesses, which Holsti considers as the prominent aspect in playing a role in the international community.

Islam was considered an asset to the process of democracy in Indonesia from 1998 until 2004. According to Nakamura, Indonesia has over 88% of its total population that is approximately 220 million who are Muslim, which cannot be ignored. This number which is bigger than the total Arab Muslim population in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Central Asia (Nakamura, 2005), really showed that there is a democratic government in the Muslim world that should be taken into account. It is thus undeniable that Islam gained its place in conducting Indonesian foreign policy during the SBY era. It was proven that in many international forums, he frequently talked about the Islamic factor in Indonesian foreign policy. One of the examples is in Washington DC, where SBY stated that "in a world haunted by a clash of civilizations, Indonesia remains a shining example where democracy, Islam and modernity thrive together" (Yudhoyono, 2009). Also, on another occasion which was the 11th Summit of the OIC, he asserted Islam and democracy are not only compatible but also flourish together as well as among our strongest advocates of democracy are political parties with strong Islamic platforms" (Fanani, 2012). The Foreign Minister also put forward "both the government and Indonesian Muslims have a commitment to actualizing Islam as *rahmatan lil-'alamin* (mercy for all people)" (Sukma, 2004). These statements are important to bear in mind that there is new development about the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. In fact, to promote SBY's reputation nationally and internationally, it was driven by Islamic ideas (I. W. Wicaksana, 2012, p. 52) where he appointed a special envoy to foster peace and collaboration as well as prove the Western media wrong that Islam is backward, violent, and against women.

Promoting moderate Islam was found in Indonesian politics and the biggest moderate Islamic organizations like Muhammadiyah and NU. These two organizations contributed to the decreasing number of radical Islamist groups and religious communalism (Nakamura, 2005, pp. 25-33). The endorsement of both political parties and such organizations towards *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution indicated that Muslims prefer secular democracy, which resulted in democracy and Islam positively got along together (Buehler, 2009). This view is strengthened by Hadiwinata and Agustin, who assert that Indonesia can be considered the best example of the compatibility of Islam with democracy (Hadiwinata & Agustin, 2011, pp. 59-60). One example of promoting moderate Islam is establishing the Indonesia-UK Islamic Advisory Council (Sukma, 2009).

Indonesian Foreign Policy towards the Palestine-Israel Conflict

Indonesia has consistently shown its support for the Palestinian cause since the era of Soekarno. It has been demonstrated through international forums, including the United Nations. In fact, domestic politics in Indonesia mostly express “sentiments of supports for Palestine and enmity towards Israel” (Lukens-Bull & Woodward, 2011). In other words, supporting Palestine is considered non-controversial by the majority of Indonesians.

The question ‘is Islam the main factor in supporting Palestine’ has been discussed and debated by scholars. For instance, Suryadinata (1996) and Perwita (2007) argue that since the era of Soeharto until today, the issue of Palestine is not a religious sentiment, including the stance of not recognizing Israel as a state is merely based on the Third World solidarity rather than Islamic factor. Sihbudi (1997), on the other hand, put forward Indonesia’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, including Palestine, which cannot be separated from the Islamic factor. Whatever it is, Indonesia has continuously committed to supporting the struggle of the Palestinians to gain its independence and rights according to international law and the mandate to get rid of colonialism as enshrined in Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution.

As soon as SBY came into power, he affirmed that Indonesia would not recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Israel until Palestine became an independent state living side-by-side with Israel (Al-Anshori, 2016). It is also demonstrated during the Asian-African Summit in Jakarta in 2005, in which Indonesia proposed the adoption of the Declaration on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) that was signed by 106 states including Palestine as the participating country. The document states that the Asian and African countries’ support Palestine, as follows:

“We express our abhorrence that, fifty years since the 1955 Bandung Conference the Palestinian people remain deprived of their right to independence; we remain steadfast in our support for the Palestinian people and the creation of a viable and sovereign Palestinian state in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions” (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Declaration on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership, 2005, pp. 1-2).

SBY carried on this effort by conducting the NAASP Ministerial Conference on Capacity Building for Palestine in Jakarta in 2008. Indonesia would offer capacity-building opportunities to 1000 Palestinians over five years (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2011) where it resulted in 1200 Palestinians took part in the programme in 2008–2013. In addition to that, the conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD) was held and initiated by Indonesia and Japan to invite other East Asian countries to support Palestine. Fardah (2015) asserts that the countries participating in CEAPAD should have concrete contributions to Palestine's nation-building efforts.

In making an effort to play a greater role in the peace settlement in Palestine, Indonesia has been majorly constrained and limited by the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel (Xinhua, Indonesia says little chance to open ties with Israel, 2006). In fact, in 2005, SBY demonstrated his desire and commitment to visit Palestine (Sabri, 2012) and willed to have a more important role in the peace process in the Middle East during the Asian-African Summit in Jakarta (Jakarta Post, Susilo to visit US, Palestine in September, 2005), but then it was all hindered and would not be easily organized considering Palestine is under the Israeli occupation. In addition to that, Indonesia's involvement requires an offer from the Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan, which give it a relatively less chance to do so (Kemham, Rapat kerja menteri luar negeri dengan Komisi I Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat RI (Meeting between foreign minister and Commission I, DPR RI) 9 December 2004, 2004). Although there had been rumors that SBY's administration might have relations with Israel, it was denied (BBC, 2005) and instead reiterated that Indonesia should become "a direct peace broker between Palestine and Israel" (Al-Anshori, 2016, pp. 185-6). Nonetheless, one of the Indonesian Parliament members made a controversial proposal that Indonesia should start diplomatic relations with Israel, in which, upon hearing that, angry reactions were triggered, and the Muslim groups and the Islamic political parties strongly refused. Similarly, the visit of Israel by the representative of one Indonesian nationalist party received a harsh reaction and was perceived to offend Muslim people (Waskita, 2013) coming from the Muslim groups including Muhammadiyah, NU, Indonesian Ulama Forum, and other Islamic political parties and organizations. Eventually, the representative publicly apologized (Tribunnews, 2013), clarified, and reaffirmed his support to Palestine (Maruli, 2013).

Being aware of the biggest stumbling block faced by Indonesia to become the peacemaker in the Palestine-Israel conflict (Xinhua, Indonesia says little chance to open ties with Israel, 2006), which was the absence of diplomatic ties with Israel, did not stop SBY to come up and consider intentions to support Palestine. For instance, although Indonesia could not establish an Indonesian consulate in Ramallah, it managed to find "a workable form, namely the appointment of an honorary Indonesian consul to Ramallah" (Al-Anshori, 2016) that was done by conveying a letter to President Mahmoud Abbas from SBY in Jordan in 2012. This appointment process has been carried on by President Joko Widodo in which the Foreign Minister, Retno L. Marsudi, stated in 2015 that "Indonesia will establish an Honorary Consulate in Ramallah in the near future to complements its embassy accredited

to Palestine based in Amman, Jordan to forge a closer relationship to Palestine” (Marsudi, 2015, p. 8). Such high supports and shared concerns about Palestine statehood were shown by nationalists and Islamic parties, and the members of parliament.

Another attempt done for Palestine was that Indonesia, together with other countries, “frequently co-sponsored UNGA resolution 67/19 that conferred Palestine with a non-member state status” (Al-Anshori, 2016, p. 192). Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Natalegawa, used this UNGA session to have meetings for the sake of Palestinian statehood with the Palestinian Committee, Brazil, India, South Africa in 2011 (Antara, 2011), and the OIC ministers in New York. The idea was all promoted by Indonesia to Non-Alignment Movement countries during the meeting in Bali, 2011, where initially only 113 countries recognized Palestine to 132 in 2012 when the UN voting was carried out (Indonesian Foreign Affairs, 2012). In the following year, the Indonesian parliament established the Group of Bilateral Cooperation between Indonesia and Palestine (Ramadhan, 2012).

When Israel attacked Gaza in 2009, most Indonesian media, both TV and newspapers, were flooded with coverage of the brutal Israeli attacks that drew reactions from the Muslim groups demanding the government to take immediate actions against Israel. As a response to it, the government “condemned and urged Israel to respect international law, humanitarian law, and human rights law” (Al-Anshori, 2016), and through the Seventh Parliamentary Union of the OIC Conference, Indonesia proposed and agreed to send a delegation to Gaza (Purwadi, 2012) regardless of its outcomes. Furthermore, as a member of both UNHCR and NAM, Indonesia pushed for a special meeting in 2009 (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2014) in which SBY expressed his disappointment when witnessing the negligent response of the UNSC and Israel’s disdain for the UNSC resolution (Jakarta Post, 2009) that resulted in SBY found the resolution 1860 was not strong enough to condemn Israel (Lacey, 2009). Aside from diplomatic efforts, humanitarian aid and donations were also provided by the government and the Muslim groups (Hendropriyono, 2009) and annual contributions to the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine in the Near East (UNRWA). As for the Muslim groups, a wide range of supports were demonstrated, such as protests and mass rally demanding the government to take a strong stance against Israel, instructing their organizations to take necessary actions, calling out to Israel to stop through media, sending humanitarian aids, and wishing to send volunteers to Gaza for the sake of jihad but the government refused it as it was not helpful to reach the true aim.

Taking everything into account, it can be seen that both the government and the Muslim groups are in agreement and unity when it comes to the Palestinian issue. They strongly view that Palestine has been under attack and suppression of Israel, which rights have been violated. They also shared the view that the UNSC does not do enough to solve the Palestine issue and force Israel to comply with the resolutions, and the US applies a double standard when it comes to Israel’s actions. In addition, when it comes to opening a diplomatic tie with Israel, all elements of Indonesian Muslims would be the first to deny and disagree with the idea and thus prioritize and view the issue from the Palestinian perspective. Nonetheless,

they have a different view of the basic argument behind the Indonesian policy towards Israel. The government bases its action on the constitution that mandates the abolition of colonialism, human rights violations, territorial issues, and humanitarian crises. At the same time, the Muslim groups admit that it is a religious sentiment and conflict between Islam and Judaism. Even though the government did not formally argue that the Palestinian issue is related to religious factors, it has seemingly tried to accommodate the Muslim majority's beliefs and aspirations, which align with the 1945 Constitution.

Indonesian Foreign Policy toward Pakistan

In the aftermath of 9/11, Indonesia and Pakistan embarked on the journey to combat terrorism. Apart from the improving relations in economy and trade, the defense cooperation became even stronger when the second Bali bombings took place, in which the government realized the severe impact of radicalism that threatens national security. Realizing the growing number of Islamic militants in both countries brought them to promote anti-terrorism cooperation and security needs. Since the religious factor was involved in this issue, 'Islam' cannot be neglected.

It is necessary to note that formal counterterrorism cooperation between these two countries was achieved when SBY came to office in 2004 and visited Islamabad. His visit was to sign the Accords of Terrorism signed by both countries on 24 November 2005 to establish a joint working group to combat terrorism through information sharing and joint law enforcement (TEMPO, 2005). Pakistan is considered to have a growing significance for its regional security policy. As asserted by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda in the 11th ASEAN Summit, Pakistan is Indonesia and ASEAN's vital partner in countering transnational terrorism (Yahya, 2004). Furthermore, the other reasons as to why Pakistan is viewed as crucial in this field, namely "Pakistan has placed itself as the frontline state to combat terrorist of al Qaeda working from its country borders with Afghanistan" (Bubalo, Phillips, & Yasmeen, 2011) and "President Pervez Musharraf had initiated reform to *madrasahs* in the country to restrain militancy" (Noor, 2008, pp. 144-5). In fact, together with ASEAN, Pakistan decided on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a basis for the two parties' practices of stronger and peaceful relationships. Pranomo and Bandoro agreed that strengthening counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan "in terms of intelligence sharing can enhance the Indonesian regional security policy that focuses on three pillars, namely the Southeast Asia Centre for Counterterrorism and the Law Enforcement Academy and Cooperation" (Yahya, 2004).

However, this partnership was not free from criticisms. The weak framework, lack of details about the planning and implementation, and insufficient infrastructure are the most highlighted issues. The real condition in Pakistan was ineffective in watching, reforming, and controlling all *madrasahs* throughout the country that were engaged in militant group influence. It is also supported by the International Crisis Group (2007) that Pakistani

madrasahs did not as planned and extremism continues to grow. In addition, the criticism became louder when the bombing of J.W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels Jakarta on July 17, 2009 took place. The partnership on fighting extremism was perceived unreliable and unrealistic as the two states “did not have an impact on eradicating acts of terrorism” (I.W. Wicaksana, 2012). In response to such criticisms, the government of both countries argued that Indonesia-Pakistan anti-terror collaboration on combatting terrorism and abolishing radical and extremism is underway; just because attacks happened does not necessarily mean and “could be concluded that the intergovernmental measures had failed, but rather Indonesia working out the issue here, while Pakistan helps us from there” (I.W. Wicaksana, 2012, p. 263). Ansyaad adds that Indonesia and Pakistan were preparing to organize a de-radicalization programme by teaching true Islam and moderate Islamic figures to *madrasahs* (Kemham, 2004). Apart from this, the concrete result of the partnership was the capture of one of the most wanted Jemaah Islamiyah military figures, Umar Patek, by Pakistani police on January 25, 2011, which linked to the information about the presence of Osama bin Laden (Oak, 2010).

This effort in combatting religious radicalism gained full support from the Muslim groups. It is necessary to mention that only moderate Muslim groups showed that radical groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah became the mutual enemy and thus needed to be de-radicalized. The concrete achievement from the counterterrorism partnership of the two countries was the creation of a channel to expose “terrorist suspect without formal extradition mechanisms” (I.W. Wicaksana, 2012, p. 264) in which the most wanted Jemaah Islamiyah militant figure was captured in January 2011 and led to information about other most wanted terrorists such as Osama bin Laden (Qureshi, 2018). Hence, cooperation had become more comprehensive and improved in assessing hidden terrorist groups.

Another important issue to discuss between these states is the issue of Kashmir. Since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia’s response toward Muslim-related issues such as Kashmir was hoped to change for the better. However, after including SBY, the presidency seemed to continue the attitude of his predecessors, which remains impartial (I.W. Wicaksana, 2012) as it was due to the tsunami in Aceh that brought the issue slightly hidden. In fact, the Kashmir issue disappeared from Indonesia-Pakistan talks during his visit in 2005 (Yahya, 2004). Similarly, President Musharraf did not discuss the Kashmir problem on a visit to Jakarta in 2007 (Hussain, 2007). There could be some reasons why Pakistan was committed not to talk about it with ASEAN member countries, especially in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Meanwhile, it cannot be avoided that on some occasions, Indonesia has a willingness to be a mediating role for the India-Pakistan dispute, only if they asked. Hassan Wirayuda stated that the unwanted involvement of a third party would only deteriorate the situations (Yahya, 2004). Consequently, Indonesia had no moral duty to interfere in the dispute.

Another reason that Indonesia did want to offend India’s position regarding the Kashmir issue was the strategic partnership between the two countries made in 2005. The scheme covered cooperation in defense, economic, and technology sectors (L.P. Singh, 1967). Specifi-

cally, in the SBY era, the relation between India and Indonesia got better, and they viewed each other as a partner in economic development (Yumitro, 2014). Considering the economy is at the top priority, it is unlikely that Indonesia would undertake policies that render India upset, which is to support the Islamic cause in Kashmir.

Just like the issue of Palestine statehood, to facilitate aids for the Kashmir issue, the role of Muslim groups was significant. Kashmir Solidarity Forum (KSF) of Indonesia, unlike the militant groups, did not organize mass rallies to demonstrate their views and feelings about Kashmir. Rather they were actively involved in seminars, discussions, fundraising, and humanitarian purposes (I.W. Wicaksana, 2012). For instance, KSF successfully collected donations worth IDR 15 million in 2006 to help the Kashmiri refugees. In addition, they also worked on information technology to combat terrorism propaganda, such as arrahmah.com, where the Ministry of Communication and Information of Indonesia considered it a radical jihad website. However, this advocacy for the struggle of Kashmiris was not fully heard by the government and thus had insufficient power to influence the foreign policymaking process. The gap and distance between the Muslim groups and the government's aspirations on this particular issue existed. In fact, foreign policy was greatly influenced by the elite's interest, where economic and geopolitical developments were prioritized.

In conclusion, Indonesia and Pakistan came together to combat Islamic extremism. It is fair to say that it was all about the effort of moderate Muslims to demolish radical Muslims' propaganda. Although Indonesia did not specifically express formal Islamic terms in the partnership, the influence of the Islamic component could be noticed. SBY's administration and other Indonesian Muslim groups did not support the concept of terrorism that is linked to Islam. Rather it takes action cautiously when there is adequate evidence to combat terrorism acts. Compared to the Kashmir issue, both the government and the Muslim groups did not show full support as reflected in their foreign policy. It was mostly hindered by the state interest and a diplomatic tie with the two conflicting countries, namely India and Pakistan.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, the influence of Islam has been secondary in Indonesian foreign policy. However, since this article has specifically defined Islam as movements represented by the involvement of the Muslim groups in formulating and shaping foreign policy, there has been a greater influence than it previously was, particularly during the SBY presidency. With the consolidation of democracy, Islam has been given a place to develop domestic and foreign policy. It also confirms that the increased influence of Islam occurs accompanied by Muslim groups' aspirations during the SBY era. In other words, the increase in utilizing Islam in foreign policy can be measured through the involvement of the Muslim groups.

The cases being observed show various results to how much degree Islam influences foreign policy. As per the case of the Palestine-Israel dispute, it can be seen that Islamic

influence, to some extent, has been found particularly the participation and aspirations of the Muslim groups to prevent the government from establishing diplomatic ties with Israel and even to put pressure that the Palestine issue should be put on the priority list in Indonesian foreign policy. Additionally, the shared aspirations could be found in the views of the Muslim groups ranging from Islamic organizations, political parties, members of parliaments, etc. The effort was based on the Muslim *ummah* solidarity. On the other hand, the government believed that the Indonesian stance for the case aligns with the 1945 Constitution despite its noticeable religious sentiment.

Unlike the case above, in the context of Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan, it suggests that the government used Islam to a limited degree. The partnership was mostly based on secular economic and political agendas. Nonetheless, the role of Islam in counter-terrorism partnership could be seen. Both sides agreed that the true Islamic teaching could abolish Islamic radicalism reflected by utilizing *madrasahs* to realize this re-radicalization goal. In this regard, the role of the Muslim groups existed and acted more like the moderate Muslim groups against radical Muslim groups. In contrast, when it comes to the issue of Kashmir, the place of Islam was absent. Although the Muslim group, such as KSE, constantly vocalized the struggle for Kashmir, it did not share a similar view with the government as it was constrained by the fact that Indonesia developed diplomatic relations with both India and Pakistan, especially in economy and trade. As a result, Indonesia did not wish to offend them and deteriorate the situation and chose to stay uninvolved.

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