

# ANALYSIS OF PARTY MOTIVES INTERESTED IN IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

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## *Abstract*

In order to have a clear overview regarding the Iranian nuclear program, and whether any indication that Iran has deviated from its peaceful nuclear program, we must investigate Iran's true motive for possessing nuclear weapons. Analyzing every detail of the reasons and motive of Iran, Iran's covert actions on one side and the motive of the western countries on the other side to accuse Iran of enriching uranium illegally, and after summarizing and analyzing all the "points", then it will be easier to have a clear overview over the suspected Iranian nuclear program. This paper will use the method of analyzing and comparing the motivation and reasons *pro and contra* regarding processing and possession of nuclear weapons. This scientific article will contribute to clarifying the whole puzzle of the Iranian nuclear crisis, which itself incorporates different significant factors such as: legal, political, security one.

**Keyword:** *Iran, nuclear weapon, motive, western countries.*

**JEL Classification:** K33

## **1. Iran's motivation to produce nuclear weapon**

To understand whether Iran has deviated from its nuclear program toward building the nuclear weapons and to consider the possibility of resolving this ongoing international dispute, it is very necessary to be approached scientifically to this country's motive for possessing nuclear weapons<sup>2</sup>. Analyzing this Iranian motive should be in correlation with other states' motive (NWS - Nuclear Weapon States - NWS are states considered to be states who have legally tested Nuclear Weapons before NPT - Nuclear Proliferation Treaty entered in force) which already possess nuclear weapons whether they are legally or illegally. As a beginning the opinions of the majorities policy makers and scholars in this field, who argue a set of reasons that can lead a country to produce or possess nuclear weapons must be considered. According to them, one of the main reasons that most of the countries want to be protected from external military threat that threatens its internal and external security, since it cannot find other alternative means to guarantee its own security<sup>3</sup>. For example, one of these countries is considered to be Israel, which wishes to achieve its national security by possessing such weapons (eg. Israel deters Arab neighbor countries invasion, considers developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent and tool that could be used as a 'last resort').

Furthermore, NWS are hesitant to disarm or put away nuclear weapons, since they would lose their national prestige in the international system. This can be proven by mentioning of all permanent members of the UN Security Council who are in possession of nuclear weapons. Such weapons could give more dominant position to a state in the region. Eg. France and the United Kingdom, having nuclear weapons, are able to guarantee the preservation and growth of influence in the international system which are considered to be anarchic where the most powerful state dominates the arena according to the Realism Theory<sup>4</sup>.

Analyzing and comparing this uncontested motive of the NWS states, we may come to the same conclusion that states which possess such weapons - NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon State) are increasing their prestige.

Another factor that states may tend to produce or possess the weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is keeping the influence of political leaders, who, for internal political reasons, tend to

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<sup>2</sup> Sherrill, Clifton W., *Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy*, „Nonproliferation Review”, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2012, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Sagan, Scott D., *Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb*, „International Security”, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996-1997, p. 54-86.

<sup>4</sup> Frank, Barnaby, *How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and other weapons of mass destruction*, Nation Books, 2004, p. 4-5.

maintain and increase their political power within their own country. This can be used as well as very effective mean to deconsecrate population from socio-economic problems in that country (eg. North Korea). Another above - mentioned factor of motivation such is regional domination, can be mentioned in the case of India, where nowadays this country already has to nuclear weapons, it has partly to do with influence of government within its own country, it has to increase Pakistan's awareness of its power and it has also to improve its own security against China. However, as a negative consequence possession of WMD can usually have a chain reaction in some regions, where neighbor countries naturally feel endangered and forced to seek, and develop nuclear weapon and to follow the above mentioned examples. For instance, Pakistan felt very pressured to start nuclear program since India had already developed and tested nuclear weapon<sup>5</sup>.

As for Iran's case it seems that the same factors may be affected to determine the path of this country toward nuclear bomb. Primarily it can be the security from outside threats, partly to dominate the region, as well as balancing Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, it can be of an inevitable very certain motivation that this state could shift its peaceful nuclear program toward nuclear bomb. The question could be arisen how Iran could get a bomb? The basis and strategy of Iran's nuclear weapons build-up could be possible only if Iran takes very covert actions under the shadow of its peaceful nuclear energy program, which is essentially considered to be legal. While exploiting this situation, after reaching the international political it is needed only a political decision to build a nuclear weapon. Iran's interest in developing nuclear capabilities, as stated above, appears to be one of the crucial priorities of its political leadership in order to extend the life and ensure the survival of its regime. From the historical perspective, the above mentioned data seems to be very reasonable since the revolutionary government of the Islamic Republic has started be from its first day in power until nowadays. The danger and threaten of this government comes as the result of bad relations with the United States and Israel. The presence of the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in the Persian Gulf and in the region in general, continues to increase and influence on Iranian frustration as a very possible and real threat to its own national security. Hence the possession of such nuclear bomb viewed from the Iranian security perspective will restrain enemy to intervene in internal affairs. Some scholars think that Iran's nuclear ambitions are rooted in the country's aspiration to politically dominate the Middle East and repeatedly attack other countries (Saudi Arabia, Israel) in the region, increasing its influence by pressuring and promoting destabilization<sup>6</sup>. Some authors argue that main Iran's motivation for possessing nuclear weapons has to do with concealing its own domestic economic issues, avoiding domestic criticism by public opinion and disorienting it by a possible internal counter-revolution<sup>7</sup>.

One of the reasons why Iran might seek security under the umbrella of nuclear weapons is the stalemate in military modernization, which has been limited as the result of external restrictions due to the Iran-Iraq war. After nearly eight-year war, and the change in the international system, Iran was left without any foreign ally. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the death of Aytollah Homeini in 1989, made this country to be rely only in nuclear weapons and terrorist groups<sup>8</sup>.

If Iran possesses the WMD, it will automatically be elevated to the status of its international power, and this will enable this state to rank in the future with very powerful states such as: The U.S, other Western countries, China and Russia, especially during negotiations will increase its status on the table. Bearing in mind that Iran is the largest state in the Persian Gulf, at a very important geostrategic point (Hormuz) - it can control this point, blocking it from time to time and denying other states to access, in the same time will also protect his vital interest in the region more

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, *Did Ahmadinejad Really Say that Israel Should be „Wiped off the Map“?*, „The Fact Checker, Washington Post“, October 5, 2011, [www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really-say-israel-should-be-wipedoff-the-map/2011/10/04/gIQABJIKML\\_blog.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really-say-israel-should-be-wipedoff-the-map/2011/10/04/gIQABJIKML_blog.html), visited 16.02.2016.

<sup>7</sup> Sherrill, Clifton, *op. cit.*, 2012, p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> Major Thomas, Galasz Nielsen, *What can Iran gain by having a nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilize security in the Middle East?*, Institute for Strategy and Danish Institute for International Studies, Royal Danish Defence College, June, 2015, p. 8.

easily<sup>9</sup>.

The following analysis and data prove that Iran wants to increase its influence in the region. Looking at it from a historical perspective, Iran failed to defeat Iraq militarily, but the country has consistently tried and continues to make such efforts to become a major regional power by competing with Saudi Arabia. Former competition with Iraq has come to an end after the US overthrew Saddam Hussein and devastated its military capabilities. Moreover, today Iran can influence the current government in Baghdad with the support of the Shiite population. Furthermore, Iran is operating under pressure from harsh sanctions imposed by the UN and the Western countries, however it has chosen perfidy methods to maximize its influence in the region. These countries including Syria, Yemen and Hezbollah, could increase fears and destabilization of Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain and Israel. Influence of Iran's political and religious rhetoric has often placed it in an ideological competition with other regional countries, especially Saudi Arabia which was constantly threatened by Iran's efforts. All these ambitions of Iran create an external security dilemma, driven by Iran's efforts to stir up unrest in other countries. All these efforts taken and exploited by Iranian regime are very effective in a region with different conglomerate socio-economic problems and religious divergence<sup>10</sup>.

All of above-mentioned Iran's ambitions, motives, and reasons make this country very potential to take action to divert its nuclear peaceful program.

## 2. Western motivation to accuse Iran on nuclear program

To reach a scientific truth about the Iranian nuclear program, one must look at the other side of the spectrum, which might be the West's motives for accusing Iran of possessing nuclear weapons. One must keep in mind a lot of data, where if analyzed objectively then the situation could be 'clarified' even more. These data give another clue, dates to the 1980s. According to the data from intelligence services and individuals linked to the Israeli intelligence service, they have begun preparing the ground to accuse Iran for building nuclear weapons. For example, according to the July 1984 State Department Bulletin, Kenneth L. Adelman, then Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, addressing the "Mid-America Committee" in Chicago, states that countries such as Iran, Libya, or the Palestine Liberation Organization adopt nuclear bombs. Iran side, which it had imported from Pakistan, based on West German intelligence data. According to his declarations, Iran is only two years away from acquiring nuclear weapons<sup>11</sup>.

By continuously and chronologically analyzing such decades-long reports, we can finally draw a scientific conclusion that might be ambiguous. For example, another US intelligence report, published in the 1990s, states that Iran is continuing its nuclear weapons capability and that if it has external support, it is very likely that it will be able to produce nuclear weapons by at the end of the decade 2000. The report further paraphrases the Iranian government's declarations, which presents its plans to expand its dependence on nuclear power in order to generate more electricity. According to the interpretation of this report, Iran says that it intends to build additional reactors to generate 20,000 megawatts of energy within the next 20 years<sup>12</sup>.

Other data suggest that some US officials, in the early 1990s, were preoccupied and preparing - a case for Iran. Their 'preoccupation' concerned that Iran would be able to possess nuclear weapons by the year 2000. These data are corroborated by The Houston Chronicle dated March 28, 1992. This magazine interprets the CIA Director's report. Robert Gates, who had said Iran was continuing to develop nuclear weapons by the year 2000<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> *Idem*, p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Sasan Fayazmanesh, *The United States and Iran sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008, p. 133.

<sup>12</sup> Paul K. Kerr, *Iran's Nuclear Program: Status*, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, RL34544, October 17, 2012, www.crs.gov, consulted on 1.10.2019.

<sup>13</sup> Sasan Fayazmanesh, *op. cit.*, 2008, p. 133-134.

Even the new CIA director, Woolsey, had the same declaration as his predecessor before Congress. That led to the IAEA's move, where its experts visited Iran, but found no indication at the time where Iran was developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, Mr. Woolsey continued to insist that "We believe that within the next 10 years, Iran may be able to build such weapons and that if it provides outside assistance this deadline will be even more critical in achieving this goal"<sup>14</sup>.

Statements by the US intelligence community continued throughout the 2000s, which stated that Iran had the technological and industrial capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, but the US government estimated that Tehran did not have all the technological capabilities needed to build nuclear weapons. American intelligence community statements have often been controversial and contradictory. In November 2007, states that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. While several years later, President Obama has said that his goal of a comprehensive agreement is to extend Iran's time needed to produce enough deployable material for a nuclear weapon in a range of six months to a year, and to improve the ability of the international community to detect such a scenario<sup>15</sup>.

If we analyze the above reports and the time period at the time of this article, which are numerous (and may not all be mentioned) all official declarations in succession since the 1980s to date have not substantiated their accuracy. Iran has no nuclear weapons today, so the reports and declarations, if viewed from an Iranian perspective, appear to be fabricated lies in order to exert constant pressure on this state<sup>16</sup>.

What is important to note is that no one from outside knows whether Iran has decided to produce nuclear weapons or not. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has consistently sought data to answer questions whether Iran has decided and coordinated military action aimed at exploring a nuclear weapons program<sup>17</sup>.

On the other hand, President Ahmadinejad's declarations, during a speech at his Natanz nuclear facility in April 2007, said that "... it will not allow some powers to harass and hinder its progress. We will continue to achieve our goals"<sup>18</sup>.

The statements of the Iranian President, if analyzed from the perspective of the western countries, appear to be very ambiguous. Iran's motive to build nuclear weapons from the perspective of Western countries is also based on Iran's actions, which they say are too ambiguous as to the lack of timely reporting to the IAEA. All of this is not that Iran was unaware of its obligations under the IAEA-Iran safeguards agreement, but that such actions should be understood as deliberate and consciously prolonged by authority of Tehran. It should be borne in mind that a variety of actions by the Iranian authorities in the context of the period under review relate to major regional or global political events. For example, there are interventions in the Gulf War in 1991, where the international community has not been so interested in the Iranian nuclear program, avoiding Israel, which has continuously alerted the international public and the media for suspicious Iranian actions. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the aftermath of the Iraq War have also led Iran to take such actions, which we will illustrate below. It is not here that Iran has not been frightened of US attacks, but given the unity of the fragile international factor regarding the Iraq war, internal public pressure in Britain and the US, Iran has been convinced that it will not to have outside attacks. So its game with the IAEA is more of a political rather than a legal and technical one<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Katzman Kenneth, Kerr Paul K., John Garcia Michael, *Iran: Efforts to Achieve a Nuclear Accord*, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R43333 April 9, 2015, www.crs.gov, consulted on 1.10.2019, p. 2-4.

<sup>16</sup> Sasan Fayazmanesh, *op. cit.*, 2008, 133-134.

<sup>17</sup> Patrick M. Cronin., *Double trouble: Iran and North Korea as challenges to international security*, Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, 2008, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> *Idem*, p. 25.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

### 3. Conclusions

Since the first declarations of the Iranian opposition in exile, the IAEA has issued at least 50 reports and resolutions regarding peaceful usage of nuclear program. In these documents - reports are also incorporated the answering reports of Iran sent to the relevant agency. By analyzing them and reading and interpreting them between the lines, we will be able to understand the actions taken by the Iranian authorities, whether they are in accordance with the requirements of the safeguards provisions of the agreement or not. An objective analysis of these reports, which are purely technical, reveals that Iran's actions toward nuclear program have been highly suspicious and possess major legal and political implications for international security. Based on the analysis it is very important to understand, that the Republic of Iran in certain cases appears to be very cooperative with the IAEA authorities and the international community by answering periodically to the IAEA - which Tehran was obliged to do.

Findings over motivation over Iranian nuclear program are as follow:

The will and motivation to produce and possess nuclear weapon it is uncontested matter as a result of seeking secure from outside intervention, dominate region, increasing its prestige, as well as deconsecrate population from socio-economic problems, and balancing Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.

The will and motivation of western countries and Israel to accuse Iran for building up a nuclear weapon it seems to be more exaggerated than realistic one.

Moreover, the motives of both parties in contested issue are sustainable. The de facto situation can be proved by two appearing future situation, by Iran possessing nuclear weapon publicly or by attacking militarily non-nuclear Iran as in Iraq.

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