

Abdullah Metin Durmuş
Başkent University (Turkey)

A New Method to Calculate Power of International Actors

Abstract: This article is based on the idea that it is necessary to develop a quantitative method to calculate power of international actors, which will enable scholars to analyse international conflicts. The Global Potential Power Distribution Chart, which is calculated based on three main characteristics of international actors, namely population, territory and economic power, shows “potential power of states and international organisations”. It may be called “Durmuş Scale of Power (DSoP)”. The chart is a comprehensive indicator with considerable accuracy and 100 % objectivity. In this article, potential powers of international actors have been calculated for years 1987, 2004 and 2015, which gives a clear overview of the potential power distribution (balance of power) of the World regarding states and as well as international organisations. Potential military powers of some states and international organisation in year 2015 have also been calculated. This research proves by means of a contemporary approach applied and a quantitative method developed that, the World is multipolar since 2004, and China is, potentially, the most powerful state of the World since 2015. The method introduced in this article were sufficient enough to explain the effects of the enlargement of NATO and EU, EU after BREXIT, reform of the Security Council of the United Nations and instrumental enough to provide a peaceful understanding for the self-determination issue of Kosova. There are three conclusions to this research: 1) The method “Durmuş Scale of Power” is calculated is reliable because everybody with a scientific calculator or a computer can easily calculate potential power of a state provided that he or she has reliable data for territory, population and GDP. 2) “Global Potential Power Distribution Chart” is a comprehensive Chart which shows “balance of power” at a specific year. It enables us to compare power of states and international organisations in different years. 3) It is convenient to use “Durmuş Scale of Power” while analysing issues of international relations.

Keywords: *International Relations Theory, Power Politics, Conflict Resolution, European Union, NATO, United Nations, Durmuş Scale of Power*

Introduction

What is power in International Relations? According to Cambridge International Dictionary **power** may be defined as **ability to control people and events**; and it is also **strength or forcefulness** (Cambridge, 1998, p. 1105, 1106).

Furthermore, Oxford Thesaurus selects the words **capacity, potential and competence**, having same or similar meaning to **power** (Oxford Thesaurus, 1998, p. 624).

According to Thucydides (460–395 BC), the reason of the Peloponnesian Wars (434–404 BC) was the increasing **power** of Athens which threatened Sparta in ancient Greece. The **Thucydides Trap** states that when one great power threatens and tries to replace another great power, war is almost inevitable. Another observation of Thucydides is called **Melian Dialogue**: “Powerful ones do what they can, and the weaker ones do what they are told to do”. Hence, **power** is the ability of an international actor to change the behaviours of another international actor. However, **power is relative**, since it is possible to exert power only when there is a relation between actors or when the leadership of one actor wants to exert power on another actor (Kardaş and Balcı, 2017, p. 223–334). In this article, this phenomenon is described as “**potential power**” of an international actor.

Robert Gilpin, in his book “War and Change in World Politics”, tries to converge propositions at state and international system level. According to Gilpin, world history since Westphalia Agreement of 1648 is state centric, and stability or instability of the international system depends on the existence of a political and economic hegemon. But it is difficult to maintain stability since the pace of economic and technological change differs from one state to another. For this reason, there is an increasing disproportionate in the **power** some states “spend” while they try to preserve their status and prestige, along with their interests (Griffiths, Roach and Salamon, 2011, p. 17–19).

We usually hear descriptions such as “Great Power” or “Super Power” to categorize a state’s strength with respect to other states. Ordinary people use these phrases only by viewing military capacity or economic development level of states. A Great or Super Power has the potential to control events affecting its interests. But, is there a scientific criterion to define a state as a Great Power? What about political entities, which are yet to be defined as a state?

In the first quarter of the 21st Century, politicians, diplomats and scholars face every day wide range of questions in international relations, such as:

- Which states should be permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, on which criteria?
- How does the enlargement of NATO or the European Union affect the power of the Organisation and the balance of power in the world?
- How will Brexit affect the potential power of the EU?
- What should be the criteria for self-determination?

It is necessary to have a useful method to get the real picture of a situation before applying diplomatic means for conflict resolution. In this article, the method to calculate

power of international actors (Durmuş Scale of Power – DSoP) is introduced with the aim of helping politicians, diplomats and scholars in analysing issues related to international relations. Understanding how to use this method may give us a chance to avoid wars, ethnic conflicts or ease regional tensions, thus contribute to world peace, security and stability.

The DSoP is not a magic formula for peaceful resolution of all international conflicts. It should rather be regarded as an “objective method in foreign policy” in order not to repeat the fatal mistakes made in the course of history. The aim of this article is to make a modest contribution to theory of International Relations.

This article analyses the concept of power politics with a contemporary approach. It also introduces a new quantitative method to calculate power of international actors. It is a unique study with regard to its approach and the method.

The new method is named as “Durmuş Scale of Power – DsoP” because, it is a common practice in science to name a new phenomenon by the name of the author or the inventor of it such as “Higgs boson”, “Behçet illness”, “Budd-chiari syndrome” or “Halley comet”.

I. Some Definitions

I.a. *International System:*

Buzan states that “international political system is anarchy and that its defining character is the absence of overarching government”, (which is generally accepted by IR scholars) (Buzan, 1983, p. 93). In International System, international actors provide the input for the system by their actions, these actions create reactions from other international actors, this results in new actions from international actors. Since there is not an authority to control behaviours of powerful international actors, this explains anarchical structure of international system.

Morton Kaplan identifies six types of system: Balance of power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, unit veto, universal and hierarchic (Buzan, 1983, p. 101). In fact, the system makes moves according to moves of international actors. For example, if some states with similar political ideology creates an alliance, other states with a different ideology will create their own alliance in order to secure balance of power. Therefore, types of system identified by Morton Kaplan are only descriptions of the system at a specific period of time. Consequently, there is only one international system. The only thing that changes is our perception of balance of power, or number of great powers (such as bi-polar) at a specific time.

I.b. *Actors of International Relations:*

The state can, most simply, be defined as a political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined borders and exercises authority via a set of permanent institutions (Heywood, 2015, p. 212).

An international organisation is an institution with formal procedures and a membership comprising three or more states (Heywood, 2015, p. 105).

Therefore, states and international organisations are major international actors. The actors of international relations have potential power, by means of which they have relative weight on International System. The level of the power international actors exert on the international system preserves or deteriorates the **balance of power**.

I.c. Failing International Actors:

For the last several years, lists of failing (failed or collapsed) states are published. How do we define an international actor as failing? If the political system of a state cannot govern the country, if it is not able to provide welfare for its population or if it is not able to defend its citizens against foreign aggression, that state may be defined as failing state.

A failed state is a state that is unable to perform its key role of ensuring domestic order by monopolizing the use of legitimate force within its borders. (Technically, failed states cease to be states, since they lack of meaningful sovereignty.) ... Failed states, nevertheless, are not only a domestic problem. They often have a wider impact through, for example, precipitating refugee crises; providing a refuge for drug dealers, arms smugglers and terrorist organisations; generating instability; and provoking external intervention to provide humanitarian relief and to keep the peace (Heywood, 2015, p. 67–68).

For 2017, South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Yemen, Soudan and Syria are listed as top 5 failing states (Fore more detailed explanation see: Boniface, 2018, p. 59–60).

On the other hand, every century has limitations on states and / or international organisations with regard to expansion by occupation or annexation, or enlargement for the case of international organisations. For example, empires dissolve when they are over stretched or oversized, when they cannot be governed by means of political system, technology, communication and transportation means of the current time frame they exist.

League of Nations was an example of a failing international organisation which could not took effective measures against fascist Mussolini when Italy occupied Ethiopia. Although the United Nations was able prevent a world war until today, it could not prevent regional wars. If it fails to manage a possible nuclear conflict in Korean Peninsula, its fate will be similar to that of League of Nations. Nevertheless, the major threat to peace is the possibility that one of the Security Council members with veto right has a leader who turns his country into a rouge one.

I.d. Power Politics:

According to Cambridge International Dictionary “**power politics** is the threat or use of military force to end an international disagreement” (Cambridge, 1998, p. 1105).

The concept of power is accorded particular significance by analysts who subscribe to what is called 'power politics'. Power politics is an approach to politics based on the assumption that the pursuit of power is the principal human goal. The term is generally used descriptively and closely linked to realism. This is a tradition that can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and his assertion that the basic human urge is to seek 'power after power'. The theory of power politics portrays politics as nothing more than an arena of struggle or competition between differently interested actors... At the international level the power politics approach emphasizes the inherent instability of a world riven by competing national interests, and links the hope of peace to establishment of a balance of power (Heywood, 2015, p. 173).

States (and international organisations) use a variety of techniques to translate power potential into effective power, namely, diplomacy, economic statecraft (such as sanctions) and (use or threat to use of) force (Mingst & Arreguin-Toft, 2014, p. 146).

The rhetoric about the growing strength of international institutions notwithstanding, there is little evidence that they can get great powers to act contrary to the dictates of realism... The United Nations is the only worldwide organisation with any hope of wielding such power, but it could not even shut down the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 364).

II. What are Main Characteristics of a State?

Which political entities can be described as a state? What are the criteria for self-determination? When should a state establish diplomatic relations with a political entity? Do we have an objective method to answer these questions?

"Through the exercise of power, states have influence over others and can control the direction of policies and events. Whether power is effective at influencing outcomes depends in part, on the power potential of each party... The three most important **natural sources of power potential are geographic size and position, natural resources and population**" (Mingst & Arreguin-Toft, 2014, p. 141).

Raymond Aron, in his book "Peace and War" clearly asserts that states affects each other based on their concrete inputs such as geography, population and resources (economy) (Griffiths, Roach and Salamon, 2011, p. 5–6). In fact, population, territory and economic power (Gross Domestic Product) are the main characteristics of a state. In this study, a mathematic formula is proposed in order to calculate "relative weight" of the states in the international system (Durmuş, 2017).

Mingst and Arreguin-Toft asserted that "tangible sources of a state's power are industrial development, level of infrastructure, characteristics of military, and intangible sources of power are national image, public support, leadership (Mingst & Arreguin-Toft, 2014, p. 143). Some scholars claim that **sovereignty** is also one of the main characteristics of a state. As Heywood describes "sovereignty is the principle of absolute and unlimited power...

External sovereignty relates to a state's place in international order and its capacity to act as an independent and autonomous entity" (Heywood, 2015, p. 210).

However, Description of the characteristics (source of power) of a state (and international organisation) in this article is valid because industrial development and level of infrastructure is an outcome of the GDP of a state. Intangible sources are embedded in population of a state and can be measured by some methods such as human development index. And finally, sovereignty is the natural consequence for a political entity which meets self-determination criteria according to DSoP (i.e. its potential power). Therefore, **sovereignty is not an input to calculate power of a state**, it, rather, is the resulting political situation when a political entity meets self-determination criteria according to DSoP after we calculate potential power of an international actor by using its values for population, territory and GDP.

II.a. Population

A state should have a permanent population, who feel themselves as citizens of (belonging to) that particular state. Population is the most important element of a state. It is not necessary that its people have the same ethnic origin, religious belief or belong to same human race so long as they have loyalty to their state. The state must have enough number of citizens to run the Government, to provide basic state services, to produce food, to recruit army and to run economy. Population growth and territorial limitations should be proportional. In other words, if territory is very large and population is not sufficient to govern this territory, there is danger to turn into a failing state. Government type, whether it is presidential or parliamentary democracy, dictatorship or kingdom is not important when we calculate potential power of a state. It is worth to remember that, over the course of history, some states with strong leadership or robust ideological support by its community were more powerful than some democratic states.

"Military capability and alliances are necessary safeguards in the rough-and-tumble world of international relations but cannot be counted on to preserve the peace or the independence of actors. Order, domestic and international, ultimately rest on the strength of the community... States like Athens, and leaders like Napoleon and Hitler cannot be deterred" (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2013, p. 39–40).

Diplomatic power of a state is also determined by the quality of its leaders or government, thus it is also a function of its population. However, it is *sine qua non* that diplomats must provide leaders and governments with information concerning historical background and actual flow of events in order to help administrations to develop sustainable foreign policy. Naturally, percentage of highly educated population and quality of education of the population determines the power of population. Qualified population provides necessary human capacity to govern the state. Hence, contemporary approach to teaching at all education levels is a key factor for a powerful population.

II.b. Territory

A state should have a territory large and rich enough to provide home, food and vital natural resources (water, energy) to its citizens. Having natural resources and energy helps a state to increase its power. Either you export these resources or use them as input for your industry, consequently increasing your GDP. Service sector is also an important contributor to GDP, such as tourism. However, sectors like tourism is very fragile if one country does not have peaceful domestic or foreign policy.

There is a relation between population number and territory of a state. If the population increases a lot and if there is scarcity of water, food and other resources, states tend to be aggressive and imperialistic. Consequently, geostrategic importance of a state is also a function of its territory. If the state has mountains or rivers on its borders, if it controls straits or water canals, if it is located on main trade routes, geostrategic importance of that state increases (For more detailed explanation see: Boniface, 2018).

The number of neighbouring states is also important since it is difficult to coordinate foreign policy of a state if it has to deal with many neighbours. When there is a failing state among your neighbours, it is most likely that your country faces influx of refugees, infiltration of terrorists and decrease in the income from exports to failing state. All of these side effects cause loss of power of the state neighbouring a rogue state.

It is also important that when you are neighbouring a great power, either you have to have good relations with her or you have to balance its power by establishing alliances. Otherwise, this great power can easily follow foreign policy which is detriment to your country's interests.

II.c. Economic Power (GDP)

A state should have an economic capacity strong enough to provide sustainable development, to develop technology, to increase industrial capacity and to distribute welfare to its citizens. If the concerned state is developed and has industrial and technological capacity to benefit from its natural resources, its GDP will increase accordingly. Increasing the GDP is a crucial contributor to increase potential power of a state.

The economic power of a state is fragile if more than 50% of its GDP depends on only one product (such as petroleum) or on only one type of income (such as tourism). Any international conflict, which results in decrease of the number of tourists visiting a country or any financial or technological development which decreases the price of petroleum, will rapidly cause losses of income and inevitably potential power of the concerned state will decrease.

Furthermore, the more GDP a state has, the more soft power it may create. Because if you can allocate funds for research at universities or for making movies, people of "less developed states" will admire your country. To become a powerful country, it is sometimes necessary to create means to increase its soft power.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that the military power of a particular state is a derivative combination of all these three characteristics of a state. In order to have a powerful army which has the capacity to deter foreign aggression, a state must have enough population to recruit soldiers, a territory large enough to defend easily and a GDP strong enough to produce or import weapons, armoured vehicles, warships and fighter planes.

Kenneth N. Waltz warns against proliferation of nuclear weapons and increase in the number of states having nuclear weapons (Waltz, 2015, p. 227). Having nuclear weapons and means to deliver these weapons by long range missiles have multiplying effect on the military power of a state. Anyway, this does not change the fact that military power of an international actor is a derivative of three main characteristics of it: That means if you have a population qualified enough to educate scientists and engineers, enough economic power to produce or import necessary material to build nuclear weapons, you can have nuclear weapons.

However, states cannot easily launch nuclear weapons when they face an international conflict because nuclear weapons are not like conventional weapons. Destructive effect of conventional weapons focus on the target and its effects ends in a relatively short time. On the other hand, destructive effects of nuclear weapons last years, affects even next generations. From the environmental perspective, nuclear weapons do not affect only military targets, but its spill over effects “travel” to other geographical regions by means of natural ways. There is only one world where humanity lives. If the nuclear weapons are launched, living conditions on the world deteriorates at the expense of all humanity, even for the states which launch it.

III. A New Method to Calculate Power

III.a. A New Method

Waltz asks the most important question in International Relations: How do we count poles (number of major powers) in international system and how do we measure power? He admits that even **Henry Kissinger** was confused when he was Secretary of State of the USA between 1973–1977, as Kissinger stated that “there were two super powers in terms of military and at least five powers in terms of economic capacity”! (Waltz, 2015, p. 163, 164).

In this article three characteristics of an international actor are used together in order to calculate its potential power and prepare charts easy to compare number of powers in a specific year. Logarithms (base 10) of the territory, population and GDP are taken so that we can have scientifically understandable and comparable values in order to prepare a “Global Potential Power Distribution Chart”. The charts, which were calculated by calculating arithmetic mean of the total of logarithms of territory, population and GDP of an international actor, are attached.

It should be noted that the results which were calculated by this method are similar to Richter scale for measuring earthquakes. The difference between a state’s power (DSoP)

with 7,4 and another state with 3,2 (in other words, relative weight of a state in balance of power with respect to the weight of other states) is similar to the difference of the destructive potential of an earthquake with a magnitude of 7,4 to another earthquake with a magnitude of 3,2 at Richter scale.

Here are five examples for this new quantitative method:

Example – 1: Republic of Turkey in 2015:

Territory: 779.452 sq.km.

Population: 74.900.000

GDP: 822.000 Ths. \$

Potential Power of Turkey = [Log (territory) + Log (population) + Log (GDP)] / 3

DSoP of Turkey = (5,89 + 7,87 + 5,91) / 3 = **6,55**

Example – 2: NATO with 29 members in 2015:

Total Territory of Members : 24.471.767 sq.km.

Total Population of Members: 919.100.000

Total GDP of Members : 36.381.600 Ths. \$

Potential Power of NATO = [Log (territory) + Log (population) + Log (GDP)] / 3

DSoP of NATO = (7,38 + 8,96 + 7,56) / 3 = **7,96**

Example – 3: EU with 28 members in 2015:

Total Territory of Members: 4.380.802 sq.km.

Total Population of Members: 509.100.000

Total GDP of Members: 17.958.500 Ths. \$

Potential Power of EU = [Log (territory) + Log (population) + Log (GDP)] / 3

DSoP of EU = (6,64 + 8,70 + 7,25) / 3 = **7,53**

Example – 4: The USA in 2015:

Territory: 9.809.155 sq.km.

Population: 320.100.000

GDP: 16.768.000 Ths. \$

Potential Power of the USA = [Log (territory) + Log (population) + Log (GDP)] / 3

DSoP of the USA = (6,99 + 8,50 + 7,22) / 3 = **7,57**

Example – 5: China in 2015:

Territory : 9.572.419 sq.km.

Population : 1.385.600.000

GDP: 9.240.000 Ths. \$

Potential Power of China = [Log (territory) + Log (population) + Log (GDP)] / 3

DSoP of China = (6,98 + 9,14 + 5,96) / 3 = **7,69**

According to calculations, **minimum DSoP of 3,0 is necessary for self-determination** of a political entity to become a state (i.e. an international actor) (Chart – 1). It is important to keep in mind that the charts and “Durmuş Scale of Power” shows “**potential power of a state**”. However it is a useful indicator with considerable accuracy and 100 % objectivity.

Chart 1. DSoP: durmuş scale of power global potential power distribution chart in year 2004 ©

STATE DESCRIPTION	STATE POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OR NUMBER OF STATES	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Mega	9.0 or more	None	Total global hegemony. Global sustainable strike capability without any risk of self-damage.
Great	8.0 – 8.9	None	Partly global hegemony. Global sustainable strike capability with ignorable self-damage risk.
Major	7.0–7.9	NATO-26 (7,88) NATO-19 (7,87) USA (7,49) EU-27+TR (7,49) (-) EU-27 (7,45) (*) EU-25 (7,42) China (7,45) India (7,09) Russia (7,00)	Global power. Single long range, allied global strike capability with some self-damage – short term, not sustainable. Space technology. Self-sustainable nuclear technology. (-) Turkey is still a candidate country. (*) The EU does not have a single comprehensive foreign policy.
Dominant	6.0–6.9	Brazil (6,9) Canada (6,8) Japan (6,7) Australia (6,6) Indonesia (6,6) Germany (6,5) France (6,5) UK (6,4) Iran (6,38) Turkey (6,36) Pakistan (6,3) Nigeria (6,26) Egypt (6,24) Italy (6,13)	Regional power. Should be taken into consideration in global issues. Ability or possible capacity for nuclear technology.
Strong	5.0–5.9	Netherlands (5,83) Norway (5,83) Greece (5,79) Syria (5,61) Bulgaria (5,40) Serb. & Mont. (5,39) Israel (5,38) Albania (5,25) (Terror organisations)	Should be taken into consideration in regional balance of power. Possible quest for nuclear technology capability in case of asymmetric threat – reciprocal.

STATE DESCRIPTION	STATE POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OR NUMBER OF STATES	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Medium	4.0–4.9	Armenia (4,79)	Regional player.
		Macedonia (4,79)	Should be taken into consideration in regional balance issues.
		Grk Cyprus.Ad. (4,55)	
		Kosova (?) (4,51)	
		Luxembourg (4,49)	(?) Not independent, yet, in 2004
		Montenegro (4,37)	
		TRNC (4,05)	
Small	3.0–3.9	Tonga (3,36) Kiribati (3,21)	Rarely taken into consideration.
Minor	2.0–2.9	None (!) (Loose Sovereignty)	Partly Vulnerability to occupation.
Micro	Less than 2.0	None	Total Vulnerability to occupation.

III.b. Analysing the Global Results

In the charts, values for years 1987, 2004 and 2015 are taken into consideration. Because, year 1987 shows us the power distribution situation just before the **fall of the Berlin Wall** and **the end of the Cold War**. On the other hand, in year 2004, both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation carried out **substantial enlargement**. Year 2015 is taken to get a recent picture and to calculate values before and after **Brexit**.

A **Great Power** is a state deemed rank among the most powerful in a hierarchical state system: Great powers are in the first rank of **military prowess**, having the capacity to maintain their own security and, **potentially**, to influence other powers. They are **economically powerful** states, though (as Japan shows) this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for great power status. They have **global, and not merely regional, spheres of interests**. Great powers thus differ from regional powers. They adopt a “**forward**” **foreign policy** and have an **actual**, and not merely a potential, **impact on international affairs** (during its isolationist phase, the USA was not a “great power”) (Heywood, 2015, p. 86).

In the Chart – 1 for year 2004, the USA has a potential power of 7,49. The USA is located in the “Major” powers category. **China**, with 7,45, **India** with 7,09 and **Russia** with 7,00 follows the USA. And all are in Major power category. Therefore, there have been a **multi-polar world** already in 2004. The illusion that the USA was the only “**super**” **power**, is the result of US’s diplomatic and military skills to form multi-state alliances for its interventions against Afghanistan and Iraq. It is clear that without NATO and without ad-hoc alliances, the USA is not in a position to take military action against China or Russia. The fact that there are four states in “Major” power category in 2004, does not support the claims that the USA was the only “global power” and there is a unipolar international system in the beginning of the 21st Century. On the contrary, three Asian states have a balancing power.

Notwithstanding the absence of a European Union Army (in its classical meaning) yet, the EU had a potential power of 7,42, which locates it among “Major” powers. It is worth to notice that whereas **Germany, France, UK and Italy** are **dominant powers**, but are mainly **regionally effective** in 2004, when they act alone, but they skip to **global power category** under the umbrella of the European Union, which is a **major power**. **After Brexit**, UK will be deprived of the EU umbrella and will stuck into regional power category level for some time.

In the Chart – 2, we have the opportunity to observe the change in DSoPs of states **from year 1987 to 2004**. NATO increased from 7,71 to 7,88 with 26 members in 2004. After the enlargement to 25 members, European Union increased from 7,17 to 7,42. USA increased from 7,34 to 7,49, while China jumped from 7,14 to 7,45 in 2004. Russia fell to 7,00 in 2004 from USSR’s 7,38 in 1987. India raised to Major Power category in 2004, after an increase from 6,94 in 1987 to 7,09 in 2004. **This development changed the international system into a multi-polar one.**

Chart 2. DSoP: durmuş scale of power global potential power distribution chart comparison between years 1987 and 2004

POWER DESCRIPTION	POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OF STATE OR IO	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Mega	9.0 or more	None	Total global hegemony. Global sustainable strike capability without any risk of self-damage.
Great	8.0 – 8.9	None	Partly global hegemony. Global sustainable strike capability with ignorable self-damage risk.
Major	7.0–7.9	NATO-26 (7,88) NATO-19 (7,87) NATO(1987) (7,71) USA(2004) (7,49) EU-27+TR (7,49)(-) EU-27 (7,45)(*) EU-25 (7,42) China (2004) (7,45) Warsaw P.(’87) (7,38) USA (1987) (7,34) USSR (1987) (7,30) EU-12 (1987) (7,17) China (1987) (7,14) India (2004) (7,09) Russia (2004) (7,00)	Global power. Single long range, allied global strike capability with some self-damage – short term, not sustainable. Space technology. Self-sustainable nuclear technology. (-) Turkey is still a candidate country. (*) The EU does not have a single comprehensive foreign policy.
Dominant	6.0–6.9	India (1987) (6,94) Japan (2004) (6,70) Germany (2004) (6,50) Turkey (2004) (6,36) Turkey (1987) (6,17)	Regional power. Should be taken into consideration in global issues. Ability or possible capacity for nuclear technology.

POWER DESCRIPTION	POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OF STATE OR IO	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Strong	5.0–5.9	Yugoslavia (1987) (5,87) Serb.& Mont. (2004) (5,39)	Should be taken into consideration in regional balance of power. Possible quest for nuclear technology capability in case of asymmetric threat – reciprocal.
Medium	4.0–4.9	Kosova (?) (2004) (4,51) Luxembourg (2004) (4,49) Montenegro (2004) (4,37) TRNC (2004) (4,05)	Regional player. Should be taken into consideration in regional balance issues. (?) Not independent in 2004
Small	3.0–3.9	Kribati (2004) (3,21)	Rarely taken into consideration.
Minor	2.0–2.9	None (!) (Loose Sovereignty)	Partly Vulnerability to occupation.
Micro	Less than 2.0	None	Total Vulnerability to occupation.

Chart 3. DSoP: durmuş scale of power global potential power distribution chart comparison between years 1987, 2004 and 2015

POWER DESCRIPTION	POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OF STATE OR IO	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Mega	9.0 or more	None	Total global hegemony. Global sustainable strike capability without any risk of self-damage.
Great	8.0 – 8.9	None	Partly global hegemony. Global sustainable strike capability with ignorable self-damage risk.
Major	7.0–7.9	NATO-29 (2015) (7,96) NATO-26 (7,88) NATO (1987) (7,71) Warsaw P.(’87) (7,38) EU after Brexit (7,47) EU-28 (2015) (7,53) EU-27 (7,45) EU-25 (*) (7,42) EU-12 (1987) (7,17) China (2015) (7,69) China (2004) (7,45) China (1987) (7,14) USA (2015) (7,57) USA (2004) (7,49) USA (1987) (7,34) India (2015) (7,29) India (2004) (7,09) USSR (1987) (7,30) Russia (2015) (7,23) Russia (2004) (7,00) Brazil (2015) (7,19)	Global power. Single long range, allied global strike capability with some self-damage – short term, not sustainable. Space technology. Self-sustainable nuclear technology. (-) Turkey is still a candidate country. (*) The EU does not have a single comprehensive foreign policy.

POWER DESCRIPTION	POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OF STATE OR IO	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM	
Dominant	6.0–6.9	India (1987) (6,94)	Regional power. Should be taken into consideration in global issues. Ability or possible capacity for nuclear technology.	
		Brazil (2004) (6,9)		
		Japan (2015) (6,78)		
		Japan (2004) (6,70)		
		Germany (2015) (6,67)		
		Germany (2004) (6,50)		
		France (2004) (6,50)		
		France (2015) (6,65)		
		UK (2015) (6,53)		
		Turkey (2015) (6,55)		
Turkey (2004) (6,36)				
Turkey (1987) (6,17)				
Sou. Korea ('15) (6,26)				
Strong	5.0–5.9	Greece (2015) (5,84)	Should be taken into consideration in regional balance of power. Possible quest for nuclear technology capability in case of asymmetric threat – reciprocal.	
		Greece (2004) (5,79)		
		Yug.lavia (1987) (5,87)		
		Srb. Mnt.(2004) (5,39)		
		Serbia (2015) (5,48)		
		Syria (2015) (?) (5,71)		
		Syria (2004) (5,61)		(?) There is civil war!
		Nor. Korea ('15) (5,55)		
Israel (2015) (5,55)				
Israel (2004) (5,38)				
Medium	4.0–4.9	Kosova (2015) (4,71)	Regional player.	
		Mont.gro (2015) (4,51)		

In fact, **in 2015**, China is the second largest economy. DSoP of **China increased to first rank with respect to its potential power with 7,69**, which is more than USA with 7,57 (Chart – 3). China's **potential military power is also at the first rank** with 61,63 (Chart – 5). This development resulted in worries among the Western countries:

Even Germany, which is participant in the BRI (Belt & Road Initiative), interprets China's Silk Road diplomacy from the **perspective of power politics**. In early 2018, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel stated that China's BRI amounts to a struggle between democracy and dictatorship. He believes that China, in expanding its influence to Afro-Eurasia, is trying to create something different from the system of freedom and democracy – something that threatens the interests of democratic countries (LANG, 2018, p. 415).

Boniface stated that China will be the most powerful state in the near future (Boniface, 2018, p. 144–147).

According to www.bbc.com/news of 18.12.2018:

“Xi Jinping says China ‘will not seek to dominate’

Chinese President Xi Jinping has vowed that his country will not develop at the expense of other nations, in a speech marking 40 years since China introduced major economic reforms. However, he also said that the global superpower would not be told what to do by anyone.

Late leader Deng Xiaoping’s campaign of “reform and opening up” began four decades ago. The resulting growth has made China the second-largest economy in the world. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty but in recent years China has struggled with mounting debt and slowing economic growth.

*Mr Xi said despite his country’s economic achievements, **China would “never seek global hegemony”** and also highlighted its contributions towards a “shared future for mankind”. He did not mention the current trade dispute with the United States.*

*China continues to crack down on political dissent and is **accused of locking up hundreds of thousands of Muslims without trial in the western region of Xinjiang.***

***Its militarisation of islands in the South China Sea** – home to vital shipping lanes – has sparked concerns among Asian neighbours that it seeks to dominate the region.”*

During the last two centuries the West’s domination of world affairs went as far as to trigger global conflicts: the two world wars of the twentieth century were extensions of internal European rivalries. An indication that the world has changed is the fact that if a new world war were to erupt in the twenty-first century it would probably originate in Asia or the Middle East (Cohen-Tanugi, 2008, p. 93).

When years 1987 and 2015 are compared, it is observed that **China** increased from 7,14 to 7,69, which has a difference of 0,55 in DSoP units.

USA increased from 7,34 to 7,57, a difference of only 0,23 in DSoP units, which is well below than China’s pace.

For **India**, increase is from 6.94 in 1987 to 7,29 in 2015. The increase is 0.35, with a pace less than China but more than USA.

DSoP of **Turkey** increased to 6,55 in 2015 from 6,17 in 1987. The increase of 0,38 DSoP units is more than pace of USA and India, and proves that Turkey’s potential power increases in multifaceted dimensions.

An important development in 2015 is that **Brazil** increases from 6,9 in 2004 to 7,19 in 2015 and becomes another **Major power**. Thus, contributes to multi-polar characteristic of the International System, becoming the **5th major power in 2015**.

Chart 4. DSoP: durmuş scale of power Russia, China, NATO and eu members in year 2015

POWER DESCRIPTION	POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OF STATE OR IO	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Mega	9.0 or more	None	Total global hegemony.
Great	8.0 – 8.9	None	Partly global hegemony.
Major	7.0–7.9	NATO-29 (2015) (7,96) NATO-26 (7,88) EU-28(*) (2015) (7,53) EU-28+TR (7,58) EU after Brexit (7,47) EU aft.Brıt + TR (7,53) China (2015) (7,69) USA (2015) (7,57) Russia (2015) (7,23) India (2015) (7,29) Brazil (2015) (7,19)	Global power. Single long range, allied global strike capability with some self-damage – short term, not sustainable. Space technology. Self-sustainable nuclear technology.
Dominant	6.0–6.9	Canada (2015) (6,93) Germany (2015) (6,67) France (2015) (6,65) Turkey (2015) (6,55) UK (2015) (6,53) Italy (2015) (6,52) Spain (2015) (6,50) Poland (2015) (6,26) Sweden (2015) (6,13)	Regional power. Should be taken into consideration in global issues. Ability or possible capacity for nuclear technology.
Strong	5.0–5.9	Romania (2015) (5,99) Norway (2015) (5,97) Holland (2015) (5,92) Finland (2015) (5,89) Greece (2015) (5,84) NATO average (5,82) Austria (2015) (5,82) Portugal (2015) (5,77) Czech R. (2015) (5,74) EU -28 average (5,69) Hungary (2015) (5,69) Croatia (2015) (5,63) Denmark (2015) (5,63) Ireland (2015) (5,62) Bulgaria (2015) (5,54) Slovakia (2015) (5,47) Belgium (2015) (5,42) Lithuania (2015) (5,31) Latvia (2015) (5,20) Slovenia (2015) (5,10) Estonia (2015) (5,05) Albania (2015) (5,02)	Should be taken into consideration in regional balance of power. Possible quest for nuclear technology capability in case of asymmetric threat – reciprocal.

POWER DESCRIPTION	POWER MAGNITUDE	NAME OF STATE OR IO	EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SYSTEM
Medium	4.0-4.9	Lu.bourg (2015) (4,95) Iceland (2015) (4,88) Grk Cyprus.Ad. (4,73) Mont.gro (2015) (4,51) Malta (2015) (4,02)	Regional player. Should be taken into consideration in regional balance issues.




Figure 1. Potential Military Power

I have explained that the **potential military power** of a particular state is a derivative combination of all three characteristics of an international actor.

In the figure above, there is an equilateral triangle. Triangle is equilateral because we calculate potential military power and assume that each three variable has equal percentage of contribution to power. One lateral of the triangle is 6 units in DSoP, because 3 unit in DSoP is the minimum limit of self-determination (Chart:1). Corners of the triangle are the centres of three circles. Radius of each circle is logarithms of population (p), territory (t) and GDP (e) of a state respectively. The overlapping area (c) of three circles, defines the potential military power of an international actor.

For **potential military power values** of some states and some international organisations see **Chart 5**.

Chart 5. DSoP: durmuş scale of power potential military powers of some states and some international organisations in year 2015

State or International Organisation	Potential Military Power (c)
China	63,13
USA	61,63
Russian Federation	52,05
India	49,98
Japan	39,53
Germany	37,35
France	37,34
Turkey	34,71
UK	34,05
South Korea	27,96
Greece	21,12
Israel	15,78
Serbia	14,78
North Korea	14,24
Albania	8,47
Kosova	5,17
Montenegro	3,96
Malta	0,53
NATO (29 members)	73,33
EU (28 members)	59,53

With regard to the **reform of the Security Council** of the United Nations (UNSC), Naidu states that “**India** has a very legitimate claim to be permanently placed in the Security Council...” (Naidu, 2004: 20). Indeed, India is in major power category in the Chart-1 already in 2004, and has a potential power of 7,29 in 2015. India’s potential military power 49,98 and at the forth row after China, USA and Russia.

Japan has a potential power of 6,78 in 2015 and is not a major power and is not eligible to be a permanent member of the UNSC. Japan’s potential military power is 39,53, which is almost half of China’s.

Germany, with a potential power of 6,67 in 2015, is not also in major power category and does not qualify to be a permanent member of the UNSC either. Potential military power of Germany is 37,35, slightly more than the half of the NATO’s.

After BREXIT, **France** will be the only EU member which has a permanent seat at the UNSC.

In the group of “dominant” states, where **Turkey** is located with a power of 6,36 in 2004, we observe that there are states from American, Asian, European, African and Australian continents. Potential power of **Turkey** increased to 6,55 in 2015.

Turkey has a potential military power of 34,71, whereas **Greece's** potential military power is 21,12. Recent provocative statements by some Greek officials in 2018 shows that they are **unrealistic** about the real military potential of Greece vis a vis Turkey. Furthermore, it is an **illusion** of Greek politicians that EU will provide military assistance to Greece in case of a military confrontation with Turkey regarding the sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea or in Mediterranean.

In this article, DSOP of organisations like **MIKTA** (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) or **BRICS** (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) were not calculated because these organisations do not have robust military wings yet.

To sum up, **according to the results for 2015, one can presume that a “multi-polar international system” will prevail in the second half of the 21st Century**, namely China, USA, EU, Russian Federation, India, Brazil and the African Union (of course only after encouraging steps forward for a unification similar to EU (Chart – 4).

IV. How to Use the Method?

When we face an international issue, first we do calculations regarding the concerned international actors. Then, we locate related power coefficients of the actors on the chart in order to understand the real “power/weight” of the relevant actor in the system. We have to make sure that statistics are true and valid for the period of time which we analyse. It is easy to read the chart: Just find the concerned state or international organisation on the chart, read the explanations on the horizontal left and right columns.

IV.a. Case 1: Enlargement of NATO

Before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in 1987, NATO had a potential power of 7,71, which was more than the Warsaw Pact, with a power of 7,38 (Chart – 2). After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has emerged as a leading power. Russian Federation, with a power considerably less than NATO, did not have the means and power to stop NATO's intervention in Kosova in 1999. As Naidu describes: “In initiating the Kosovo action the United Nations was totally disregarded, for the first time, NATO was the main force that carried out the Kosovo attack” (Naidu, 2004, p. 18).

In 2003, NATO had a potential power of 7,87, thus had global operational capability. However, the enlargement of NATO in 2004 with 7 new members had only 0,01 value of additional power to the Organisation (Chart – 1). When we consider 29 members of **NATO** in 2015 with a coefficient of 7,96, the organisation will move to the next level (with a power more than 8,00) and become a **Great Power** by means of possible future enlargements, which will mean NATO will have **partly global hegemony** (Chart – 3).

NATO's potential military power in 2015 is 73,33, ranking first in the list. The problem NATO faces is the lack of a balancing military power. As most of the International Relations

scholars agree, excessive military power of an international actor without a balancing power or balancing alliance triggers conflicts by igniting issues or files left on the shelves. The changing of strategic concepts of NATO in the course of time displays this phenomenon.

IV.b. Case 2: Enlargement of EU

The EU with 25 members in 2004 had a potential power of 7,42. After the membership of Bulgaria and Romania its power increased to 7,45.

How **the potential power of the EU** will be affected after **Brexit**? We can also analyse the power of the EU if Turkey joins the EU before and after Brexit (Chart 4). Power of the EU with 28 member states in 2015 is 7,53. Suppose that Turkey joins the EU, then it has 29 members and its potential power will increase to 7,58, so EU will have almost the same level of potential power as USA. When UK leaves the EU after Brexit, power of the EU with 27 members will fall to 7,47.

If Turkey joins the EU after Brexit and EU becomes a 28th member organisation again, its power will be 7,53. Therefore, Turkey will compensate the EU's potential power loss after Brexit (Chart 4). Furthermore, Turkey's contribution to the future "European Union Army" will be substantial. In fact, EU's potential military power is 59,53 and that of Turkey is 34,71.

The anxiety among the populations of EU member states regarding the **membership of Turkey to EU** is exaggerated by far-right politicians, whose main aim is to increase their votes at elections. They want to find a scapegoat to use when they develop populist discourse. Therefore, their negative policy against Turkish membership is baseless in the light of the findings of this article.

IV.c. Case 3: Independence of Kosova

As the diversity of appeals to self-determination suggests, the principle can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Indeed, it has become so flexible a rhetorical device that some might think it to have lost its moral content (Beitz, 1979, p. 95).

Regarding peaceful conflict resolution of **the question of the self-determination (independence) of Kosova**, we have to remember that "the Albanians first emerge in the historical record in 1043, when Albanians troops appear fighting alongside Greeks in the army of a rebel Byzantine general" (Malcolm, 1998, p. 8).

Skënderbej had been a leading figure for independence of Albania in the 15th Century in his struggle against Ottomans. Religion had an important effect too for the construction of an Albanian nationhood.

Even under the rule of Yugoslavia there was Albanian nationalism in Kosova. After the death of Tito, "the most damaging effect of the political reaction in 1981 was the way in which it unleashed a new round of accusations and counter accusations about Albanian and Serbian nationalism" (Malcolm, 1998, p. 58).

For the Serbs, Kosova is a mythical value. Kosova-myth “secured land” and “cradle of the Serb State” has become a second religion for the Serb state (Delvina, 2003, p. 242–243).

This was the reason behind ethnic cleansing in Kosova after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

In Rwanda western politicians did not provide much help but in Kosovo, in the name of “**human security**”, they intervened. The concept of human security ..., in contrast to the traditional notion of “national security”, proposed that if human beings are suffering in large numbers and are in desperate and catastrophic situation, we should not stop international concern only at the borders of national sovereignty (Naidu, 2004, p. 17).

However, Kosova, in 2004, had a population of almost 2.4 million (including Kosovars living abroad). It is quite homogenous with Albanian 88 %, Serbian 7 % and other 5 % (Bosniak [1.9 %], Roma [1.7 %], Turkish [1 %], Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani) ethnic groups. Major religions are Islam, Serbian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.

There are 56 member countries of the United Nations which have less population than Kosova. Kosova has an area of 10.887 km². There are 33 member countries of the United Nations which are smaller than Kosova. Kosovo may be one of the poorest economies in Europe, with per capita income of an estimated €1243 (\$1,600) per annum in 2005. On the other hand, there are 81 member countries of the United Nations which has less per capita income than Kosova.

Kosova had a potential power of 4.51 in 2004 (Chart 1). It is more than the potential power of Montenegro (4.37), which declared its independency on 3 June 2006. East Timor, which declared its independence on 22 May 2002, has less population (980.000) and less GNI per capita (USD 750) than Kosova. **Therefore, Kosova meets the criteria for self-determination.**

Republic of Kosova declared its independence in February 2008, which is recognized by more than hundred states. However, as of 7 January 2019, Kosova is not a member of the United Nations yet.

Conclusions

It should be noted that DSoP is not only related to Realist Theory since it focuses on power of states and international organisations. Liberal and Constructive theories may be also useful while analysing decision making processes of states. Discussing models of foreign policy decision making process is not main topic of this article. However:

There is a vicious cycle of interests in international relations. Conflict of interests increases weapon sales, it increases in GDP of supplier states, and, naturally increases power of the supplier, which results in further instabilities in world order and creates anarchy in international system.

Major international actors use centuries old “divide and rule” method in their foreign policy so that they can force rival less powerful countries “**to do or not to do**” what they are

told. Division of a state's population (in fault lines of ethnic, religious or ideological belief) or its territory (through annexations or guerrilla wars) causes considerable decreases in the target state's potential power.

International actors seek to increase, if not possible, maintain, their power. To this end, they even tend to follow paths contrary to international law. For example, there is a growing suspicion that some states are being targeted by "rouge" terrorists, who carry out attacks in these states, on behalf of other states, who want to destroy tourism industry in their rival states. Tourists cancel reservations in violent states and prefer safer countries, as a result, GDP of safer countries increases, thus increasing their power.

In 2018, trade wars between USA and China, USA and two other NAFTA countries, namely Canada and Mexico, USA and EU are also the examples of **power politics**. **President Trump**, by means of his "Make America Great Again" policy, wants to defend and increase economic power of USA. This policy, implicitly, admits that USA is not the number one great power anymore.

For collective and peaceful development of all states in the world, it is necessary to have global order. International order should be provided by balancing liberty and domestic order. Furthermore, governments, no matter which type of government, must govern not for a specific section of their community but for all of their people. By means of a policy of free trade, and free movement of people and capital, an environment of peaceful international order is established. It is important that even great powers are obliged to respect international order. Otherwise, pursuit of interests by applying excessive power results in loss of power, even for major powers, in the long run (As **Atatürk** stated, **peace at home, peace in the world**).

For states, which are already powerful, it is easy to apply power politics to their foreign affairs. However, less powerful states can only protect themselves for the sake of survival.

First finding is that **international system is multi-polar since 2004**.

Second finding of this article by using the quantitative method introduced in this article is that **China, potentially, in 2015, is the most powerful state** in the world, followed by USA, India, Russia and Brazil.

The new quantitative method introduced in this article were sufficient enough to explain the effects of the enlargement of NATO and EU, EU after BREXIT, reform of the Security Council of the United Nations and instrumental enough to provide a peaceful understanding for the self-determination issue of Kosova.

Therefore, there are three conclusions to this research:

1) The method "Durmuş Scale of Power" is calculated is reliable because everybody with a scientific calculator or a computer can easily calculate potential power of a state provided that he or she has reliable data for territory, population and GDP.

2) "Global Potential Power Distribution Chart" is a comprehensive Chart which shows "balance of power" at a specific year. It also enables us to compare power of states and international organisations in different years.

3) Consequently, it is convenient to use “Durmuş Scale of Power” while analysing issues of international relations.

Finally, when we consider that this article has theorist background and it is an empirical approach, it is fair to state that the quantitative method to calculate DSoP makes substantial contribution to International Relations in IR’s struggle to become a solid branch of science.

References and Selected Bibliography

- Albrecht-Carrie, René (1973) *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, New York: Harper & Row.
- Anderson, Benedict (2006) *Imagined Communities, Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Ari, Tayyar (2002) *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, İstanbul: ALFA Yayınları.
- Balta, Evren (Editör) (2016) *Küresel Siyasete Giriş*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bely, Lucien (2017) *Histoire de France*, Firmin Didot: Gisserot.
- Baylis, John, Smith, Steve and Owens, Patricia (Editors) (2014) *The Globalisation of World Politics, an Introduction to International Relations*, Italy: Oxford University Press, L.E.G.O.
- Beitz, Charles R. (1979) *Political Theory and International Relations*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Bentley, J.H. and Ziegler, H.F. (2000) *Traditions & Encounters*, Volume B & C, McGraw Hill, Vol. B: S: 675 Vol. C: S: 06, 1048, 1064
- Boniface, Pascal (2018) *La Géopolitique*, Paris: Eyrolles.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2012) *Strategic Vision – America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York: Basic Books.
- Burrell, B. (1996) *Pocket Guide to Business & Everyday Math*, Springfield: Merriem-Webster.
- Butterfield, H. (1965) *The Origins of Modern Science*, New York: The Free Press.
- Buzan, Barry (1983) *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.
- “Der Fisher Weltalmanach 2005” (2005) Frankfurt am Main: Fisher Taschenbug Verlag.
- Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (1995), London: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen-Tanugi, Laurent (2008) *The Shape of the World to Come – charting the geopolitics of a new century*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Delvina, Sherif (2003) *The Truth on Kosova*, Tirane: Eurorilindja.
- Devlen, Balkan, James, Patrick and Özdamar, Özgür, *The English School, International Relations and Progress*. *International Studies Review* (2005) 7, 171–297. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja and Smith, Steve (Editors) (2013) *International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity*, Italy: Oxford University Press, L.E.G.O.
- Durmuş, A. Metin (2017) *Modular System Theory on International Relations* (Published as an article in Conference Proceedings Book, on the occasion of DAKAM’s International Political Science Studies Meeting – International Conference on Terrorism and Political Violence, which took place on 7 April 2017 in İstanbul. ISBN: 978–605–9207–70–6).
- Eralp, Atila (2005) *Devlet ve Ötesi – Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Evans, Graham and Newnham, Jeffrey (1998) *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London: Penguin Books.
- Frankel, J. (1973) *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2004) *Devlet İnşası*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Gibbon, Edward (2000) *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, London: Penguin Books.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. (2001) *International Relations*, Crawfordsville: Longman, R.R. Donnelley and Sons.
- Gözen, Ramazan (2017) (Editör) *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, İstanbul: İletişim.
- Griffiths, Martin, Roach, Steven C. and Salamon, M. Scott (2011) (Çev. Cesran) *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Düşünürler ve Teoriler*, Ankara: Nobel.
- Heywood, Andrew (2015) *Key Concepts in Politics and International Relations*, China: Palgrave.
- Holsti, K.J. (1972) *International Politics*, London: Prentice/Hall International.
- Hughes, W. (1999) *Western Civilisation Volume I*, Guilford: Dushkin / McGraw Hill.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (2003) *Medeniyetler Çatışması*, Ankara: Vadi Yayınları.
- Hupchick, D.P. and Cox, H.E. (2001) *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans*, New York: Palgrave.
- Jenkins, Cecil (2017) *A Brief History of France*, London: Robinson.
- Kann, Robert A. (1980) *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918*, London: University of California Press.
- Kaplan, A. Morton (1967) *System and Process in International Relations*, John Wiley and Sons.
- Kardaş, Şaban ve Balci, Ali (2017) *Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş*, İstanbul: Küre.
- Lang, Kao, *Silk Road Diplomacy: China Redefines its Role on the Asia Mainland*, International Relations and Diplomacy, July 2018, Vol. 6, No: 7, 408–418.
- Luttwak, Edward N. (2016) *Çin'in Yükselişi – Strateji'nin Mantiğine Karşın*, İstanbul: Doruk.
- Malcolm, Noel (1998) *Kosovo – A Short History*, New York: New York University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Mingst, Karen A. and Arreguin-Toft, Ivan M. (2014) *Essentials of International Relations*, 6th Edition, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1997) *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*. International Organization, 51, pp 513–553.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1972) *Politics Among Nations*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Nevins, Allan, Commager, Henry Steele (2017) *ABD Tarihi*, Ankara: Douğubati.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2003) *Understanding International Conflicts*, New York: Longman.
- Nye, Joseph S. and Welch David A. (2015) (Çev.: Akman, R.) *Küresel Çatışmayı ve İşbirliğini Anlamak*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları.
- Ogden, Chris (2016) *Hindistan Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İyidüşün.
- Oxford College Thesaurus* (1998), Oxford University Press.
- Putzger, F.W. – Bruckmuller, E. (2000) *Historischer Weltatlas*, Wien: öbv-hpt.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom ve Miall, Hugh (2012). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity*. Cambridge: MPG Books.
- Russel, Bertrand (1972) *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York: Touchstone Book.
- Scott, A.M. (1967) *The Functioning of the International Political System*, New York: The Macmillan.
- Smith, Steve, Hadfield, Amelia and Dunne, Tim (2012) *Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases*, London: Oxford University Press.

- Stalker, P. (2004) *Oxford A – Z Countries of the World*, Oxford University Press.
- Teeple, J.B. (2002) *Timelines of World History*, London: DK Publishing.
- Trachtenberg, Marc, *The Question of Realism – A Historian’s View*, Security Studies 13, no: 1 (autumn 2003): 156–194.
- The Economist, Pocket World in Figures (2015) – 2016 Edition*, London.
- Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi Marc V. (1999) *International Relations Theory*, Allyn and Bacon, Needham Heights, MA.
- Walt, Stephan M. *International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy*, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge. (Spring, 1998), pp. 29–32+34–46.
- Waltz, N. Kenneth (2015) (Çev. Osman S. Binatlı) *Uluslararası Politika Teorisi* Ankara: Phoenix.
- Watson, A. (1993). *The Evolution of International Society*, London: Routledge.

Internet References:

- Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. „Power in International Politics.” *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 39–75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877878>.
- Lemke, Douglas. „Power Politics and Wars without States.” *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (2008): 774–86. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193849>.
- Naidu, M.V. „Patterns of Power Politics.” *Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (2004): 15–21. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23684852>.
- <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46601175> (20.12.2018)

Author

Abdullah Metin Durmuş

The author was born in 1965, in Turkey. He is a graduate of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations (1990). He retired in March 2018 after 27 years of diplomatic career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. This article is the extract from his draft Master’s thesis in International Relations at the Institute of European Union and International Relations of Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey. I dedicate this article to the founder and the first President of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who introduced the principle “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”.

e-mail: ametindurmus@gmail.com