

## A Glance to Turkey-EU Relations from the Security Perspective: Incorporation of Turkey into the EU is Necessary for European Security would Strengthen the Prospects of Turkey's Integration.

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### **ABSTRACT**

*This study argues that Turkey's inclusion into the EU is important for the EU's security role. An essential reason behind the European Council decision to raise Turkey's status to that of candidate country is the EU's evolving security role. In other words, the estimates of the potential benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU's policy towards Turkey.<sup>1</sup>*

**Key Words:** *European security, the role of Turkey, the ESDP, security opportunities and risks.*

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## Introduction

This study is based on rational intergovernmentalism-institutionalism (liberal inter-governmental approach) approach of international relations theory by placing this issue within a theoretical perspective of states' preferences and policy making in the EU. According to A. Moravcsik (1993), there are three essential elements at the core of liberal intergovernmentalism: the assumption of national state behavior, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining or negotiation<sup>2</sup>. In this respect, understanding the EU states as rational actors and taking decisions with regard to foreign affairs based on their own benefits and preferences (cost and benefit analysis) are the basic premises of this approach. Theoretically, boundaries of the EU will therefore in the last resort "depend on its ability to strike a balance between the benefits and costs involved for each member state"<sup>3</sup>. This is why member states' egoistic interests and cost/benefit calculations determine major EU policies. In this context, security is one of the major EU policies.

As A. Moravcsik explained (1993), according to rational intergovernmentalism, the preferences of member states are the most important parameters that affect membership status of a candidate country. These preferences incorporate material benefits being as economic and security fields. Considering these theoretical parameters, this study argues that, as far as security issues are concerned, the member states that support Turkey's EU membership into the EU would increase and Turkey's prospective membership into the EU might gain a huge amount of importance. Indeed, former minister of foreign affairs of Germany, Joschka Fischer explained (2004) significant role of Turkey on European security in that way: "Some old-minded persons are talking about that membership of Turkey into the EU would affect negatively. However, I cannot ignore realities. Turkey has an extremely important strategic actor for Europe"<sup>4</sup>. At the intergovernmental level, the relative power of member states determines which states' preferences will be reflected in EU policies. This statement implies that convergence of preferences of relatively more powerful actors in the EU is an important factor in the process of interstate bargaining and in EU policies such as enlargement and the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy). For that reason, if the most powerful member states within the EU, particularly, UK, France and Germany come to the concerted conclusion regarding the indispensable character of Turkey for European security perspective and identity, then positions of the other member countries would be formulated according to this point of view. Since, theoretically speaking, according to rational intergovernmentalism, the EU policies are constituted and determined ramifications of strategic partnerships and agreements, which take place among the most powerful states within the Union.

2 Moravcsik, A. (1993) "Preferences and power in the European Communities: a liberal intergovernment approach." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31-4: 482.

3 Baç, Meltem M. and McLaren, L. (2003) "Enlargement preferences and policymaking in the EU: Impacts on Turkey." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 25: 17-30.

4 *Hürriyet*, 08.09.2004, in Baç, Meltem M. A Glance to the relationships between Turkey and the EU from a security dimension, Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, November 2006, p. 7.

One of the most important obstacles in front of Turkey in the terms of its membership into the EU is the fact that Turkish identity is seen out of the European identity. In this context, if the importance of Turkey for interests of the EU is conceived, the Europeanness of Turkey might be questioned less. In other words, the more emphasis on cost and benefit analysis in the Turkish case could pave the way for altering identity perceptions. To put it crudely, if both governments and peoples understand considerable opportunities that Turkey might bring for European security, interactions between Turkey and the EU may go up and what Meltem M. Baç called , this socialization process might facilitate a common identity constitution.

As Meltem M. Baç (2006) correctly underlines that the role of Turkey that has played so far and will play in the future for European security is closely related to what sort of actor that EU is in the field of security. It is widely known that since 1949, by the establishment of NATO, European states left their security affairs to the NATO and USA at a greater level. Needless to say, international role of the EU in the global arena is entirely different from that of USA. In the case of the latter, USA carries, hard power features along with its technological superiority and military capabilities as a hegemonic leader in Gramscian terminology and shapes world politics. Whereas the former are quiet often defined as soft power. For instance, Robert Kagan in his "Power and Paradise" resembled Americans coming from 'Mars' as Hobbesian world where conflicts are inescapable and on the other hand resembled Europeans coming from 'Venus' as Kantian peaceful world where international institutions would solve world-problems by means of peaceful means. This epitomizes the way in which USA and Europe look at the world affairs and clear differences between their perspectives of world and international affairs. That is the reason why Ian Manners (2002) describes the EU as a civil power by saying that "the concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed in a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics". With regard to Turkey, in this respect, probable international role of the EU, whether it will decide to be a hard/military power or soft/civilian power is going to determine the role of Turkey for European security as well.

The fundamental reason behind incapability of the EU to develop an efficient foreign and policy is interest and preference based conflicts among member-states. The basic issue affecting relations between Europe and Turkey has always been one of security. Nevertheless, the existence of common enemy, the significant Turkish contribution to European security and the multi-national character of NATO has had the effect that Turkey, for the first time in its history, has come to be perceived as a key component of the European security framework. In 1963, Turkey signed an agreement with Brussels indicating the possibility of membership. In 1995, the EU signed a customs agreement with Turkey and in 1999; Turkey was officially declared a candidate nation. The key condition, which also applied for Eastern European applicants, was that Turkey must fulfill the Copenhagen economic and political Criteria (laid down at the EU summit in December 2002). However, the Copenhagen criteria do not consider security issues to be as important as economic and political ones. Though Turkey does not underestimate the require-

ments of the Copenhagen Criteria, they are also well aware that the world after 9/11 has changed dramatically. Within the EU, the main problem is the dysfunctional nature of European collective politics concerning security and foreign policy. Hence, the insistence on politicizing security issues and seeking political compromise has caused the European Union to be regarded internationally as a less of a “super-power” than a “super-market”. Therefore, I argue that, Turkey with its important geopolitical role, superior military capabilities and its significantly crucial strategic position as its assets, could behave strategically and demonstrate itself as security opportunity for the EU by making use of these conflicts among member-states in a rational way.

### **European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP):**

ESDP is a project on developing the EU's ‘military and non-military crisis management capability, as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defense’, in cooperation with NATO. This capability known as the “Petersberg Tasks”, as agreed by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, involves humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and the tasks of the armed forces in crisis management including peace-making. The ESDI controversy between Turkey and the EU evolves around whether and how Turkey would participate in discussions and decisions within the EU concerning the ESDP from the beginning of a crisis to the actual use of force to achieve the Petersburg task. Although the origins of the ESDP could be traced back to the EU Summit in Maastricht in 1991, the controversy itself had started to dominate the agenda of the Turkish-EU relations in 1999. Furthermore, The ESDP was built on an EU/NATO common acceptance of the “Berlin Plus” agreement, which enabled the EU to develop an effective and capable military dimension by providing a channel for the EU to access NATO's military assets and planning capabilities. The EU has also been building its own rapid response capability under the “Petersberg Tasks”, which is specifically related to humanitarian and rescue work, peacekeeping, and combat tasks. These include military and police units, as well as civil administration, rule of law experts, and civil protection teams, for running UN-mandated crisis management operations. While the “Berlin Plus” agreement facilitates the realization of the “Petersberg Tasks” through EU/NATO politico-military cooperation with possible non-EU members' participation, the ESDP provides the necessary mechanism to realize the same tasks with an autonomous EU defense capacity, “backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis. In order to realize an autonomous EU defense capacity, the EU agreed at the Helsinki European Council meeting to establish a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year, as well as a new idea for the creation of 13 rapidly deployable, each 1,500 men strong, EU “Battle Groups”.

While NATO, with its operations in the Balkans and successful enlargement, has established itself as the central military-security institution, the EU has started to claim a larger role, gradually incorporating the WEU. This process developed throughout the

1990s, but had accelerated greatly by the end of the decade. Overall, the EU has become an important actor in the restructuring of the European security system, advancing the ESDI with the aim of strengthening the European pillar of NATO and ensuring that it has the capability to act on its own when NATO chooses not to act. As far as NATO is concerned, it certified the ESDI as the European pillar of the Alliance at its 1996 Berlin Summit and reiterated this endorsement at its 1999 Washington Summit. As Meltem M. Baç correctly puts forward (2000) that it is within this context that Turkey's incorporation into the EU becomes essential. In fact, exclusion of such an "integral actor" from the European security structures would bear significant risks, while its inclusion would boost European capabilities and allow the EU to take advantage of Turkey's geopolitical value. For instance, since any EU operation can be implemented- according to Washington Summit decisions- only after NATO Council approval, including Turkey's vote, the EU has in each case to find a way to accommodate Turkey.

### **The Role of Turkey on European Security**

To begin with, there are both military sphere that articulates hard power traits and civil sphere that shows soft power features within the EU for Turkey to play a potential role on European security. For instance, according to Meltem M. Baç maintains (2000), there are three assets that make Turkey an indispensable actor in the European security system in the post-Cold War era: its membership in NATO, its military capabilities, and its geostrategic position. First, by exercising its vote in the North Atlantic Council, Turkey has an institutional lever that can affect the EU's defense aspirations. Second, Turkey's military capabilities are vital for operations in the expanded European security area. Third, Turkey controls a pivotal intersection between Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, which allows it to qualify as a major player all these regions.

Furthermore, broad military capabilities of Turkey and worthwhile experience of its army constitute a solid ground of Turkey's contributions to the EU's security dimension. As we have emphasized earlier, from a geo-political point of view, it is clear that Turkey, because of its geographic positioning at the crossroads of South East Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus- Caspian region, is destined to play a key role in European security and foreign policy issues. It will do so whether it becomes a member state or not. The acceptance of Turkey, would bring two major benefits: the unquestionable strengthening of European military capabilities (Turkey's army consists of around 400.000 troops -Ed), and a direct physical presence in the Middle-Eastern and Caucasus-Caspian region. In the Caucasus, the most visible aspects of an EU presence, thus far, has been the monitoring of elections, whose outcomes are usually regarded as not having been carried out freely and fairly. The hope is, that Turkey's undeniable status as a neighboring country, will finally force the EU to implement a more rational approach toward Turkey, and to come up with a functional strategy, whose aim will be the combination of political dialogue, financial aid and real military strength. In addition to these, Turkey is one of the largest investors in Central Asia. From the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey has closed

more than 400 bilateral and multilateral agreements of a technical and even political nature. Thousands of students from Central Asian Republics such as Kazakhstan, study at Turkish Universities. These future technical and intellectual elite present the possibility of a significant flow of investment and political discourse into this strategically important region.

Turkey's institutional role in the Union's common foreign and security policies, its significant military capabilities, and its pivotal geographical position determine Turkey's strategic importance for the EU in the post-Cold War era. As Richard Holbrooke has put it, "Turkey stands at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance on the European continent-including NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, Russian relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and transit routes for Caspian oil and gas".

First, Turkey's participation in the EU's possible military operations could contribute significantly to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility. For instance, the EU's declared goal of being able to deploy 60,000 soldiers- the kind of force that could serve as peacekeeper in hot spots like Bosnia and Kosovo- will require up to 200,000 soldiers because of rotation needs. Yet, the European allies, with 2 million soldiers on paper, had trouble-fielding 40,000 for peacekeeping in the Balkans. In addition, the allies lack the huge transport planes required to project military power beyond their borders. This situation, despite all the post-Kosovo plans for a European army, is not going to change in the near future. According to Lord Robertson, "Kosovo was only an alarm calm. The simple, but brutal message was: we made promises that we could not keep". The EU will have either to rely on the USA or to involve a European power, which is capable of sustained military effort and has a large standing army-Turkey. Indeed, Turkey spends 4.4% of its GNP on defense. On the other hand, defense budgets have been falling across much for Europe such as Germany, France and Britain. As an indication of its willingness to contribute to the EU's rapid deployment force, Turkey offered in February 2000 to provide a brigade-size unit supported by air naval components.

As far as the Turkey's geographic significance for European security is concerned, four specific aspects can be identified. The first one encompasses Iraq, and the key reference point here is certainly the 1990-91 Gulf War, which has shown how much the security of Europe could be damaged by turmoil in the Gulf area. Turkey's participation in the allied coalition against Iraq was crucial for the victory, because of the high value of the Incirlik air base for conducting the air campaign. Turkey's position was vital again, much the same way as in 1991. Turkey's participation and its military bases would be crucial for the success of any possible NATO/EU operation in the Middle East.

The second aspect of Turkey's place and role in the Middle East that carries implications for the EU involves its closeness to and alliance building with Israel. Since 1993, Turkey has been engaged in extensive cooperation with Israel, formalized in a range of agreements stretching from cultural to military matters. These latter are certainly of particular importance since the agreements on military cooperation brought Turkey and Israel together as security partners in the Middle East. More recently, Turkey furthered its

ties with Egypt by signing an agreement on cooperation between two nations' security and police agencies in May 2000. Turkey has already played an important role in the multilateral track of the Middle East Peace Process and is able to act as an intermediary role between Palestine and Israel, as illustrated by its diplomatic efforts in August 2000, when Palestine leader Yassir Arafat, Israeli Foreign Minister Sholomo Ben Ami, and Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak visited Turkey one after another. With these assets, Turkey with its secular character and dynamic economy can play an important role in the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process in terms of ensuring economic development in the Mediterranean region and eliminating the economic and political causes of immigration from North Africa to the EU and also with Turkey's close ties with Israel can help achieving the peace between Israel and Palestine. Thus, Turkey's role in Barcelona Process would help the EU to deal with such security challenges as ethnic conflicts, the rise of political Islam, immigration, and instability in the Middle East (Baç M. Meltem, 2000: 497).

The third aspect of Turkey's geostrategic weight is related to its role in Southeast Europe and the Balkans, the region that in the 1990s posed the most serious challenges to European security and stability. Turkey's role in the Balkans is highlighted by its participation in resolving the Bosnian crisis of 1992-95 and the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99. In both cases, Turkey provided substantial humanitarian aid, its troops served under UN command, and it accommodated many thousands of refugees. Turkey has contributed an infantry battalion group (1300 officers and soldiers) to NATO's Implementation/Stabilization Force in Bosnia, as well as 26 police officers to the UN Mission in Bosnia; its mechanized battalion (940 officers and soldiers) is deployed in Kosovo. As the EU-with its Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe -shifts the emphasis on economic development aid as a means to discharge security challenges, Turkey can capitalize on its active economic role in the Balkans. Therefore, Turkey has great potential for contributing militarily, politically, and economically to the EU's Balkan policies. Its ties with the people of Southeastern Europe are historical, cultural, ethnic, and- in the case of Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albians-religious. One should note that these ties might well increase the EU's security problems, because they make Turkey a party to Balkan politics. As for the Cyprus problem, this definitely constitutes a special case, but as Meltem M. Baç argues (2000), if the EU were able to pressure Turkey towards a resolution of this problem, using the additional leverage of Turkey's candidacy, this would increase stability in Southeastern Europe.

The fourth aspect of Turkey's potential geopolitical contribution to European security is related to its role in the Caspian region. Turkey has for years played the role of an energy corridor for Europe, as some of the oil from the Middle East is transported through its territory. One should notice that this role would increase extraordinarily when the energy resources of the Caspian area reach the world markets. It is rather essential to know the fact that these resources are of such a scale that whoever controls them would hold the key strategic balances for the 21st century, so, it can be argued that Turkey's position will shape key regional balances.



In brief, parallel to these explanations above, Turkey's inclusion into the EU trajectory brings various benefits for the Union's foreign and security policies through Turkey's capabilities and its ties in the regions around. Meanwhile, its exclusion would be problematic and even risky because of Turkey's ability to influence EU military operations and decisions through its vote in the NATO Council. Therefore, if the process of Turkey's candidacy is reconsidered, the lesson that was driven would be: "geopolitical and security risks that Turkey's exclusion entails for the EU and the potential benefits its inclusion would bring driven the EU's decision to grant Turkey a candidate-country status". Turkey's contribution to the EU's CESDP is derived from its military capabilities and its role in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Caspian area, while its ability to affect EU operations through its vote in the NATO Council cannot be underestimated (Baç M. Meltem, 2000: 499). Turkey is an important players in the changing European security arena, and, without its participation, EU-led operations may stand less chance of success. Turkey's role in the EU's security perspective particularly, is certainly different from the one that Turkey played during the Cold War, but it is no less than vital Turkey's integration into the EU carries therefore an additional advantage that the Central and Eastern European countries cannot match. Therefore, it would be a more healthy consideration to see granted candidate status to Turkey in the Helsinki Summit, in 1999 by taking into account Turkey's salient and considerable security role for the EU.

This clearly indicates that Turkey bears remarkable advantages to EU's security. The EU that incorporates Turkey as a full member will be more active actor in the global arena. Turkey's enormous military capability will make a considerable contribution to hard power of the EU. Indeed, success of the EU's military operations in the Balkans and the Middle East that depends on the Turkey's support and its logistic assistance proves the importance of Turkey geostrategic position. In addition to this, Turkey's geographical position, its pivotal role within the Balkans and Caucasus and its secular and democratic characteristics as an overwhelmingly Muslim country will enable the EU to enhance its sincerity of soft power quality.

As M. Bali Aykan points out (2005) with Europeans have not appeared willing to accept Turkey's becoming a full member in the foreseeable future, they have agreed with American and Turkish political leaders concerning its strategic importance in securing regional stability and peace. It appears that, Turkey's case constituted a dilemma for the European states. Modern Turkey had a strong military with an effective deterrent capability integrated into the NATO establishment: "an army, experienced in and capable of carrying out various peace-keeping and war-making missions, maintaining historically close ties and a "strategic partnership" with the USA, the one and only superpower in the post-Cold War era". As such, Turkey was a credible factor to be accepted in the maintenance of regional order and security. According to the Europeans, who had been living through an ambitious but a sensitive integration process, as M. Bali Aykan remarkably emphasizes (2005) these characteristics made Turkey too important to be disregarded and alienated.



Moreover, Turkey was now a status quo-oriented moderate country in relation to her Ottoman past. Specifically in this respect, Verheugen expected that Turkey would demonstrate its good will by arranging a settlement of the Cyprus conflict with Greece in order to secure full membership in the EU. Apparently, this expectation was shared by government's decision in the Helsinki Summit not to use any veto against membership status being given to Turkey appeared to be that the Greek Premier Simitis believed that a Turkey that was oriented toward Europe would pose fewer security risks to Greece than a Turkey focused away from Europe.

### **Complexity of Turkey's Security Environment**

As far as Turkey's role and its security-oriented characteristics are concerned, nature of the relationship between Turkey and the EU is both intricate and complicated. The EU door is bound to remain close to Turkey for the foreseeable future, a situation that poses problems not only for both sides, but also for the whole framework of security in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Since the US is more enthusiastic about Turkish membership of the EU than are most EU members, it could even damage transatlantic relations. In that context, Barry Buzan & Thomas Diez focus on the complexity nature of Turkey's security environment.

Common interests between the EU and Turkey start with Turkey's strategic geography. Turkey places at the edge of three more-or-less distinct regions of conflict- the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus- and has a role in two more that are at a slight geographical remove from it- west Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. According to B. Buzan and T. Diez, from a systemic perspective, it plays the role of an insulator, a peripheral actor in all of the security regions surrounding it, but not centrally involved in any (1999: 41-57). This should not be read as Turkey being unimportant to its neighbors; its main function, in practice, is to separate other regional security dynamics from each other. Given the complexity of its security environment, agreed by B. Buzan and T. Diez (1999) Turkey needs to promote stability on as many fronts as possible if it is to avoid living in a region of permanent conflict. Whether this can be achieved by bringing Turkey into the EU seems doubtful. They argue (1999) that it is more likely that such a situation would lead to a direct entanglement of the EU in the security dynamics of the Middle East and the CIS. For the time being, Turkey's security links to the Western powers via its NATO membership should be sufficient to meet its own security concerns. The strategic interests shared reciprocally by Turkey and the EU should be obvious. For the EU, Turkey can provide security insulation from the Middle East, and a partner in stabilizing the Balkans. For Turkey, the EU can provide a stable and supportive relationship, a partner in containing conflict in the Balkans generally, and the Greek-Turkish conflict in particular. Both sides should want to prevent the growth of any linkage between the security dynamics of the Middle East and those of the Balkans.

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**Security opportunities of Turkey for the EU-1:**

In non-military security relations between Turkey and states in Central Asia in terms of vision of intense system of cooperation on the basis of common language and cultural heritage like these, there is undoubtedly considerable scope for Turkey to play some kind of bridging role between the EU and countries further a field. There must be a role for Turkey as a regional dynamic in the Balkans, where it shares the EU's interest in stabilization. As a rule, Turkey's Middle Eastern engagements create more ties with the US than with Europe, whereas its Balkans and Black Sea engagements create more ties with the EU than the US.

**Security opportunities of Turkey for the EU-2:**

The logic behind the ESDP is that the EU will be involved in crisis management in a wider geographical area from the Balkans to the Caucasus and from Middle East to North Africa where Turkey is at the crossroads of region. These are conflict regions have a direct bearing on international peace and security. The EU plays a significant role in establishing a stable environment in its neighborhood with strategies such as The European Neighborhood Policy , and a Turkey, as a country with significant military capabilities and a growing civilian sector that is active in humanitarian efforts, has been the net contributor to international peace and security in key international organizations such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE.

S. Gürsoy strongly puts forward (2005) that this is the manifestation of one of the most important trends in Turkey's domestic and foreign policies: investment in the military sector, which inevitably resulted in identifying Turkey as a "security consumer" at the beginning of the 1990s, shifted to investment in the civilian sector in peace-keeping and peace-making operations by visualizing the country as a "security provider" towards the end of the 1990s. Moreover, Turkey, as a country that began accession negotiations for EU membership on 3 October 2005, has also taken active part in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations .

Turkey's historic contribution to efforts to build a greater regional capacity for peace operations continues in the EU efforts to create a Rapid Reaction Force and a Civilian Crisis Management Capacity since December 1999; in the OSCE's Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Team (REACT) to support timely deployment of police and other civilian expertise since April 2001; and in the NATO Response Force (NRF) since November 2002. (In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia).

With regard to EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations, Turkey has participated in :

- The first EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 14 police officers, where Turkey had contributed 186 police officers under the UN International
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Police Task Force (IPTF) in 2003 .

- The EU's first military mission Operation Concordia in Macedonia with 11 personnel. The EU took over the mission on 31 March 2003, from the NATO Operation Allied Harmony. Turkey's contribution continues in the follow-up civilian crisis management operation "Proxima" with eight personnel .
- The first EU autonomous military operation "Artemis" in Democratic Republic of Congo with nine personnel, which lasted from 15 June until 1 September 2003 .
- The EU Operation Althea in Bosnia with over Turkish 350 troops, as well as contributing personnel to the Integrated Police Unit of this operation with Turkish gendarmerie forces, which was launched following the termination of the mission of NATO's Stabilization Force.

H. Tank Oğuzlu considers (2003) that the EU's final decision on Turkey's accession is dependent both on Turkey's performance in adopting the EU's distinctive security identity and on the continuation of the EU member states' commitment to turning the EU into an international actor with vital security interests in Turkey's neighborhood. On the basis of this reasoning, it can be concluded that the longer the accession process lasts and the more ambiguously the EU reacts towards Turkey's membership, the more likely Turkey and the EU view each other as "security threats" rather than "security providers" .

Turkish public has been continuously supportive of its country's bid for membership as it sees inclusion within the EU as a "logical consequence" of its Kemalist Western orientation and as a means of finally confirming Turkey' European identity . However, Turkey's inclusion in the EU has been considered problematic because of its economic problems, shortcomings in promoting democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus problem, and size of population . While these factors could be considered as obstacles to membership, they are not exclusive to Turkey; previous candidates have also had the same problems, yet have gained membership (for example, Spain and Poland). EU member-states have all had the same point that Turkey must meet the prerequisite entry standards framed as Copenhagen Criteria and regard that an overall settlement with Greece of bilateral dispute and a solution to the Cyprus problem would almost certainly be a sine qua non for Turkish membership . Fundamentally, as S. Desai points out (2005), the central part of the debate is about how this particular enlargement would affect the future security and identity of the EU .

#### **After 11 September (positive developments in EU-Turkey relations in terms of security in the post-September Era:**

In the post-September era, one can correctly claim that Turkey's chances of being included within the EU have drastically increased from a security perspective. First

of all, if the ideational boundaries of Western civilization, of which the EU constitutes an important part, are defined by the struggle against global terrorism, then Turkey's case for EU membership will likely become stronger. This is so because Turkey has struggled with separatist and fundamentalist terrorism for decades.

Second, if the EU wants to see its security interests preserved and its security model applied to the global struggle with terrorism, then Turkey's incorporation into the EU family is highly significant. This is so mainly for following reasons. The post-September era has increasingly exposed Europe to the challenges of global terror. Given that the sources of global terrorism mainly originated from the Middle East, Turkey's inclusion within the EU would enable the latter to rely on Turkey's advanced military capabilities in its struggle with such threats. Turkey's membership into the EU would support the claims of those who argue, "the war on terrorism should not be continued on the basis of a clash of civilizations between the developed Christian North and the undeveloped Muslim South". Moreover, Turkey's EU membership would also imply that it is not predestined that a country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim and whose economic power lag far behind those of the developed countries can never join the EU, currently, a Christian club of developed European states. Third, if the EU's security is based on efforts to embrace and engage with regions to the East and South, the EU will not be able to achieve ultimate security by fixing borders at some definite point and excluding a number of countries outside the EU area (Oğuzlu T., 2003: 285-299). In line with this argument, leaving Turkey outside the EU and treating it as a barrier against soft and hard security threats will not operate in today's environment because of the globalized and trans-regionalized nature of security issues in this special part of the world. It seems that there is a close relationship between the quality of the Turkey's accession process with the EU and the quality of the EU's security sensitivity. Indeed, as T. Oğuzlu states (2003), the further Turkey's domestic structures depart from those of the EU, the more turbulence and chaos takes place inside the country (pp.285-299). The more internal instability takes root in Turkey, the less secure the EU will feel because the kind of security threats that the EU is trying to eliminate would increase.

Fourth, if the transatlantic rift between the EU and the USA further widens in the years to come, Turkey's placement in this equation will become fundamentally important for the EU. If Turkey continues to ally with the USA and Israel in the region, this would unquestionably limit the potential geopolitical influence of the EU. After all, what would be at stake would be the promise of EU's security model. The debate on Turkey's membership into the EU would affect the future security and identity of the EU. This debate moved to center stage after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, when Turkey finally granted candidate status and intensified especially after the events of 9/11. It is correct to argue that Turkey's membership would change the EU forever. The EU would share common borders with the Middle East and the South Caucasus, and its predominant Christian population would expand considerably to include a substantial Muslim minority. Several EU member states are alarmed by this prospect, perceiving Turkey's position in the middle of unstable regions and the influx of Islamic radicalism as threats to Europe: "Europe would implode" (Frits

Bolkestein, Dutch European Commissioner) . Other EU member states have a different, perhaps strategic, perspective. They believe that Turkish accession would promote greater stability in its near-abroad ultimately benefiting the EU, and finally dispel Huntington's notion of a "clash of civilizations" along the cultural fault-lines of Christianity and Islam: "Turkey anchored in Europe... would deal a heavy blow to those who stoke up mistrust and division and it could be an inspiration to many others in the Muslim world". (Jack Straw, UK Foreign Minister) .

This situation can be best summarized as two groups within the EU that have drawn contradicting conclusions about Turkey's membership of the EU, with one side viewing it as a security risk and the other seeing it as a security opportunity. It depends on the way where you can look at. Actors that share identical or similar values and views of the world are better able to cooperate . It can be talked about the notion of convergence that exists between the EU and Turkey when identifying security threats, geographic priorities, security collaborates (NATO and the UN) and recognition of the strategic role of the US and Russia. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies the key threats to EU security to be international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states and organized crime , and these are reflected in the Turkish Defense White Paper 2000: "Turkey also believes that... the fight against international terrorism in the world, the illegal arms trade, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occupy an important place in providing regional and world peace" . EU member states may perceive Turkey as a security opportunity if its values and views of the world converged with those of the EU. If that is not so, Turkey would be perceived as security risk.

### **Contribution: Turkey-An attractive prospect for the EU**

Turkey's entrance into the European Union as a full member is expected to bring new capabilities and interests that pave the way the EU's ability to realize its security objectives .

Turkey could also positively contribute to the EU's future economic security through its various plans for securing oil and gas for itself and others in Europe . EU member states are already fearful about being too dependent on oil from the Middle East or from Russia, as there are concerns that as the latter's economy develops oil supplies will dwindle. The construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, following the emergence of the Caspian basin as a significant source of oil and natural gas highlights the fact that Turkey is geographically and culturally close to 65% of all world oil and natural gas reserves . Turkey in the EU could act as the frontline against transnational crimes that constitute "soft threats" through beneficial cooperation in JHA.

Turkey's inclusion within the EU could create two effects. First, at a strategic level it would demonstrate that 'Christian Europe' is not the enemy of Islam. Second, Brussels could utilize Turkey's advanced military and intelligence capability in its struggle against

international terrorism, which is an overt threat against security of the EU. It could be argued that Turkey being at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East and at the door of Central Asia, holds a strategic position which gives it a role of major importance, on the one hand as a pole of stability in this particularly troubled region, and on the other hand, as a moderating element in the many regional conflicts at its doorstep. Turkey has a complex web of relationships with these regions where the EU wishes to develop the European Neighborhood Policy, including commercial, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and historical links .

Turkey's geographical location, NATO-class military infrastructure and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for European military power projection to theaters of operation outside the EU. In short, Turkey could become a force multiplier in ESDP, especially when considering that the EU member states have armed forces that number 1.2 million, yet only 80,000 of these can be deployed overseas . Turkey also has the second largest army in NATO and thus already has a long experience of working with many European armed forces, sharing the same defense doctrines and training procedures. Turkey has also been involved in numerous UN missions, notably in Somalia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrating its political willingness and ability to contribute to global security. Turkey's success as lead nation for operations in Afghanistan during 2002 was considered due in part to the Turks' cultural awareness and sensitivity for the Afghan people based on long-standing relations .

Turkey's exclusion would mean that the EU would lose the opportunity of influencing an important regional actor. In the wider geopolitical context, against the conditions of growing Islamic-based terrorism, the EU needs a secular, democratic and stable Turkey for several reasons. First, to demonstrate that Huntington's well-known thesis is not true and second, to demonstrate to the wider world that the EU can act as an inspiration for greater democratic reform leading to security and stability.

In brief, needless to reiterate, it can be clearly noticed that Turkey's real contribution to regional peace operations stems not only from its military capabilities and its crucial geopolitical location, but also from its ability to contribute to the civilian sector of peace operations. Turkey, as a full member of NATO and a country entered into accession negotiation for the EU membership, has a crucial role to play in UN-mandated and not UN-mandated regional and multilateral peace operations. Thus, arguably, Europeans should press for the establishment of readily deployable EU/UN post-conflict multi-national military and civilian units, with possible participation of key regional powers, such as Turkey. In that respect, Turkey bears very huge impact and greater importance.

### Conclusion

As we know, in today's world the term 'security' is an essentially contested term. A simple definition for security may be 'the absence of threat'; a more sophisticated one may be 'security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile'. In the post-Cold War era, the security environment is perceived to be more complex because of its multifaceted nature. Security is now broader than the traditional military focus including interrelated economic, political, social and environmental factors, with the referent object of security being at multiple levels; individual, community and state. The challenges in the twenty-first-century are diverse, as are the methods needed to be employed in dealing with them. It is a decisive moment for the EU and other international organizations like UN concerning how they could best reform their structures in order to be able to maintain international peace and security in today's uncertain, troubled and unstable the world. Rather than asking whether Turkey's membership in the EU is a security risk or opportunity, perhaps the significant question is what is the risk of not having Turkey in the EU? The answer to this question, assuming the Turkey has made the necessary transformations, will be dependent on the Europe of 2015- "Old Europe" or "New EU". Perhaps, the situation of Iraq and unresolved Iranian question would invoke the EU to reconsider on Turkey's prospectus EU membership. Briefly speaking, in this article, I tried to indicate importance of Turkey's past and prospective contributions to EU's foreign, defense and security policies and how Turkey could fill security holes of EU. I would argue that Turkey would be a crucial player for filling security and foreign policy gaps of EU and in that respect security would be regarded as a bridge-building for Turkey's EU membership.



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