Revista de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia

66 - 78

Authors: Michael Gilbert

Sometimes rights conflict, as when the right to religion interferes with the right to equality. Often law does not prioritize rights, leaving judges to resolve conflicts among them based on their own intuitions and beliefs. This paper explores a new principle for resolving such cases: rule against the party that could have avoided the rights conflict more easily. This principle builds on “least cost avoidance,” a theory of liability developed by scholars in law and economics. The main objective of this paper is to adapt least cost avoidance to questions of rights. The secondary objective is to demonstrate the potential of economics in constitutional law. Economics has illuminated and influenced many legal fields. To influence constitutional law, economists must address the questions of lawyers and judges, meaning questions about constitutional doctrine. This paper presents a modest step in that direction.

106 - 122

Authors: Juan Carlos Cassagne

This analysis article describes the process of constitutionalization of law and argues around how neoconstitutionalism ends up appropriating the technique of general principles (sometimes deforming its meaning), whatever the philosophical sign of its cultivators (inclusive or exclusive positivists). The article states that it has occurred and continues to occur within inclusive positivism and analytical jurisprudence.

139 -178

Authors: Valeria De Lorenzi

In the preliminary phase of contracting, the fundamental importance of information, and the information exchanged by the pre-contractual parties, is undoubted. Parties, by entering a contract, seek to pursue their interest, to maximise their welfare. Based on the information it possesses, a party decides to conclude or not to conclude the contract; if the party concludes the contract, the pre-contractual information spills over into the content of the contract, influencing the contractual agreements, the reciprocal performances established, the conditions under which the contract is concluded. This is not a work of economic analysis, but rather a legal work; economic analysis is used exclusively to highlight problems, to which the rules of the Civil Code provide a solution. The pre-contractual problems in the light of economic analysis, arising from the asymmetries of information between the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and the solutions to them provided by the rules of the civil code, have already been examined by the writer in a fragmentary way during studies concerning representation and the insurance contract. The survey will briefly examine information, and especially pre-contractual information, and the problems connected with it, in the light of economic analysis; it will then focus on the rules of the Civil Code that deal with pre-contractual information and the problems connected with it and will try to find solutions to them.

197 - 213

Authors: Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mila Versteeg; Emilia Reinhart

Traducción original