Knowledge and practices: pragmatic constructing of known and unknown (based on materials of legal awareness)
Authors: Golikov A. S.
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The article carries out theoretically, methodologically and empirically grounded conceptualization of the connection between knowledge and practices from the point of view of the design of the known and unknown in practices and action. The author analyzes concepts of D. Hume, J. Dewey, E. Husserl, A. Schütz, A. Lefebvre, trying to conceptualize the connection between practices and knowledge. On the other hand, he offers his own concept of knowledge protocols, which is based on the development of L. Wittgenstein, P. Sztompka, P. Bourdieu ideas. The correlation of the protocols with each other, as well as with the action and the actor is demonstrated.
It is proved from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge that the main factor of the social actor’s knowledge structure is his life practices (as generally accepted algorithms of action). The example of legal awareness of Kharkov citizens shows the presence of latent factors in general structure of a social actor’s typical knowledge in any society. The relationship between awareness, practical inclusion, knowledge structures, appraisal and emotional relationship is demonstrated. The suitability of the aforementioned latent factors for any sphere of human activity is proved in the presence of analytically distinguished protocols of interaction. It is demonstrated with the example of practical inclusion of justice bodies in everyday life and in practical knowledge of Kharkov inhabitants that the mass consciousness of everyday actors is formed primarily by their practices, legal “being”, direct contacts with the justice bodies – on the one hand, and the universality and relevance of their services – on the other.
The author builds a factorial model, which includes participation in formal practices, everyday realities and vexatiousness. These three factors influence the familiarity and awareness of everyday actors about the organs of justice. At the same time, the author notes that an important part of any knowledge is not only the known (as permissible for comprehension, action, discussion), but also the unknown. It is concluded that the order of organization of knowledge (protocols) is an indispensable element of the functioning of any social order.