IPRI Journal

1-20

Authors: Imdad Ullah

Within the realm of pre-emptive self-defence, any recourse to the use of force remains a delicate legal undertaking. This is because such a military manoeuvre is conceived and carried out without the evidence of an armed attack that has already occurred. Instead, it is justified on the basis of understanding that such an armed attack is underway. It involves, thus, numerous pieces of practical measures- meant to prove the coming of harm. These are hostile intentions; capability to inflict harm; and actual movements of the adversary. In this context, provision of precise justifications for these prerequisites is what makes the application of pre-emption complex. Hence, the Indian pre-emptive strikes inside Pakistan to eliminate so-called ‘terrorists’ and their infrastructure becomes an important case of enquiry and analysis. This study, therefore, seeks to discuss the legal merits of India’s recourse to use of force. In terms of its theoretical orientation, it is set within the framework of positivist legal traditions. During the course of argumentation, thus, it engages both customary international law and treaty law, relevant to pre-emptive self-defence.

44-71

Authors: Muhammad Ali Baig and Syed Sabir Muhammad

Various terrorist outfits or Actors Other Than States (AOTSs) are not only functionally similar in their motivation/objectives but are also driven by strategy which includes the means, ends or tactical and operational manoeuvring. This makes terrorism an extension of military strategy. The article views terrorism through a prism of military tactics and strategy in the historical backdrop of various forms of warfare. Drawing upon comparative analysis of the striking similarities in leading strategies and tactics between military forces of nation states, it argues that AOTSs make a conscious and significant use of military strategy in the pursuit of terrorist objectives.

105-134

Authors: Masood Ur Rehman Khattak

The Indian military is continuously transforming its doctrines to fill operational gaps, create synergy and integration in its tri-services, and execute realistic conventional limited war-fighting strategies. Its Land Warfare Doctrine-2018(LWD-18) is a renewed form of previous limited war doctrines. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and effective conventional counter measures have confined the India’s military from any large-scale offensives. This is the reason why it is constantly looking for a gap between the nuclear and conventional capabilities of Pakistan to launch limited but intense quick and swift operations under the nuclear umbrella without invoking Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Through in-depth primary interviews supported by secondary sources, this study finds that the new LWD-18 has put greater emphasis on the restructuring of the Indian Strike formations into small Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) equipped with offensive elements for shallow manoeuvres in protracted, rapid and nimble warfare scenarios. The LWD-18 also focuses on force modernisation; synergy & integration; flexibility; agility and greater manoeuvrability to fill operational gaps; shorten mobilisation time; and execute limited war concepts against Pakistan. It also stresses the significance of hybrid warfare threats in modern times, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities for real-time information about the adversary and enhanced battlefield transparency for precision strikes. All these capabilities are required for any quick and swift specialised operations in the South Asian strategic milieu. Such doctrinal transformation in the Indian Army is taking place rapidly and is going to put extreme strain on Pakistan’s military to manage growing conventional asymmetries, counter hybrid nature of threats, and employ credible counter measures along with pragmatic conventional strategies backed by nuclear weapons, to ensure territorial integrity, manage internal security and deter aggression at all levels to maintain deterrence stability in South Asia.