The paper explores why and how native units were mustered in the Imperial Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 – 1905. One of the key directions of combat activities, led by the Russian Empire and Japan, where the Chinese population was widely engaged, was reconnaissance operations. Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, the adversary's reconnaissance service demonstrated achievements in the area, which were much more impressive than performance of the Russian service for a number of reasons. The Japanese had a significant advantage – their ethnic appearance was similar to that of the Chinese, and the benefit greatly facilitated the task of planting their agents, disguised as the Chinese, into the rear of the Russian army to collect information, as well as impersonating Chinese officers and commanding Honghuzi units operating in the rear of the Imperial Russian Army. As a consequence, to enhance the efficiency of the efforts of gathering intelligence directly in the theater of war, the Russian army command started forming native sotnias and detachments, as well as preparing an agent network consisting of the local Chinese and Mongolian population. The detachments and units were planned to carry out deep and close reconnaissance, including operations around the areas where Russian troops were positioned, deep reconnaissance in the enemy territory, in the rear of the Russian army and in Mongolia.
This paper explores some of the key themes of Soviet anti-US visual propaganda in Krokodil, a satirical literary-artistic magazine. The author examines some of the key ways of disseminating this type of Soviet propaganda. The paper explores its manifestations across the physical, information, and virtual domains. The work reveals that Soviet propaganda used to be a tool for building the “right” model of the world by way of contrasting heroics with anti-heroics in Soviet-American relations. These relations were interpreted in Soviet visual propaganda both as an inter-national conflict and as an antagonism between the socio-political conditions that the USSR and the US were in during the Cold War.
It is suggested that this visual propaganda, which concurrently influenced the cognitive, emotional-volitional, and communicative subsystems of the human mind, was aimed at building the picture of a world in which a happy citizen lives in a just state. An attempt is made to prove that at the time this type of propaganda performed an ideological function and was a key means of conducting ideological work in the USSR as part of its clash with world imperialism and capitalism.
This paper addresses issues related to Russian government propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904−1905. The work analyzes the key reasons behind and the essence of the related ideological “warfare” and explores the effect the propaganda had on domestic political affairs in the Russian Empire during the First Russian Revolution (1905–1907). The paper describes some of the key forms and methods of ideological warfare used during the period, the “target audience”, and some of the more prominent and effective propaganda “artifacts”. The author provides insight into the efficiency of the propaganda campaign as a whole, the key effects it produced, its influence on the progress of the war, and some of the subsequent use of propaganda by the Russian government.
This paper addresses the use of messenger pigeons for intelligence and propaganda purposes during World War I. The author describes the mechanism underlying the use of messenger pigeons by France and England on the Western Front against Germany.
In putting this work together, the author drew upon various sources of private origin, including the reminiscences of Chief of the Intelligence Service of the German High Command Colonel Walter Nicolai. The author also made use of some narrowly specialized literature on the subject, including regulations dealing with the use of messenger pigeons in the army. The following methods were employed: (1) the chronological method (to examine the issue in the chronological order it developed in); (2) the comparative method (to compare the efforts of the participating nations in terms of the use of pigeon stations and pigeon post services); (3) the generalization method (to identify the common and distinctive features of the use of messenger pigeons during World War I for intelligence and propaganda purposes).
The author’s conclusion is that by the start of World War I the opposing sides had amassed extensive experience in the use of pigeons for war purposes. During the military confrontation, the participating nations continued to explore pigeons’ potential as messengers with a view to employing them further not only for prompt delivery of information but for intelligence and propaganda purposes as well. With that said, these practices were reported to be quite efficient at certain stages of the war.
The article is dedicated to the use of propaganda ammunition by the warring parties during World War I and World War II. Attention is paid to the means of ammunition delivery to the enemy’s positions, as well as performance characteristics of the ammunition used.
We used specialized scientific and technical literature on the issue of military propaganda and methods of the propaganda sources delivery as materials. Methodology of the study is based on the main principles of historicism, objectivity and chronological sequence. The principle of objectivity allowed us to disengage ourselves from stereotype opinions, assessments and thinking, and thanks to the chronological principle we were able to build up the study in its chronological sequence.
In the conclusion, the author notes that the experience of using propaganda materials during World War I has shown that efficient delivery of propaganda sources to the enemy’s deployment sites can play a significant role in orchestrating the desired psychological effect on the enemy. Keeping this in mind, in the period prior to the World War II, different countries were developing propaganda ammunitions delivered by air and ground transport. During World War II, further development of propaganda ammunitions was taking into account the military hardware technical development. As a result of this confrontation, a range of means for the delivery of propaganda materials was determined, and firing leaflets charged into the missile of a caliber of more than 122 mm was considered inefficient.