Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

360-397

Authors: IRENE BREUER

The article deals with Conrad-Martius’ conception of being and existence and explores it by contrasting it with the conceptions of Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl within the framework of their respective ontologies and metaphysics. The article delves into the problems of both the hypostatization and the origin of being in particular. I claim that the hypostatization of being does not concern the Sachverhalt, as Jean Wahl claims, but the noema itself insofar as intentionality transcends what is constituted by consciousness and grasps the essence of the substance itself, whose existence is not absolutely but hypothetically posited. I will further show that even though Conrad-Martius rejects the transcendental reduction, she accepts the eidetic reduction and the positing of a sphere of original and given facts, which are not only absolutely given to consciousness, but also self-grounded and self-sustained. Conrad-Martius’ research traces the origin of these back to a transphysical realm, thus revealing the grounds for the Husserlian sphere of primal facts, which itself remains beyond the reach of phenomenological reflection. Hence Conrad-Martius’ and Husserl’s investigations encounter and complement each other at the point where the real bursts into reality and becomes available to consciousness. These reflections are organized as follows: The first part presents Conrad-Martius’ conception of a real-ontological phenomenology in order to examine her criticism of Husserl’s transcendental reduction. The second part deals with her real-ontological conception of the essence of reality or the “real-reality” and its hypothetically posed existence. The third part concerns the conceptions of being, analogia essendi and categorial being with recourse to Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl and sets these in relation to Conrad-Martius’ own conception. The fourth part deals with her own understanding of the analogia essendi and of real being in order to shed light on the claim concerning the hypostatization of being. The fifth part explores Husserl’s positing of a sphere of primal facticity, Conrad-Martius’ conception of a real entity and its origin in a transphysical realm. The article finally summarizes the main results of these reflections.

425-440

Authors: ANNA JANI

The aim of the present contribution is to prove that spiritual acts not only play a significant role in the phenomenological description of the person and in individual and social experiences, but likewise they play a decisive role in the methodological constitution of phenomenology and have a core function in the theoretical structuring of the phenomenological description of the person, regarding, for example, metaphysical and anthropological characteristics. Firstly, in the paper, the implications for anthropology that arise from Edith Stein’s phenomenology are examined. In the second part—from the insight that Stein does not structure anthropology without its metaphysical background—the paper underlines the metaphysical presuppositions of anthropology in Stein’s thinking. In both stages, the investigation engages with Husserlian insights that Stein took on board and creatively introduced from Husserl’s thought into her own work. The inference from this engagement of Stein with Husserl emerges in the way Stein structures anthropology in general, and the origin of this can be seen in the description of the person as a psychophysical individual. At this point, the question arises regarding how the description of the spiritual acts can contribute to the structure of the person and, in this sense, to the foundation of anthropology as a philosophical-theological science.

463-483

Authors: TIMOTHY BURNS

Edith Stein is considered a leading figure in the early phenomenological movement and the disciple who performed in the best way the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl, and yet her relationship to phenomenology remains unclear in the literature. This article seeks to add clarity to her relationship to phenomenology while considering three inescapably related questions. (1) What did Stein conceive phenomenology to be? (2) How should we understand Husserl’s influence on Stein? (3) Was Stein an original phenomenological thinker? I argue that Stein conceives of phenomenology as an epistemological critique that aims to clarify the essential foundations of knowledge. It involves intentional analysis that proceeds by way of essential-seeing (Wesensschau), which can be brought about through the method of free imaginative variation, and its intentional analysis involves close attention to the relationship between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. I argue that the primary influence Husserl exerts on Stein is in the development of phenomenology as conceived in his Logical Investigations. Finally, I offer an understanding of how Stein conceived of her differences with Husserl on the issue of idealism in order to argue that Stein’s phenomenological writings in On the Problem of Empathy and “Sentient Causality” offer us a novel phenomenological account of the human being that begins with the ego but escapes being a mere egology. Edith Stein’s phenomenology of the human person begins with the ego and its experiences, and yet, she identifies within those experiences a certain kind of extra-egoic content, viz. experiences of my sentient states

499-533

Authors: PATRICIA FEISE-MAHNKOPP

In her main work, Walther exposes the unio mystica as meta-transcendental constitution of (fundamental) spiritual being (the bracketing indicates that this demonstration can be read in a metaphysical, i.e., strong, as well as in a secular, i.e., weak, version). While reflecting her approach theoretically and methodologically by drawing on Husserl, Landmann, Stein, just as on Pfänder and Conrad-Martius, Walther proposes a genuine approach that pushes the transcendental idealistic paradigm further. Its crucial claim is (imperfect) perceptibility and experientiality of (fundamental) spiritual being (labeled “God” by Walther). It is based on a substantially and ontologically differentiating—though integrative—notion of the conditio humana: entanglement of ego-center (both belonging to the transcendental realm and transgressing it meta-transcendentally), self (belonging to psychophysical being), and soulspiritual implications of personal basic essence (belonging to spiritual being) with its “metaphysical-real core” (belonging to fundamental spiritual being). By the help of mystical vision, (fundamental) spiritual being is not only (though imperfectly) perceived and experienced; rather, according to Walther, human ego-consciousness also communicates with God as a spiritual person. However, the latter cannot be supported by Walther’s analysis. In other words, a critical distinction must be made between the—phenomenologically demonstrable—philosophical content of Walther’s investigation and its theologically motivated readings. Accordingly, the present article can appreciate the philosophical significance of her Phenomenology of Mysticism without thereby being committed to its theological interpretations. Walther’s main work, in summary, is a substantial—if not consistently concise—contribution to the philosophy of mind/spirit and being, which, moreover, is able to act as a bridge between philosophical phenomenology and theology. Additionally, in the weak reading, Walther’s integrative concept of mind/spirit and being is connectable to postmaterialist notions of reality.

553-576

Authors: ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ, Joachim Feldes (tr.)

Alexandre Koyré from Taganrog in Southern Russia, later teaching in France and the US, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius from Rostock in Northern Germany, eventually teaching in Munich, got to know each other as students of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen. Members of the Philosophische Gesellschaft Göttingen, they then also belonged to the Bergzabern Circle which came into existence during World War I and has been named this way as the group usually met in Conrad-Martius’ and her husband Theodor Conrad’s house in Bergzabern, a small town in Southern Palatinate, close to Germany’s border with France. Common to the circle was their critical reception of Husserl’s “transcendental turn” and their adhesion to Adolf Reinach whom they understood as the “real phenomenologist” because of upholding a rather realist view on things and consciousness. Also typical for the Bergzabern phenomenologists, both Koyré and Conrad-Martius spent much effort on religious and theological questions. So beginning from the second half of the war, inspired by Reinach’s writing on religious philosophy, and intensifying during the early 20s, Koyré and Conrad-Martius shared the interest e.g. in the idea of God, considerations on God’s existence which then led to common endeavors on René Descartes and similar investigations of theosophical thinkers like Jakob Boehme. Together with Jean Hering, Edith Stein and Alfred von Sybel they struggled and intensely questioned Martin Heidegger’s philosophical and academic activity and sharply argued—especially after the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927 and Husserl’s 70th birthday in 1929—against Heidegger’s “Atheist philosophy,” as they would call it. Though being one the most compelling relationships inside the early phenomenological movement, the interconnection of Koyré and Conrad-Martius by now has unfortunately merely been scratched on its surface, let alone has been analyzed in depth. Following some minor recent contributions of the author on the topic, the article highlights Koyré’s and Conrad-Martius’ correspondence from the time before World War I until Summer 1933, in particular the nine letters and postcards preserved in Munich’s Bavarian State Library. It may show not only the personal and philosophical relationship between Koyré and Conrad-Martius, but hopefully raise the interest in further research on this topic, i.e. to what degree Koyré’s claim that phenomenology can’t do without a samovar should be followed and lived up to.

585-608

Authors: JOERI SCHRIJVERS, Maria Rakhmaninova (tr.)

We offer an introductory article to the translation of Dutch philosopher Joery Schrijvers’ work Phenomenologists and Anarchism, which deals with the reception of current foreign trajectories of phenomenological and akratic reflexions from the perspective of contemporary Russian academic discourse. In the light of this, an attempt is made to assess the significance and originality of J. Schrijvers’ study, focused on the conceptual juxtaposition of two philosophical traditions: phenomenology and the philosophy of anarchism. The value of the author’s stated perspective, which provides an opportunity to revise the classical phenomenological texts, is articulated as being related to its methodological novelty—not only for the Russian-speaking space, but also for foreign philosophy; a review and analysis of the central theses of the article, related to the key figures of the line of succession of acrical reflection in the phenomenological tradition, which is outlined by the author, is given, including: M.Heidegger, R. Schürmann, E.Levinas, J.Derrida, J.-L.Nancy, J.-I.Lacoste, C.Romano and J.-L.Marion. The article also builds theoretical connections between the anarchist foundations of a number of phenomenological reflections identified by J. Schrijvers and the ontological accoutrements of other current philosophical trends—for example, the actor-network theory and the polyphony of new materialisms

613-619

Authors: Alexei Krouglov

No abstract

623-624

Authors: No author

No abstract