Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

9

Authors: Alexander Schnell

This is the foreword to the issue as a whole

25-53

Authors: Dominique Pradelle

Abstract This study focuses on the essential difference between Kant's and Husserl's transcendental Idealism. In fact, Husserl describes in the «Cartesian Meditations» his own ontological thesis as a «transcendental idealism», in which all sorts of entities have to be constituted by an activity of the transcendental subjectivity, so that we have to regard pure consciousness as the ontological origin of all entities in the world. But this study is interested in the two opposite significations of the kantian copernican inversion. On the one hand, the copernican inversion has the same sense as the phenomenological reduction, which implies that Husserl can't agree with Kant's presupposition of absolute things in themselves; on the second hand, it involves a relativistic and anthropologistic orientation, so that the aprioristic structures of given objects are founded on the universal structures of finite subjectivity, on pure forms and faculties of human consciousness. At the opposite, Husserl enounces a methodological prescription for any phenomenological elucidation: it is not allowed to presuppose in phenomenology any given faculty or given nature of transcendental subjectivity. This prescription has important consequences on which this study focuses. First the ontological difference between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus, infinite and finite type of intuition, doesn't have any validity: the difference between factual and rational truths only depends on the essence of the truth itself, and doesn't have its foundation on the ontological difference between creative and receptive sort of intuition. Secondly, this first thesis admits an immediate application on the level of subjective constitution of objects: the modality in which an object appears to the subjectivity doesn't depend on the universal structure of finite subject, but is exclusively founded on the essence of the object itself, so that it is impossible to consider the aprioristic constitutive structure as a merely subjective structure. Thirdly, in this transcendental phenomenology everything has to be constituted by subjectivity: the aprioristic character of the pure forms of sensibility is not founded on the structure of finite subjectivity, but rather on the essential connection between sensual material and form; so that it is not allowed to presuppose any facticity of time and space; the pure forms of sensibility have to be constituted by a special type of synthesis that we have to elucidate in opposition to other types of higher levels. The profound signification of Husserl's anticopernican inversion is that the field of transcendental phenomenology consists of the essential form of an eidos ego, which is «more objective than any objectivity», as Levinas said; and that transcendental phenomenology is completely dominated by the principium reddendae rationis. Key words Copernican inversion, constitution, intuition, Kant, phenomenology, subjectivity, transcendental idealism.

63-70

Authors: Georgy Chernavin

Radically different strategies of interacting with sound common sense, found within three big philosophical discourses of the 20th century (analytic philosophy, poststructuralism, phenomenology), led nearly to the impossibility of communication between those discourses. The judgement by Deleuze concerning Kant's critical philosophy and Husserl's transcendental philosophy seems to be an example of the failed philosophical dialogue, this time between post-structuralism and (classical as well as modern) transcendentalism. Deleuze sees in transcendental philosophy the dominance of the twofold instance of the common sense; the two forms are the sensus communis (which dominated already in Kant) and the bona mens (which crystallized in the Husserlian Urdoxa). Even if one could agree that the poststructuralist reading of transcendental philosophy is likely sometimes too rash, it is still helpful. One can then see that at the center of the research-field of transcendental phenomenology a real nodal point of paradoxes remains: first of all, the so-called «paradox of human subjectivity» — the relation between the empirical and the transcendental, which seems to be paradoxical for sound human understanding. One could contrast here the goal of transcendental research, which consists in sense-building and sense-enrichment, with the poststructuralist art of the forming, inventing and production of concepts. The passion for paradoxes, the provocation of the sound human understanding as a motor of thinking (characteristic of poststructuralism) is still bound to doxa and to the common sense, although it tries to «turn it inside out». Transcendental philosophy tries rather to take a «step back» from the solidification of common sense in order to observe the sense-building in statu nascendi. Key words Transcendental philosophy, poststructuralism, common sense, doxa, paradox, Husserl, Deleuze.

87-98

Authors: Guillermo Ferrer

Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations of a subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness. To this end, a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affects the inner sense is necessary. Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appear to me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its succession on the space, thus inasmuch as I am conscious, at least implicitly, of my activity of the drawing. Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering, I will hypothesize the idea that a phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant's theory of self-affection; however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Self shall be set. Because of these limits, the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes» of my life-history, namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past. Also, in this respect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself. From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant's theory in this way: by reflection on my past, the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memory to some extent with substitutes. In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediation of phantasy and imagination. Key words Self-affection, reflection, past I, Self, irrevocability, substitutes, phantasy.

121-138

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract The author of the article framed the question of the possible relevance of the treatment of the Schelling's philosophy in the context of a phenomenological one. Thereby, he points its problematic character, referencing Husserl's treatment of German idealism after Kant (including the thought of Schelling) as the romantic idealism. At the same time, he also states the influence of Schelling on the few phenomenologists who made their careers after Husserl. The article's author reviews the concept of the «being outside-itself» or «ecstasy» in Schelling and Heidegger (as one of the phenomenologists) for the further concretization of the theme. The ecstasy in Schelling is the new name for the idealistic intellectual intuition, by which a singular subject loses its own position as subject and thereby gets to the position of the absolute subject. The absolute subject is one which cannot be an object already. Schelling identifies the ecstasy understood in this way with the wondering as philosophical initiation in Ancient Greece. Such ecstasy leads to unknowing knowledge in Schelling's words. The concept of being outside-itself means the structural element of being of human Dasein, i.e. of temporality in Heidegger. This philosopher thinks that a human being is always already outside itself ontologically, before any intuition both sensual and intellectual. The human subject is not closed in on itself, for then it has to transcend from its immanence to the outside. It is always outside itself, it is ecstatic. In its ecstasies, it is always in the world, instead of being inside the world and other people. Heidegger bases his critique of the traditional metaphysics of the subject on such understanding of the ontological structure of Dasein, i.e. of the true «subject». In conclusion, the article's author states that the approaches to the problem of being outside-itself of both mentioned philosophers are in principle, quite different. Schelling tries to rehabilitate the subjectivity by the reduction of the singular subject to the absolute one. On the contrary, the finitude of human Dasein is the necessary condition of its being in Heidegger. The ecstasy is interiorization in Schelling, but it is exteriorization, which has been always already realized, in Heidegger. However, the author of the article also pinpoints a certain isomorphism of the treatments of ecstasy in both thinkers. In the different ways they attempt to overcome the crisis of the understanding of the subject as closed in itself, create the conditions of this isomorphism. Key words Being outside-itself, ecstasy, intellectual intuition, wondering, Dasein, temporality, existence, metaphysics, German idealism, phenomenology.

154-185

Authors: Yusuke Ikeda

In this paper I outline main theses of Fink's phenomenological interpretation of Kantian transcendental philosophy. My aim is to clarify how and to what extent Kant's philosophy determines Fink's «phenomenology of enworlding [Verweltlichung]». First, I show the very starting point and original motivations of Fink's interpretation of Kant. I proceed by examining the contexts in which Fink refers to Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason and showing that in these contexts Fink is dealing with a specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant's cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant's profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink's criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant's «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure reason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant's account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink's phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink's phenomenological interpretations of Kant's transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger's (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant's philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink's cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel's idea of dialectic, as on Kant's (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink's phenomenology). Key words World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.

203-217

Authors: Simona Bertolini

Abstract Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel's conception of the absolute had a decisive role in the genesis and development of Eugen Fink's philosophy. While Husserl and Heidegger showed Fink two different and fruitful ways to interpret phenomenology, Hegel suggested and offered him the conceptual means with which to combine these theoretical models and elaborate a third phenomenological paradigm, based on the concept of world. This is not only valid for Fink's early interpretation of Husserl's thought, but also (and especially) for the version of phenomenology that Husserl's last research assistant developed after World War II and the death of the old professor. Two goals characterize this second phase of Fink's philosophy: on the one hand, the purpose to pose the fundamental question of Being anew, without mistaking it for the «ontic» question referred to beings and things (in accord with Heidegger's indications and with the concept of «ontological difference»); on the other hand, the purpose to combine ontology, so interpreted, with genetic phenomenology and its rigorous method. The aim of the paper is to highlight how and to what extent the realization of this philosophical project is based on the interpretation of both Hegel's idealism and of the experience of consciousness Hegel describes in Phenomenology of Spirit. Assuming that Fink is looking for an ontological ground coinciding with the genesis of the structure of the world (in accord with the concept of phenomenological reduction), Hegel appears as the Western philosopher whose system of thought offers a conceptual model in accordance with such a requirement. Key words World, being, phenomenology, metaphysics, self-consciousness, ontological experience, phenomena.

239-283

Authors: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling; Andrei Patkul (tr.)

Abstract This publication is the translation of the first fragment of F. W. J Schelling's Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism accompanied by the analytical translator's preface. In his treatise, Schelling assesses the history of modern philosophy. Namely, he treats it as history of experiments, the goal of which was in the search for the primary fact in the world. In Schelling's opinion, this fact is in the growing over-weight of the subjective over the objective. Only his philosophy of nature was able to find this fact. However, it is not genuine fact but only pure fact, because it does not content in itself any ground for the over-weighting of the subjective over the objective. For resolve this problem, Schelling starts to use the concepts formed by Ancient philosophers, namely by Pythagoras and Plato. The concepts of the limitless and the limit are belonging to the series of the mentioned concepts. Accordantly, Schelling associates the notion of the objective with the one of the limitless being and the notion of the subjective with the one of the limit or limiting instance. His inquiry into the correlation between the limitless being and the limit, i.e. between the objective and the subjective leads him to the declaration of the existence of the free efficient cause, which determinates their interplay and the rise of that-what-should-be from that-what-should-not-be. Since the limitless is the objective and the limit is the subjective in accordance with Schelling, such efficient cause is also the cause of the progressive over-weighting of the subjective over the objective as well. It can explain the fact, which the Schelling's philosophy of nature has only found but not explained. The in his preface, the translator puts the question of the possibility as well as of a relevance of the Schelling's late philosophy to the phenomenological thought. In this context, he emphasizes few moments, by which the later Schelling' philosophy could be of interests for phenomenologists, namely the following ones: the concept of philosophical empiricism itself, the Schelling's division between the pure fact and the genuine fact, his treatment of history of philosophy as history of experiments. Moreover, he speaks about main difficulties connected with the translation of Schelling's text into Russian and gives a German-Russian glossary for utility of Russian readers. The translator gives also the commentaries by Arthur Drews, who reedited the Schelling's treatise in 1902, in their Russian translation. Key words Philosophical empiricism, genuine fact, over-weight of the subjective over the objective, subjection, the limitless, limit, substance, cause, German idealism.

323-331

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract The content of the presentations, which were delivered on the 46th Annual Husserl Circle Meeting in Helsinki (Finland) from June 9th to June 12th, 2015 is presented briefly in the review. The speakers of the meeting touched the themes, which are of very importance as well for today's reception of Husserl's philosophy as for the stay of the problematic field of Post-Husserlian phenomenology. The problems of intentionality, of active and passive syntheses, of correlation of logic and semiotics, of empathy and intersubjectivity, of correlation of intentional acts and intentional objects belong to the main subjects, which were treated in the presentations. The psychological applications of the phenomenological method, which were inquiered by several speakers during the meeting, could be also of very interest. Key words Husserl, Husserl Circle, intentionality, type, passive syntheses, intersubjectivity, empathy, typification, phenomenological ontology.

9-37

Authors: Alexey Savin

This article aims to define the phenomenological philosophy. To achieve this goal, the author exposes a phenomenological philosophy's genesis by means of genetic phenomenology. This investigation is necessitated by the problem situation. On the one hand, many versions of phenomenological philosophy emerged and developed; on the other hand, the idea of postphenomenological philosophy was put forth. Therefore the question inevitably arises about the foundation of unity of phenomenological philosophy and about its essence. In order to solve the problem the author traces the history of phenomenology's basic methodological concepts — epoche and reduction, and clarifies the meaning of the discussion on the nature of the phenomenological method. In the light of genetic phenomenology, epoche and reduction are the exposure of the connection between habitualization and horizon in the main aspect — as the connection between the natural attitude as the primary habit (Urgewohnheit) and the world as the universal horizon. The analysis of the history of interpretation and criticism of Husserlian epoche and reduction concepts reveals latent consensus among thinkers, who adhere to different variants of phenomenological philosophy, in the understanding of the phenomenological enterprise as such. The author demonstrates that the universal theme of phenomenological research within the framework of the latent basic consensus is the intimacy with the world. The general method of phenomenological investigation is the explication of the history of the intimacy with the world as the origin of all thinkable horizons. The author supposes that the phenomenological philosophy is the disclosure of the transcendental history of the domestic world (Heimwelt). Moreover the phenomenological philosophy implies the phenomenological understanding of the phenomenological reduction, i. e., comprehension of its historicity and its connection with the horizon of the world, which it takes as the theme. Hence the author infers his definition of phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy is the genealogy of the intimacy with the world. (Phänomenologische Philosophie ist Genealogie des Vertrauens mit «der» Welt). Key words Phenomenology, reduction, genealogy, intimacy, habitualization, historicity, horizon, world, Husserl.

70-96

Authors: Anne Gléonec

This article is the second part of our phenomenological study on the analogy between the body and the political body. Its aim is to confront the previous analysis of Claude Lefort's critique of the ontologies of the Political Body with the Merleau-Pontian thought of history, institution, and corporeality. Indeed, this Merleau-Pontian thought, specifically developed in the courses of the 1950's, allows for a renewal of the analogy itself, via another reading of the Lefortian major inheritance: Machiavelli and Marx. By parallelly following Merleau-Ponty's evolutive reading of these two authors, and the essential changes in his phenomenology of perception, this article thus proposes to disclose the main entry points into a Merleau-Pontian reform of the analogy; an analogy that has to be thought against the ambiguity of the flesh that Claude Lefort inherits precisely from Merleau-Ponty. By discussing this ambiguity that «The Visible and the Invisible» is often charged with via a reading of Merleau-Ponty's courses at the Collège de France — specifically Institution, Passivity, and Nature — this article intends to disclose the political meaning of the concept of intercorporeity, with which the human body will no longer be understood as «one's own body», but rather interpreted in a radically a-subjective way. Moreover, this very concept of intercorporeity specifically opens a novel way to understand the meaning of the central concept of the analogy of the political body itself, namely the concept of incorporation. Indeed, by following Merleau-Ponty's lesser known thought of the 1950's, one can think incorporation against the classical schema of fusion, that is to say, on the opposite, as an encounter of dispossessions, and thus as a path into a new analogy. Key words Body, flesh, Gestalt, history, institution, Machiavelli, Marx, Merleau-Ponty.

114-123

Authors: Claudio Rozzoni

This paper aims to analyze the question of how to define the essence of the theater, building on a conference Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset held in Lisbon in April 1946, where he radically raised the question of the «strange» relationship between reality and unreality that the «world of the stage» makes possible for us to experience. On the one hand, Ortega states that theater is essentially vision, while, on the other hand, it seems that such a seeing, in itself, leads to a problematic relationship with a not-seeing. In particular, Ortega seems to claim that in theater spectators experience a vision both «paradoxical» and «magic», insofar as it entails an essential not-seeing that gives rise to a play between opacity and transparency. A play that is also to be found in a masterwork many phenomenologists admired, Proust's Recherche, in which, in order for Marcel to see the image of Phaedra, the ordinary body of the actress Berma has to vanish. Here the body becomes transparent and one no longer sees the performer himself: he/she is simply a window opening upon a great work of art. This way, the spectator can experience «this new order of creatures» that reminds us of the «êtres d'une nouvelle nature» of which Du Bos wrote in the Eighteenth Century. However, regarding the topics of the «image-window», Eugen Fink and his teacher Edmund Husserl had already paved the way, and an intertwined reading of some important texts of both authors can in turn shed new light on this question. With regard to Husserl, special attention will be paid to a very interesting text from the Husserliana XXIII (probably dating to 1918) in which he, taking theatrical image into profound consideration, paradoxical and powerful notion of perceptual phantasy. Key words Aesthetics, image, theater, transparency, opacity, window, perceptual phantasy, feelings.

146-157

Authors: Natalia Artemenko

The theme «Heidegger and ethics» remains controversial among the researchers of Heidegger. Somehow it turns to talk about Heidegger and do not raise issues of ethics and, by contrast, the talks about ethics often directly concern the figure of Heidegger. Our task is not to justify the possibility of «Heidegger‘s ethics». The question of ethics in Heidegger‘s philosophy should be shown as quite competent as well as the demonstration an ethical perspective in his thinking at different stages. However, the very first difficulty that we face, setting themselves above the problem is that Heidegger quite rare and very specific — for the most part even negative — spoke about ethics. The second problem — quite obvious here — Heidegger did not leave us any systematic work devoted to ethics. In this article we try to trace the path of Heidegger‘s thinking in order to understand where there is any possibility of the ethical dimension in Heidegger‘s philosophy which is seen by different researchers in the different manners. Heidegger proposes to consider ethics in its original source, distinguishing it from morality as well as from «ethics» as a «philosophical discipline» closed to the social or political issues. Heidegger distinguishes ἔθος and ἦθος, preferring to talk about «ethos» and not about «ethics». The main «hero» for Heidegger is Aristotle. Heidegger was not so much influenced by Aristotle as he helped to bring Aristotle to some entirely new and unexpected interpretation which is differ from the traditional interpretation. We must say that Heidegger from the outset challenged the established and entrenched in the European metaphysics the primacy of practical over the theoretical. To rethink the «first» of the first philosophy — that's what Heidegger attempts, referring to the Aristotelian texts. The leading question in regard to the interpretation of Aristotle is the question about existential objectness, in which and through which human existence and the existence of life being interpreted. Heidegger asks himself what is a phenomenal base of the explication of Dasein and what categories occur here. We are following this question in the article, beginning with the project of the hermeneutic phenomenology and ending with the existentiall-historical thinking as significant milestones of Heidegger's path of thinking. Key words Ethics, ἔθος, ἦθος, Aristotle, Dasein, existence, being, ontology, ontic foundation, hermeneutic phenomenology, factuality, Ereignis.

171-174

Authors: Fedor Stanzhevskiy

The seventh study of the «Rule of Metaphor» deals with the problem of the reference of metaphoric statement. Poetic statements do not just constitute accentuating the message for its own sake. Far from being restricted to the emotive function, poetry also has a heuristic function which takes away the strong opposition between the internal and external, the subjective and objective. Metaphor re-describes reality and makes it possible to see it in a different way, «to see as...» Metaphor is based on the tension between two poles: «is» and «is not». Ricœur considers the nature of our phenomenological experiencing of the world in the language. He shows how the meaning emerges directly from our existence. The relationship between meaning, language and reality is the field of work of metaphor, in which we originally find ourselves. In this study Ricoeur takes up the question of reference on two different levels: semantic and hermeneutical ones. While the first presupposes the difference of semantics and semiology, the nature of predication, the second lets us shift from language to ontology and regard the problem as an ontological one. Here Ricœur addresses Frege's and Benveniste's theories of references, pointing the ideas they have in common. Approaching the hermeneutical research of reference, we face the necessity of postulating a special discursive entity, that is, the text. Concerning the discursive production Ricœur analyzes such categories as production and labor, disposition and codification, style and individuality, singularity. By considering the structure of the piece of work as its meaning and the world of the work as its denotation, hermeneutics regulates the transition from the structure to the world. Interpretation means revealing world, which the given work addresses, based on its composition, style and genre. Key words Reference, denotation, semantics, hermeneutics, poetic function, reality, metaphor, emotive function.

220-223

Authors: Daria Kononetc

This paper is a translation into Russian of the article by Riccardo Lazzari where the poorly explored topic of Eugen Fink's phenomenological interpretation of Kant's «Critique of pure reason» is discussed. In this work he puts in a par interpretation made by Fink in his works: «Welt und Endlichkeit», «Alles und Nichts», «Epilegomena zu Immanuel Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”» — with others phenom-enological interpretations of «Critique of pure reason». Comparing method of interpretation used by Fink with interpretations made by Heidegger and Husserl author discovers a specific of phenomeno-logical interpretation of Fink and its role as a method that allows phenomenological philosophy to find a way to negotiate metaphysics and to clarify one of the main philosophical problems that is the prob-lem of the world. In this article Lazzari particularly analyses the Fink's lecture «World and finitude» (1949) which is the most important text for understanding of the role of «Critique of pure reason» for Fink's own phenomenological approach. The aim of the article is to summarize the evolution of Fink's interpretation of Kant's «Critique of pure reason» during his entire philosophical research. The problem of the world is the guiding idea of this study. At the same time, Lazzari analyzes the role of Fink's inter-pretation of Kant in the debate about the meaning of the world between Fink, Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's phenomenological project. Key words Phenomenology, E. Fink, phenomenological interpretation, world, infinity, finitude, transcendental dialectic.

240-307

Authors: A. Patkul, Prep. by N. Artemenko

This publication is a transcript of the open disputation dedicated to the theme Ontology of Consciousness: Naturalism vs Transcendentalism, which has been held at March 27, 2015 at the Institute of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University. Both positions, naturalism and transcendentalism, were presented by the teams of two experts, who offered to the public their vision of correlation between naturalism and transcendentalism as well as attacked the arguments of opposite side. Moreover, the audience had the possibility not only to put the questions to experts, but also to make short remarks on the subject of discussion. The following problems were discussed during the disputation time: the causal conditionality of the consciousness, constitution of the object of nature and belonging of consciousness to their realm, the possibility of the freedom inside the natural world, the perspectives of the naturalization of the phenomenology. But the consensus has not been reached. The range of opinions reached by the experts during the discussion was quite extensive: from the recognition that transcendentalism and naturalism are enemies, which fight each other until final victory, to the assumption of the possibility of mutual complementarity or at least a correction of its own thesis under the influence of criticism opposite side. Key words Naturalism, transcendentalism, consciousness, subjectivity, freedom, causality, intentionality, constitution, mental states.

314-321

Authors: A. Khakhalova

The review addresses the clue aspects of the book. Namely, the review concerns the conception of experiential self on different levels of inquiry, analyses models of intersubjectivity in phenomenological tradition, the nature of shame from interdisciplinary perspective. Also, the reviewer notices the author's emphasize on relationship between phenomenology and other scientific traditions. The author discusses the interdisciplinary approach to the problem. As such, the author considers antirealist position to the problem of the self, arguing about its inconsistency in relation to the phenomenologically elaborated conception of experiential minimal self. Various conceptions of identity are also under the interest in first part of the book. Key words Intersubjectivity, experiential self, minimal self, constructivism, antirealism, shame, stream, We, identity, narrativity, pathology.

329-329

Authors: NN

ANNOUNCE

330-331

Authors: NN

ANNONCE