Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

8-9

Authors: NN

FROM THE EDITORS

23-35

Authors: Tatiana Tatarintseva

Abstract The article attempts to defend and advance the project of Gadamer's hermeneutics of trust given that today the notion of understanding is inextricably tied to the view of tradition, discourse and language as inevitably contaminated by ideological distortions by supplementing it with Foucault's critical insights. The common ground between Foucault and Gadamer is that both thinkers militate against the notion of understanding as a process guided by universal criteria of rationality (in particular against Habermas' notion of non-distorted communication) maintaining instead that individuals are inextricably embedded within a particular tradition. Foucault, we maintain, is extremely important for Gadamer in that he develops a mode of critical relationship towards the tradition but precisely understood as a dynamic within the tradition itself, renegotiating and expanding the space of personal freedom; this process, no doubt, being guided by engaged individual perspective and self-understanding without any recourse to an Archimedean point of view outside of any tradition. In doing so Foucault is able to provide a much needed method of immanent critique of ideological distortions (potentially always present in the tradition, discourse or language) that remains faithful to the basic tenants of Gadamer's hermeneutic outlook. We consider a model that schematically demonstrates how such immanent critique can be carried out. We take Gadamer's notion of understanding as realised in an open and charitable dialogue and internalise this dialogue within a single subject taking place between two distinct perspectives: a critical Foucauldian perspective on the one hand, and the immediate self-undertstanding of situated subjectivity on the other. This internal dialogue should enable the subject to maintain a critical distance with respect to aspects of oneself that are a product of social practices and conditions (as demanded by critics of Gadamer), yet remaining within the space of Gadamerian dialogical understanding situated in the first-person ontology. Key words Philosophical hermeneutics, hermeneutics of trust, hermeneutics of suspicion, under- standing, dialogue, prejudices, ideology.

60-92

Authors: Yusuke Ikeda

Abstract This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl's and Fink's phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion”, which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions — a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason” (Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink's characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl's. This difference or distance comes from Fink's conception of “enworlding” (Verweltlichung), i. e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink's very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world's originally enframing function (die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion) of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” (Eindringen) of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink's phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world. Key words Transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.

116-139

Authors: Andrei Patkul

Abstract This paper is the first publication of a translation of the classical phenomenological article by Oskar Becker into Russian. It contains an exemplary application of phenomenological method in the field of esthetics. The aim of the article's author is to introduce the new category of “vacuity” (it goes from K. Solger) in the former esthetics. Becker believes that vacuity is a con- stitutive feature of the beautiful as well as of the esthetic domain as such. He also calls it “fragility” and “frailness”. The philosopher uses the method of separation (die Abhebung) trying to distinguish the proper meaning of fragility and the similar but not identical phenomena. He states that fragility belongs to any esthetical phenomenon regardless of its tragic or comic character or of its character of pulchritudo vaga. The analysis of the possibility of the disinterested pleasure as opposed to the phenomenon of “thrill” in the field of esthetics given by Becker is of very importance. Generally, he thinks that the esthetical objects are phenomena as phenomena. And their way of being is auto to phainesthai in the sense of Th. Hobbes. The main thesis relating to the esthetical phenomena by Becker, who follows F. Schelling here, is that their ontological basis is in the identity of conscious and unconscious principles of being. In conclusion, Becker analyses of the temporality of being of an artist basing on Heidegger's hermeneutical ontology. Becker, however, introduces his own notion of stateliness (die Getragenheit), which shows that the being of an artist is raised by grace of nature outside the ordinary historicity. Thus, according to Becker. Key words Phenomenology, Phenomenon, Esthetics, Art, Artist, Way of Being, the Beautiful, Historicity, Nature, the Conscious, the Unconscious.

165-170

Authors: Andrei Patkul, Olga Bashkina

Abstract The article treats the notion of consciousness in three theories: those of Leibniz, Kant and Husserl. Klaus Kaehler tends to examine how these three doctrines relate to each other and whether it is possible to register a linear development among them. Though Kaehler un- derlines difficulties in comparing views of these philosophers, he draws some informative parallels between them. The author starts off by mentioning Leibniz as the bearer of the initial understanding of consciousness and emphasizing that Leibniz' monadology contains the basic form of the ideas which will be later expressed by Kant and Husserl. Defining consciousness as the notion of the being's mode, and accordingly, the structure of the subject, Kaehler unfolds the interpretation of this notion both before the transcendental turn and after it. He holds Leibniz to be responsible for the transcendental turn, as Kaehler finds a crucial element of Leibniz' theory: the dependence of each and every being from the independent substantial unity (the monad). According to Leibniz, the outer world exists only in the form of mutual self-representation of the monads. What Kant does, according to Kaehler, is that he on the basis of Leibniz notes that not only an existing individual substance, but the finite reason-subject should be considered in its limits. As a result, everything existing is determined by the immanent structure of the subjectivity. Husserl in his turn insists on examining the activities and intentionality of the consciousness. sort of substantiality or relation from this notion. Key words Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, consciousness, transcendental turn, reason, perspectivism.

193-195

Authors: Georgy Chernavin

Abstract This paper deals with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Firstly, through the analysis of a passage found in “Logical Investigations”, the author will show Husserl’s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. He will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl’s works written after the 1920’s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as practical philosophy. The author makes this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is practical philosophy, firstly, in the sense that it investigates various forms of practical intentionality and, secondly, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. Key words Practical intentionality, transcendental phenomenology, Husserl, practical philosophy, experience, perception, intentional experience, stream of consciousness.

211-214

Authors: Fedor Stanzhevskiy

Abstract The second part of the chapter eight of the “Rule of Metaphor” deals with further philosophical implications of the metaphor. Ricoeur dissipates any suspicion of complicity between the metaphorical and metaphysical. He shows that it is due to a wrong understanding of the metaphor as embedded in nomination, while its proper place, as Ricoeur insists, is in discourse. The living metaphor is a principle animating thought and inciting it “to think more”. The very relationship between thought and poetry, between speculative and metaphorical discourses proves to be a dynamic process based on the dialectics between the poetical experience of belonging and the speculative power of distancing. Key words Metaphor, literal and figurative, speculative discourse, lexicalization, resemblance, reference.

237-250

Authors: Natalia Artemenko, Andrei Patkul

Abstract This is the text of an interview given by professor of department of logic of the philosophical faculty St. Petersburg State University Yaroslav A. Slinin to Natalia Artemenko and Andrei Patkul. Prof. Slinin talks about the genesis of his philosophical views, in particular, about his way into phenomenology. His recollections of the phenomenological community in the former Leningrad is of very interest in the context of Soviet philosophy’s historiography. It ought to remarked that the course under the titled «Phenomenology and Logic» delivered by Prof. Slinin since 1970 brought to bear overwhelming influence on the shaping of today’s philosophical community in St. Petersburg. Hence, the problems of correlation between phenomenology and logic are discussed in this interview. Prof. Slinin points that the problematic of logic is the confluence point of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, which deal with the same problems but by different methods and in different attitudes. The main distinction points between these two philosophical trends are, on the one hand, that phenomenology has a metaphysical background, which is denied by representatives of classical analytical philosophy, and on the other hand, that phenomenologists as distinguished from analytical philosophers accept the intellectual intuition of essences. Prof. Slinin states with regard to correlation between phenomenology and contemporary cognitive sciences that the Husserl’s distinction of transcendental and natural attitudes is very important up to now. He gives his own interpretation of Husserl’s doctrine of reduction in this context. Prof. Slinin tries to show also that Heidegger describes by ontological terms the same phenomena which are described by Husserl in transcendental terms. As conclusion, Prof. Slinin talk about his other non-phenomenological interests in philosophy, namely, about ancient philosophy (particularly, patristic, early modern and Russian philosophy. Key words Phenomenology, logic, cognitive sciences, philosophy in USSR, reduction, intersubjectivity, theory of subjectivity, ethic.

261-267

Authors: Alexei Krioukov

Abstract In this short review I share my impression from an excursion, which was held in December 2013 in Göttingen, through the places where Edit Stein lived during her working period on her PhD thesis under the supervision of Edmund Husserl. Under the guidance of Mary Heidhues, we walked through Göttingen and saw the places where Edit Stein first lived upon her arrival in the city, the evangelical church where her supervisor Adolf Reinach's funeral was held after his fall during the first world war, the nice old house where the Göttingen phenomenologists met with each other, the building of the university aula which was both a place for the official affairs and a disciplinary cell, and many other interesting places. This text is followed by the chronological biography and the autobiography of Edit Stein. Key words Edit Stein, Edmund Husserl, early phenomenology, Göttingen, biography, excursion.

272-279

Authors: Igor Evlampiev

Abstract The author of the book focuses on two “metaphors” of memory, i.e. two ideas about how the act of memory is carried out and how then we “restore” what is remembered. Metaphor of storage is absolutely understandable and familiar to every man. At first glance it seems to be a universal form of memory. We are all in our everyday experience believe that memories are “stored” in a certain area of our consciousness and recovered from it if needed. However, one of the main theses of the book is the claim that such a widespread understanding of memory although captures some of its features, but still does not correspond to its essence and is not able to explain its meaning. The second “metaphor” describes memory as a project. This approach seems to be paradoxical (because the project is something adressed in the future), but the author shows convincingly that only an understanding of the memory can grasp its essence, and puts it at the center of the human personality. Key words Metaphor, memory, personality, store, project, imprint, neglect, Plato, St. Augustine, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Henri-Louis Bergson.

281-282

Authors: NN

No abstract

284-285

Authors: NN

No abstract