Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

9-37

Authors: Alexey Savin

This article aims to define the phenomenological philosophy. To achieve this goal, the author exposes a phenomenological philosophy's genesis by means of genetic phenomenology. This investigation is necessitated by the problem situation. On the one hand, many versions of phenomenological philosophy emerged and developed; on the other hand, the idea of postphenomenological philosophy was put forth. Therefore the question inevitably arises about the foundation of unity of phenomenological philosophy and about its essence. In order to solve the problem the author traces the history of phenomenology's basic methodological concepts — epoche and reduction, and clarifies the meaning of the discussion on the nature of the phenomenological method. In the light of genetic phenomenology, epoche and reduction are the exposure of the connection between habitualization and horizon in the main aspect — as the connection between the natural attitude as the primary habit (Urgewohnheit) and the world as the universal horizon. The analysis of the history of interpretation and criticism of Husserlian epoche and reduction concepts reveals latent consensus among thinkers, who adhere to different variants of phenomenological philosophy, in the understanding of the phenomenological enterprise as such. The author demonstrates that the universal theme of phenomenological research within the framework of the latent basic consensus is the intimacy with the world. The general method of phenomenological investigation is the explication of the history of the intimacy with the world as the origin of all thinkable horizons. The author supposes that the phenomenological philosophy is the disclosure of the transcendental history of the domestic world (Heimwelt). Moreover the phenomenological philosophy implies the phenomenological understanding of the phenomenological reduction, i. e., comprehension of its historicity and its connection with the horizon of the world, which it takes as the theme. Hence the author infers his definition of phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy is the genealogy of the intimacy with the world. (Phänomenologische Philosophie ist Genealogie des Vertrauens mit «der» Welt). Key words Phenomenology, reduction, genealogy, intimacy, habitualization, historicity, horizon, world, Husserl.

70-96

Authors: Anne Gléonec

This article is the second part of our phenomenological study on the analogy between the body and the political body. Its aim is to confront the previous analysis of Claude Lefort's critique of the ontologies of the Political Body with the Merleau-Pontian thought of history, institution, and corporeality. Indeed, this Merleau-Pontian thought, specifically developed in the courses of the 1950's, allows for a renewal of the analogy itself, via another reading of the Lefortian major inheritance: Machiavelli and Marx. By parallelly following Merleau-Ponty's evolutive reading of these two authors, and the essential changes in his phenomenology of perception, this article thus proposes to disclose the main entry points into a Merleau-Pontian reform of the analogy; an analogy that has to be thought against the ambiguity of the flesh that Claude Lefort inherits precisely from Merleau-Ponty. By discussing this ambiguity that «The Visible and the Invisible» is often charged with via a reading of Merleau-Ponty's courses at the Collège de France — specifically Institution, Passivity, and Nature — this article intends to disclose the political meaning of the concept of intercorporeity, with which the human body will no longer be understood as «one's own body», but rather interpreted in a radically a-subjective way. Moreover, this very concept of intercorporeity specifically opens a novel way to understand the meaning of the central concept of the analogy of the political body itself, namely the concept of incorporation. Indeed, by following Merleau-Ponty's lesser known thought of the 1950's, one can think incorporation against the classical schema of fusion, that is to say, on the opposite, as an encounter of dispossessions, and thus as a path into a new analogy. Key words Body, flesh, Gestalt, history, institution, Machiavelli, Marx, Merleau-Ponty.

114-123

Authors: Claudio Rozzoni

This paper aims to analyze the question of how to define the essence of the theater, building on a conference Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset held in Lisbon in April 1946, where he radically raised the question of the «strange» relationship between reality and unreality that the «world of the stage» makes possible for us to experience. On the one hand, Ortega states that theater is essentially vision, while, on the other hand, it seems that such a seeing, in itself, leads to a problematic relationship with a not-seeing. In particular, Ortega seems to claim that in theater spectators experience a vision both «paradoxical» and «magic», insofar as it entails an essential not-seeing that gives rise to a play between opacity and transparency. A play that is also to be found in a masterwork many phenomenologists admired, Proust's Recherche, in which, in order for Marcel to see the image of Phaedra, the ordinary body of the actress Berma has to vanish. Here the body becomes transparent and one no longer sees the performer himself: he/she is simply a window opening upon a great work of art. This way, the spectator can experience «this new order of creatures» that reminds us of the «êtres d'une nouvelle nature» of which Du Bos wrote in the Eighteenth Century. However, regarding the topics of the «image-window», Eugen Fink and his teacher Edmund Husserl had already paved the way, and an intertwined reading of some important texts of both authors can in turn shed new light on this question. With regard to Husserl, special attention will be paid to a very interesting text from the Husserliana XXIII (probably dating to 1918) in which he, taking theatrical image into profound consideration, paradoxical and powerful notion of perceptual phantasy. Key words Aesthetics, image, theater, transparency, opacity, window, perceptual phantasy, feelings.

146-157

Authors: Natalia Artemenko

The theme «Heidegger and ethics» remains controversial among the researchers of Heidegger. Somehow it turns to talk about Heidegger and do not raise issues of ethics and, by contrast, the talks about ethics often directly concern the figure of Heidegger. Our task is not to justify the possibility of «Heidegger‘s ethics». The question of ethics in Heidegger‘s philosophy should be shown as quite competent as well as the demonstration an ethical perspective in his thinking at different stages. However, the very first difficulty that we face, setting themselves above the problem is that Heidegger quite rare and very specific — for the most part even negative — spoke about ethics. The second problem — quite obvious here — Heidegger did not leave us any systematic work devoted to ethics. In this article we try to trace the path of Heidegger‘s thinking in order to understand where there is any possibility of the ethical dimension in Heidegger‘s philosophy which is seen by different researchers in the different manners. Heidegger proposes to consider ethics in its original source, distinguishing it from morality as well as from «ethics» as a «philosophical discipline» closed to the social or political issues. Heidegger distinguishes ἔθος and ἦθος, preferring to talk about «ethos» and not about «ethics». The main «hero» for Heidegger is Aristotle. Heidegger was not so much influenced by Aristotle as he helped to bring Aristotle to some entirely new and unexpected interpretation which is differ from the traditional interpretation. We must say that Heidegger from the outset challenged the established and entrenched in the European metaphysics the primacy of practical over the theoretical. To rethink the «first» of the first philosophy — that's what Heidegger attempts, referring to the Aristotelian texts. The leading question in regard to the interpretation of Aristotle is the question about existential objectness, in which and through which human existence and the existence of life being interpreted. Heidegger asks himself what is a phenomenal base of the explication of Dasein and what categories occur here. We are following this question in the article, beginning with the project of the hermeneutic phenomenology and ending with the existentiall-historical thinking as significant milestones of Heidegger's path of thinking. Key words Ethics, ἔθος, ἦθος, Aristotle, Dasein, existence, being, ontology, ontic foundation, hermeneutic phenomenology, factuality, Ereignis.

171-174

Authors: Fedor Stanzhevskiy

The seventh study of the «Rule of Metaphor» deals with the problem of the reference of metaphoric statement. Poetic statements do not just constitute accentuating the message for its own sake. Far from being restricted to the emotive function, poetry also has a heuristic function which takes away the strong opposition between the internal and external, the subjective and objective. Metaphor re-describes reality and makes it possible to see it in a different way, «to see as...» Metaphor is based on the tension between two poles: «is» and «is not». Ricœur considers the nature of our phenomenological experiencing of the world in the language. He shows how the meaning emerges directly from our existence. The relationship between meaning, language and reality is the field of work of metaphor, in which we originally find ourselves. In this study Ricoeur takes up the question of reference on two different levels: semantic and hermeneutical ones. While the first presupposes the difference of semantics and semiology, the nature of predication, the second lets us shift from language to ontology and regard the problem as an ontological one. Here Ricœur addresses Frege's and Benveniste's theories of references, pointing the ideas they have in common. Approaching the hermeneutical research of reference, we face the necessity of postulating a special discursive entity, that is, the text. Concerning the discursive production Ricœur analyzes such categories as production and labor, disposition and codification, style and individuality, singularity. By considering the structure of the piece of work as its meaning and the world of the work as its denotation, hermeneutics regulates the transition from the structure to the world. Interpretation means revealing world, which the given work addresses, based on its composition, style and genre. Key words Reference, denotation, semantics, hermeneutics, poetic function, reality, metaphor, emotive function.

220-223

Authors: Daria Kononetc

This paper is a translation into Russian of the article by Riccardo Lazzari where the poorly explored topic of Eugen Fink's phenomenological interpretation of Kant's «Critique of pure reason» is discussed. In this work he puts in a par interpretation made by Fink in his works: «Welt und Endlichkeit», «Alles und Nichts», «Epilegomena zu Immanuel Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”» — with others phenom-enological interpretations of «Critique of pure reason». Comparing method of interpretation used by Fink with interpretations made by Heidegger and Husserl author discovers a specific of phenomeno-logical interpretation of Fink and its role as a method that allows phenomenological philosophy to find a way to negotiate metaphysics and to clarify one of the main philosophical problems that is the prob-lem of the world. In this article Lazzari particularly analyses the Fink's lecture «World and finitude» (1949) which is the most important text for understanding of the role of «Critique of pure reason» for Fink's own phenomenological approach. The aim of the article is to summarize the evolution of Fink's interpretation of Kant's «Critique of pure reason» during his entire philosophical research. The problem of the world is the guiding idea of this study. At the same time, Lazzari analyzes the role of Fink's inter-pretation of Kant in the debate about the meaning of the world between Fink, Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's phenomenological project. Key words Phenomenology, E. Fink, phenomenological interpretation, world, infinity, finitude, transcendental dialectic.

240-307

Authors: A. Patkul, Prep. by N. Artemenko

This publication is a transcript of the open disputation dedicated to the theme Ontology of Consciousness: Naturalism vs Transcendentalism, which has been held at March 27, 2015 at the Institute of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University. Both positions, naturalism and transcendentalism, were presented by the teams of two experts, who offered to the public their vision of correlation between naturalism and transcendentalism as well as attacked the arguments of opposite side. Moreover, the audience had the possibility not only to put the questions to experts, but also to make short remarks on the subject of discussion. The following problems were discussed during the disputation time: the causal conditionality of the consciousness, constitution of the object of nature and belonging of consciousness to their realm, the possibility of the freedom inside the natural world, the perspectives of the naturalization of the phenomenology. But the consensus has not been reached. The range of opinions reached by the experts during the discussion was quite extensive: from the recognition that transcendentalism and naturalism are enemies, which fight each other until final victory, to the assumption of the possibility of mutual complementarity or at least a correction of its own thesis under the influence of criticism opposite side. Key words Naturalism, transcendentalism, consciousness, subjectivity, freedom, causality, intentionality, constitution, mental states.

314-321

Authors: A. Khakhalova

The review addresses the clue aspects of the book. Namely, the review concerns the conception of experiential self on different levels of inquiry, analyses models of intersubjectivity in phenomenological tradition, the nature of shame from interdisciplinary perspective. Also, the reviewer notices the author's emphasize on relationship between phenomenology and other scientific traditions. The author discusses the interdisciplinary approach to the problem. As such, the author considers antirealist position to the problem of the self, arguing about its inconsistency in relation to the phenomenologically elaborated conception of experiential minimal self. Various conceptions of identity are also under the interest in first part of the book. Key words Intersubjectivity, experiential self, minimal self, constructivism, antirealism, shame, stream, We, identity, narrativity, pathology.

329-329

Authors: NN

ANNOUNCE

330-331

Authors: NN

ANNONCE