Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

495-516

Authors: DANIEL NEUMANN

A phenomenological approach to the ontology of the will could be rendered along three positions: Firstly, the willing I is completely immanent in its experience, such that one can only will, and know that one wills, by reflecting on the actual experience of willing. Secondly, one could hold that the will, while being analyzable as a conscious phenomenon, is itself a real psychic force driving one’s motivations and actions without one necessarily being aware of it. The third position would argue that the reality of the will is not exhausted by the way it is experienced, but that its real causes are not necessarily part of a complete phenomenological investigation. I discuss the phenomenology of the will of Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger and Edmund Husserl along this realist-transcendentalist spectrum. My basic concern here is a critical examination of the phenomenological approach to an entity beyond experience which is responsible for the experienced volitions. I will proceed in three steps, based on the distinction of volitions into three parts. Firstly, I ask what antecedes a volition in order to determine its phenomenal and ontological causes. Secondly, the analysis of the apperception of willing clarifies in what sense an “I” is experienced as the real or phenomenal cause of its volition. Thirdly, the discussion of the realization of the volition will address the role that this “I” subsequently plays in the process of fulfilling its intent. The paper develops the ways in which the ontology of the “willing I” limits and shapes the conception of the intentional relation between willing and desiring consciousness and its contents.

544-557

Authors: GEORGY CHERNAVIN

The implicit conception of conscience from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notes from 1929 is brought into comparison with the theory of conscience as a paradoxical identity of guilt and innocence by Philip Konrad Marheineke (which served as a pattern for Kierkegaardian concept of “despair”) and of conscience as a (grammatical and temporal) redoubling by Vladimir Jankélévitch. Wittgensteinian views on conscience and feeling of guilt tend to Marheineke-Kierkegaard’s model (the guilt hides in innocence and vice versa) and to Jankélévitch’s model (the wrongdoing from the past makes us regret the innocence which preceded it in a far remote past). I explore these tautological models of conscience using the example of Wittgensteinian metaphor of “waterwheel”: of an engineering failure producing a constant sentiment of guilt. Austrian philosopher describes his “incapacity to think” as a source of background, freely floating guilt. “Uselessness” and “mediocrity” or as he puts it “groundlessness of your own existence” altogether with “incapacity to think”—those are the self-accusations of the thinker. This torturing state he at the same time considers to be the source of his own philosophical productivity. Would a conscience be possible which would be free of this tautological structure and of this endless “rumination” of the petty guilt? The article proposes a hypothesis how one could break the tautological circle of an idling scrupulous conscience.

584-606

Authors: CHRISTIAN VASSILEV

The starting point of the following article are statements by various prominent musical performers of the 20th century who have testified to the life-experience of musical identification, i.e. the experience of unity and oneness with music. The purpose of the article is to explore the phenomenological implications of this experience on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological work. The article compares Heidegger’s early view of phenomenal givenness with that of Edmund Husserl. While Husserl sees phenomenal givenness as constituted by (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger finds primary givenness in the resonance (Mitschwingen) between the I and its lifeworld. I argue that in Heidegger’s early phenomenology it is not the subject, but rather the relatio between I and world, which “constitutes” givenness. This viewpoint allows for the exploration of musical identification as a life-experience. Musical identification suspends the difference between subject and object. In musical identification, it is the relation between “I” and music, which is constitutive of both. Thus, music cannot be adequately grasped in phenomenological terms if it is regarded simply as an object, which is the premise of more traditional phenomenological approaches to music such as Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s. Ingarden and Dufrenne both position music at a distance from the subject, as something to be explored in its objective characteristics, without presupposing the constitutive relation between them. Contrary to them, Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht, Günther Anders and Ilya Yonchev all recognize that the subject-object divide is insufficient for the exploration of musical experience. However, while Eggebrecht ultimately remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, or Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of the I and musical sense coincide.

625-640

Authors: JUAN JOSÉ GARRIDO PERIÑÁN

From a biographical description made by the German thinker Martin Heidegger of the Spanish thinker José Ortega y Gasset, this article sets out to explore how Heideggerian philosophy requires a tragic condition for its development and promotion. The first part of the article attempts to justify why Heidegger’s thinking would fit harmoniously within Ortega’s description of Spanish culture and his vision of death. The notion of death is approached as a cultural and philosophical problem of great relevance in order to understand the being-in-the-world of a specific society or nation. In our case, we try to show that Ortega’s description of Spain as a philosophical and cultural problem at least coincides with the phenomenological-existential description that Heidegger develops in Being and Time. In its second part, through Heidegger’s dialogue with Hölderlin, an attempt is made to show how this tragic need for philosophising continues in Heidegger’s work. Finally, it concludes by leaving the reader with a question: was Heidegger a Southern-Spanish thinker?

666-688

Authors: VERA SERKOVA, VERA LOBASTOVA

The article analyzes literature addressing the problem of reality in modern anti-realist theories. The purpose of the review is to expand the circle of researchers, including not only representatives of analytical philosophy, but also those of the phenomenological tradition, since the principle of phenomenological reduction corresponds to the general conceptual attitude of anti-realists, and in methodological terms, phenomenology more consistently implements the program of anti-realism. The principle of anti-realist philosophy is shown as exemplified in solutions of the “difficult problem of consciousness” within analytical philosophy and also in the development of a phenomenological attitude. Such a combination of two, by far the most respectable, philosophical schools makes it possible to more accurately determine the contribution of theorists of both directions to the theory of reality, to identify problematic nodes, internal disagreements and points of intersection of the ideas of phenomenologists and representatives of analytical philosophy in understanding the nature of reality. The works of modern researchers of the problems of reality R. Berghofer, V. Vasyukov, Ya. Ishihara, V. Ladov, L. Makeeva, R. Pils, A. Fursov, D. Chalmers and many others, as well as the works of E. Husserl, W. Quine, H. Putnam’s works, which have become philosophical classics, allow us to clarify the ideas about reality that have developed in the anti-realist discourse from different sides. New studies of the principle of phenomenological reduction by Yu. Himanka and the origins of the formation of phenomenological philosophy by N.V. Motroshilova make it possible to clarify the contribution of phenomenologists to the anti-realist tradition.

711-719

Authors: IVAN KURILOVICH

This article aims to contextualize and problematize Alexandre Kojève’s Note on Hegel and Heidegger, written in 1936 and unpublished during his lifetime, which is being introduced into Russian-language scholarship. A translation of the Note is published in the same issue with the permission of the copyright holders. This paper provides a general introduction to Kojève’s philosophy, illustrates possible reading strategies for Kojève and the place of the translated Note in his corpus of the philosopher’s texts, and describes the philosophical and historical circumstances of the text, namely that it was composed as an extension of a review on Tragische Existenz. Zur Philosophie Martin Heidegger by Alfred Delp written and published by Kojève that same year in Recherches philosophique. The article reconstructs the lines of reference that are essential to understanding Alexandre Kojève and provides a critique of certain statements. Finally, on the basis of an analysis of Kojève’s language, it offers a broader thesis on the epistemological problems of Kojève’s philosophy, the discovery of which led him to make a series of debatable statements in the philosophy of history (on the necessity for the philosopher to participate in the realization of the end of history), in anthropology (on the difference between people in their capacity to be philosophers or sages depending on a philosophical and religious attitude that is not entirely dependent on them), and in his decision to leave academia and turn to the ideological and diplomatic provision of economic integration of European states during the Cold War.

735-742

Authors: ANDREI PATKUL

In my review, I analyze the main theses of Anastasiya Medova’s monograph entitled Phenomenology of Musical Experience (2021). The author of the book raises the issue of what it is that we generally hear as music, as well as many directly or indirectly related other issues with regard to both the essence and the ontological status of music. According to her, it is only the phenomenological methodology that can provide an answer to these questions, which deals with the specifics of a musical object always in the context of the specifics of musical experience. Particular emphasis in the review is placed on the concept of reduction, as it is used in relation to music. It is designed to clear the experience of all elements not related to music as such, including sensitive shape-associations that often arise while listening to music. Another important point in the study of A. A. Medova is her posing of the question as to the regional nature of music and its possible correlation with the sphere of aesthetic in general. In this regard, I point out that the author of the monograph seeks to justify the irreducibility of music to the aesthetic sphere and that her solution of the problem of the possible regionality of music remains insufficiently determined. I also emphasize that one of the points of interest in the book is that Medova works with specific material, notably with the interpretation of significant works of musical art and the analysis of important theoretical statements about the essence of music.

11-26

Authors: VICTOR MOLCHANOV

This article discusses Husserl’s “epoche” and “phenomenological reduction” and early Heidegger’s “fear” and “anxiety” from a conceptual and terminological point of view. The basis for comparing “epoche” and “fear” is their main function of neutralizing the world. The author also considers the way of correlating the epoche and anxiety as philosophical concepts with three types of realizable experience that served as their source. The main points and stages of the introduction of the term “epoche” are highlighted; the main functional differences between the terms “epoche” and “phenomenological reduction” in various works of Husserl are indicated. A number of Husserl’s attempts to transform the methodological principles put forward by him into a description of a special experience of detachment, accessible through moral efforts, courage and honesty, are considered. In this regard, the transformation of Cartesian doubt into the procedure of “epoche” through the artificial procedure of “attempt at doubt” is analyzed. Three types of restrictions on the universality of the epoche are distinguished. Terminological and meaningful relationships between neutralization as a mode of consciousness and the epoche are considered. Two main differences are revealed, with the help of which Husserl tries to transform principles into experience: the difference between positional and neutral consciousness (primary and shadow one) and the difference between an epoche and a quasi-epoche. Husserl’s interpretation of the epoche and reduction as a special experience has two main sources: first, the experience of the imagination, or fantasy, and in this sense the source of the epoche is the quasi-epoche, and not vice versa. Secondly, the postulate of the identity of sensation from the real and illusory object. Heidegger’s distinction between fear and anxiety is critically analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that a common source of the phenomena of anxiety, fear, horror, fright, and so on consists in the collision and mutual penetration of various human worlds. It is impossible to distance oneself from this diversity; further, it is the true source of philosophical reflection.

40-72

Authors: MIKHAIL BELOUSOV

In his late works Husserl interprets the crisis of European sciences as the loss of their meaning for life. The diagnosis seems to suggest therapeutic strategy: to overcome the crisis, phenomenology must return to the evidences of the life-world. The article argues that the husserlian strategy of overcoming the crisis consists not in the elimination of the break with the prescientific evidences of the natural attitude, but, on the contrary, in the radicalization of the breach. Thus, I want to show that Husserl seeks to overcome the crisis of sciences by means of more radical crisis of phenomenology. In Husserl’s view, phenomenology must become the only science, which does not presuppose the life-world, since it problematizes it. I am going to argue also, that the counterintuitive strategy is not just of the historico-philosophical interest, but is meaningful for the actual philosophical understanding of the life-world. To justify those claims, I will proceed in three stages. In the first section of the article, I analyze the difference between the objective world and the life-world, which is the point of departure of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of sciences in Crisis. Bringing into correlation the difference between the objective world and the life-world in Crisis with the distinction of the ideal world and the real one in Ideas I, I disclose the ambiguity of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of European sciences. According to Husserl, the crisis arises, when science transcends the life-world through the idealizations, and, at the same time, presupposes the immediate prescientific evidences as something that is taken for granted. In the second section, I argue that the strategy of overcoming the crisis in Crisis is based on the phenomenological epoche, which allows for the porblematization of the life-world without presupposing it, Within this context I demonstrate the motivational unity of two reductions, performed by Husserl in Crisis—the reduction to the life-world, stripping the reality of the garb of ideas mistakingly taken to be the reality itself, and the reduction of the life-world, turning it into horizon and depriving phenomenologist of a right of relying on the life-worldly evidences, which is taken for granted in the natural science and renders it possible. The unity of the reductions indicates that phenomenological descent back down to the life-world is treated by Husserl as the radical break with the evidences of the natural life. The third section discusses the question, whether the problematical character of the life-world can be revealed only from the point of view of disinterested spectator, or it can be discovered, in a way, from within, in pretheoretical experience, which capacitates the life to problematizing itself and motivates phenomenological epoche. I argue that, although the question is not answered in a suitable way within husserlian analyses of the motivation for the epoche, the key to the solution of the problem is provided by the genetic phenomenology, since it thematizes the historicity of the life-world. I interpret the historicity as the ambivalent pretheoretical experience, constituting both the self-evidence and the problematical character of the life-world.

93-113

Authors: JOHANNES VORLAUFER

Against the background of worldwide, intentional or unintentional everyday violations of human dignity and the epochal need to experience oneself as a human being in one’s specific way of being, this article attempts to pursue the question of human dignity and its concealment. On the one hand, it seeks to ask whether human dignity has become obsolete due to social and epochal developments and preconditions and whether it can only appear and be experienced as antiquated in the context of a technological language or an administered world. On the other hand, it asks whether ethical and anthropological thinking have not sufficiently experienced, thought, and conceptualized man. From the context of these perspectives that determine the question of dignity, Heidegger’s article seeks to take up Heidegger’s repeated search for an original ethics based on Heraclitus’ fragment 119, and from this point of view to ask for a perhaps deeper and more adequate understanding of human dignity. At the centre of this is Heidegger’s thesis that human dignity is based on the protection of the unhidden and, ever before, the hiddenness of all beings. Without wanting to ignore the difficulty and complexity of Heidegger’s thinking, the author seeks to find access to this understanding of our dignity based on the experience of personal encounters.

141-169

Authors: ANTON VAVILOV

Based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger the article presents the possibility of actualizing Heidegger’s main question about the meaning of Being in the context of the analysis of so-called “a priori perfect.” During the development of fundamental ontology in the second half of the 1920s, Heidegger ponders the approach to Being in the history of philosophy and identifies such a feature of Being as a priori, a kind of antecedence of Being in relation to being. Although tradition invariably understands Being in this way, in it, according to Heidegger, the question is no longer raised either about the sense of such antecedence, or about the temporal basis of this sense, and therefore a priori as the essential character of Being is left in total oblivion. We suggest that it is the problematization of apriority in its temporal origin that can contribute to resolving Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical question of time as the transcendental horizon of any concept of Being that precedes being. In this precedence there is a cherished temporal moment, the comprehension of which allows us to develop the “basic question of metaphysics” about the relationship of Being and time in a more concrete way than Heidegger’s four main themes of the question of Being: the ontological difference; the basic articulation of Being (essentia/existentia)); the truth-character of Being; the possible modifications of Being and the unity of Being’s variety. Revealing a priori question as the central question of all Heideggers thinking before the “Turn” we attempt to update this question and justify the need for its renewal on the basis of a fundamental ontology. With this task we relate the question of the essence of philosophy in general in its existential-temporal concept since philosophy appears as a temporality-based possible of the questioning return to the “earlier”: to the essential structures of being, knowledge, Being, Dasein. Our analysis is based on the following decisions: (1) Being in relation to being is always pre-understood as “earlier,” and in this understanding a temporal definition operates, hence the main question of fundamental ontology about the relation of Being and time can be developed or at least clarified through the problem of meaning of a priori. (2) The question of the meaning of the “earlier” and of the temporal basis for understanding Being as “earlier,” a priori, is concretized into the question of the conditions for the possibility of any ontology, including the fundamental ontology, which raises the question of the earlier in relation to Being and therefore “lives” in the light of the understanding of the “earlier” as such. (3) This reflexive foundation of the fundamental ontology from itself is a necessary stage on the way of developing its project, if we remember that the main “duty” of the philosopher is to clarify “our inner nature” for the sake of opening the boundaries and conditions of the possibility of philosophy. The conclusion is that the possibilities of fundamental ontology in making sense of Being, time, and philosophy in general are far from exhausted, but await the questions that actualize them and new readings that allow to see the hidden richness of Heidegger’s thought

190-207

Authors: VLADIMIR BELOV

Although the concept of “pure knowledge” is one of the most interesting and singular concepts in the philosophical work of Vasily Seseman (1884-1963), it can only be presented after a comprehensive analysis of the philosopher’s numerous works devoted to ontological, epistemological and logical problems. Seseman believes that the main philosophical trends at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology, could not present this concept, although they did try. According to the philosopher, the main reason for the inability of neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology to start talking about pure knowledge is their inability to assert the essential difference between objective and non-objective knowledge. Sesemann pays special attention when substantiating his concept of “pure knowledge” to the difference between his approach and that of the founder of modern phenomenology. The philosopher points out that even Husserl, who concentrated attention on the specifics of inner experience, puts this specific, in the end, in dependence on the process of cognition and reflection, completely ignoring its ontological foundations. While pure knowledge, according to Seseman, is neither non-objective, nor objective knowledge, nor non-objective, nor objective being, it, in fact, is non-knowledge and non-being. It is precisely this understanding by the philosopher of this phenomenon that allows him to characterize pure knowledge as premiseless and limitless and, in general, as free from any ontological or epistemological determinations. However, on the other hand, Sesemann insists that the phenomenon of pure knowledge has the meaning of not just a regulatory idea, an infinitely distant ideal, but also a real constitutive meaning, as a principle that reveals and determines the human striving for knowledge as an interconnected and necessary process that ascends from the onto-gnoseological stage of non-objective knowledge to the epistemological, and then the logical stage of objective knowledge.

229-247

Authors: GARRIS ROGONYAN

The article examines some well-known attempts to consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in the context of transcendental idealism. The main purpose of these attempts is to protect Wittgenstein’s later philosophy from the relativistic interpretation of such concepts a “language games” and “forms of life.” Thus, Bernard Williams, noting the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” in Philosophical Investigations, believes that such a “we” has a transcendental rather than empirical character. This approach allows Williams to argue that there is no meaningful alternative to the general perspective on the world that is embodied in this “we.” However, the main disadvantage of this approach is that Williams views such a “we” in much the same way as a conceptual schema. However, as many authors point out, this idea does not find its confirmation in the later works of Wittgenstein. Jonathan Lear, in turn, suggests that we should consider such a non-empirical “we” as a special kind of “mindedness.” Such a mindedness could be considered as analogous to a Kant’s analytical principle of apperception. Lear believes that it is this principle that gives meaningful unity to human behaviour and makes possible any communication with other people. Following Williams and trying to correct the shortcomings of his position, Lear proposes to consider the ambiguous status of “we” in Philosophical Investigations as an argument in favour of the “disappearance” of the transcendental “we,” and with it the disappearance of the threat of relativism. John McDowell, however, agreeing with the need to get rid Wittgenstein's philosophy of relativistic interpretations, critically assesses the idea of using transcendental idealism for this purpose. Instead, McDowell proposes to return to Hegel’s thesis about the unboundedness of the conceptual, which makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transcendental justification of harmony between reason and the world. The article, therefore, also examines McDowell’s arguments against attributing to Wittgenstein any versions of transcendental idealism.

276-297

Authors: ALEXEY STOVBA

The article is devoted to the reasoning of the „Ereignis“ phenomenon in the philosophy of M. Heidegger. It is worth to emphasize that one of the main trends in contemporary philosophy is an attempt of creation of new–non-substantial–ontology. The very specificity of such ontology lies in the fact that classical substance is replaced by the dynamical configuration of sense, which is not “purely theoretical” but “ontological” in its core. “Ontological” means, in fact, that it is impossible to separate the mode of Being of phenomena from the process of thinking about them. Heidegger’s philosophy was one of the first attempts to create such ontology. It is worth to point out the three steps of the Heidegger’s studies of Being. The first, “fundamental-ontological” step is characterized primarily through the “ontological difference” between Being and entity, when the phenomenon of time represents by itself their hidden basis. During the second, “radical-ontological” period, Heidegger has already carried out his famous “turn.” In compliance with this “turn,” the truth of Being, die Lichtung, substitutes time as the “pre-ontological” basement of Being. In this case, Being itself transforms into the Event, „Ereignis“. On the third, “post-ontological” stage of studies the focal point of Heidegger’s thought is “post-ontological difference” between the Being of entity and Being itself. On this stage both Being and time are rooted in the phenomenon of „Ereignis“. The latter has been now transformed from being a “simple Event” into a “matter of fact” (the new interpretation of the Husserl’s famous „die Sache selbst“) as the alternation of the “disclosedness” and “concealness” of Being and time. In this case, „Ereignis“ is not quasi-substantial basement of Being, time or entity but it shows itself as its “Beginning” („Anfang“)“), when the Truth of Being is replaced by the dynamical sense configuration of the event, i.e., a “matter of fact.” Thus, Heidegger has conceptually created a new type of thnon-substantial ontology, the core of which is the phenomenon of „Ereignis“ as the dynamical singular configuration of the temporal-ontological sense of the Event itself.

306-342

Authors: WOLFGANG BONSIEPEN (Trans. from German by Anton Fomin, Alexander Frolov )

The article is devoted to the genesis of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It shows us that the formation of the natural philosophical views of the German philosopher took place not only in a speculative way, in the critical reception of Schelling’s works, but, first of all and for the most part, was predetermined by Hegel’s own interest in natural science and acquaintance with some prominent scientists of that time. The focus of the paper is on the evolution of the first part of Hegel’s natural philosophy: the doctrine of space and time as it presented in some excerpts from two revised lecture notes on the philosophy of nature, read by Hegel in the winter semester of 1821/1822 at the University of Berlin and published as an appendix to the article by Bonzipen. In his article, Bonzipen provides historical information on the fate of these texts, raises the question of their authorship, gives a general outline of Hegel’s thought, and also compares both texts with the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. From his point of view, the revised notes allow partly to illustrate, partly to fill in some gaps in the dialectic of two forms of abstract appearance known on the basis of the Encyclopedia. Bonzipen notes that Hegel’s speculative consideration of space and time is complemented by a discussion with the history of philosophy and the history of mathematics. While reproaching traditional mathematics for being fixed on the quantitative aspect of reality, which does not allow to fully resolve the contradiction between space and time, Hegel at the same time refuses to attempt to build philosophical mathematics that focuses on the consideration of the qualitative certainty of the moments of space and time, declaring that although it is solvable, it is an extremely time-consuming task. This refusal becomes a turning point in the further development of the dialectical doctrine of space and time.

379-401

Authors: SAULIUS GENIUSAS

The paper is guided by three goals. First, it shows that the methodological standpoint of classical Husserlian phenomenology provides us with reliable tools to resist the grand narratives that proliferate during times of war. Second, it demonstrates that phenomenology provides much-needed methodological support for hermeneutically-oriented reflections on war. Third, it shows how the gruesome reality of World War One introduced a practical turn in Husserl’s phenomenology by forcing Husserl to rethink the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics. Tracing the development of phenomenological metaphysics in Husserl’s Fichte lectures (1917-1918), Kaizo articles (1923-1924) and private correspondence, the paper shows that, in response to war, Husserl deliberately chose not to engage in straightforward reflections on war, but instead to write about the prospects of peace. Reflections on cultural renewal necessitated him to rethink phenomenology as practical philosophy. The entanglement of praxis and theoria in Husserlian phenomenology relies upon the establishment of a metaphysically-grounded conceptual bond that ties reason to love and faith, which in its own turn suggests that a human being is not merely animal rationale, but also animal amans and animal religiosum. Ultimately, the possibility of cultural renewal relies upon a metaphysical broadening of Husserl’s conception of philosophy as rigorous sciences.

421-440

Authors: PETAR BOJANIĆ

My intention is to demonstrate how Hobbes’ attempts to adapt two ancient institutions from Roman Law to his own time and knowledge of theology and philosophy. Treason (and the figure of the traitor) could be quite significant within the context of Hobbes’ (but not only his) understanding of the figure of the sovereign and sovereignty. The central part of the text is an endeavor to ascertain the source and unconditional condition for treason as such, within the framework of Hobbes’ theory of representation (representatio) which he writes about in Chapter 16 of the Leviathan. The act or performance in which we could perhaps recognize a traitorous gesture (or the dynamic of treason) could be found in the so-called paradox of representation. The “traitor” breaks the chain of the transfer of power and empowerment, thus stops representation, and puts an end to speaking in the name of the other. If it is possible to discover whether this is possible and whether speaking and acting in one’s own name always carries elements of treason, then we can conclude that differing forms of “direct” speech and action (“in one’s own name”) are “acts of treason.” In that case, what interests me is whether “treason” is found within the heart of representative democracy, and thus if it is de facto an integral part of a democratic order and society.

455-465

Authors: ALEKSEY SIDOROV

The review is devoted to a joint monograph of Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values published in 2019. The peculiarity and novelty of this monograph is that it is devoted not so much to the cognitive and epistemological aspects of phenomenology of intersubjectivity as to ethical, existential and value problems of relations with the Others, presented in various phenomenological concepts. One of the advantages of the work is the pluralistic approach, which allows the reader to get acquainted with the solutions to the problem of intersubjectivity posed by a number of the most prominent phenomenologists, i. e. Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Levinas and others. The book traces the idea that emerging of the topic of intersubjectivity in phenomenology caused a socio-ethical and axiological shift in the phenomenological movement. Considering moving of modern philosophy towards “the intersubjective paradigm” (W. Hösle), the aim of the authors of the monograph to show the relevance and innovation of phenomenology in discussing the problems of the Other, communication and ethics can be assessed as a promising theoretical project. Whereas critics of the phenomenological movement reproached “methodological solipsism” of phenomenology, which develops Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, a serious analysis of the works of the most prominent representatives of the phenomenological tradition leads the authors of the monograph to the conclusion that a phenomenological subject is social in its essence. The review draws a conclusion that the joint monograph brings into sharp focus that phenomenology is in possession of deep and diverse ways of studying the common being of people and collectively shared values.

355-359

Authors: RONNY MIRON, SIMONA BERTOLINI

No abstract

398-424

Authors: SIMONA BERTOLINI

Interest in the ontological constitution of living beings (with particular reference to the human being) characterizes the whole development of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ philosophy. Several works written by the philosopher over the years deal with both the phenomenological description and the ontological foundation of the difference between plants, animals, and humans. Specifically, the ontological structure of the human being is investigated as a layered structure which presupposes those of plants and animals while overcoming them in a more complex and spiritual unity, on which human freedom and human knowledge depend. Although this topic maintains a crucial role in Conrad-Martius’ thought, the way the philosopher addresses it and the theoretical results of her phenomenological-ontological inquiry about it do not remain unchanged. Indeed, the ontological structure at the basis of phenomenal differences as well as the metaphysical foundations of this structure change over the decades. This paper aims at distinguishing between two phases, characterized by different ontological categories, through which Conrad-Martius’ anthropology and biological ontology develop. In the first phase, at the beginning of the twenties (precisely in her work Metaphysical Dialogues), the essential differences between plants, animals, and humans are explained with reference to a vital origin preceding the constitution of reality; to describe it Conrad-Martius employs terms such as “abyss” and “under-earthly realm.” In the second phase, exemplified by some writings published in the forties and the fifties, the reference to such a dimension disappears and the eidetic variety within the living world, including human specificity, is exclusively traced back to the finalistic substantiation of essences in the natural beings.

441-462

Authors: DANIELE DE SANTIS

The present paper makes the case for considering Jean Hering the source from which Edith Stein first borrowed the concept of “core,” notably, “core of the person.” In particular, we maintain that the background of Stein’s decision is represented by the original version of Hering’s famous booklet Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee, namely, the Appendix (Fragmente zur Vorbereitung einer künftigen Lehre vom Apriori) to his still unpublished dissertation on Lotze. Nevertheless, whereas Hering introduces the concept of “core” to merely discriminate between different types of essences within the framework of a general attempt at determining the structure of individual essences, Stein takes it to characterize always and exclusively the structure of the person, notably, its mode of being, thereby paving the way for her future personalistic ontology. The paper will be divided into three parts. In § 2 evidence will be produced to support the thesis that Stein had direct knowledge of Hering’s dissertation. § 3 will analyze Hering’s notions of essence and “core of the essence” (in both versions of the text and in relation to the example of the “essence” of Caesar). Finally, § 4 will tackle the “core” in Stein’s early works, in particular in the book on empathy, and in comparison with Hering’s understanding of it. The paper intends to pursue a double goal: it aims at emphasizing the novelty of Stein’s conception of the essence, notably, core of the (individual) essence while at the same time reconstructing the wider framework to which it belongs.

484-498

Authors: ANTONIO CALCAGNO

The phenomenon of I-splitting or Ichspaltung poses many challenges for phenomenology. In particular, one wonders how one and the same I can perform different acts while preserving its disinterested autonomy and identity. Moreover, as the I moves from the natural attitude to the phenomenological one, phenomenologists like Husserl defend the purity of the transcendental I to grasp the sense of what its lives. How can the I move from one attitude to the next without being affected or conditioned by the acts carried out and content seized by the I in both attitudes? For example, one wonders how trauma or intense emotional experiences may affect the transcendental or phenomenological I, if at all. Edith Stein and Gerda Walther are read here as deepening the problem of I-splitting, for they introduce a form of it that is not merely defined by the undertaking of different acts of consciousness, for example, the move from the natural to the phenomenological attitude; rather, they describe lived experiences in which the very fundamental unity of the individual, personal I is challenged or negated through intense forms of sociality and intersubjectivity achieved in community and telepathy as well as ruptures in the constitutive unity of persons through soullessness. I argue here that these phenomena seriously challenge not only the unity of I experience but also phenomenology’s claim of the capacity of a pure and absolute ego to grasp philosophically and scientifically the objective sense of its investigations.

534-552

Authors: WITOLD PŁOTKA

Phenomenology originates in a critical assessment of descriptive psychology. In this regard, scholars emphasize mainly the problem of psychologism. Yet, the question of a methodological divide between both approaches is rather at the margins of contemporary scholarship. In the present paper, I analyze and discuss the 1931–32 debate held by Irena Filozofówna and Leopold Blaustein as a case study of the phenomenology-psychology divide. The debate addresses the structure of aesthetic experience, as well as a methodological background for describing psychic life. My main task is to present arguments, concepts, and methodologies of the opposing positions. To do so, in Sect. (1) I outline biographical sketches of Filozofówna and Blaustein. They were members of the Lvov-Warsaw School, but they presented different approaches: whereas Filozofówna advocated descriptive and experimental psychology, Blaustein—educated not only by Twardowski, but also by Ingarden, and Husserl—referred to the phenomenological tradition too. Sect. (2) summarizes Blaustein’s phenomenological aesthetics. His approach consists in analyzing aesthetic experience as a combination of nonreducible presentations. His key observation is that different types of art require different presentations, say, imaginative, schematic, or symbolic. In Sect. (3), I analyze Filozofówna’s criticism of this approach. Her main argument consists in emphasizing judgments as a necessary element of every lived experience. She claims that Blaustein comprehends acts as intentional, i.e., as presenting their objects as “such and such,” but by doing so, he confuses presentations with judgments. In this section I follow Blaustein’s replies to Filozofówna’s criticism. In Sect. (4), I analyze Filozofówna’s argument that Blaustein adopted an ineffective method, since he was too hasty in accepting unjustified hypotheses. In Sect. (5), I ask about a theoretical background of Filozofówna’s criticism, and I juxtapose both positions.

577-584

Authors: MARIA RAKHMANINOVA

We offer an introductory article to the translation of Dutch philosopher Joery Schrijvers’ work Phenomenologists and Anarchism, which deals with the reception of current foreign trajectories of phenomenological and akratic reflexions from the perspective of contemporary Russian academic discourse. In the light of this, an attempt is made to assess the significance and originality of J. Schrijvers’ study, focused on the conceptual juxtaposition of two philosophical traditions: phenomenology and the philosophy of anarchism. The value of the author’s stated perspective, which provides an opportunity to revise the classical phenomenological texts, is articulated as being related to its methodological novelty—not only for the Russian-speaking space, but also for foreign philosophy; a review and analysis of the central theses of the article, related to the key figures of the line of succession of acrical reflection in the phenomenological tradition, which is outlined by the author, is given, including: M.Heidegger, R. Schürmann, E.Levinas, J.Derrida, J.-L.Nancy, J.-I.Lacoste, C.Romano and J.-L.Marion. The article also builds theoretical connections between the anarchist foundations of a number of phenomenological reflections identified by J. Schrijvers and the ontological accoutrements of other current philosophical trends—for example, the actor-network theory and the polyphony of new materialisms.

609-612

Authors: Andrei Patkul

No abstract

620-622

Authors: Rusaln Loshakov

No abstract

11-14

Authors: RAIVIS BIČEVSKIS, INETA KIVLE

No abstract

45-60

Authors: ANNA MAŁECKA, PIOTR MRÓZ

The paper presents a non-standard interpretation of the celebrated Heideggerian existential das Man in terms of its oft-underrated unity with Dasein—an entity of a special ontic-ontological prerogative. The present authors intend to highlight this essential theme in terms of the specific unity of Dasein being-in-the world, covering many subsequent and adjacent existentials in the analytics of the Heideggerian existential hermeneutics, especially Mitsein/Mitdasein. Dasein’s existence-essence is based on the structure of possibilities, and hence free, spontaneous choices, while Das Man is a concrete choice of a certain modus of existence rendering—as it were—all other modi invalid and non-operational. Although Heidegger is far from taking up an ethical or moral stance in its traditional understanding, he is quite adamant that the phenomenon of das Man invalidates a truly human project of existing one’s own possibilities—to wit—be oneself (Jemeines).

77-95

Authors: ANNA KHAKHALOVA

The paper intends to supplement the studies of emotional affordances of BAA by elaborating on the conception of participatory sense-making as well as developmental studies on joint attention and interattentionality. I address different spheres of expertise from the experience-based phenomenological perspective, which allows exploring the problem both from the first-person and second-person perspectives. This research presents the conception of inter-selfness that carries on M. Merleau-Ponty’s idea of intercorporeality, T. Fuchs’ et al. analysis of intersubjectivity and phenomenologically oriented psychoanalysis by E. Z. Tronick et al., R. Stolorow et al. The mechanism of BAA is presented through the conception of participatory sense-making and the idea of minimal inter-attentionality in developmental studies. The paper presents an emotional affordances scheme that illustrates the emotional regulation of BAA. By examining this process of regulation one could see in what way the self becomes an inter-self in communication. The article also postulates correlation between cultural mediation of emotional affordances and their direct accessibility from the second-person perspective. In the last part of the paper, I examine social interaction from the viewpoint of developmental studies (C. Trevarthen, V. Reddy, M. Carpenter). The developmental perspective supplements the idea of emotional regulation in interaction, by focusing on primary such forms of BAA between a caregiver and a baby, as joint attention and mutual gaze. Herein, I demonstrate how the initial forms of the positive bodily-affective attunement develop into the interattentionality and self-representation practices of the subject. This point could contribute to the theory of personal identity by exploring the process of maturing of the sense of self in its different aspects. The results of the research could be useful for further study of BAA and its pathologies. The results could also be of use for the discussion on non-human or human-like affordance-based technological interaction theory.

108-122

Authors: RIHARDS KŪLIS

The secularized and rational-oriented mindset of the Western civilization does not preclude important elements of a religious worldview. The objective of the present study is to come to understand the role the categories of Being and God play in the present day spiritual situation. Heidegger’s and Rahner’s views are considered here within the prospective of the paradigmatic process. The latter marks the fading away of the classical understanding of God and search for new and divine meanings. Therefore I suggest considering some of the most significant motifs in the two philosophers’ reflection as regards the history of western civilization and our epoch in the context of the categories of God and Being. Among these motifs there are such attitudes as subjectivism, self-suggestion, disposal of beings, planetarism, oblivion of Being, loss of origins, groundlessness, alienation, situation of meaninglessness. It is due to these attitudes, especially owing to meaninglessness, that many people tend to raise again the issue of the concealed, the encompassing, God or Being. Or perhaps speaking about “Being” and “God” can be interpreted as something that leads to the oblivion of Being and to atheism. “Being” in Heidegger and “God” in Rahner single out the existential centre to which forms of life are related. Nowadays it is forgotten or even vanishes. “God” or “Being” hold everything together and confer meaning thereto. Could it be exactly what modern man is in search of? One has to find answers to these questions.

140-162

Authors: MĀRA KIOPE

Phenomenology contains potential that can be expanded to include the development of cognitive phenomenology concepts. One of the most notable works in this area is related to the name of Stanislavs Ladusāns (Staņislavs Ladusāns, 1912–1993), the famous Latvian and Brasilian philosopher. The article will outline the key elements of S. Ladusāns’s phenomenology of cognition, showing how his many-sided gnoseology was developed as the basis for multidimensional humanism to transform culture into a more humane one. At first phenomenology of cognition is discussed as the ground of many-sided humanism. The notion of many-sided or multidimensional humanism clearly affirms that human understanding about the human itself is based on a plurality of principles. At the end of the seventies Stanislavs Ladusāns decided to realise the philosophy-as-rigorous-science approach—a clear citation of Husserlian idea—and to concentrate attention on the human person within the manifold relations—providing his/her existential experience. All the system of rigorous science of many-sided humanism should be grounded on the theory of cognition. On the basis of epistemology, Ladusāns wants to build a unified picture of human existence, including the discoveries of many sciences and integrating them into multidimensional humanism through philosophy. Meanwhile the phenomenology of cognition in its final form as it is appears in the monograph Gnosiologia Pluridimensional (1992) was build up by Stanislavs Ladusāns during many decades. One of the first most important episodes in this process was the reinterpretation of the Thomistic concept of induction. Stanislavs Ladusāns deals with the conception of the general critical reflection by demonstrating the judgment-formation of the mind. Ladusāns holds that the sensual experience providing material contents of our knowledge displays certain nexuses between forms of experience, these may be transferred onto general inductive judgements. The second significant episode in the construction of system of the phenomenology of cognition is linked with the concept of “doubling-of-cognition-structure” by which the religious, spiritual experience becomes philosophically legitimate. Even in the case of religion the objective evidence comes first; it gives an opportunity to reason to ascertain about the existence of God. Stanislavs Ladusāns places phenomenology of cognition or many-sided gnoseology at the corner-stone of his programme of cultural regeneration. The capacity of reason is incapable for revigoration of culture—these are overestimated or underestimated—this has to be established in a truly gnoseological investigation. In the context of critics of culture and ideologies is presented Ladusāns’ correspondence with Welte and Heidegger, which reveals the intensive quest for thinking about being that where characteristic of the seventies of the last century aspiring towards the grasping of the Highest Being.

186-211

Authors: ULDIS VĒGNERS

Temporality is one of the key components of our experience, but the experience of time is hardly one and the same for all of us throughout our lives. The experience of time in its entirety is not solid and simple. It is a fluid and complex phenomenon consisting of a multitude of dimensions. In medical phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology there are ample cases of different temporal experiences analysed in the context of the illness experience. However, only a few attempts have been made to propose a conceptual framework that could not only be used to conduct a concrete analysis in a more systematic manner, but also provide a solid and comprehensive theoretical basis. The aim of this article is to draw on the rich distinctions found in Husserl’s phenomenology to outline a framework of different temporal dimensions for the analysis of temporal experience. The framework could provide conceptual tools to analyse temporal experiences in any field of study that deals with the human experience, including medical phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology. The resulting analysis would be not only clearer, more comprehensive and precise, but also more systematic and conceptually consistent. The framework consists of fourteen dimensions of temporal experience ordered in seven binary distinctions: (1) change and structure, (2) immanence and transcendence, (3) ownness and intersubjectivity, (4) passivity and activity, (5) receptivity and spontaneity, (6) presentation and representation, (7) unthematized temporality and thematized temporality.

232-257

Authors: VIRGIL W. BROWER

The primary focus of this project is the silent and subvocal speech-recognition interface unveiled in 2018 as an ambulatory device wearable on the neck that detects a myoelectrical signature by electrodes worn on the surface of the face, throat, and neck. These emerge from an alleged “intending to speak” by the wearer silently-saying-something-to-oneself. This inner voice is believed to occur while one reads in silence or mentally talks to oneself. The artifice does not require spoken sounds, opening the mouth, or any explicit or external movement of the lips. The essay then considers such subvocal “speech” as a mode of writing or saying and the interior of the mouth or oral cavity as its writing surface. It briefly revisits discussions of telepathy to recontextualize Heidegger’s warning against enframing language exclusively within calculative technics and physiology, which he suggests is detrimental to Mundarten (mouth-modes of regional dialects). It closes in reconsideration of Husserl’s phenomenology of language and meaning in Ideas as it might apply to subvocal speech-recognition interfaces. It suggests ways by which the electrophysiology that the device detects and deciphers (as an alleged intention of a presumed natural language unspoken vocally or aloud) might supplement Husserl’s insinuation of the Leiblichkeit of language through a self-stamping extraction of an extension of meaning.

268-285

Authors: ONUR KARAMERCAN

Although Heidegger’s explicit account of “poetic dwelling” belongs to his later philosophy, there are important indications that he was already engaging with the core matter of the notion in his early thought. Contrary to the idea that in Being and Time, “dwelling” amounts to mere practical coping with the environment, we would like to demonstrate that the notion is already a poetic issue in his early thought, as it requires the appropriation of our relation to the world via an authentic experience of finitude. Following a topological mode of thinking, the paper thematizes the connections between Heidegger’s early and later thought, and elucidates the following three points: First, “freeing” and “letting” appears as the appropriate ethos of a poetic experience of finitude, one that maintains the “clearing” of meaningfulness. Second, a topological reading of Being and Time can explicate the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity as different disclosures of the clearing where human being-world correlation occurs. Third, the notion of “keeping-still” (Schweigen) can be interpreted as an authentic disposition that frees space for the disclosure of existence. The paper concludes that an authentic experience of finitude through “stillness” appears to reorient human ethos by releasing “discourse” from absorption in “idle-talk” and that such an act of existential re-orientation of one’s disposition towards the world is the essence of “authenticity,” and Heidegger’s early “poetic dwelling”.

305-311

Authors: RAIVIS BIČEVSKIS, VALTERS ZARIŅŠ

Book review focuses on two books by Gunther Neumann, dedicated to the thought of Heidegger and Leibniz. If one of the books deals specifically with the understanding of freedom in both of the two philosophers, then the other one deals more with Heidegger’s three approaches to Leibniz’s thought: (1) Interpretation of Leibniz in the context of the making of fundamental ontology and in Being and Time, as well as the reading of Leibniz after Being and Time; (2) Interpretation of Leibniz during the transition to Ereignis thought; (3) Interpetation of Leibniz in the framework of Ereignis thought. Author’s scrupulous close reading approach allows to show the changes in Heidegger’s approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, as well as sketch out the placement of Leibniz’s great themes on the horizon of Heidegger’s history of the truth of being. Author also shows that from metaphysics there stems a certain view in the modern philosophical discussions oriented on neurosciences—a certain view on the human being and on the freedom of will. On this background Heidegger appears as a thinker who has looked beyond the alloy of metaphysics and sciences, in which the concept of freedom has been greatly restricted. Heidegger manages (thanks to the radical questioning of Being) to turn the view on the problem of freedom, which appears in G. Neumann’s books as the main problem of philosophy—through the contact of Leibniz’s thought and Heidegger’s.

320-327

Authors: JAROSLAVA VYDROVÁ

The collective volume Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe: Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems, edited by Witold Płotka and Patrick Eldridge, enriches the ongoing and highly topical research of the history of phenomenology with the thematization of a specific period and localization of phenomenology. The authors of eleven chapters explore the emergence of phenomenology in local traditions outside the Germanophone area, its appropriation and development, describing the unique forms it acquired in individual environments. The book clarifies the characteristics of the early wave of phenomenology and provides a list of Central and Eastern European phenomenologists who participated in it. On the one hand, the volume is a contribution to historiography, enriching the study of the history of phenomenology thematically and thus contributing to the development of phenomenology itself; on the other hand, it introduces its own set of philosophical problems. These concern methodology and the issue of the Central and Eastern European identity, which is examined through the prism of the development of local traditions of phenomenology. When exploring the latter it is useful to introduce the concept of the marginocentric. This concept, which originated in comparative literature, facilitates an understanding of the unique cultural configuration of a concrete tradition in its communication with internal and external environments.

489-494

Authors: WITOLD PŁOTKA, THOMAS BYRNE

No abstract

513-531

Authors: THOMAS BYRNE

This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden’s 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. I elucidate and critique Ingarden’s analysis of the differences between the 1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden’s interpretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl’s claim that he only engages in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, when he asserts that Husserl had fully transformed his philosophy into a transcendental idealism in the second edition. While Husserl does appear to adopt a transcendental phenomenology by asserting–in his programmatic claims–that the intentional content and object are now included in his domain of research, he does not alter his actual descriptions of the intentional relationship in any pertinent manner. Third, I show Ingarden correctly predicts many of the insights Husserl would arrive at about logic in his late philosophy. This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl’s later writings and from recent literature on the Investigations. By doing so, I hope to additionally demonstrate how research on the Investigations has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that text, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.

552-578

Authors: WITOLD PŁOTKA

The article addresses the popular reading of Ingarden that his aesthetic theory is determined by ontology. This reading seems to suggest that, firstly, aesthetics lacks its autonomy, and, secondly, the subject of aesthetic experience is reproductive, and passive. The author focuses on Ingarden’s aesthetics formulated by him in the period of 1925–1944. Moreover, the study presents selected elements of Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and by doing so, the author aims at showing how Ingarden’s aesthetics was reconsidered by Blaustein, a student of Ingarden, whose theory seems to lead one beyond the scope of ontology. Blaustein, namely, reconsiders Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects by interpreting it in a descriptive-psychological, or phenomenological fashion. The article is divided into four parts. In section 1, the author highlights historical interconnections between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Section 2.1. is devoted to Ingarden’s phenomenological approach towards aesthetic experience as a phasic structure. At this basis, in section 2.2., Ingarden’s early theory of intentional objects is to be discussed. Section 3 concerns Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Given that Blaustein formulates his theory in discussion with Ingarden, section 3.1. is devoted to Blaustein’s critical assessment of Ingarden’s method, and aesthetics. Next, in section 3.2., the author presents Blaustein’s original theory of presentations, and its use in aesthetics. Finally, in section 4, the author lists similarities, and differences between Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s aesthetic theories.

601-618

Authors: TOMAS SODEIKA

The Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden gained recognition primarily due to his research on aesthetics. However, he considered the ontology to be the main area of his philosophical interests. At the beginning of his scientific career, Ingarden realized that he could not agree with his teacher Edmund Husserl, who considered phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. From Ingarden’s point of view, the fallacy of this approach lies in the fact that it leads to metaphysical idealism and makes it impossible to grasp the difference between real-life objects and intentional objects, i.e. objects generated by pure consciousness. In his main work Controversy over the Existence of the World (Der Streit um dieExistenz der Welt), Ingarden tried to identify the difference between the ontological structures of real and intentional objects, expecting in this way to uphold the legitimacy of a realistic point of view and to prove that the real world is not a product of pure consciousness, but exists independently of him. Nevertheless, the result achieved by using the existential and formal ontological analysis of the a priori structures of various objects turned out to be insufficient to refute Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The article focuses on the last lifetime publication of Ingarden—his book On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations (Über die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente) published in 1970. Since this work is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of responsibility, it may seem that here we are dealing primarily with research on ethics. The article attempts to show that the book can be read as an ontological study that continues the “debate about the existence of the world,” i.e. as an attempt to prove the reality of the world. However, this proof is no longer based on an analysis of the a priori structures of various objects, but on a direct experience of responsibility.

640-661

Authors: MATTHEW E. GLADDEN

From his earliest published writings to his last, Roman Ingarden displayed an interest in theoretical biology and its efforts to clarify what distinguishes living organisms from other types of entities. However, many of his explorations of such issues are easily overlooked, because they don’t appear in works that are primarily ontological, metaphysical, or anthropological in nature but are “hidden” within his works on literary aesthetics, where Ingarden sought to define the nature of living organisms in order to compare literary works to such entities. This article undertakes a historical textual analysis that traces the evolution of Ingarden’s thought regarding the nature of the literary work of art as an organism-like entity and uncovers its links with the simultaneous development of his systems theory and its central concept of the “relatively isolated system”: for Ingarden, a literary work and an organism are each a systematically transforming, “living,” functional-structural whole that comprises a system of hierarchically arranged and partially isolated (yet interdependent) elements whose harmonious interaction allows the literary work or organism to fulfill its chief function. Having completed that historical analysis, we test Ingarden’s assessment of works of art as organism-like entities in a novel context by investigating the organism-like qualities of the contemporary computer game; insofar as their AI-driven behavior displays a form of agency, such games might appear to be even more “alive” than traditional works of art. We show that Ingarden’s conceptual framework provides a useful tool for understanding the “organicity” of such games as works of art, despite the fact that they differ qualitatively from those art forms with which Ingarden was directly familiar.

683-702

Authors: ROBERT LUZECKY

In the present paper, I suggest a modification to some aspects of Ingarden’s analyses of the sound-synchronized filmic work of art. The argument progresses through two stages: (1) I clarify Ingarden’s claim that the work of art is a stratified formation in which the various aspects present objectivities; (2) I elucidate and critically assess Ingarden’s suggestion that the filmic work of art is a borderline case in respect to other types of works of art—paintings and literary works. Here, I identify a problem with Ingarden’s claims about the function of sound in the concretized filmic work’s presentation of its fictive world. Ingarden identifies the presented universe of the filmic work of art as a habitus of reality, but Ingarden seems oddly conflicted with respect to his notion of habitus. I argue that this stems from Ingarden’s conceptualization of the filmic work of art as primarily composed of the stratum of represented “visible aspects” in both the cases of the silent film and the sound-synchronized film, and his restriction of the role of phonetic content in the latter. I suggest that were we to reconceptualise the role of aurally presented phonetic content in the concretized sound-synchronized film, we could better understand how film has the seeming magical capacity to transfix us.

729-748

Authors: CHARLENE ELSBY

The time of the literary work of art is a schematized aspect of the represented objectivities of the literary work. Roman Ingarden’s analysis of the time of the literary work extends upon Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness but nevertheless remains consistent with it, insofar as within a literary work as well as actuality, an objective time or literary objective time is constituted from an experience of temporal objects (or in the case of the work of art, represented objectivities). The time of the literary work of art is experienced through its represented objectivities and depends on an already existent concept of objective time. (We conceive of the time of the literary work of art as a variant of actual time.) The time of the literary work, however, gains an indeterminacy, as the author of the literary work is able to manipulate our experience of time within the literary work by predicting how the reader will concretize its events, characters, and objects with respect to time. I use Alain Robbe-Grillet’s representation of the centipede in La Jalousie as an example of the possible manipulations of time, explicable through Ingarden’s analysis of time in the literary work of art.

760-781

Authors: MARC RICHIR (Trans. by D. Mikhaylov, ed. by D. Chaganova, G. Chernavin)

The article « La Défenestration » by Belgian philosopher Marc Richir has been translated into Russian for the first time for this issue of the “Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology.” In his early work “The Defenestration” Richir raises the question of relation between the subject and conceivable world. Here, a philosopher is pictured contemplating the world through the window of his tower. In such detachment from the world the thinker finds himself according to all Modern philosophies of consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology inherits this detachment, since Husserl imposes the structure of transcendental ego as external to the world. Richir abolishes the concept of transcendental ego with the help of heideggerian Dasein, but analyzing Heidegger’s ontology he comes to the conclusion that the latter remains fixated on beings. Believing a person to live in the fundamental openness of Being, Heidegger places such a person in the secondary world of “truth.” In order to overcome the remains of traditional philosophy in Heidegger’s ontology Richir turns to Merleau-Ponty’ “cosmology of the visible.” The author takes the Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that everything visible has something fundamentally invisible in it.This allows him to discover the universe of “nothing” (rien), which includes both the visible and whatis “behind” it. As a result Richir overcomes the classical dualism of the sensual and the intelligible. The concept of defenestration places the subject and the world in the same universe.