Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

263–269

Authors: JESÚS M. DÍAZ ÁLVAREZ, JESÚS GUILLERMO FERRER ORTEGA

No abstract

285–301

Authors: JESÚS M. DÍAZ ÁLVAREZ, JORGE BRIOSO

This article tries to unravel some of the main clues provided by Ortega on his understanding of philosophy. The thesis we defend is that the Spanish philosopher maintains two slightly different answers concerning the question what is philosophy, though Ortega does not acknowledge them in the explicit narrative of his thinking. This, we believe, creates tensions in his late second philosophical model, as he does not fully break away from certain “adherence” or “mannerisms” associated to his early model. In this respect, Ortega would be a thinker who lives between two philosophical worlds, someone who sees, narrates and interprets the philosophical shock wave occurring at his time, but does not quite let go of the old intellectual constructions. To support our thesis, we will compare two texts, his 1929 lectures What is Philosophy?, and his Notes on Thinking, from 1941. In the period between these two works, Ortega seems to move from a more “traditional,” “universalistic,” “transcendental,” in short, Husserlian phenomenological understanding of philosophy, to a more historicist, hermeneutical, and pragmatic one, which lays the emphasis on the plurality of discourses on the sense, the contingency of the philosophical narrative itself, and even the very possibility of its ending, at least in its more “metaphysical” and classical form.

327–339

Authors: MIGUEL GARCÍA-BARÓ LÓPEZ

This article deals with the reception of phenomenology by Xavier Zubiri, one of the most important figures of 20th century Spanish philosophy. During his lifetime Zubiri published few books, but he left an immense legacy of courses and manuscripts. Among the most important published works is the book Naturaleza, Historia, Dios. Zubiri explains there his critical reception of phenomenology: he subscribes to it, insofar as it is a philosophy of things themselves. But this evaluation of phenomenology is at the same time a farewell to her. Zubiri’s philosophical project consists in giving a reason not for things as objects of consciousness, but rather for their entitary or real structure. Thus, his purpose is to establish a logic of reality or new metaphysics that is at the same time different from the old ontology and whose sources of inspiration are Heidegger and Aristotle. To the author of this essay seems also highly probable that Alfred N. Whitehead influenced decisively certain prominent features of Zubiri’s ontological program. Husserl’s treatment of the theory of wholes and parts in Logical Investigations III pertains also to the intellectual basis of Zubiri. The article raises the question of the traces of phenomenology that are still present in Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, and critically assesses their importance for phenomenological philosophy today. The article shows above all how Zubiri’s perspective vindicates phenomenologically the traditional concept of Man and his experience of religious connection (religatio) with a transcendent Grund. As a consequence, the traditional notions of spiritual reality, eros and agape are given a new meaning.

362–381

Authors: CÉSAR GÓMEZ ALGARRA

This paper discusses why the work of Eduardo Nicol, still not translated and mostly unknown outside of the Hispanic context, deserves more attention, for two main reasons. First, the novelty of his meditations concerning phenomenology, following the steps of Husserl and Heidegger, but taking a different turn. Furthermore, several scholars have noted how his phenomenological project intertwines with the anthropological question, fostering a new approach to the question concerning “who are we?”. Our aim is to explore how Nicol, while setting foot in the founders of phenomenology, departs from previous interpretations of its method, to advance a new dialectical phenomenology that could contribute to the actual debates on anthropological phenomenology. In order to do so, we will first examine how his vision of the phenomenological task involves an historical interpretation of metaphysics and a critique of two fundamental concepts: the transcendental reduction (Husserl) and the thesis of an “occultation of being” (Heidegger). A careful reading of Nicol’s philosophy would allow us to go a step further and explain how, according to him, phenomenology should become an analysis of the dialectical presence between being/beings. Finally, we will show that the answer to the question “who are we?” is to be found inside this dialectic, in what Nicol identifies as the historical phenomenon of expression, encouraging a new dialogue with other phenomenologies of the body⸺and beyond.

398–432

Authors: IRENE BREUER

This paper focuses on the Argentine philosopher Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907-1995) and his critical reception of phenomenology. It introduces to his contribution to phenomenology in the context of its early reception in Argentina and addresses the following issues: 1) the mission of philosophy, the various ways of accessing its essence, in particular those of Scheler, Dilthey and Husserl, 2) his reception of Husserl as far as the ideals of science and reason are concerned, 3) the crisis of reason 4) his pluralistic conception of reason and time, and finally, to 5) his humanistic stance. I argue that his conception of philosophy, which emphasizes the personal dimension and the social commitment of philosophical practice as well as the relentless search for unshakeable foundations of knowledge as carried out by Husserl, is underpinned by a pluralistic conception of reason, time and culture that confers Pucciarelli’s philosophizing a humanistic bias. Phenomenology as conceived by Pucciarelli becomes thus an active force by embracing multiple perspectives, such that its methodology can be applied to varying contexts and circumstances. Pucciarelli’s commitment to social justice and Latin American culture responds to the attempt to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual, which ground human dignity. In short, Pucciarelli’s stance reveals a profound pluralistic humanism that does not neglect its militant and critical function, thus evidencing its relevance to the current sociopolitical situation in Latin America.

457–478

Authors: JUAN JOSÉ RODRÍGUEZ

This paper refers to the connection between the metaphysical duality of ground and existence and inner dynamic of the particular will of man. We will analyse how the metaphysical monism, which Schelling attributes to Spinoza and later to Hegel, is responsible for the abolition of the freedom of the human individual, because it does not account for the existence of evil, and consequently reduces it to the existence of a higher order reference system that over and predetermines the individual (1). We will first scrutinise the principles of separation and union, ground and understanding from the human point of view, namely as the will of ground and love, as particular and universal will (2). The will of man reveals itself as the culmination and model of the will that permeates nature, an essential aspect of the process of God’s revelation and becoming. The link between the principles of separation and union shows us the difference that Schellingian thought establishes between man and God, the real and the ideal. While God, or the purely ideal principle, precedes the separation in a logical-ontological sense, the will of man remains always in an indissoluble tension between the principles, since it is unable to overcome the opposition between good and evil that is characteristic of freedom. The good remains one of the results of human freedom and thus of the particular will of man. The good lies for Schelling not in the simple actualization of the general, but in the moment ineradicable particularity needed for the attainment of a real and effective principle (3). It is to this insurmountability of the particular will in the process of the constitution of man that our proposal of Schelling’s libertarian anarchism refers. The connection of this thesis with the critique of the State is also discussed (4)

502–530

Authors: MIKHAIL BELOUSOV

The question of the world in itself — the world beyond its correlation with experience in the broadest sense — is one of the sore points of phenomenology and becomes especially acute in the light of modern discussions around correlationism. These discussions, in one way or another, make phenomenology come around to the classical distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, with the help of which Kant outlines the field of ethics as a special world lying on the other side of the correlation of knowledge and object constitutive for nature. Philosophy deals with the thing-in-itself in the proper, positive sense of the word, not as phenomenology (transcendental philosophy, which reveals the correlation of knowledge and reality in the world of phenomena and the futility of attempts by theoretical reason to know anything beyond phenomena), but as a critique of practical reason. The article attempts to consider the opposition of the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon in the context of the criticism that Kant’s practical philosophy is subjected to in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit and to explicate the arguments that this criticism makes available to phenomenology for rethinking the problem of Ding an sich and the ethical dimension of the epoche. The first part of the article examines the Hegelian analysis of the main contradiction contained in the Kantian opposition of duty as something that is in itself, and nature as a phenomenon (this opposition forms what Hegel calls the moral worldview): duty does not depend on nature and therefore does not need natural (phenomenal) realization in actions, but at the same time, duty is nothing but the necessity of actions and, consequently, the necessity of a phenomenon. This contradiction, as Hegel shows, leads to the disintegration of the moral worldview and, thus, turns into the sublation of the absolute separation of duty (thing in itself) and nature (phenomenon). The restitution of the difference between the moral an sich and the phenomenon within conscience — a phenomenon that arises as a result of the destruction of the moral worldview — turns into a new paradox, which demonstrates that the thing-in-itself (ethical good), since it is freed from the phenomenon, is not only unreal, but also turns into its own opposite. The paradox consists in the fact that the consciousness of duty, taken in its independence from the phenomenal realization in actions, becomes evil itself, turning to hypocrisy in the moral judgment about other people’s actions. In the second part of the article, the significance of the Hegelian critique of Kant’s practical philosophy for the phenomenological destruction of the difference between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon and the problematization of the ethical dimension of the phenomenological method is explicated. Tracing the naive origins of this difference in the natural attitude and their transformation in Kantian philosophy, the author tries to consider the sublation of the opposition of the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon in the field of ethics as one of the possible paths to phenomenology. It is shown how the necessary relation of the supra-worldly an sich with the situational nature of its phenomenal realization in actions calls into question the possibility of a phenomenological epoche. The author also seeks to demonstrate that the problematization of the difference between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon does not turn phenomenology into a system in the Hegelian sense.

554–569

Authors: ALEXANDER FROLOV

This article attempts to outline the contours of a transcendental phenomenology that would retain the intuition of a healthy realism. In this connection it is proposed to reinterpret the Husserlian notion of constitution, presenting constitution as a discover of reality. A distinction is made between strong and weak versions of constitution. It is constitution in the weak sense that combines, in our opinion, with the realist attitude. In order to achieve the above-mentioned goal (to present constitution as discovery), the Husserlian notion of object sense is clarified: it is excluded as a representative or substitute of an intentional object; object sense is seen as a mode of givenness, as а medium by means of which the object is implied or given. The idea of a meaningful discovery of reality is best matched by this treatment of object meaning. It is thus possible to combine the realist attitude with the idea of meaningful access to the real, thus avoiding, on the one hand, naive realism and, on the other hand, transcendental-idealist implications. The Husserlian notion of constitution is further related with the idea of forming interpretative schemes of understanding the world, which may include political agendas, scientific paradigms, systems of speculative metaphysics, and religious faith. It is emphasized that, although the rejection of interpretation is impossible, interpretive schemes must be reconciled with real facts and events in order to “fine-tune” reason and reality. Finally, a separation is undertaken with the conception of J.-L. Marion, which relies on the deflation of meaning in favor of the given as such, calling into question the status of man as a being who possesses reason, who discovers reality and constitutes its meaning.

580–595

Authors: SVETLANA KONACHEVA, ANDREI PATKUL, ANNA I. REZNICHENKO

Our paper is an overview of the anniversary All-Russian scientific conference with international participation “Aleshin Academic Readings — 2022: Philosophy as a Way of Life. Dedicated to the 30th Anniversary of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Russian State University for the Humanities,” which was held at this faculty from December 15 to 17, 2022. The first day of its work was devoted to plenary reports, the other two days were connected with the work of sections and workshops. Speakers from Moscow, Almaty (Kazakhstan), Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Yerevan (Armenia), Kaliningrad, Rome (Italy), St. Petersburg, Simferopol, Tyumen, Ufa, Bochum (Germany), Essen (Germany) performed their presentations at the conference. It discussed a wide range of topics, both classical and modern philosophy, having some bearing on philosophy as a way of life and on the significance of a philosopher’s way of life for philosophical knowledge. Particular emphasis in the course of reports and discussions was placed on the problems of the relationship between theoretical and practical in philosophy, the limited nature of the philosophy of forms and concepts and the possibilities of overcoming such limitations, the existential sense of philosophizing, the possibility of explication of living historical experience by means of philosophy, the role of philosophy for diagnosing modernity, the prospects of dialectics, the relationship between philosophy and governments. Sections of the conference were also devoted to methodological, historiographical, pragmatic and other problems of modern thought. No less wide was the range of materials on which the speakers relied, starting with pre-Socratic philosophy and ending with the most relevant examples of philosophy that have not yet received sufficient reception in our country. Many talks also referred to the history of Russian philosophical thought.

612–616

Authors: ANTON VAVILOV

No abstract

9-29

Authors: ABBED KANOOR

In this article I try to show that there is an evolution in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the concept structure. Structure is neither an entity nor an a priori principle, but the expression of certain configurations of sense and meaning. There is a transition from a static to a dynamic approach, paralleling a movement from a philosophy of structure to a philosophy of individuation. There exists for each individual a general structure of behavior as a unity expressed in certain constants of its conduct. The structure is a momentary manifestation of the general orientation of the passive-affective life in its bodily expressions. Structuration is the act of creating order in the perception of the surrounding situation and the process of taking a position in it. By doing so Merleau-Ponty replaces the Gestalt psychology with a philosophy of the living being. This essential philosophical intuition culminates in the concept of style, which becomes an important element in Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological aesthetics and phenomenology of world appearance.

48-73

Authors: CARLOS LOBO

By going back to the starting point of Derrida’s debates with some of the main representatives of structuralism in France, I propose to highlight the ambiguities that cover the very notion of structure, and to take the measure of the exact role that the reference to phenomenology plays then and will continue to play thereafter. Among these ambiguities: the one that touches the mathematical notion of structure, central in the triumphant structuralist mathematical current in France at that time; and especially: the one called “groups of transformations,” the most important one to understand at the same time the audacities and the impasses of structuralism. The hard core of mathematization of modern physics, with Galileo’s principle of relativity, then developed in a masterly way in Einstein’s theory of relativity rest on this very structure. After tracing the broad outlines of these initial discussions, we engage in an analysis of how it is possible to understand the “epistemological contemporaneity” of relativity theory and Husserl’s transcendental aesthetics. Based on a thorough exploration of the analyses of the intersubjective constitution of space, time and the objective common world, we identify this central structure that Husserl calls “intersubjective group of transformation.” Equipped with this phenomenological structure, we trace this motif in Derrida’s work. Its insistence allows us to understand how the phenomenological premises of his critique of structuralism can help to understand his theoretical positions, especially in contrast to Jean-Luc Nancy.

103-114

Authors: DALIUS JONKUS

Despite their creativity, cultural actions are not established out of nothing. They are based on previous actions, their passive or active memory, and extension. Sedimentation is the depositing of sediments that occurs during certain processes. They testify to the processes that have taken place and themselves become significant links or traces. Different layers of sediment are formed, which testify to past events, which have structures in the present. The best-known phenomenological concept of sedimentation was formulated in Husserl’s text The Origin of Geometry. Husserl uses the specific geological term of sedimentation to describe the science of geometry as a linguistically (written) mediated genesis of conceptual knowledge. The human practice of knowledge can be transmitted to other generations only by expressing it linguistically and recording it in writing. Derrida used the phenomenological concept of sedimentation and created Grammatology. The main idea of documentality is that a particular kind of social objects, namely documents (records of social acts) are the ground of social reality. For all three philosophers, writing or recording becomes a model for reflecting on cultural-social reality. The purpose of this article is to discuss the writing as a model for cultural sedimentation and memory. Husserl understood writing as a sedimentation that must be reactivated. However, Derrida and Ferraris identify the written objects only with materialized writing and the repetition of what is written. They do not distinguish between imitative and comprehensive reading.

141-158

Authors: DENIS MIKHAYLOV

This paper analyzes the influence of J. Derrida’s philosophy on the early thought of French phenomenologist M. Richir. Main texts for the analysis are Derrida’s report « La Différance » and the article « Le Rien Enroulé » by Richir. The author stresses their deep figurative and substantive interconnectedness. Thus, Richir borrows from Derrida a number of key philosophical figures, including the figure of différance itself, and applies them to phenomenological landscape through the “first-person” narrative. Having examined the correlation between Derrida’s figures of différance and Richir’s phenomenalization, the author concludes that Richir, influenced by the impersonal figure of différance, leads his “first-person” narrative in an attempt to take it beyond the limits of classical phenomenological discourse. Moreover, the author finds preconditions for Richir’s introduction of one of his early key concepts “nothing” (rien) in the text of Derrida’s « La Différance ». The main thesis of this research is: Richir borrows Derrida’s understanding of consciousness and performs phenomenological description from its perspective. The paper considers Derrida’s text as a key to understanding Richir’s article « Le Rien Enroulé » and, as a result, the key to his early philosophy in general.

173-194

Authors: MARIA STENINA

The article further elaborates on a project of phenomenological critique of ideology and reveals its potential for the discourse of literature. Since the paradigm of studying ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ set in classical Marxism run into several problems connected with the transition from being in ideology to performing its critique, a genuine way out of it became impossible due to the totality of a discursive structure common to them. The articulation of this paradox in Karl Mannheim, Louis Althusser, Paul Ricœur, Michel Pecheux, and Mikel Dufrenne changed the way of statement of the question, shifting the emphasis from the content of ideology and its characteristic features to the status of a critic who is inevitably hypostatizing his thinking. The change of perspective, in turn, entailed a transformation of the method: while the previous tradition focused on finding a connection between the distorted representation of reality in ideological consciousness and the social position of its bearer, structuralist and phenomenological approaches tend to consider the contingent content of consciousness as an inevitable consequence of its structuring always-already-given horizon of meaning. Working with the latter, Mark Richir introduces the concept of a symbolic institution—the domain of meaning, which determines the human habitus, providing it with linguistic and cultural practices that have lost their phenomenological origin. In this framework, the criticism of ideology is understood as an exit from a symbolic institution, albeit temporary. Mark Richir thematizes this exit as an encounter between symbolic and phenomenological registers, i. e. a phenomenological challenge that assumes the agent of the reduction. Nevertheless, gaining a foothold 'outside' the symbolic institution is impossible: the overcome symbolic order undergoes recoding over time. Therefore, the phenomenological criticism of ideology cannot offer a normative program of a presumed non-ideological field to which the previous tradition aspired. The work hypothesizes that such critique is given as a trace of a once-perfect exit from a symbolic institution and is subject to interpretation as evidence. The development of this hypothesis is presented in the final, practical part of the work.

216-234

Authors: NATALIA ARTEMENKO

The aim of our “discussion remark” is not to present a critical review on the book written by S. Geniusas, a brilliant study notable by its extreme painstakingness, historical sensitivity and terminological accuracy, but rather to delve deeply into the origins of phenomenological understanding of productive imagination, i.e., to turn “back to Kant”, given in Saulius Geniusas’ book (the first chapter) for introductory reason. We proceed from S. Geniusas remark that productive imagination establishes a relation between different abilities, reconciles the antagonism between them and, in this respect, exercises a pro-creative function. We reveal that it is this pro-creative element of productive imagination that brings it closer to time (as indicated by Viktor Molchanov, a prominent Russian phenomenologist, in his study of 1988) and serves as the basis for gaining new knowledge. Imagination acts as a limit for reflection, however, it gets revealed only through reflecting, and, thus, it proves to be connected with a fundamental layer of consciousness, which appears both as an object and as a means of describing reflection, i.e., as time. The convergence, or rather, identification, of time with imagination lies in the very fact that both of them exercise an objective function: time – as a possibility for semantic definition of objectivity, imagination – as a basis for a possibility of any knowledge. Moreover, imagination turns out to be a source of a paradox and, ultimately, the only thing that explains self-cognition.

495-516

Authors: DANIEL NEUMANN

A phenomenological approach to the ontology of the will could be rendered along three positions: Firstly, the willing I is completely immanent in its experience, such that one can only will, and know that one wills, by reflecting on the actual experience of willing. Secondly, one could hold that the will, while being analyzable as a conscious phenomenon, is itself a real psychic force driving one’s motivations and actions without one necessarily being aware of it. The third position would argue that the reality of the will is not exhausted by the way it is experienced, but that its real causes are not necessarily part of a complete phenomenological investigation. I discuss the phenomenology of the will of Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger and Edmund Husserl along this realist-transcendentalist spectrum. My basic concern here is a critical examination of the phenomenological approach to an entity beyond experience which is responsible for the experienced volitions. I will proceed in three steps, based on the distinction of volitions into three parts. Firstly, I ask what antecedes a volition in order to determine its phenomenal and ontological causes. Secondly, the analysis of the apperception of willing clarifies in what sense an “I” is experienced as the real or phenomenal cause of its volition. Thirdly, the discussion of the realization of the volition will address the role that this “I” subsequently plays in the process of fulfilling its intent. The paper develops the ways in which the ontology of the “willing I” limits and shapes the conception of the intentional relation between willing and desiring consciousness and its contents.

544-557

Authors: GEORGY CHERNAVIN

The implicit conception of conscience from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notes from 1929 is brought into comparison with the theory of conscience as a paradoxical identity of guilt and innocence by Philip Konrad Marheineke (which served as a pattern for Kierkegaardian concept of “despair”) and of conscience as a (grammatical and temporal) redoubling by Vladimir Jankélévitch. Wittgensteinian views on conscience and feeling of guilt tend to Marheineke-Kierkegaard’s model (the guilt hides in innocence and vice versa) and to Jankélévitch’s model (the wrongdoing from the past makes us regret the innocence which preceded it in a far remote past). I explore these tautological models of conscience using the example of Wittgensteinian metaphor of “waterwheel”: of an engineering failure producing a constant sentiment of guilt. Austrian philosopher describes his “incapacity to think” as a source of background, freely floating guilt. “Uselessness” and “mediocrity” or as he puts it “groundlessness of your own existence” altogether with “incapacity to think”—those are the self-accusations of the thinker. This torturing state he at the same time considers to be the source of his own philosophical productivity. Would a conscience be possible which would be free of this tautological structure and of this endless “rumination” of the petty guilt? The article proposes a hypothesis how one could break the tautological circle of an idling scrupulous conscience.

584-606

Authors: CHRISTIAN VASSILEV

The starting point of the following article are statements by various prominent musical performers of the 20th century who have testified to the life-experience of musical identification, i.e. the experience of unity and oneness with music. The purpose of the article is to explore the phenomenological implications of this experience on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological work. The article compares Heidegger’s early view of phenomenal givenness with that of Edmund Husserl. While Husserl sees phenomenal givenness as constituted by (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger finds primary givenness in the resonance (Mitschwingen) between the I and its lifeworld. I argue that in Heidegger’s early phenomenology it is not the subject, but rather the relatio between I and world, which “constitutes” givenness. This viewpoint allows for the exploration of musical identification as a life-experience. Musical identification suspends the difference between subject and object. In musical identification, it is the relation between “I” and music, which is constitutive of both. Thus, music cannot be adequately grasped in phenomenological terms if it is regarded simply as an object, which is the premise of more traditional phenomenological approaches to music such as Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s. Ingarden and Dufrenne both position music at a distance from the subject, as something to be explored in its objective characteristics, without presupposing the constitutive relation between them. Contrary to them, Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht, Günther Anders and Ilya Yonchev all recognize that the subject-object divide is insufficient for the exploration of musical experience. However, while Eggebrecht ultimately remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, or Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of the I and musical sense coincide.

625-640

Authors: JUAN JOSÉ GARRIDO PERIÑÁN

From a biographical description made by the German thinker Martin Heidegger of the Spanish thinker José Ortega y Gasset, this article sets out to explore how Heideggerian philosophy requires a tragic condition for its development and promotion. The first part of the article attempts to justify why Heidegger’s thinking would fit harmoniously within Ortega’s description of Spanish culture and his vision of death. The notion of death is approached as a cultural and philosophical problem of great relevance in order to understand the being-in-the-world of a specific society or nation. In our case, we try to show that Ortega’s description of Spain as a philosophical and cultural problem at least coincides with the phenomenological-existential description that Heidegger develops in Being and Time. In its second part, through Heidegger’s dialogue with Hölderlin, an attempt is made to show how this tragic need for philosophising continues in Heidegger’s work. Finally, it concludes by leaving the reader with a question: was Heidegger a Southern-Spanish thinker?

666-688

Authors: VERA SERKOVA, VERA LOBASTOVA

The article analyzes literature addressing the problem of reality in modern anti-realist theories. The purpose of the review is to expand the circle of researchers, including not only representatives of analytical philosophy, but also those of the phenomenological tradition, since the principle of phenomenological reduction corresponds to the general conceptual attitude of anti-realists, and in methodological terms, phenomenology more consistently implements the program of anti-realism. The principle of anti-realist philosophy is shown as exemplified in solutions of the “difficult problem of consciousness” within analytical philosophy and also in the development of a phenomenological attitude. Such a combination of two, by far the most respectable, philosophical schools makes it possible to more accurately determine the contribution of theorists of both directions to the theory of reality, to identify problematic nodes, internal disagreements and points of intersection of the ideas of phenomenologists and representatives of analytical philosophy in understanding the nature of reality. The works of modern researchers of the problems of reality R. Berghofer, V. Vasyukov, Ya. Ishihara, V. Ladov, L. Makeeva, R. Pils, A. Fursov, D. Chalmers and many others, as well as the works of E. Husserl, W. Quine, H. Putnam’s works, which have become philosophical classics, allow us to clarify the ideas about reality that have developed in the anti-realist discourse from different sides. New studies of the principle of phenomenological reduction by Yu. Himanka and the origins of the formation of phenomenological philosophy by N.V. Motroshilova make it possible to clarify the contribution of phenomenologists to the anti-realist tradition.

711-719

Authors: IVAN KURILOVICH

This article aims to contextualize and problematize Alexandre Kojève’s Note on Hegel and Heidegger, written in 1936 and unpublished during his lifetime, which is being introduced into Russian-language scholarship. A translation of the Note is published in the same issue with the permission of the copyright holders. This paper provides a general introduction to Kojève’s philosophy, illustrates possible reading strategies for Kojève and the place of the translated Note in his corpus of the philosopher’s texts, and describes the philosophical and historical circumstances of the text, namely that it was composed as an extension of a review on Tragische Existenz. Zur Philosophie Martin Heidegger by Alfred Delp written and published by Kojève that same year in Recherches philosophique. The article reconstructs the lines of reference that are essential to understanding Alexandre Kojève and provides a critique of certain statements. Finally, on the basis of an analysis of Kojève’s language, it offers a broader thesis on the epistemological problems of Kojève’s philosophy, the discovery of which led him to make a series of debatable statements in the philosophy of history (on the necessity for the philosopher to participate in the realization of the end of history), in anthropology (on the difference between people in their capacity to be philosophers or sages depending on a philosophical and religious attitude that is not entirely dependent on them), and in his decision to leave academia and turn to the ideological and diplomatic provision of economic integration of European states during the Cold War.

735-742

Authors: ANDREI PATKUL

In my review, I analyze the main theses of Anastasiya Medova’s monograph entitled Phenomenology of Musical Experience (2021). The author of the book raises the issue of what it is that we generally hear as music, as well as many directly or indirectly related other issues with regard to both the essence and the ontological status of music. According to her, it is only the phenomenological methodology that can provide an answer to these questions, which deals with the specifics of a musical object always in the context of the specifics of musical experience. Particular emphasis in the review is placed on the concept of reduction, as it is used in relation to music. It is designed to clear the experience of all elements not related to music as such, including sensitive shape-associations that often arise while listening to music. Another important point in the study of A. A. Medova is her posing of the question as to the regional nature of music and its possible correlation with the sphere of aesthetic in general. In this regard, I point out that the author of the monograph seeks to justify the irreducibility of music to the aesthetic sphere and that her solution of the problem of the possible regionality of music remains insufficiently determined. I also emphasize that one of the points of interest in the book is that Medova works with specific material, notably with the interpretation of significant works of musical art and the analysis of important theoretical statements about the essence of music.

11-26

Authors: VICTOR MOLCHANOV

This article discusses Husserl’s “epoche” and “phenomenological reduction” and early Heidegger’s “fear” and “anxiety” from a conceptual and terminological point of view. The basis for comparing “epoche” and “fear” is their main function of neutralizing the world. The author also considers the way of correlating the epoche and anxiety as philosophical concepts with three types of realizable experience that served as their source. The main points and stages of the introduction of the term “epoche” are highlighted; the main functional differences between the terms “epoche” and “phenomenological reduction” in various works of Husserl are indicated. A number of Husserl’s attempts to transform the methodological principles put forward by him into a description of a special experience of detachment, accessible through moral efforts, courage and honesty, are considered. In this regard, the transformation of Cartesian doubt into the procedure of “epoche” through the artificial procedure of “attempt at doubt” is analyzed. Three types of restrictions on the universality of the epoche are distinguished. Terminological and meaningful relationships between neutralization as a mode of consciousness and the epoche are considered. Two main differences are revealed, with the help of which Husserl tries to transform principles into experience: the difference between positional and neutral consciousness (primary and shadow one) and the difference between an epoche and a quasi-epoche. Husserl’s interpretation of the epoche and reduction as a special experience has two main sources: first, the experience of the imagination, or fantasy, and in this sense the source of the epoche is the quasi-epoche, and not vice versa. Secondly, the postulate of the identity of sensation from the real and illusory object. Heidegger’s distinction between fear and anxiety is critically analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that a common source of the phenomena of anxiety, fear, horror, fright, and so on consists in the collision and mutual penetration of various human worlds. It is impossible to distance oneself from this diversity; further, it is the true source of philosophical reflection.

40-72

Authors: MIKHAIL BELOUSOV

In his late works Husserl interprets the crisis of European sciences as the loss of their meaning for life. The diagnosis seems to suggest therapeutic strategy: to overcome the crisis, phenomenology must return to the evidences of the life-world. The article argues that the husserlian strategy of overcoming the crisis consists not in the elimination of the break with the prescientific evidences of the natural attitude, but, on the contrary, in the radicalization of the breach. Thus, I want to show that Husserl seeks to overcome the crisis of sciences by means of more radical crisis of phenomenology. In Husserl’s view, phenomenology must become the only science, which does not presuppose the life-world, since it problematizes it. I am going to argue also, that the counterintuitive strategy is not just of the historico-philosophical interest, but is meaningful for the actual philosophical understanding of the life-world. To justify those claims, I will proceed in three stages. In the first section of the article, I analyze the difference between the objective world and the life-world, which is the point of departure of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of sciences in Crisis. Bringing into correlation the difference between the objective world and the life-world in Crisis with the distinction of the ideal world and the real one in Ideas I, I disclose the ambiguity of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of European sciences. According to Husserl, the crisis arises, when science transcends the life-world through the idealizations, and, at the same time, presupposes the immediate prescientific evidences as something that is taken for granted. In the second section, I argue that the strategy of overcoming the crisis in Crisis is based on the phenomenological epoche, which allows for the porblematization of the life-world without presupposing it, Within this context I demonstrate the motivational unity of two reductions, performed by Husserl in Crisis—the reduction to the life-world, stripping the reality of the garb of ideas mistakingly taken to be the reality itself, and the reduction of the life-world, turning it into horizon and depriving phenomenologist of a right of relying on the life-worldly evidences, which is taken for granted in the natural science and renders it possible. The unity of the reductions indicates that phenomenological descent back down to the life-world is treated by Husserl as the radical break with the evidences of the natural life. The third section discusses the question, whether the problematical character of the life-world can be revealed only from the point of view of disinterested spectator, or it can be discovered, in a way, from within, in pretheoretical experience, which capacitates the life to problematizing itself and motivates phenomenological epoche. I argue that, although the question is not answered in a suitable way within husserlian analyses of the motivation for the epoche, the key to the solution of the problem is provided by the genetic phenomenology, since it thematizes the historicity of the life-world. I interpret the historicity as the ambivalent pretheoretical experience, constituting both the self-evidence and the problematical character of the life-world.

93-113

Authors: JOHANNES VORLAUFER

Against the background of worldwide, intentional or unintentional everyday violations of human dignity and the epochal need to experience oneself as a human being in one’s specific way of being, this article attempts to pursue the question of human dignity and its concealment. On the one hand, it seeks to ask whether human dignity has become obsolete due to social and epochal developments and preconditions and whether it can only appear and be experienced as antiquated in the context of a technological language or an administered world. On the other hand, it asks whether ethical and anthropological thinking have not sufficiently experienced, thought, and conceptualized man. From the context of these perspectives that determine the question of dignity, Heidegger’s article seeks to take up Heidegger’s repeated search for an original ethics based on Heraclitus’ fragment 119, and from this point of view to ask for a perhaps deeper and more adequate understanding of human dignity. At the centre of this is Heidegger’s thesis that human dignity is based on the protection of the unhidden and, ever before, the hiddenness of all beings. Without wanting to ignore the difficulty and complexity of Heidegger’s thinking, the author seeks to find access to this understanding of our dignity based on the experience of personal encounters.

141-169

Authors: ANTON VAVILOV

Based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger the article presents the possibility of actualizing Heidegger’s main question about the meaning of Being in the context of the analysis of so-called “a priori perfect.” During the development of fundamental ontology in the second half of the 1920s, Heidegger ponders the approach to Being in the history of philosophy and identifies such a feature of Being as a priori, a kind of antecedence of Being in relation to being. Although tradition invariably understands Being in this way, in it, according to Heidegger, the question is no longer raised either about the sense of such antecedence, or about the temporal basis of this sense, and therefore a priori as the essential character of Being is left in total oblivion. We suggest that it is the problematization of apriority in its temporal origin that can contribute to resolving Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical question of time as the transcendental horizon of any concept of Being that precedes being. In this precedence there is a cherished temporal moment, the comprehension of which allows us to develop the “basic question of metaphysics” about the relationship of Being and time in a more concrete way than Heidegger’s four main themes of the question of Being: the ontological difference; the basic articulation of Being (essentia/existentia)); the truth-character of Being; the possible modifications of Being and the unity of Being’s variety. Revealing a priori question as the central question of all Heideggers thinking before the “Turn” we attempt to update this question and justify the need for its renewal on the basis of a fundamental ontology. With this task we relate the question of the essence of philosophy in general in its existential-temporal concept since philosophy appears as a temporality-based possible of the questioning return to the “earlier”: to the essential structures of being, knowledge, Being, Dasein. Our analysis is based on the following decisions: (1) Being in relation to being is always pre-understood as “earlier,” and in this understanding a temporal definition operates, hence the main question of fundamental ontology about the relation of Being and time can be developed or at least clarified through the problem of meaning of a priori. (2) The question of the meaning of the “earlier” and of the temporal basis for understanding Being as “earlier,” a priori, is concretized into the question of the conditions for the possibility of any ontology, including the fundamental ontology, which raises the question of the earlier in relation to Being and therefore “lives” in the light of the understanding of the “earlier” as such. (3) This reflexive foundation of the fundamental ontology from itself is a necessary stage on the way of developing its project, if we remember that the main “duty” of the philosopher is to clarify “our inner nature” for the sake of opening the boundaries and conditions of the possibility of philosophy. The conclusion is that the possibilities of fundamental ontology in making sense of Being, time, and philosophy in general are far from exhausted, but await the questions that actualize them and new readings that allow to see the hidden richness of Heidegger’s thought

190-207

Authors: VLADIMIR BELOV

Although the concept of “pure knowledge” is one of the most interesting and singular concepts in the philosophical work of Vasily Seseman (1884-1963), it can only be presented after a comprehensive analysis of the philosopher’s numerous works devoted to ontological, epistemological and logical problems. Seseman believes that the main philosophical trends at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology, could not present this concept, although they did try. According to the philosopher, the main reason for the inability of neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology to start talking about pure knowledge is their inability to assert the essential difference between objective and non-objective knowledge. Sesemann pays special attention when substantiating his concept of “pure knowledge” to the difference between his approach and that of the founder of modern phenomenology. The philosopher points out that even Husserl, who concentrated attention on the specifics of inner experience, puts this specific, in the end, in dependence on the process of cognition and reflection, completely ignoring its ontological foundations. While pure knowledge, according to Seseman, is neither non-objective, nor objective knowledge, nor non-objective, nor objective being, it, in fact, is non-knowledge and non-being. It is precisely this understanding by the philosopher of this phenomenon that allows him to characterize pure knowledge as premiseless and limitless and, in general, as free from any ontological or epistemological determinations. However, on the other hand, Sesemann insists that the phenomenon of pure knowledge has the meaning of not just a regulatory idea, an infinitely distant ideal, but also a real constitutive meaning, as a principle that reveals and determines the human striving for knowledge as an interconnected and necessary process that ascends from the onto-gnoseological stage of non-objective knowledge to the epistemological, and then the logical stage of objective knowledge.

229-247

Authors: GARRIS ROGONYAN

The article examines some well-known attempts to consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in the context of transcendental idealism. The main purpose of these attempts is to protect Wittgenstein’s later philosophy from the relativistic interpretation of such concepts a “language games” and “forms of life.” Thus, Bernard Williams, noting the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” in Philosophical Investigations, believes that such a “we” has a transcendental rather than empirical character. This approach allows Williams to argue that there is no meaningful alternative to the general perspective on the world that is embodied in this “we.” However, the main disadvantage of this approach is that Williams views such a “we” in much the same way as a conceptual schema. However, as many authors point out, this idea does not find its confirmation in the later works of Wittgenstein. Jonathan Lear, in turn, suggests that we should consider such a non-empirical “we” as a special kind of “mindedness.” Such a mindedness could be considered as analogous to a Kant’s analytical principle of apperception. Lear believes that it is this principle that gives meaningful unity to human behaviour and makes possible any communication with other people. Following Williams and trying to correct the shortcomings of his position, Lear proposes to consider the ambiguous status of “we” in Philosophical Investigations as an argument in favour of the “disappearance” of the transcendental “we,” and with it the disappearance of the threat of relativism. John McDowell, however, agreeing with the need to get rid Wittgenstein's philosophy of relativistic interpretations, critically assesses the idea of using transcendental idealism for this purpose. Instead, McDowell proposes to return to Hegel’s thesis about the unboundedness of the conceptual, which makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transcendental justification of harmony between reason and the world. The article, therefore, also examines McDowell’s arguments against attributing to Wittgenstein any versions of transcendental idealism.

276-297

Authors: ALEXEY STOVBA

The article is devoted to the reasoning of the „Ereignis“ phenomenon in the philosophy of M. Heidegger. It is worth to emphasize that one of the main trends in contemporary philosophy is an attempt of creation of new–non-substantial–ontology. The very specificity of such ontology lies in the fact that classical substance is replaced by the dynamical configuration of sense, which is not “purely theoretical” but “ontological” in its core. “Ontological” means, in fact, that it is impossible to separate the mode of Being of phenomena from the process of thinking about them. Heidegger’s philosophy was one of the first attempts to create such ontology. It is worth to point out the three steps of the Heidegger’s studies of Being. The first, “fundamental-ontological” step is characterized primarily through the “ontological difference” between Being and entity, when the phenomenon of time represents by itself their hidden basis. During the second, “radical-ontological” period, Heidegger has already carried out his famous “turn.” In compliance with this “turn,” the truth of Being, die Lichtung, substitutes time as the “pre-ontological” basement of Being. In this case, Being itself transforms into the Event, „Ereignis“. On the third, “post-ontological” stage of studies the focal point of Heidegger’s thought is “post-ontological difference” between the Being of entity and Being itself. On this stage both Being and time are rooted in the phenomenon of „Ereignis“. The latter has been now transformed from being a “simple Event” into a “matter of fact” (the new interpretation of the Husserl’s famous „die Sache selbst“) as the alternation of the “disclosedness” and “concealness” of Being and time. In this case, „Ereignis“ is not quasi-substantial basement of Being, time or entity but it shows itself as its “Beginning” („Anfang“)“), when the Truth of Being is replaced by the dynamical sense configuration of the event, i.e., a “matter of fact.” Thus, Heidegger has conceptually created a new type of thnon-substantial ontology, the core of which is the phenomenon of „Ereignis“ as the dynamical singular configuration of the temporal-ontological sense of the Event itself.

306-342

Authors: WOLFGANG BONSIEPEN (Trans. from German by Anton Fomin, Alexander Frolov )

The article is devoted to the genesis of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It shows us that the formation of the natural philosophical views of the German philosopher took place not only in a speculative way, in the critical reception of Schelling’s works, but, first of all and for the most part, was predetermined by Hegel’s own interest in natural science and acquaintance with some prominent scientists of that time. The focus of the paper is on the evolution of the first part of Hegel’s natural philosophy: the doctrine of space and time as it presented in some excerpts from two revised lecture notes on the philosophy of nature, read by Hegel in the winter semester of 1821/1822 at the University of Berlin and published as an appendix to the article by Bonzipen. In his article, Bonzipen provides historical information on the fate of these texts, raises the question of their authorship, gives a general outline of Hegel’s thought, and also compares both texts with the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. From his point of view, the revised notes allow partly to illustrate, partly to fill in some gaps in the dialectic of two forms of abstract appearance known on the basis of the Encyclopedia. Bonzipen notes that Hegel’s speculative consideration of space and time is complemented by a discussion with the history of philosophy and the history of mathematics. While reproaching traditional mathematics for being fixed on the quantitative aspect of reality, which does not allow to fully resolve the contradiction between space and time, Hegel at the same time refuses to attempt to build philosophical mathematics that focuses on the consideration of the qualitative certainty of the moments of space and time, declaring that although it is solvable, it is an extremely time-consuming task. This refusal becomes a turning point in the further development of the dialectical doctrine of space and time.

379-401

Authors: SAULIUS GENIUSAS

The paper is guided by three goals. First, it shows that the methodological standpoint of classical Husserlian phenomenology provides us with reliable tools to resist the grand narratives that proliferate during times of war. Second, it demonstrates that phenomenology provides much-needed methodological support for hermeneutically-oriented reflections on war. Third, it shows how the gruesome reality of World War One introduced a practical turn in Husserl’s phenomenology by forcing Husserl to rethink the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics. Tracing the development of phenomenological metaphysics in Husserl’s Fichte lectures (1917-1918), Kaizo articles (1923-1924) and private correspondence, the paper shows that, in response to war, Husserl deliberately chose not to engage in straightforward reflections on war, but instead to write about the prospects of peace. Reflections on cultural renewal necessitated him to rethink phenomenology as practical philosophy. The entanglement of praxis and theoria in Husserlian phenomenology relies upon the establishment of a metaphysically-grounded conceptual bond that ties reason to love and faith, which in its own turn suggests that a human being is not merely animal rationale, but also animal amans and animal religiosum. Ultimately, the possibility of cultural renewal relies upon a metaphysical broadening of Husserl’s conception of philosophy as rigorous sciences.

421-440

Authors: PETAR BOJANIĆ

My intention is to demonstrate how Hobbes’ attempts to adapt two ancient institutions from Roman Law to his own time and knowledge of theology and philosophy. Treason (and the figure of the traitor) could be quite significant within the context of Hobbes’ (but not only his) understanding of the figure of the sovereign and sovereignty. The central part of the text is an endeavor to ascertain the source and unconditional condition for treason as such, within the framework of Hobbes’ theory of representation (representatio) which he writes about in Chapter 16 of the Leviathan. The act or performance in which we could perhaps recognize a traitorous gesture (or the dynamic of treason) could be found in the so-called paradox of representation. The “traitor” breaks the chain of the transfer of power and empowerment, thus stops representation, and puts an end to speaking in the name of the other. If it is possible to discover whether this is possible and whether speaking and acting in one’s own name always carries elements of treason, then we can conclude that differing forms of “direct” speech and action (“in one’s own name”) are “acts of treason.” In that case, what interests me is whether “treason” is found within the heart of representative democracy, and thus if it is de facto an integral part of a democratic order and society.

455-465

Authors: ALEKSEY SIDOROV

The review is devoted to a joint monograph of Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values published in 2019. The peculiarity and novelty of this monograph is that it is devoted not so much to the cognitive and epistemological aspects of phenomenology of intersubjectivity as to ethical, existential and value problems of relations with the Others, presented in various phenomenological concepts. One of the advantages of the work is the pluralistic approach, which allows the reader to get acquainted with the solutions to the problem of intersubjectivity posed by a number of the most prominent phenomenologists, i. e. Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Levinas and others. The book traces the idea that emerging of the topic of intersubjectivity in phenomenology caused a socio-ethical and axiological shift in the phenomenological movement. Considering moving of modern philosophy towards “the intersubjective paradigm” (W. Hösle), the aim of the authors of the monograph to show the relevance and innovation of phenomenology in discussing the problems of the Other, communication and ethics can be assessed as a promising theoretical project. Whereas critics of the phenomenological movement reproached “methodological solipsism” of phenomenology, which develops Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, a serious analysis of the works of the most prominent representatives of the phenomenological tradition leads the authors of the monograph to the conclusion that a phenomenological subject is social in its essence. The review draws a conclusion that the joint monograph brings into sharp focus that phenomenology is in possession of deep and diverse ways of studying the common being of people and collectively shared values.

355-359

Authors: RONNY MIRON, SIMONA BERTOLINI

No abstract

398-424

Authors: SIMONA BERTOLINI

Interest in the ontological constitution of living beings (with particular reference to the human being) characterizes the whole development of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ philosophy. Several works written by the philosopher over the years deal with both the phenomenological description and the ontological foundation of the difference between plants, animals, and humans. Specifically, the ontological structure of the human being is investigated as a layered structure which presupposes those of plants and animals while overcoming them in a more complex and spiritual unity, on which human freedom and human knowledge depend. Although this topic maintains a crucial role in Conrad-Martius’ thought, the way the philosopher addresses it and the theoretical results of her phenomenological-ontological inquiry about it do not remain unchanged. Indeed, the ontological structure at the basis of phenomenal differences as well as the metaphysical foundations of this structure change over the decades. This paper aims at distinguishing between two phases, characterized by different ontological categories, through which Conrad-Martius’ anthropology and biological ontology develop. In the first phase, at the beginning of the twenties (precisely in her work Metaphysical Dialogues), the essential differences between plants, animals, and humans are explained with reference to a vital origin preceding the constitution of reality; to describe it Conrad-Martius employs terms such as “abyss” and “under-earthly realm.” In the second phase, exemplified by some writings published in the forties and the fifties, the reference to such a dimension disappears and the eidetic variety within the living world, including human specificity, is exclusively traced back to the finalistic substantiation of essences in the natural beings.

441-462

Authors: DANIELE DE SANTIS

The present paper makes the case for considering Jean Hering the source from which Edith Stein first borrowed the concept of “core,” notably, “core of the person.” In particular, we maintain that the background of Stein’s decision is represented by the original version of Hering’s famous booklet Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee, namely, the Appendix (Fragmente zur Vorbereitung einer künftigen Lehre vom Apriori) to his still unpublished dissertation on Lotze. Nevertheless, whereas Hering introduces the concept of “core” to merely discriminate between different types of essences within the framework of a general attempt at determining the structure of individual essences, Stein takes it to characterize always and exclusively the structure of the person, notably, its mode of being, thereby paving the way for her future personalistic ontology. The paper will be divided into three parts. In § 2 evidence will be produced to support the thesis that Stein had direct knowledge of Hering’s dissertation. § 3 will analyze Hering’s notions of essence and “core of the essence” (in both versions of the text and in relation to the example of the “essence” of Caesar). Finally, § 4 will tackle the “core” in Stein’s early works, in particular in the book on empathy, and in comparison with Hering’s understanding of it. The paper intends to pursue a double goal: it aims at emphasizing the novelty of Stein’s conception of the essence, notably, core of the (individual) essence while at the same time reconstructing the wider framework to which it belongs.

484-498

Authors: ANTONIO CALCAGNO

The phenomenon of I-splitting or Ichspaltung poses many challenges for phenomenology. In particular, one wonders how one and the same I can perform different acts while preserving its disinterested autonomy and identity. Moreover, as the I moves from the natural attitude to the phenomenological one, phenomenologists like Husserl defend the purity of the transcendental I to grasp the sense of what its lives. How can the I move from one attitude to the next without being affected or conditioned by the acts carried out and content seized by the I in both attitudes? For example, one wonders how trauma or intense emotional experiences may affect the transcendental or phenomenological I, if at all. Edith Stein and Gerda Walther are read here as deepening the problem of I-splitting, for they introduce a form of it that is not merely defined by the undertaking of different acts of consciousness, for example, the move from the natural to the phenomenological attitude; rather, they describe lived experiences in which the very fundamental unity of the individual, personal I is challenged or negated through intense forms of sociality and intersubjectivity achieved in community and telepathy as well as ruptures in the constitutive unity of persons through soullessness. I argue here that these phenomena seriously challenge not only the unity of I experience but also phenomenology’s claim of the capacity of a pure and absolute ego to grasp philosophically and scientifically the objective sense of its investigations.

534-552

Authors: WITOLD PŁOTKA

Phenomenology originates in a critical assessment of descriptive psychology. In this regard, scholars emphasize mainly the problem of psychologism. Yet, the question of a methodological divide between both approaches is rather at the margins of contemporary scholarship. In the present paper, I analyze and discuss the 1931–32 debate held by Irena Filozofówna and Leopold Blaustein as a case study of the phenomenology-psychology divide. The debate addresses the structure of aesthetic experience, as well as a methodological background for describing psychic life. My main task is to present arguments, concepts, and methodologies of the opposing positions. To do so, in Sect. (1) I outline biographical sketches of Filozofówna and Blaustein. They were members of the Lvov-Warsaw School, but they presented different approaches: whereas Filozofówna advocated descriptive and experimental psychology, Blaustein—educated not only by Twardowski, but also by Ingarden, and Husserl—referred to the phenomenological tradition too. Sect. (2) summarizes Blaustein’s phenomenological aesthetics. His approach consists in analyzing aesthetic experience as a combination of nonreducible presentations. His key observation is that different types of art require different presentations, say, imaginative, schematic, or symbolic. In Sect. (3), I analyze Filozofówna’s criticism of this approach. Her main argument consists in emphasizing judgments as a necessary element of every lived experience. She claims that Blaustein comprehends acts as intentional, i.e., as presenting their objects as “such and such,” but by doing so, he confuses presentations with judgments. In this section I follow Blaustein’s replies to Filozofówna’s criticism. In Sect. (4), I analyze Filozofówna’s argument that Blaustein adopted an ineffective method, since he was too hasty in accepting unjustified hypotheses. In Sect. (5), I ask about a theoretical background of Filozofówna’s criticism, and I juxtapose both positions.

577-584

Authors: MARIA RAKHMANINOVA

We offer an introductory article to the translation of Dutch philosopher Joery Schrijvers’ work Phenomenologists and Anarchism, which deals with the reception of current foreign trajectories of phenomenological and akratic reflexions from the perspective of contemporary Russian academic discourse. In the light of this, an attempt is made to assess the significance and originality of J. Schrijvers’ study, focused on the conceptual juxtaposition of two philosophical traditions: phenomenology and the philosophy of anarchism. The value of the author’s stated perspective, which provides an opportunity to revise the classical phenomenological texts, is articulated as being related to its methodological novelty—not only for the Russian-speaking space, but also for foreign philosophy; a review and analysis of the central theses of the article, related to the key figures of the line of succession of acrical reflection in the phenomenological tradition, which is outlined by the author, is given, including: M.Heidegger, R. Schürmann, E.Levinas, J.Derrida, J.-L.Nancy, J.-I.Lacoste, C.Romano and J.-L.Marion. The article also builds theoretical connections between the anarchist foundations of a number of phenomenological reflections identified by J. Schrijvers and the ontological accoutrements of other current philosophical trends—for example, the actor-network theory and the polyphony of new materialisms.

609-612

Authors: Andrei Patkul

No abstract

620-622

Authors: Rusaln Loshakov

No abstract