Science almanac of Black sea region countries

5

Authors: Petrova Yu., Yarovoy M.

According to data for 2014, Crimean Tatars occupied the third place in the rating of nations by population of the Republic of Crimea after the peninsula became the part of the Russian Federation. They are Turkic people, historically formed in the Crimea and the Northern Black Sea coast; along with small Karaites and Krymchaks, Crimean Tatars belong to the indigenous population of the Crimea. Also, Crimean Tatars live in the regions of Russia adjacent to the Crimea (2.4 thousand, mainly in the Krasnodar Territory) and in the adjacent regions of Ukraine (2.9 thousand, mainly in the Kherson region), as well as in Turkey, Romania (24 thousand, mainly in the County of Constanta), Uzbekistan (90 thousand, estimates from 10 thousand to 150 thousand), Bulgaria (3 thousand). There is no official number of Crimean Tatars in Turkey, yet some researches state that there are 100,000 speakers of Crimean Tatar language in Turkey, at the same time some Crimean Tatar activists estimate a figure about 6 million people. The activists have reached this number by taking one million Tatar immigrants to Turkey as a starting point and multiplying this number by the birth rate in the span of the last hundred years. Another source claims that 5-6 million people live in Turkey, whose ancestors at different times (from the end of the XVIII to the beginning of the XX century) moved to this country from the Crimea. This gives an opportunity to Crimean Tatar public organizations of Turkey to assert that several millions of Crimean Tatars live in the country. However, most of the descendants of Crimean Tatar immigrants in Turkey assimilated and consider themselves Turks. The actual number of Crimean Tatars in Turkey is unknown, since data on the ethnic composition of the country's population in Turkey have not been published since 1965. Crimean Tatars have a strong cultural connection with the inhabitants of Northern Turkey, i.e. the Turks of the southern Black Sea coast, which is expressed in the community of etiquette, religion, relations to the family and children, peculiarities of the wedding.

6

Authors: Shestakov Y.

The cultural and philosophic explication of the notion “national security culture” is presented. It is argued that the essence of the “national security culture” definition is reflected in the cultural certainty of the goals and methods of national security generated by the influence of both exogenous and endogenous factors. In Russia, such certainty is impossible without the community of axiological unity around its cultural and historic core. It is impossible to achieve this unity without a consensus about the cognition and evaluation of its past, that is, without the formation of a common historical consciousness. Historical consciousness fragmentation under the globalization processes influence in modern Russia leads to the diffusion of cultural certainty and security purposes and means of determinancy. This, in its turn, determines the hazard of safety culture elimination. In consequence of the national security culture temporal certainty, foundation of its unite national historical consciousness is considered to be the main formation factor. Therefore, in order to ensure national security, it is necessary to build the self-awareness of Russian citizens on the basis of not individualistic and pragmatic, but historically formed collectivist and spiritual values. Mainly they define the Russia civilization archetype and appear to be the main determinant of its cultural identity preservation. Since the historical consciousness is a basic factor in ensuring the society axiological consensus, while collectivistic and ideocratic components are the dominant in the Russians’ mentality the following author conclusion appears to be legitimate. The cultural-historical certainty of the goals and methods of national security determines the necessity to provide the historical consciousness with the priority status of a national security object. Citizens associations under the dominant role of the state will act as the subjects of national security ensuring.

6

Authors: Khazan Y.

In this article author argues that the AKP is not a classical political party, but an economic enterprise (cartel) and an ideological organization based on political Islam. These two properties allow us to assume with a high degree of probability what actions the AKP and Erdogan may take in order to remain in power, and also provide an opportunity to make sound forecasts of the political situation in Turkey for the near future.In the first years of its rule, the AKP created a new layer of monopoly bourgeoisie closely connected with Western monopolies, which has exploited all the means of the state apparatus. The AKP itself was an organic component of this layer, which was organized as a consortium led by Erdogan himself and his cohort. The ideological goals of the AKP, based on political Islam, allowed them to establish a strong social basis for the newly created regime. They eliminated internal competition, for instance by appointing the party’s co-founder Abdullah Gul president in 2007, a role that was largely ceremonial at the time. Thus the AKP turned itself into a Bonapartist dictatorship. This dictatorship was consolidated in an informal coalition with the Gulenists, even in a power-sharing, giving them whole apparatus of judiciary and police. The current popular opinion among the politicians is that Erdogan is going to turn away from the traditional pro-American position that has been followed by all Turkish governments since the 1950s. However, this opinion does not coincide with reality. Firstly, the AKP as an economic enterprise and as the state itself is bound up through umbilical cord with imperialism and it has to act in line with the interests of the new class it represents. Secondly, AKP is ideologically an American project. This project, namely political islam, nowhere, and, especially not in Turkey will be able to free itself from this pro- Americanism because of historical and ideological reasons. And because of practical ones: The US and the EU, as it is appeared in the lawsuit against Zarrab in New York, have a lot of trumps in the game against AKP and Erdogan, and Erdogan has almost nothing. The results of this process will be manifested in the Kurdish problem. The USA has transformed the Kurdish nationalist movement into its collaborator one, and it relies on the Kurds to legitimize its illegal presence in Syria. The Erdogan regime is currently in a de-facto coalition with the “traditional” Turkish fascist movement (MHP – Nationalist Movement Party) to oppose the Kurdish national demands and even their right to exist as a people. But this policy cannot last forever. Erdogan’s government, allegedly rejecting any concessions on the Kurdish issue, should indeed find out a way of reconciliation with the Kurdish nationalist movement in the sense of common pro-Americanism.

9

Authors: Matetskaya A.

In recent decades, the classical theory of secularization has been criticized because it does not make it possible to provide an adequate analysis of the religious situation in the world at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries. New theoretical approaches that take into account activization of religions in recent decades and conversion of forms of religiosity are emerging. However, criticism of the secularization theory does not mean that all of its conclusions were erroneous. According to this theory, the most important aspect of secularization was the process of separating religion from other social institutions, in particular, from the state. As a result of the secularization process in Western societies, a secular state was formed, and religion turned into a private matter of an individual, that was reflected in the concepts of the privatization of religion, the invisible religion, etc. The result of secularization was the dominance of secularism as a form of world outlook and the appearance of a way of social life that implies not only separation of religion from the state and other social institutions, but dominance of secular values, ideas and norms in the public and worldview sphere. In the modern globalizing world, the spreading of secularism is a part of the global spreading of Western values. However, outside Western European societies, secularism can take forms which are different from the Western model historically based on the rethinking of the Catholic and Protestant heritage. This article examines the specific form of secularism that developed in Bulgaria and was called by K. Ghodsee "symphonic secularism." It is based on the idea inherited from Orthodoxy about interrelation between religion and politics, church and state, allowing even in modern conditions state intervention in regulation of religious issues. This form of secularism does not exclude religious pluralism and does not imply a deep personal religiousity. Religion appears as not so much as the doctrine of an individual salvation, but rather as the basis of cultural, ethnic and political identity. Specific forms of secularism and understanding of religion affect the religious situation in modern Bulgaria.