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Pragmatism and Political Pluralism Consensus and Pluralism
Authors: Giuseppe Masullo
Number of views: 75
A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research.
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists”
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other,
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce.
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of
“ideal speech situation” which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic
matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature
of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong
consequence derives from Habermas’ premises: were we to abandon the search
for consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he
views the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely
practical objective). Rescher opposes both Peirce’s eschatological view and Habermas’
regulative and idealized one.