Academicus International Scientific Journal

15-37

Authors: Marţian Iovan

Based on a sociological research, the author of this article aims to identify the beliefs and the attitudes of a group of BA and MA students enrolled in university programs of Juridical Science, regarding their apprehension of the principles of justice - as the central value of the Romanian judicial system. This would contribute to the implementation of justice in the actual Romanian economic, political, and judicial structure. The data analysis provides the necessary information for comprehending the extensions of justice and injustice within the specific social context. A real distance between reality and the political doctrines, and the classical and post-modern philosophical theories of justice as well can be noticed. The resulting conclusions could provide solid settings in order to develop a number of strategies/public policies to shape a more honest society.

47-58

Authors: Giuseppe Masullo

A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of “ideal speech situation” which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong consequence derives from Habermas’ premises: were we to abandon the search for consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he views the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely practical objective). Rescher opposes both Peirce’s eschatological view and Habermas’ regulative and idealized one.

73 - 93

Authors: Wei-Bin Zhang

This paper generalizes the dynamic growth model with wealth accumulation, technological change and environmental change by Zhang (2012) by making all the parameters as time-dependent parameters. The model treats physical capital accumulation, knowledge creation and utilization, and environmental change as endogenous variables. It synthesizes the basic ideas of the neoclassical growth theory, Arrow’s learning-by-doing model and the traditional dynamic models of environmental change within a comprehensive framework. The behavior of the household is described with an alternative approach to household behavior. We simulated the model to demonstrate existence of equilibrium points, motion of the dynamic system, and oscillations due to different exogenous shocks.

120-133

Authors: Giuseppe Masullo

The article focuses on young people of foreign origin in Italy, analysing in particular the experiences of those of a homosexual orientation. Starting from a theoretical reflection that takes into account the various possible statuses expressing young migrants situation, we will analyse the complexities that arise in terms of identity for young foreigners who, when living their sexuality, relate both with the cultural standards of the country of origin (often homophobic and repressive) and with those of the host country, in which they can instead intercept new opportunities to express themselves and their desires. The core idea is to verify the means through which they manage these contrasts, aiming at empirically outlining the strategies of behaviour, thus increasing the understanding of the ongoing processes of social and cultural integration.

147-154

Authors: Spiro Paço

One of the political goals of the EU in broad is the absorption of all European continent state in a sort of United States of Europe. Nowadays the EU counts 28 states and the perspective of enlargement is not stopped by the current economic crisis. The current situation after the just completed pro-EU revolution in Ukraine and the implementation of strong economic link with former USSR Transcaucasian Republics (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) may suggest the final number of state in the EU. Many people believe that the United States of Europe puzzle is nearly full defined … but a new kind of EU enlargement may change the situation. This paper will focus only in one question. “Is an EU Member state secessionist territory automatically in the EU after archiving its Independence or have to reapply?” To answer to this question I will analyses the possible past experiences in secessionist territory getting membership in international organization like UN. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties is a good material to use in case of succession but the fact that is not in force and not signed by the greatest part of EU member state make it only advisory and not binding

169-179

Authors: Dr. Mirlinda Batalli

The purpose of this paper concerns the relation between delivery of electronic services (e-services) and evaluation of public administration performance. Public sector organizations should pay attention and determine the strategies to be followed in order to increase the satisfaction of citizens and businesses in relation to delivery of electronic services. The study aims to review the demands toward progress to the competitiveness, the sustainability, efficiency and effectives in public administration that have rapidly enforced the wide reforms in the public sector, in order to modernize the initiatives to offer better electronic services for the citizens. The article aims to present that the transformation process toward providing electronic services to the citizens should be assessed continuously, in light with challenges, demands and process of globalization, in order to strengthen the capacities of public administration and make it more efficient. In this regard, the regular evaluation and measurement of the public administration performance leads toward the promotion of enhanced public services and higher level of accountability. Through receiving the e-services, citizens can save their time, can reduce the expenses and create an easier access of communication with all levels of the government.

190-198

Authors: Jusuf Mustafai

L2 learners may try to pick up the unknown word’s meaning from a dictionary. Many different factors, such as how important the meaning of the word is in the passage, the number of unknown words, and the reason the students are working on it, etc., affect the frequency of the student’s use of the dictionary for help. However, trying to guess the meaning of the unknown word from the context before consulting a dictionary is more beneficial since this may help the learners to pick the correct meaning relevant to the text. Using a dictionary should be limited to those unguessable words whose meanings can hinder the learner’s understanding.

207-225

Authors: Vilma Hasneziri

The European Union is a reality closer and closer for Albania as well. The status Albania obtained as a candidate country, not only means a step forward towards the European Union, but it also sets forth a number of challenges to be solved such as, freedom, property, democracy, human rights, the fight against organized crime and corruption etc. Under these circumstances, the analysis of the issues that have to do with the European Union is of a great importance, as in the near future, Albania is designated to join the great European family. The scope of this work is to analyze tow important aspects that have to do with one of the most important institutions of the European Union, such as the European Court of Justice. The first aspect of this work, which is also its first subject, refers to the juridical nature of the European Court of Justice. Analyzing this topic, we shall see that this Court, as per its nature, contains elements of different courts, thus, presenting similarities with the Constitutional Courts of Member States, civil courts, criminal courts, administrative and labour courts and with other international courts as well. However, despite the similarities it presents with other courts, the European Court of Justice is a court of a special kind, “sui generis”, exactly as the European Union is, thus, an organization of a special kind. The second aspect of this paper, which is also its second issue, analyses the fundamental principles where the European Court of Justice bases its activity. The most important principles are that of equality and non discrimination, the principle of protecting and guaranteeing the human rights, the principle of access before the court or the right to address the court, the principle of legality as well as the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. In this work, especially in the second part, there shall be presented several decisions of the European Court of Justice as well, that have to do with its interpretation on the dispositions of the establishing Treaties as well as the analysis of the above mentioned principles. At the end of this work, there will be given its conclusions as well as the bibliography where it is based on.

244-259

Authors: Admir Belishta

This paper considers different alternatives to Sentence to a Term of Imprisonment listed in a chapter with the same title, in the Articles 58-64 of the Albanian Criminal Code. This approach to such subject reflects not only the reality of how the judicial system in Albania operates, but, because of the purpose and the positive changes that the implementation of these alternatives to sentence to a term of imprisonment brings, it is also a permanent requirement of the international community. In this note I have focused in three important quests: theoretical interpretations of these criminal code provisions, examples from court’s practices as well as problems and challenges that might arise, and lastly, the procedures required for their implementation. Moreover, in considering the procedural challenges, the conditional sentence (Article 59), semi freedom (Article 58), house arrest (Article 59/a), community service (Article 63) and conditional release or parole (Article 64) of the Criminal Code, I have also presented my personal view on the matters. My thoughts and suggestions add to the explanation and elaboration of this subject not only from the practitioners’ points of view, but they also add to the intellectual discussion among those who exchange ideas and theories on the subject. This concludes the intent and purpose of this note, which focuses on a topic that is very current today.