Security and Defence Quarterly

3-18

Authors: Krystian Frącik

From July 2015, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) moved into the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and started acting in the supporting role. From that time, one of the most important Security Force Assistance tasks has been maintaining and developing relationships with its counterparts in the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) and Afghan National Defence Security Forces (ANDSF). Being aware of the importance of those connections, the enemies of Afghan society have attempted a tactic named Insider Attack (IA). Insider Attack is not a new means of tactic. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Britain and the Soviet Union were victim to insider attacks. Insider attacks have a significant strategic impact on the campaign, as they erode the relationship between the Afghan National Defence Security Forces and Coalition Forces. Insider attacks occur for numerous reasons, including personal grievances, insurgent influences, psychological distress, and ideological motivations. More than half of the attackers have insurgent ties. NATO utilises Target Focused Analysis & Neutralisation and Counter Intelligence Support Teams to screen, vet, and interview persons of interest, as well as collect, analyse, and exploit biometric data, documents, and media. Other measures implemented to mitigate insider threats are the threat Awareness and Reporting Programme (TARP) and the Terrorism Espionage and Sedition briefing to RSM personnel. Incorporating appropriate lessons learned from the British, Russian and ISAF experience into RSM training and operations will have a positive impact on responding to Insider Attacks while reducing their frequency across the Combined Joint Operational Area - Afghanistan. It is clear that the common approach to defeating Insider Threats must be holistic and each activity should be conducted according to equal principles. The conceptual framework for countering Insider Threats has five functions: prepare, deter, detect, respond, recover and exploit. This conceptual framework underpins the common approach and guides of counter - measures. While skills and drills are important, combatting Insider Threats is first and foremost about mindset and therefore it needs to be command-led. If proper preparation makes Coalition Forces members culturally adaptive, develops effective systems and procedures, and hones military skills and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, NATO will be able succeed in the Resolute Support Mission.

46-73

Authors: Juha Mattila, Simon Parkinson

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has made major advances in linking physical dimension through information to cognitive dimension as described by John Perry et al. (2004) in their model for Information Superiority. The information technology linkage between the physical and cognitive dimensions has created new ways of effect both for the red and blue force. The paper focuses on the information dimension and searches for better models to describe the structure of blue force information, especially from the Enterprise Architecture (EA) approach. Enterprise Architecture has been developed to better communicate the complex structures of military capabilities. Major EA frameworks (TOGAF, DODAF) recognise the layer of information between business and technology, but in practice, the focus turns more to the technology as has happened in several Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Enterprise Resource Management (ERM) programmes. The paper develops a tool for architects to use in measuring the maturity of information management in the current military organisation and in defining the possible paths of evolution in information management available for the military.

100-117

Authors: Grzegorz Pilarski

The fact that NATO has acknowledged cyberspace as the fifth dimension of combat operations indicates that this problem issue is really topical and is pointing at the direction from which the possible threat can be expected. However, the issues of information communication technology (ICT) security on the national level have been tackled in numerous countries for many years. Technological advancement has resulted in making communication, and at the same time services rendered in cyberspace, an international domain. Thus, the aspects of cyberspace threats should be considered through the international prism. The above-presented approach has become an incentive for the author to take up research on international activities in terms of cyberspace defence and reaction to the already identified as well as future threats.