Archiwum Kryminologii (Archives of Criminology)

15-38

Authors: Russell Hogg

Resurgent populism – with crime as a core theme - is depicted as a dangerous perversion of liberal democracy. But by avoiding a definition of populism, critics tend to simply conflate populism with contemporary right-wing authoritarianism. Academic analysis, including criminological, is not free of such tendencies. After a brief consideration of criminology’s engagement with penal populism and the recent spread of a more far-reaching authoritarian political populism, the article argues for the need to more carefully conceptualise populism. Theoretical clarity is needed for assessing the character of contemporary populism; for grasping its drivers in, for example, neo-liberal globalization and what Crouch calls “post democracy”; and for discerning its possible future trajectories, progressive as well as regressive. It is also argued that simple denunciations of populism often reflect a complacent liberal mentality that contributes to political disaffection fuelling populist movements, and overlooks legitimate grievances, including the (often criminal) failings of liberal institutions. Rather than being a political aberration, populism, it is argued, should be seen as a “normal” dimension of democratic politics with implications for criminal policy (as well as politics at large).

77-106

Authors: Dagmara Woźniakowska-Fajst, Katarzyna Witkowska-Rozpara

Since almost the very beginning of the 21st century, the prevalent criminal policy in Poland has been punitive, seeking to solve almost all problems related to crime by means of one solution, i.e. more severe penalties. At the same time, for more than 20 years political power has been wielded by conservative parties. It will come as no surprise that neoclassical criminology, with its retributive approach to punishment and repeated invocation of a social sense of justice, appeals most to a conservative government. Neoclassical criminology is also a good starting point for creating a penal offer typical of penal populism. In this article we analyse the latest changes in law related to the amendment of the Penal Code in June 2019. Although the amendment did not enter into force, it triggered operations aimed at tightening criminal law, with some of the changes proposed in the amendment adopted with the introduction of anti-crisis acts related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

123-145

Authors: Ian Mahoney, Kirsty Teague, Matthew Long, Belinda Winder

Drawing upon the “sociology of vindictiveness” (Young 2003; 2007) and Sumner’s (1990; 1994) work on censure the authors examine the construal, responses and treatment of individuals who have committed a sexual offence against a child/children (ICSOAC). We seek to understand the dynamics and social processes of the exclusion of others and the way negative, sectional and bureaucratised discourses, policies and practices can “other” marginalised groups, for political expediency. We argue that to fully understand these responses we need to better understand the wider social dynamics and constructions which inform and shape societal perceptions in pursuit of an essentialised “good enemy”. In line with this, we go on to outline the interaction between vindictiveness and populism in the administration of justice and situate the challenges this poses for both punishment and the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals convicted of sexual crime.

171-196

Authors: Daniela Rodriguez Gutierrez

Chilean youth justice went through a drastic reform process during the 2000s, it was the second radical youth justice reform movement in the country since the creation of the Law of Minors in 1928. The decision to reform took place as Chile transitioned and stabilized into democracy after the authoritarian regime of the 1970s and 1980s. Superficially, it seems this is just one more way of embracing democracy and Human Rights. However, after in depth documental analysis of both the reform and the socio-political context, this paper offers a different insight and an explanation for the sudden relevance of youth justice, as a tool used by authoritarian political elites that then filtered into the political elite of the new democracy. In this context, populism played a key role in spreading concerns about youth offending and the need for a new youth justice which worked to strengthen the legitimacy of authoritarian practices in the new Chilean democratic order. It was an elite-driven populism that transformed youth justice into a key social and political concern.

229-251

Authors: Leandro Ayres França, Carlos Adalberto Ferreira de Abreu

This paper introduces the concept of algorithm-driven populism, considering whether it has a consonant or a conflicting relation with liberal democracy. The overall argument is that social media platforms are not just new media used by populists; algorithms have co-constituted a new form of populism. Based on a literature review that connected different fields of research together in order to elucidate the relation between populism and digital media, this article details a few important features of social media platforms, examining how they set up specific affordances that endanger the values of liberal democracy.

283-311

Authors: John Pratt, Daisy Lutyens

The contemporary rise of populism across much of Western society – especially the Anglosphere countries that are the main focus of this article – has threatened many of the protections and freedoms provided by the post-1945 commitment to a democratic political order: guarantees of human rights, adherence to the rule of law, and a media that is free to criticise governments and hold them to account. Populism has also come to be associated with a very different penal programme from that which, for several decades after 1945, characterised a given society’s commitment to democracy. That pattern of justice – largely based on reason, liberalism, and expert knowledge – was significant beyond its operational boundaries. It symbolised the Western democratic order, standing out as a beacon of humanity against totalitarianism. The rise of populism, however, has helped to fashion a very different penal programme, associated with historic rises in imprisonment levels and the immobilisation of those who pose risks to public well-being – even if, in so doing, the foundations of criminal justice in the democratic world are undermined by the strategies employed. It might thus be supposed that governmental reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic pose a further threat to democracy and its criminal justice processes. Additional forms of immobilisation have been introduced to combat the spread of the virus: restrictions on freedom of movement in public spaces or stay-at-home orders equivalent to house arrest – controls which now cover entire nations rather than just individuals at risk of committing particular crimes. As such, this kind of ‘rule by decree’ might seem to be a blueprint for would-be autocrats wishing to subvert democratic processes and forms of accountability altogether. However, the article also argues that the pandemic provides very different possibilities of governance to populist authoritarianism. Indeed, the virus acts as an antidote to populism. COVID-19 has laughed in the face of populist demagogues. It shows them to be nothing more than incompetent, though usually malevolent, charlatans with some of the world’s highest infection and fatality rates in their societies. Instead of their empty populist blustering, the pandemic can only be eliminated by science and expert knowledge, acting in conjunction with a strong but accountable central government amidst forms of immobilisation to which the general public have largely acquiesced – strengthening rather than weakening social cohesion in the process in many instances. As the virus has eaten into the support for populism, the dangers which the latter posed to democratic order have also been pushed back. Previous pandemics have been followed by dramatic social and economic changes. Such changes post-COVID-19 may now sever the links between populism and penal development, allowing for a different and more restricted penal framework.