Archiwum Kryminologii (Archives of Criminology)

7-42

Authors: Ezzat A. Fattah

Despite dramatic social changes and unprecedented technological innovations penal philosophy has undergone little change. Retribution continues to be the key principle in sentencing and judges continue their hopeless struggle to make the punishment fit the crime. It is truly baffling that the CJS has remained archaic in its philosophy, its outlook and its tools and has remained insulated from whatever changes and advances that had taken place in modern society? For as yet unexplained reasons the system has resisted every attempt to modernize and change? This is probably why it is that despite the manifest advantages and benefits of R.J. over a punitive, retributive system, whose sole aim is to inflict pain and suffering on the wrong-doer, there is still reluctance to do away with the ideas of expiation and penitence in favor of reconciliation and compensation. The strong support for victims of crime, coupled with the undeniable fact that victims are the main losers in a punitive system of justice, have not yet succeeded in convincing politicians, lawmakers or the general public of the need to replace the medieval practice of punishment by a more constructive, more peaceful and less harmful means of dealing with crime and conflict. And yet, the destructive and detrimental effects of punishment are too evident to ignore. All this suggests that the time is right for a paradigm shift in society’s response to crime. There is a desperate need to move from philosophical abstraction to restorative action, from senseless retribution to meaningful restitution, from just deserts to restorative justice. But there is also a need for realism. R.J. is not a pana-cea. Although superior in every respect to retribution R.J. does have certain limitations and there are certain dangers to be avoided when moving towards the full implementation of a restorative justice system.

91-133

Authors: Piotr Stępniak

The article discusses studies on models of incarceration in Polish prisons. The object of the study was to determine if resocialisation model of this punishment dominates in practice, or other models, including official-formal of ostensible resocialisation, dominate and what are the factors determining this. Analysis of this problem was based on opinions by prison personnel and convicts from three prisons in the district of Greater Poland Voivodeship. Disscussion is opened by a critical reflection how much the resocialisation model suits modern penitentiary policy and to what degree it is reflected in current executory provisions of law. Discussion stars with a polemics with an opinion, quite common in Polish penitentiary literature, that incarceration should be based on this particular model as it is better than other ones. Resocialisation model does not take into account diversified needs of influence on prisoners. Some of them do not need improvement (e.g. unintentional, accidental perpetrators). Others, because of their already shaped negative personality traits will never be fit to come back to the society (e.g. perpetrators of most grave crimes of the highest degree of demorali-zation). In the end of theoretical discussion of various model of work with convicts during incarceration, the author draws one’s attention to the fact that provisions of executory criminal law can reflect resocialisation conceptions only to a limited degree. Practical model of penitentiary influence is hence not a uniform and clear pedagogical model but has an eclectic character. It is demonstrated that from such point of view, assessment of work of prisons based on the criterion if and how much they resocialise, is based on wrong premises. They are criticized in the article. In the second part of the article the author discusses the results of the empirical studies. It starts with the description of used research method and a general characteristic of the re-spondent group. The research was conducted in June and July 2010. It consisted in collecting opinions in questionnaires and in focus interviews with prisoners and prison staff. The groups were chosen in a random manner (132 prison officers and 350 prisoners) and they were representative for the population of the imprisoned in the regional authority of detention centres. Presentation of the most significant conclusions of the research starts with the fact that vast majority of convicts were imprisoned in a normal system had in practice a decisive influence on content and type of penitentiary influence. This system does not require corrective influence and thus penitentiary work concentrated on ensuring that the imprisoned are placed in conditions at least compliant with recommendations of European Prison Rules. In practice these conditions are included in prison rules. Most of all, they concern living space and prison regimen conditions without focus on education and correction work.

157-206

Authors: Paweł Ostaszewski

Criminological analyses of fear of crime conducted to date have lead to formulating many various ways of defining this phenomenon and to concepts explaining its intensity and diversity. This article assumes that the most effective definition (by Sandra Walklate) is that fear of crime is partly rational and partly irrational state of anxiety or fear caused by belief that the individual is at risk of becoming a crime victim. Basic hypotheses regarding factors influencing level of fear concern such aspects as: victimization experiences and objective crime risk level; socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and psychological features which define their sensitivity to dangers and risks, features of environment where an individual lives, and in particular manifestations of social disorganization, size of local population, and presence of social ties, mutual trust, common goals and values among local residents; actions of persecution organs and the justice system and their social perception; macro-social factors (such as quality of social security) as well as media reports and politicians’ actions. Multi-dimensional models of fear of crime constructed by researchers integrate these hypotheses into complex system which offer much more explaining power and possibility of presentation of relations between particular variables in question. The conducted research presented in the article aimed to present the level of crime fear perceived in Poland and other European countries as well as to find social, demographic, and macro-social factors conditioning that fear. The research was based on secondary data analysis from several editions of International Victimisation Studies, Polish Crime Study, and last issue of European Social Survey. Analysis of the crime level in Poland revealed there has been a definite, almost twofold, decrease of percentage of persons declaring such fear during the past 20 years. In the beginning of 21st century, Poles perceived above-European average fear of crime. In 2010 it was lower than in most European countries. As a result of conducted two-dimensional analyses, it was established that crucial factors influencing perceived lack of security contributed to the following hypotheses: victimization, sensitivity to risks, disorganization and urbanization and those focusing on the action of prosecution and macro-social characteristics of inhabited locations. Used techniques of classification tree allowed for initial examination of joint influence of particular independent and dependent variables as well as for separation of many interesting groups of respondents regarding frequency of occurrence of fear of crime. Above-average fear of crime was characteristic of women from middle-sized and big cities who had been victims of crime against property and of men who had been victims of crime against property or as-sault and lived in areas where unemployment was below average.

253-273

Authors: Paweł Waszkiewicz

Vision monitoring system cameras have been merging into the landscape of public places in Polish agglomerations for over a decade. Their spread neither has been publicly discussed nor it has been examined what is their effectiveness in crime prevention and as an irrefutable proof in criminal proceedings. Also the legislator has long failed to attempt to regulate this sphere – which not only in theory can be in conflict with the right to privacy. Similarly, no financial analyses of creating and maintaining complex systems have been made. The article presents research from selected countries (United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and Poland) on preventive effectiveness of video surveillance systems based on police and other service statistics as well as victimisation studies of inhabitants. The problem of economic analysis of the systems of this type in public areas of big cities on the example of the research by M. Spriggs and A. Gill (United Kingdom) is also discussed. An attempt of cost calculation of the greatest Polish system functioning in Warsaw is also made. It includes both material and social costs. They are compared with potential and actual profits from the use of the system and accompanied by a short survey of research on the effectiveness of video surveillance systems. Warsaw has been chosen because of the size of the system and relatively greatest availability of financial data and reports from Zakład Obsługi Systemu Monitoringu m.st. Warszawy (Surveillance System Administration Office of the Capital City of Warsaw). The article summarises the descriptions of administrators’ and system owners’ reactions to the results of the studies.

367-399

Authors: Małgorzata Dziewanowska

The purpose of this article is to present results of an examination of judicial records of cases relating to the article 200 of Criminal Code in two judicial districts. It is essential to construct a profile of a perpetrator and a profile of a victim of this offense, particularly in those cases committed by young people. Also, if possible, to answer a question whether the present legal regulation is adequate to control minors’ sexual activity. Interesting issues are the age difference between the perpetrator and the victim, the existence (or not) of some close relation between them, and also the impact of those factors on the decision of a court. Equally important are reasons of reporting the cases to law enforcement, the basis for initiation of criminal proceedings and final sentences. The objective of this study was also to check whether the reduction of age of consent or the introduction of “close in age exception” would reduce the number of convicted young offenders, who were participants of consensual sexual relations with minors under 15 years old. The analysis of data obtained is carried out in the context of socio-cultural acceptance of sexual behavior of youth, legal regulations of protection of their reproductive health, the impact of media and information technologies, as well as the history of childhood and perception of children’s sexuality. Non-criminal-law factors have very significant impact on the knowledge young people have, on the sexual needs they have, and finally implementation of those in everyday life. This study is part of the doctoral thesis analyzing the problem of sexual offenses committed by or against minors, partly illustrating the phenomenon and the problems arising from the criminal law regulations of sexual behavior of young people. This research is not representative for the whole country, because of the limited geographical scope, but allows to draw relevant conclusions and confirm or deny previously constructed hypotheses. It is also possible to prediagnose emerging problems and to present the potential legal solutions, currently existing in other countries, both in Europe and worldwide.

427-480

Authors: Waldemar Florczak

This article presents assumptions and results – along with their exhaustive discussion – of a middle-term crime forecast and its institutional and environmental crime conditioning obtained with a simulation version of WF-CRIME model for Poland for 2012-2020 Moreover, the article presents assumptions and results of two simulation scenario groups which assume realistic changes in current penal policy and environmental conditioning of crime. As for penal policy two cases were analysed: an increase of law enforcement sector (“tightening” scenario) and its decrease (“loosening” scenario) in comparison with the base solution (forecast). In the context of environmental conditioning of crime also two scenarios were drafted – “acceleration” and “deceleration” – in which activity of economic environment is a broadly understood delimitation meta-factor. All analysed scenarios are characterised by realistic assumptions and thus the results should not be considered only in the terms of purely academic discourse of experiment. Presentation of analyses results was preceded by a brief discussion of data sources, applied methodology and the structure of relations between crime and all links of law enforcement system which create simulation system of WF-CRIME model. Appendices enable the reader an independent evaluation of credibility of used data and to track the structure of relations of the system. Based on the performed analysed one can draw a number of conclusions of general nature. First, the possibilities of crime destimulation with the use of institutional measures are very limited. Decrease in general number of crimes in following penal policy toughening is not impressive. Disproportional increase in funds for certain links of the law enforcement system gives a certain chance to increase effectiveness of the whole system: greatest in funding of the judiciary, secondly for public safety. In the light of multiplier and scenario analyses outcomes, directing additional funds to penitentiary system is ineffective, unless its aim is to increase the number of places in existing prisons. Second, environmental factors – external from the point of view of law enforcement system but (at least a part of them) in the set of decisive / quasi-decisive variables from macroeco-nomic point of view - influence crime to a much greater degree than institutional measures. Among these factors, the key role falls to average real salary and economic disparity. Quick economic increase which does not happen at the cost of increase of socioeconomic disparity seems the concise formula for long-term effective crime control. To use metaphor from medi-cine, shaping an anti-criminogenic environment is a treatment of the source, not a treatment of symptoms – the latter can be applied to acting on crime by institutional measures.

531-567

Authors: Krzysztof Krajewski

After Poland regained independence in 1918, the system of crime statistics had to be organised from scratch and unified. At the same time, until new criminal code became effective, there were three criminal laws each of them with different scopes and forms of criminalization. Because of this in 1924 – 1934, crime statistics were based on classification drafted by the State Police Headquarters. Only since 1934 the statistics were base on the classification of the new criminal code. There was also a problem of separating statistical data concerning more serious crimes, defined by L. Radzinowicz as “true crime” from petty offences (which today are subject to Offences Code). As far as crime dynamics is concerned, the interwar period should be divided into three subperiods of 1924-1930, 1931-1934, and 1934-1938. In the first period crime intensity fluctuated yet with an overall increasing tendency. In 1931-1943 there was an explicit increase, particularly in 1931 and 1931. Reasons for this should be sought in the influence of the Great Depression. Since 1935 there was a decrease in reported crimes. In the last year of available statistics, that is 1938, crime level was 22,3% lower than in 1934. What draws one’s attention is the differences in reported crime levels before and after the war. Particularly, in the 1950s and 1960s crime levels were comparable to those in 1920s, that is before the Great Depression. It fell below this level only in 1970s, and in 1980s it increased again to the level comparable with 1920s. Reported crime levels throughout the period of communist Poland was however lower than in most of 1930s before the war. At the same time, it is clear that present crime levels are much higher than any of those in the interwar period. Data concerning intensity and dynamics of murders between 1924-1937 are particularly interesting. In 1920s number of murders increased similarly to increase of overall crime figures. After 1930 number of murders fluctuated only and its dynamics diverged from an explicit increase in overall crime. This fact made L. Radzinowicz conclude that the Great Depression – unlike it influenced crimes against property – did not influence violent crimes in an the same way. A decrease in violent crimes during an economic depression can be related, according to the author, with decreased alcohol consumption resulting from lower incomes of the population. There are many signs that murders are related to differences in the level of civilization, economic, and cultural life of particular parts of the country before the war and not to the economy cycle. What is interesting in the light of this is that the number of murders in post-war Poland never approached the number of crimes which were observed before the war. Dynamics of robbery was much different. Number of robberies in 1920s uninterruptedly decreased, and it increased since 1930s. But in comparison to the post-war period, robberies seem almost marginal.

603-627

Authors: Grażyna Kędzierska, Zbigniew Siemak

In the system of security organs of the Second Polish Republic fight with crime described as political belonged to the duties of National Police. The department of political Police was a secret specialized internal service of the National Police designed most of all to invigilate almost the whole of the political and social life of the country as well as to persecute perpetrators of crimes against the state, with particular focus on persons suspected of acts of subversion. Between the wars the political police underwent a complex reorganization four times each time under a different name: Defensywa Polityczna, Służba Informacyjna, Policja Poli-tyczna i Służba Śledcza (respectively: Political Defence, Information Service, Political Police, and Investigation Service) and with specialised units for fight with various forms of political crime. Illegal political activity, form the point of view of law then, was divided into activity against the state and espionage for other countries. Until 1926 political service in lubelskie voivodship conducted full operational observation of factions and political movements of communist character, of ethnic minorities, and of radical peasant activists. Political movements of bourgeois character were not of interest to political counterintelligence, still they were under discreet operational observation. After the May Coup in Poland, interest of the political police, apart from communists and national minorities, was extended also to the whole legal opposition against the government. Political police in lubelskie voivodship was occupied with revealing social tensions, antigovernment moods, subversive actions, and actions against the state (in particular those by communists and nationalists form national minorities), observation of legal political formations and parties, but also of trade unions and members of parliament. Until 1934 the police statistics included, for example, high treason, rebellion and resistance against the government, desertion, and other crimes against military power and the state. After 1934 the police statistics included high treason (articles 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 of contemporary criminal code), insult to the government or its institution (art. 125, 127), individual and group resistance (art. 129, 131, and 169 in relation to art. 129), insult and assault of an official (art. 132, 133, and para. 4 of art. 256), insult to the nation and the state (art. 152, 153), incitement to crime (art. 154, 155, 156, 157, 158), incitement to crime (art. 165 – 167), riots (art. 163, 163). “Incitement to crime” in lubelskie voivodship was carried out mainly by offenders’ by “dis-playing flags and banners” of anti-state and subversive content (26,5 % of national overall) and “spreading communist pamphlets and appeals” (16,5%). Such acts as “high treason” (7,9%), “insult to the government or its institution” (6,9%), “group resistance” (11%) were above national average.