


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## An Analysis of the Principles of Military Propaganda Employed by the Soviet Union in January 1942 (based on Materials from the Krasnaya Zvezda Newspaper)

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### Abstract

This paper relies on relevant materials from the popular Soviet newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda to investigate the propaganda work conducted by the Soviet Union in January 1942.

It provides a brief historiographical overview of the theory of propaganda (J. Dewey, W. Lippmann, and H.D. Lasswell) and offers an insight into a special type thereof – military propaganda (A. Morelli, G. Demartial, and A.A.W.H. Ponsonby).

The primary source used in this study is publications (articles, short pieces, reports, citations of official documents, etc.) in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the official mouthpiece for the People's Commissariat of Defense of the Soviet Union.

The degree is assessed to which the materials from Krasnaya Zvezda match the principles of military propaganda identified by A. Morelli's. Chronologically, the study centers on January 1942.

A key conclusion drawn from this study is that propaganda was actively employed by the Soviet media during World War II as a means of bolstering the morale of the people.

Besides the 10 general principles identified by A. Morelli ('we don't want war – we are only defending ourselves'; 'our adversary is solely responsible for this war'; 'our adversary's leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil'; 'we are defending a noble cause, not our particular interests'; 'the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities; if we are making mistakes this happens without intention'; 'the enemy makes use of illegal weapons'; 'we suffer few losses, and the enemy's losses are considerable'; 'recognized intellectuals and artists support our cause'; 'our cause is sacred'; 'whoever casts doubt on our propaganda helps the enemy and is a traitor'), the work explores a few other principles of military propaganda ('infallibility of our leader'; 'temporariness of failure'; 'our leader having the unconditional support of all the people in the country (the 'draw the nation together' effect)'; 'having the active support of the world community'; 'feats of courage being committed on a mass scale, with every single of our combatants being ready to commit one').

**Keywords:** propaganda, military propaganda, media, Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the year 1942, USSR, World War II, Great Patriotic War.

### 1. Introduction

Propaganda is a highly effective means of bolstering the morale of both the military and the civilian population. There are numerous forms and methods of conducting propaganda work. In the present age of a wide spectrum of media types (e.g., the Internet, TV, print, and radio), this area of activity has become a particularly efficient means of shaping public opinion and individual perceptions of reality. In an earlier study, we explored the theory of the phenomenon of

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propaganda and examined some of its key forms and methods (Mamadaliyev, 2020). The present work is focused on analyzing the characteristics of Soviet military propaganda conducted during a critical moment in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War – the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Moscow.

The study's chronological scope – January 1942 – was established for a reason. On December 5, 1942, the Soviet army started its counteroffensive in the Battle of Moscow (September 30, 1941 – April 20, 1942). The Wehrmacht's loss in this battle was its first major strategic defeat in World War II. On the other hand, I.V. Stalin's decision to push the enemy away from the capital as soon as possible – contrary to the advice of his top military commanders (e.g., G.K. Zhukov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, and S.K. Timoshenko) – caused the unprepared Germans to sustain heavy losses. January 1942 was a period of success for the Red Army, with Moscow already liberated, the army having suffered no significant losses as of yet, and the morale of Soviet troops and the nation's political leadership being up. This could not but be reflected in the way the Soviets would conduct their propaganda work at the time.

Let us now define some of the key terms the present work will be working with. Propaganda (derived from the Latin verb 'propagare', meaning 'to propagate', 'to disseminate', or 'to spread') may be defined as "spreading views, facts, arguments, (often) rumors, garbled information, or knowingly false information with the aim of forming a desired public opinion and manipulating public consciousness" (Filosofiya..., 2006: 712). A milder definition of propaganda is "spreading political, philosophical, scholarly, artistic, etc., views and ideas with a view to embedding them in public consciousness and galvanizing mass practical activity" (BSE, 1975: 89).

Military propaganda is "one of the crucial types of support for armed hostilities that is aimed at maintaining the faith of the civilian population and military personnel in the potential of their nation's armed forces and its ability to fight back and in the ability of its military-political leadership and unit and force commanders to achieve victory over the enemy" (O voennoi propagande, 2020).

The primary objective behind the propaganda in the Krasnaya Zvezda publications was to cultivate (bolster) the people's faith in victory over the enemy in a time of military conflict. Accordingly, the material under examination in this work is to be subsumed under military propaganda. To avoid confusion, the terms 'propaganda' and 'military propaganda' will be used in this paper interchangeably.

## 2. Materials and methods

The key source used in this study is publications in Krasnaya Zvezda for January 1942. The official mouthpiece for the People's Commissariat of Defense of the Soviet Union, this newspaper was founded on November 29, 1923. Its first issue came out on January 1, 1924. It was an all-Union (central) newspaper, i.e. it was published by federal authorities and circulated throughout the USSR. Up to this day, it has been the official mouthpiece for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. During World War II, it was a leading national publication and employed prominent opinion writers such as A.N. Tolstoy, M.A. Sholokhov, K.M. Simonov, and A.P. Platonov. And, of course, it was one of the nation's primary media for military propaganda.

The present study employed an array of historical and general research methods.

The following traditional historical methods were used:

- historical-typological method (used for the purpose of classifying the methods and principles of military propaganda);
- historical-systems method (used for the purpose of analyzing relevant materials from the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper and interpreting them in integrated association with the period's front-line and political events);
- historical-genetic method (used for the purpose of exploring the development of relevant military propaganda as a logical consequence of previous historical events).

The study utilized general research methods such as historiographical analysis and systems analysis.

The present work's scholarly novelty lies in its filling the gap left by the lack of research analyzing Soviet propaganda in the period under review based on the sources mentioned here and its expanding the roster of principles of military propaganda based on new findings from the analysis of those sources.

### 3. Discussion

Issues of propaganda and military propaganda have been explored by numerous researchers, including philosophers, historians, psychologists, and opinion writers. Below is an outline of the more significant research works on the subject.

The foundational theories of propaganda were developed by H.D. Lasswell, W. Lippmann, and J. Dewey.

In his 'Propaganda Technique in the World War', H.D. Lasswell argues that propaganda affects vulnerable elements in a person's consciousness (e.g., fearing for the life and health of themselves and their family, worrying about their financial well-being, being worried about becoming dependent on someone or something, or being concerned about being able to exercise independence in decision-making) (Lasswell, 1927). The scholar is credited with having provided a theoretical substantiation for the phenomenon of demonizing the enemy as an effective propaganda tool (Lasswell, 1938).

W. Lippmann stressed the need for sound organizational work in the area of conducting propaganda activity on the part of the government. He is credited with having provided a substantiation for the theory of portioning out and filtering information and misinformation when sharing it with the broad masses of the people – as opposed to ensuring that a nation's political elites obtain all of the information (Lippmann, 1922).

There is another theory of propaganda that is worthy of specific mention. Developed by the prominent philosopher J. Dewey, it holds that every educated person is able to discern credible information from misinformation in today's fast-paced, information-packed world. According to this scholar, letting a nation's political elites control information would be a wrong thing to do, as that could lead to the people becoming intellectually weaker and enable the state's enemies to manipulate it with ill intentions (D'yui, 2000; D'yui, 2002).

While there are other theories of propaganda, the scope of this paper limits us to the three mentioned above, all the more so as, essentially, all of them are based on those three.

Military propaganda is examined as a separate type of propaganda in 'The Basic Principles of War Propaganda' by A. Morelli (Morelli, 2001). The work provides a theoretical substantiation of military propaganda and considers some of its key principles, which will be outlined in more detail below. A. Morelli openly admits to have summarized and elaborated the ideas of A.A.W.H. Ponsonby, a British politician, writer, and social activist, whose 'Falsehood in War-Time' was published in 1928 (Ponsonby, 1928), and G. Demartial, a French antiwar and opinion writer, whose works 'La Guerre de 1914: La Mobilisation des Consciences' (Demartial, 1922), 'Les Responsabilités de la Guerre. Le Patriotisme et la Vérité' (Demartial, 1916), and 'Le Mythe des Guerres de Légitime Défense' (Demartial, 1930) discuss the purposively false nature of military propaganda.

Of particular note in the context of the present study is the article 'Good Military Propaganda and Poor Military Propaganda' by Aleksandr Timokhin, published in the electronic journal *Voennoe Obozrenie* on November 21, 2020 (O voennoi propagande, 2020).

In terms of the use of encyclopedias, reference was made to the entry 'Propaganda' in the 21<sup>st</sup> volume of the 30-volume 'Great Soviet Encyclopedia' (3rd edition) (BSE, 1975) and the same entry in the encyclopedic dictionary 'Philosophy', published under the editorship of A.A. Ivin in 2006 (Filosofiya..., 2006).

Certain aspects of the theory and practice of military propaganda were also explored in some of our own works, more specifically in the context of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (Mamadaliyev, 2020a; Mamadaliyev, 2020b; Mamadaliyev, 2021a; Mamadaliyev, 2021b).

### 4. Results

In her 156-page monograph, devoted to general principles of military propaganda, A. Morelli considers 10 postulates that, if followed, can make one's military propaganda effort more effective (Morelli, 2001), which are as follows:

- 'we don't want war – we are only defending ourselves';
- 'our adversary is solely responsible for this war';
- 'our adversary's leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil';
- 'we are defending a noble cause, not our particular interests';

- ‘the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities; if we are making mistakes this happens without intention’;
- ‘the enemy makes use of illegal weapons’;
- ‘we suffer few losses, and the enemy’s losses are considerable’;
- ‘recognized intellectuals and artists support our cause’;
- ‘our cause is sacred’;
- ‘whoever casts doubt on our propaganda helps the enemy and is a traitor’.

As we can see, the above propaganda principles work for just about any armed conflict in history one can name. Our own research into the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict confirms their validity. The aim of the present paper is to establish the degree to which the propaganda in relevant materials published in *Krasnaya Zvezda* in January 1942 matches the above postulates.

The front page of *Krasnaya Zvezda*’s “New Year’s” issue of January 1, 1942, featured a perfectly natural felicitation: “Happy New Year, comrades! Under the banner of Lenin and Stalin, let us go forth and demolish the German invaders” (KZ, 01.01.42a: 1). The page also contains a New Year’s address by M.I. Kalinin (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), an article entitled ‘To New Victories’, and several short pieces, all relating solely to the war.

As many as several principles of propaganda activity are utilized on the newspaper’s front page alone. The article ‘To New Victories’ states the following: “Last year was a special year in the history of our country. The war had chopped it in two with its axe – the first six months were filled with an atmosphere of peace-building, but the year’s second half witnessed immense battles against Hitler’s hordes of cutthroats”; “We remember the day when the ironclad Fascist hordes treacherously invaded the borders of our country and rolled through the Soviet land, putting its cities and villages to fire and sword. We remember the day when the great Stalin delivered a radio address calling on millions of people to confront German fascism in a patriotic war. We remember every word of our Leader, who told his people the whole truth about it all and inspired them to fight a deadly war against the enemy. We remember the days when we had temporary setbacks and when Soviet regiments had to retreat in the face of an enemy much superior in number and firepower” (KZ, 01.01.42a: 1). This is a good example of using the method of demonizing the enemy and their leader. Here use was made of the following two principles of military propaganda from the set proposed by A. Morelli: ‘our adversary is solely responsible for this war’ and ‘we don’t want war – we are only defending ourselves’. Besides those from A. Morelli’s set, the quote employs the following principles from our own set:

- ‘infallibility of our leader’ (what may seem an unwise decision on his part at first glance is actually part of a clever long-term strategy);
- ‘whatever military, economic, or social setbacks we have had, it is all just temporary, as we are superior to the enemy strategically’ (a focus on driving home the idea that the enemy has been just lucky or the enemy’s success has mainly been due to their treacherous tactics).

In fact, the ‘cult of personality’ idea runs through the material like a golden thread (e.g., “When retreating, we never faltered in believing in the wisdom of our leader and kept up our mighty will to advance”; “We remember the sun that morning, its light glittering on the tips of the bayonets held by the Red Army soldiers lined up in front of the Lenin Mausoleum for a parade. And, when the great Stalin spoke from its rostrum of the Red Army as a force capable of destroying the German aggressor, our Supreme Commander knew that this force would soon head to the West” (KZ, 01.01.42b: 1)). Locutions of this kind were employed not only in *Krasnaya Zvezda* but in virtually all of the period’s media outlets.

Statements regarding the cult of personality and the infallibility of the nation’s leader are found in every single issue of the *Krasnaya Zvezda* newspaper (e.g., “Back in the summer of last year, comrade Stalin called on us to try and make a wider use of Russian resourcefulness on the battlefield” (KZ, 03.01.42)). The principle of military propaganda dealing with the leader of the nation having the unconditional support of all the people in the country (the so-called “draw the nation together” effect) can be encountered in the short pieces ‘New Year’s Letter to Comrade Stalin from Uralians’ and ‘To Comrade STALIN [original upper case] from Baku Party Members’ (“The peoples of the Soviet country are celebrating 1942 with their heads held high. And, as is the case at any time, be it a public holiday or some other event in a time of peace or crisis, the thoughts of all Soviet people will be with you, our dear friend and commander. Our hearts are filled with

sincere gratitude to you, comrade Stalin. ...In your company and under your direction, with your wise advice guiding our way forward, we were able to survive the tough year 1941” (KZ, 01.01.42i); “The Members would like to assure you, comrade Stalin, that each and every Bolshevik, party or non-party, will do everything in their ability to work for the benefit of those on the front line, and will do so with redoubled zeal. A person who was content with their daily work quota yesterday will readily have it doubled tomorrow. ...We shall mobilize creative initiatives, make extensive use of local raw materials and resources to make every production facility, workshop, or machine tool work to maximum capacity, and implement a solid industrial culture in an untiring effort to support the seamless flow of defense products to the front line” (KZ, 01.01.42j)).

The ‘having the active support of the world community’ principle is employed in the short pieces ‘Greeting from Chiefs of Staff in London to Comrade Shaposhnikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union’ (“We are pleased to send you our cordial greetings in conjunction with New Year’s Eve. Following a heroic defensive effort against a treacherous invader, the Soviet army and air forces are currently advancing. We are convinced that 1942 will be a year in which your courageous soldiers and pilots, who are fighting our common enemy, will achieve a historic victory. We wish you success in this endeavor” (KZ, 01.01.42c: 1)) and ‘Greeting from General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief in India, to Comrade Shaposhnikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union’ (“On behalf of all troops under my command, I wish you and your courageous troops success in 1942” (KZ, 01.01.42d: 1)). This principle is utilized in other articles as well (e.g., ‘Foreign Press on Red Army’s Military Operations’ (KZ, 08.01.42c)). This method would not, of course, work for every single nation. What sets it apart from the other methods is that here the propagandist is keenly looking for an ally to their country. This approach was employed not only by the USSR and its allies but by the Third Reich and the Axis powers as well.

The principle ‘we suffer few losses, and the enemy’s losses are considerable’ is present in the short pieces ‘Germans Suffering Heavy Losses’, ‘Troops on Western Front Take Control of Kaluga. General Guderian Beaten’, and ‘Spoils of War Seized by Troops on Southwestern Front between December 7 and 25’. These publications detail the losses sustained by the Wehrmacht (e.g., “Between December 7 and 25, our troops on the Southwestern Front SEIZED [original upper case] the following spoils of war in their battles with the German invaders: 456 guns, 163 mortars, 555 machine guns, 257 assault rifles, 25 tanks, 7 armored vehicles, 1,479 motor vehicles, 239 motorcycles, 5 aircraft, 14 radio facilities, 29 anti-aircraft machine guns, more than 8,700 mines, nearly 700,000 rifle cartridges, 173 kilometers of communications wire, and other military assets” (KZ, 01.01.42f: 1)). An analysis of relevant battlefield reports released over a period of several straight weeks revealed that information as to the enemy’s losses was available in every single issue of the newspaper, while the Soviet army’s losses were not disclosed (KZ, 03.01.42b: 3; KZ, 07.01.42b: 2; KZ, 08.01.42b: 1; KZ, 09.01.42: 1; KZ, 10.01.42: 1; KZ, 11.01.42a: 1; KZ, 11.01.42b: 1; KZ, 13.01.42a: 1; KZ, 13.01.42b: 1; KZ, 14.01.42a: 1; KZ, 14.01.42b: 1; KZ, 15.01.42a: 1; KZ, 15.01.42b: 1; KZ, 16.01.42a: 1; KZ, 16.01.42b: 1; KZ, 17.01.42a: 1; KZ, 17.01.42b: 1; KZ, 18.01.42a: 1; KZ, 18.01.42b: 1; KZ, 20.01.42a: 1; KZ, 20.01.42b: 1; KZ, 21.01.42a: 1; KZ, 21.01.42b: 1; KZ, 22.01.42a: 1; KZ, 22.01.42b: 1; KZ, 24.01.42a: 1; KZ, 24.01.42b: 1; KZ, 25.01.42a: 1; KZ, 25.01.42b: 1; KZ, 27.01.42a: 1; KZ, 27.01.42b: 1; KZ, 28.01.42a: 1; KZ, 28.01.42b: 1; KZ, 29.01.42a: 1; KZ, 29.01.42b: 1; KZ, 30.01.42a: 1; KZ, 30.01.42b: 1; KZ, 31.01.42a: 1). As is commonly known, a piece of propaganda that relies on facts, even if they are made-up, tends to produce a better effect than an abstract text.

A. Morelli’s ‘the enemy makes use of illegal weapons’ principle is employed in a Krasnaya Zvezda article entitled ‘How German Generals “Manufacture” Russian Prisoners of War’. Here the focus is on the use of misinformation. This article also utilizes the ‘the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities’ principle (“The Soviet Information Bureau has new incontrovertible evidence of flagrant violations of the international rules on warfare committed by the German-fascist cutthroats, with their brutal treatment of the locals in captured areas and turning of civilians into prisoners of war” (KZ, 01.01.42h: 2)). The article uses the phrase “incontrovertible evidence” by way of confirmation, a method that is quite popular among present-day propagandists as well. The method of condemning enemy atrocities is employed several times in each issue of the newspaper. Suffice it to consider the titles of some of its front-page stories (e.g., ‘Bunch of Robbers and Murderers’ (KZ, 08.01.42a)).

While ‘the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities’ principle is likewise present in the article ‘In Kaluga’, the facts are now presented by way of fiction, perhaps because this genre tends to be a lot more effective in evoking feelings of hatred in the reader than opinion writing (“Unfortunately, traces of battle action are not the only thing you can see in Kaluga today. You should check out the horrible traces of the invaders’ presence there. 131 Lunacharsky St. The house of Mrs. Poloskova. Or what is left of it, to be exact – cinders, smoldering rubble, and six charred bodies – her mother, father, husband, two daughters, and nursing baby. What had this peaceful family ever done to the Germans to deserve this?

“You can’t quite forget the Germans, not after what they did to us”, says Poloskova.

She is in bits, this poor woman. But she has a Russian heart.

“Go on. I’ll catch up with you. I’m going to join you, and we’re going to retaliate against these heartless beasts” (KZ, 01.01.42k).

Combining the two genres, opinion writing and fiction, may amplify the overall effect on the reader. A fairly common technique is accompanying the text with photographs as supporting evidence.

The ‘our adversary’s leader is inherently evil and resembles the devil’ principle is masterfully employed in the article ‘Happy New Year’ by I.G. Ehrenburg, published on the newspaper’s back page (“Hitler is another man with colossal hopes. This maniac is a stranger to fun. He is not married. He does not eat meat and does not smoke. What really moves him is thousands of burning cities, millions of people suffering in agony, torture, and gallows. ...Just a year ago, Hitler was drunk on French blood. He breathed in the smoke from burning Rotterdam. He amused himself with the ruins of London and Coventry. To Hitler, the upcoming year is full of promise – many countries are yet to be plundered and many people are yet to be murdered! ...The maniac is rotating the globe – he is looking for suitable areas to house new cemeteries” (KZ, 01.01.42l)).

The ‘the enemy is purposefully committing atrocities’ principle is also employed in certain official documents published in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (e.g., the note ‘On Rampant Plunder, Depredation, and Monstrous Atrocities’ by V.M. Molotov (People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs) to “ambassadors and envoys of nations with which the USSR has diplomatic relations” (KZ, 07.01.42a)).

The principle ‘we are defending a noble cause, not our particular interests’ is employed in the article ‘Leaflets for German Soldiers’ (“These leaflets all have the same motif – Hitler’s rule has brought the German people war, famine, and the Gestapo’s terror. All of the Führer’s promises are just lies and downright deception aimed at turning the people of Germany into cannon fodder. The only thing that can save Germany is toppling Hitler’s regime” (KZ, 31.01.42c)).

The ‘our cause is sacred’ principle is employed in the article ‘Death and Immortality’ by I.G. Ehrenburg (“Inch by inch, town by town we are cleansing our land of these predators. This feat has no equal. We are losing many of our heroes in this tough battle. We must devoutly cherish the memory of them. We must consign their bodies to the earth with military honors. We must tend to their holy graves with care. ...History will consign to oblivion the names of German soldiers – who died in a land that was not theirs. The German people will plead with other peoples to forget them. But immortal are the names of our fallen heroes: when dying each of them was resurrected in other people – our brothers and children, our people. Most of the Germans who are still alive are actually already dead. They died the day they started their vile business of robbing, torturing, and murdering people. Nobody will ever speak well of them – neither here nor in Germany. ...Our fallen warriors have defeated not only the enemy – they have defeated death. They died for their loved ones, their friends, their villages, and our boundless country. No orphan will be left without a mother – you have all women in Russia. No childless person will be left without a child – you have all of the Russian people” (KZ, 31.01.42d)). This method was employed by other authors as well (e.g., KZ, 03.01.42c).

Another commonly used principle of military propaganda that is worthy of note in this context is ‘feats of courage being committed on a mass scale, with every single of our combatants being ready to commit one’. For instance, in the article ‘Company’s Political Officer in Offensive Combat’ this idea is expressed in the following words: “By influencing members of the Red Army mainly via Bolshevik persuasion methods, political officers within companies can inspire them to achieve some really great results on the battlefield. A person who will live forever in the loving memory of our people is political officer Diyev, who was in charge of a tiny team of guardsmen,

a total of 28 men, who fought for several hours an unequal, but close, battle with German tanks. Diyevev and his comrades died a courageous death, but victory was theirs. All German offensives were repelled, with the Fascist tanks failing to penetrate our defensive position" (KZ, 31.01.42b: 1). In 'Late-Night Communication of January 30', this principle is encountered in the following words: "In a recent battle on the Southern Front, considerable bravery was displayed by S.I. Bilichenko, a 68-year-old collective farm worker from the village of Nikiforovka. This old gunner participated in the War of 1904-1905. During a battle near the village of Nikiforovka, the Germans threw against our unit a group of tanks and started to press our men. Bilichenko stepped in to fire over open sights with one of the guns. He knocked out a German tank and smashed an armored vehicle. Following the battle, comrade Bilichenko quickly had a team of collective farm workers putting out the fires of houses that had been set to fire by the Germans" (KZ, 31.01.42a: 1). Feat-based propaganda is used in each issue for that period (e.g., KZ, 07.01.42b: 2; KZ, 08.01.42b: 1; KZ, 09.01.42: 1; KZ, 10.01.42: 1).

The Red Army, too, actively employed agitation to affect the enemy, which is attested by a Krasnaya Zvezda article entitled 'Leaflets for German Soldiers': "The Chief Political Directorate of the Red Army will be producing a series of new leaflets for German soldiers. The content of these leaflets has been written by prisoners of war in conjunction with the ninth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power" (KZ, 31.01.42c).

## 5. Conclusion

The study produced the following conclusions:

1. Military propaganda is an effective means of not only affecting the enemy's behavior but influencing the morale of the civilian population as well.

2. The theory of propaganda was developed by a number of scholars back in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The three major theories of propaganda were developed by W. Lippmann, J. Dewey, and H.D. Lasswell.

3. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, A. Morelli identified 10 principles of military propaganda arguably employed in most armed conflicts. These general principles are outlined in her work 'The Basic Principles of War Propaganda'.

4. In addition to those identified by A. Morelli, this study brought forward a few other principles of military propaganda, which are as follows:

– 'infallibility of our leader' (his tactics prove right in the long run; some of his tactics may seem wrong, but in the end they turn out to be part of a clever strategic plan; the leader always shares the hardships of war with his people);

– 'whatever military, economic, or social setbacks we have had, it is all just temporary, as we are superior to the enemy strategically' (setbacks must be seen as something fleeting and something that has not affected us in a major way);

– 'our leader having the unconditional support of all the people in the country, or the 'draw the nation together' effect' (the people are united in the enthusiasm of a potent purpose and have, therefore, lined up behind their leader);

– 'having the active support of the world community' (most people around the world are convinced of the righteousness of our cause and many have provided us with both moral and material support);

– 'feats of courage being committed on a mass scale' (our men are committing feats of courage for the sake of victory, not in pursuit of personal gain or individual glory, with every single combatant unflinchingly prepared to commit one).

5. All of the above principles of military propaganda were actively employed during World War II, which can be attested by relevant materials from the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper.

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