

ИСТОРИЯ НОВОГО И НОВЕЙШЕГО ВРЕМЕНИ



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THE KEY ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD REINFORCEMENT IN TURKEY AND SYRIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURY. THE FIRST BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES

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Abstract. After the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the end of World War I, the Middle Eastern region was waiting for its fate to be decided. Newborn countries were ethnically and religiously diverse and this fact became an obstacle on the way of acquiring political sovereignty, consolidating the new regime's grip in power and ensuring interstate stability. Nevertheless, Turkey and Syria were the first countries to secure sustainable development of a state. This article analyzes the factors that enabled aforementioned countries to become leading regional actors. Each factor is based on the analysis of both internal and external political events. In addition, the author compares similar aspects. Moreover, this piece of work investigates the peculiarities of Hatay issue which is regarded to be a starting point of bilateral relations. Evolution of this issue and viewpoints of Syria and Turkey is presented in the article. There is a conclusion devoted to the modern state of the question and an attempt to forecast its future.

Key words: Turkey, Syria, Alexandretta, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Hafez Assad

The Middle East since the beginning of the 20th century has been considered as an unstable region. A lot of issues which at first phase used to be interstate became international, so that different countries and various organizations are involved into the process of finding a compromise. At present this region is associated with enduring

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Arab-Israeli conflict, Kurdish issue, Arab spring and ISIS. Among regional countries Turkey is considered to be one of several key players. Syria is another one. What made Turkey and Syria stronger than other countries? What were first relations between these two countries in the beginning of the 20th century? These are the questions this piece of work is going to deal with.

Modern Turkey Republic was moulded during national liberty war and Lausanne conference. The state was able to sustain Thrace, vast territories on the west and east of Asia Minor. The Republic's strength is built on different factors. First of all, the strength of Turkish people to fight for their country. It is acknowledged that at that period of time Ottoman Empire was experiencing serious economic problems and strong states of the time labelled the country "Sick man of Europe". The World War I was coincident with internal problems. Different attempts to pursue reforms were made starting on the reign of Mahmud II and some of them like ending Janissaries which constituted a barrier for progress were successful. Nevertheless, as time passed "voices began to be heard demanding a constitution as a guarantee that reforms would really be carried out and become effective"¹. The reforms to be introduced proved to be late in such a multinational and multi-sect country. As a result non-Turkic peoples started to demand autonomy and these voices were heard and supported by the powers that be. Al in all, the people of Anatolia faced a hard task and turned into "a pillar of the Empire"². Secondly, another source of power lied in the very regime installed in an independent state of Turks and active policy of modernization. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first president of the new country along Grand National Assembly of Turkey³ adopted a new internal policy – policy of rejecting Ottoman heritage and embracing alien way of life. The steps taken by new government as a response for West's attempts to turn Middle East into spheres of influence were the bright example of kemalism. The term used by Samuel Huntington in order to describe the process of embracing both modernization and Westernization. So, according to the scholar "this response is based on the assumptions that modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must fully Westernize in order to successfully modernize"⁴. It would be relevant to mention some important tasks of this internal policy. By abandoning Ottoman language the government turned the population of the new born state into illiterate masses. But the actual purpose was not merely to substitute the old language with a new one, containing vocabulary mainly Turkic origin. In the first years of long-awaited independence people were ready to obey their savior. The bright example of active propaganda is that "the Turkish Historical Society, founded in 1925, publicized the notion that the Turks were one of the world's preeminent peoples before their association with Islam and the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish nationalist interpretation of history was joined to some rather extreme theories of linguistic nationalism, one of which, the sun letter theory, propounded the idea that Turkish was the first spoken language of the human race"⁵. Everything had to remind people the imperial past which made them suffer intervention, lose

¹ Price 1956, 75.

² Price 1956, 75.

³ Великое национальное собрание Турции.

⁴ Huntington 1997, 109.

⁵ Cleveland 2009, 182.

their sons during The First World War and if it was not the power came within people, they even could have been dispossessed of their motherland. Consequently, the true goal was to produce collision of past with future and make people to support the changes and follow the regime. Thirdly, Turkey's position in the World War II, which was the continuation of Atatürk's foreign policy designed to establish friendly terms with all countries. Here it would be appropriate to recall his legendary phrase "Peace at Home, Peace in the World"⁶. The history shows that the position of the state was the smartest decision taken by the government because Ankara was able to defend recently acquired independence. Despite staying neutral Turkey used to trade with both sides. For instance, it was known that the state was trading in chrome to Germany – vital element of machinery manufacturing. Nevertheless, the Republic was able to get it a place in League of Nations by joining the war in February of 1945. Finally, the last factor is connected with post-war order in the world. Afraid of Soviet demands regarding the Straits and southern territories, Turkey was forced to join the West during the bipolar world. However both sides were in win-win situation. On the one hand, Turkey opened its territory for the US military base called Incirlik in Adana. On the other hand, Turkey received military aid grant of 100 mln dollar according to Truman Doctrine which "was announced as a plan to beat back Communism in Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid"⁷ as reported in Daytona Beach Morning Journal. Yet, one-sided foreign policy did start have its negative outcomes. In order to develop national economics the government had to decrease the role of statism principle in economics, which meant increasing the engagement of private sector. Hence new trading areas were required; the neighbour Middle Eastern countries seemed to stand a good chance. So, since the 1960s the economy starts to shift the foreign policy and as a result Ankara launches an export-led policy. One of bright examples of it is mass movement of Turkish workers to Germany. According to David Conradt and Eric Langenbacher that "Turks are by far the largest minority group, with 2,5 to 4 million residents of Germany today having full or partly Turkish ancestry"⁸. Speaking of Turkish case, those days it was common in the Middle East to migrate to another country to find a job but there were some differences. Above all, Turks' migrations began a bit earlier than Arabs' because oil prices explode just after 1973 war. Furthermore, Turks were sent as a help to reduce the shortage of German workers in different industrial areas in conformity with Turkish-German agreement signed in 1961 whereas Arab workers' scenario was quite different one. "Massive labor migration took place from poor to rich states, which acquired manpower for their ambitious oil financed development while worker remittances flowed back to stimulate the economies of the labor-exporting states. From 1970 to 1980 the number of Arabs working in other Arab countries had swelled from 648,000 to nearly 4 million"⁹. Concerning Middle Eastern neighbors, one can be said for sure: Turkey's first treaties proving intent to improve relations and enhance the economy were signed with Iraq. The content of Turkey's Official Gazette¹⁰ for 1960s illustrates three Turkish-Iraqi agreements. The first agreement signed in 1965 was replacing previous Treaty of Commerce signed in

⁶ n. Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh.

⁷ Daytona Beach Morning Journal 1948, 3.

⁸ David, Langenbacher 2013, 114–115.

⁹ Hinnesch 2003, 46.

¹⁰ n. Официальная газета Турции называется Resmi Gazete.

1932. So, in accordance with the updated version of the treaty its aim was desire to promote and expand trade relations between respective countries. Two lists called A and B are given in the text of the document. The analysis of these lists demonstrates that Iraq was primarily exporting the oil derivatives. On the one hand, kerosene, gas oil and fuel oil were the main export items for Iraq. On the other hand, Turkey's oil and gas resources were not enough to provide itself. Consequently, it was a win-win situation. Turkish party was exporting various agricultural and secondary products, such as window glass, centrifugal pumps, wood-working and cotton ginning machinery, sewing machines¹¹. Investigation of these lists may give the clue about the countries' economy. The second agreement was signed in 1966 and provides the terms of lifting visa requirements. Turkey showed the initiative justifying the need to ease the trips between two countries¹². The final treaty signed in the same year like the second one was focused on promoting tourism and increasing touristic exchanges between two states as well as attracting tourists from the other countries. In order to achieve the goals parties agreed to establish a special joint committee. Agreement which comprises eleven articles gives details about the committee: members, sessions' regularities and topics for discussion. Two parties decided to make English as the working language of the committee¹³. All previously mentioned agreements even if this piece of work presented peculiarities of Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations indicate the attempts made by Turkish party to diversify its foreign policy. During 60s various treaties were signed with other Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Gradual evolution of foreign policy of Turkey may be summarized as follows. Firstly, newborn country knew where to stop even if it was able to withdraw foreign invaders. Secondly, Ankara with great cautiousness made France and the United Kingdom decide Alexandretta matter in its favour. Thirdly, international circumstances made it accompany the West side and it is unknown what side Turkey could have chosen in case Stalin had not brought up the issue of the Straits.

With regard to the Syrian Arabic Republic, another key actor of the region, it is necessary to mention that the majority of the region's countries were not capable of building a strong united state. Despite all attempts of mandate countries, new independent states formed as the result of carving up the Ottoman Empire and they did not at all conform the principles of the Westphalian state-system. Almost all countries of the region are populated by people of different ethnic groups and confessions. The logical question here is what were those secret ingredients of Syrian government which enabled it to become another pivotal actor located in these lands? First and most important issue is the ability of the regime to establish relative peace in the country of such a complicated ethnical and confessional background. The strength of Ba'ath party may easily be explained, for instance, through the biography of Hafez Assad, particularly in the pre-adult period. Later on, when Hafez Assad was holding the position of the president, he used to emphasize the strenght of Syrians in their unity. This persistent reminder pur-

¹¹ 31.7.1965 tarihli ve 6/5033 sayılı kararname ile verilen yetkiye dayanılarak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti arasında (10 Ocak 1932 tarihinde imzalanmış bulunan Ticaret Anlaşmasının yerine kaim olmak üzere) 03.08.1965 tarihinde Bağdat'da imzalanan, ilişik Ticaret Anlaşması.

¹² 8.12.1965 tarihli ve 6/5561 sayılı Kararname ile verilen yetkiye dayanılarak, Türkiye ile Irak arasında pasaport vizesi harçlarının karşılıklı olarak kaldırılması maksadiyle 28 Şubat 1966 tarihinde Bağdat'da mektup teatisi suretiyle akdolunan ilişik anlaşmanın onaylanması.

¹³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Arasında Turizm Alanında İşbirliğine Dair Anlaşma.

sued two goals. On the one hand, the attention of Syrian population was drawn to common things that everyone wanted, not to things which would stress their uniqueness and split them. On the other hand, Hafez Assad and the ruling elite were afraid of power loss. It was a million-to-one chance when someone of Alawi descent could climb to the highest peak. Frankly speaking, success of Ba'ath in Syria and the same achievements of Republic Peoples Party in Turkey are incomparable since the confessional and ethical aspects are unlike. While Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the representative of the country's ethnical majority, Hafez Assad was another brilliant person in the party and was holding the position of Defence Minister, but he was not Sunni. So, achieved successes had absolutely different values. Another important factor is Syria's firm attitude towards Arab-Israeli conflict. In comparison with other countries of the region, Syria after The Six Day War turned struggle against Israel into a national idea which along with Ba'ath ideology penetrated to all spheres of the society with a mission to unite the Syrians. This point of view is supported by O. Degtiarova, who stresses out the country's political buildup by saying that "Syria started to play the critical role in Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967 which allowed it to claim regional leadership"¹⁴. Despite unsuccessful attempts of the West to establish democracy in newly created Middle Eastern countries, Hafez Assad was too pragmatic even to try to build new regime based on Western values. He comprehended the incompatibility of Western traditions with Eastern mindset. Distinguished Russian orientalist and historian Igor Diakonoff in his book "The Paths of History" speculates on this issue and expresses his viewpoint saying that "Eastern path of development was typical whereas Western one was different of it. Peculiarity of European path of development is conditioned by ideological traditions which have connections with imperial antiquity. This stage was represented by polis structures, vestiges of polis economy and ideology"¹⁵. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that Hafez Assad conducted internal policy of gradual introducing democracy. The next important ingredient of the country stabilization is well presented in Foreign Affairs: "the key is that Assad has devoted his life to what he sees as the defense of the Arab national cause. That cause, Assad believes, was betrayed by his fellow Arab leaders – from Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat, who made a separate peace with Israel in 1978, to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chair Yasir Arafat, who agreed to the 1993 Oslo accords, to Jordan's King Hussein, who signed a peace treaty in 1994"¹⁶. Taking into consideration the fact that more than 80% of Syrian population is represented by Arabs, political call for the justice was the wisest start. It is known that Hafez Assad had a strong health and his contemporaries recall his long passionate speeches in which he used to speculate about the need to pool the efforts in fighting against the disunity within Arabs. It would be pertinent here to note the way Hafez Assad dealt with foreign diplomats. "The lengthy exchanges got to the point that one task of the American ambassador was to brief visiting dignitaries before any meeting with President Assad to pace themselves on the constant offerings of coffee, tea and lemonade lest they bruise protocol by interrupting the Syrian leader to ask for a bathroom break. "We dubbed it bladder diplomacy," said Edward P. Djerejian, the American ambassador from 1988 to 1991"¹⁷. In addition to the

¹⁴ Degtiarova 2008, 86.

¹⁵ Diakonoff 2007, 65.

¹⁶ Siegman 2000, 3.

¹⁷ MacFarquhar 2000.

previous example, there is another one confirming Syrian president's unique style of receiving guests. "Mr. Assad was most renowned for lecturing foreigners, even American presidents, about the unfair colonial fragmentation of the Middle East. In case anyone missed the point, his reception hall was dominated by a large painting depicting the Arab armies under Saladin defeating the Crusaders during the battle of Hittin in 1187, a not-so-subtle reminder that he considered present circumstances temporary"¹⁸. The head of Syrian state was a man of his word and the government never had separate meetings with Israel. Ba'ath always was able to find alternative ways of remaining in power. At first the country secured Soviet support. When it was obvious that the USSR was approaching its end, Syria promoted friendship with Iran and during Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait Assad joined coalition. As the result of the last action "funds came pouring in from the coalition partners: the European Community contributed \$200 million to Syria and the Japanese sent a loan of \$500 million. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) pledged more than \$2 billion. This massive infusion of funds gave Assad and his compatriots much relief from Syria's crushing economic problems"¹⁹. Consequently, the government was smart enough to find different ways of obtaining both financial and military help which was used to stabilize the economic environment. Third last factor is well-coordinated work of the people in power. Hafez Assad was conducting clientalist policy and in accordance with it Alawis were appointed to key positions. In order to eschew Sunni majority's strong discontent with the current Baath regime, he appointed to leading positions members of various ethnic groups. According to Ray Hinnesbusch "the top elite remained a cross sectarian coalition. Having taken power through alliances with senior Sunni military officers and party politicians—men such as Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Hikmat al-Shihabi, Naji Jamil, Abdullah al-Ahmar, and Mustafa Tlas, Assad, initially at least, had to share power with them. He took pains not to be identified as leader of an Alawi block in the regime, deliberately co-opted prestigious Sunnis into the party and state machinery, and stood above and balanced between elites of different sectarian backgrounds"²⁰. In the meantime one of most essential reforms was being conducted in the country – education reform. Hafez Assad pursued the same goals as Atatürk did: to form new generation permeated with loyalty to the Ba'ath party and its policy. Nevertheless, the elaborate state policy encountered different obstacles. The major one was called "Muslim Brotherhood". This transnational Sunni organization with its aim to instill Quran and Sunna openly confronted the Ba'ath. Hama Massacre in 1982 was the climax of their conflict. On the one hand, it was a high-profile challenge to the regime. On the other hand, this incident demonstrated the integration of the party and military. All in all, firm policy conducted by Ba'ath party in comparison with first post liberty years characterized with regular coups brought relative peace to the country. "Corrective movement" enabled Hafez Assad to improve relations with other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and decrease the role of state sector in economy. Due to these measures the government bound new middle class to the regime and national idea of resistance to Israel was designed to cement the society.

¹⁸ MacFarquhar 2000.

¹⁹ Pipes 1991, 22.

²⁰ Hinnesbusch 2005, 66.

The previous two paragraphs clearly demonstrated the steady policies conducted by Ankara and Damask. Although their start dates differ and regime types are dissimilar, they have much the same goals. First of all, both regimes encountered the heavy task - to improve the state economy since the population welfare guarantees supporters of the current regime. Turkish Republican People's Party first two decades used to win votes until in 1946 Democratic Party came to power. Nevertheless, the following parties had different programs; all of them were based on principles set at the dawn of Republic. With regard to Syria, the period since 1946 to 1963 was characterized by political instability. Conversely, Ba'ath party was able to achieve balance in the country. Secondly, both states endeavored to dominate in the region. Nonetheless, during Cold War era Turkey and Syria were on friendly terms with contending powers. Their very geostrategic location made them attractive to them and they exploited this opportunity so as the result they acquired superiority in comparison with other Middle Eastern countries.

Considering the fact that Syria achieved independence in 1946 when French troops left the territory, it is logical to count as the starting point of liberal Turkish-Syrian relations since that date. However the agreements made by France in the name of Syria are also considered as the part of Syrian diplomacy. It should be noted that Syria was incorporated to Ottoman Empire since 1517 which means that two countries' common history lasted for four hundred years. Such a long common fate had to generate close religious, cultural, economic bonds between them, but it did fail. The proof is the whole XX century which may be described as one long-lasting period of bilateral tension and the beginning of this difficult period started when France handed Alexandretta sanjak to Turkey.

To begin with, Ataturk's view upon foreign policy of the republic comprised not only defending the sovereignty and establishing equal relations with other countries but both returning back Alexandretta and Mosul. Throughout the 30s Turkey and France made various attempts of deciding the future of these lands. Turkey was eager to see the former Ottoman sanjak within its borders but in order to achieve this task the state had to come up with an elaborate project comprising steps which would enable them to change mind of global powers gradually. It is believed that the first step was taken by signing mutual agreement with France in Ankara in 1921. This treaty comprised 13 articles and was composed in Turkish and French languages. The article 8 is of great importance since it marks the border between two states and the article 7 depicts the establishment of special administrative regime in Alexandretta district which means the French admitted that the territory was inhabited by Turks since they grant Turkish language official recognition²¹. Lausanne conference once again confirmed the boundaries between Syria and Turkey set according to Franco-Turkish agreement. Syrian and Lebanese territories were divided into four independent states such as Aleppo, Damask, Lebanon and Alawi Latakia as the result of further actions taken by France. When it was announced that Alexandretta would become an autonomous region connected to Aleppo Arab population welcomed this decision. However, non-Arab population consisting of Turks, Armenians and Alawis made attempts to protest. According to M. Fırat and Ö. Kürkçüoğlu "the voices of dissatisfied people were not heard in Turkey since Ankara was busy handling Kurdish riot of Sheyh Said in 1925 and dealing with

²¹ Look: Franco-Turkish agreement signed at Angora on October 20, 1921.

Mosul issue”²². Another treaty between Turkey and France signed in 1926 confirmed the status of Alexandretta district and improved mutual relations. As a consequence, Turks were entitled to establish their own party and “analogue of Republican People’s Party was formed in Alexandretta which was used as the key tool during the annexation process”²³. Proclaiming Iraq’s independence by the UK forced France to take similar steps inasmuch as Arabs started to demand liberty, too. As stated by W. Cleveland and M. Bunton “because Atatürk believed that Alexandretta was a predominantly Turkish region (a disputable assumption), he contested France’s decision to include it as part of a proposed independent Syrian state in 1936”²⁴. In contrary to this point Turkish researcher F. Sönmezoğlu notes that “even though the French told lies about it, the Governor of Gaziantep and Chief Constable which visited the very region in April of 1934 were so enthusiastically welcomed that rumours about nearest annexation of the sanjak to Turkey spread”²⁵. Taking into consideration the fact that “at the beginning of the 20th century major Alawi communities numbering 113000–120000 people were concentrated in Latakia and Alexandretta”²⁶ it is easy to imagine the disappointment Alawi authorities felt in 1970s. Alternative version of historical process would mean that Syrian government could have more supporters. Moreover, this statistics prove that Atatürk’s assumption about Alexandretta’s ethnic composition was wrong and the majority of the population was represented by Arabs. Consequently, the article in Syrian Constitution acknowledging the special status of sanjak was another success in Turkey’s “great plan”. Even though the first world war ended with promise not to start the second one, vengeful atmosphere spread in German was bothering both the UK and France. One thing that can be said for sure is that despite choosing neutral position during the World War II Turks turned to advantage the attempts of two hostile sides to bring Ankara on their side. Turkey was attractive due to its unique geopolitics and right to control the Straits in accordance with Montreux Convention of 1936. As if Atatürk was feeling his close death he hastened the sanjak process. Within a couple of years major changes took place in sanjak. Firstly, Hatay’s flag acquired resemblance with Turkish one. Secondly, the sanjak adopted Turkish currency. Thirdly, customs frontier between Alexandretta and Turkey disappeared whereas it appeared with Syria. All of these actions were demonstrating the slow eluding of Syrian right in this land. Therefore it would be true to note that “Alexandretta was turned into pay for joining Anglo-French alliance which finally led to signing Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of union October 19 in 1939”²⁷.

From today’s position it can be concluded that an accurate decision has not still been made. In 1998 the bilateral relations between two countries were badly strained due to PKK problem, even Turkish military forces were made ready to start the fighting. It is known, that Turkish party demanded withdrawing PKK from Lebanese territories, terminating their operations and deliver Abdullah Ocalan the leader of PKK. Furthermore, “for good measure, Turkey also wants Syria to renounce its claims on the southern province of Hatay”²⁸. However, the articles of bilateral agreement signed the

²² Fırat, Kürkcüoğlu 2002, 281.

²³ Balcı 2013, 47.

²⁴ Cleveland, Button 2009, 184.

²⁵ Sönmezoğlu 2011, 383.

²⁶ Pir-Budagova 2015, 6.

²⁷ Shamsutdinov (ed.) 1968, 165.

²⁸ Economist 1998, 44.

same year in Adana embrace nothing vaguely resembling the old territory issue. According to A. Frolov “Syrians still consider Alexandretta lands for keeps”²⁹. A. Suleymanov confirms the same viewpoint adding that “in modern Syrian maps Turkish Hatay is painted the same colour as the whole territory of Syria and the dotted lines indicate the new frontiers”³⁰. Yet there is a small progress there. For instance at the beginning of the 21st century Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both Syria and Turkey started the process of land change since the inclusion of Alexandretta in Turkey landowners after frontier mark lost their lands. This events demonstrates “modern governments’ desire to make another step in regulating this conflict”³¹. Concurrently with last events Turkish Gazeteport reported that “people inhabiting Hatay region even nowadays every 23 July celebrate Hatay incorporation to Syria whereas on the other side of the border Syrians whip up hopes to return the lands”³². What is really curious here is that even the old generation of people who had to move to another country, to leave the motherland, to lose property and become detached from the very relatives are almost does not exist or very few. If people these days dream about reunification which is normal in Syria because the government cannot forget that act, but celebrating it on Turkish side makes to think that this event is passed on from generation to generation. Different viewpoint is presented by V. Akhmedov, the author of the book “Modern Syria: history, politics, and economy”. “Syria may bring up Alexandretta issue after returning Golan Heights and turn it into another national super-task”³³. This perspective explains the reason why Damascus has not still abandoned that idea. Another contradictory moment relates to the meeting of Bashar Asad with Necdet Sezer in 2004 which was quite historical. It is explained by the fact that this visit to Turkey was the first since 1946 when Syria acquired independence. Remarkably, Turkish president was not alone; he brought his whole family which represents deep respect in Eastern culture. Moreover, Syrian president demonstrated readiness for dialogue, so as the result of that meeting different agreements were signed. One of them considered opening trade promotion office in Hatay which was actually equal to admitting the very lands. However in current years Syria is undergoing Civil war and Ankara does not approve Damascus’s way of handling the situation. Syrian interstate conflict did affect bilateral relations and froze many reciprocal projects. Al in all, Alexandretta question nowadays remains unsolved.

To sum up, at the beginning of the 20th century the Middle Eastern lands which greater part once used to be the fragment of Ottoman empire encountered challenge of establishing new sovereign states. Mandate system created by League of Nations after World War I was not able to fulfill its main goal – to help new born countries to stand by themselves. The path of state development in the West and in the East differs which was comprehended after a while. Usually these countries faced and continue to peace confessional, territorial and ethnical conflicts. Both Turkey and Syria were more successful at state building than others due to new governments’ internal and external policies. Whereas Turkey’s state development process more accorded with Westphalian system in comparison with Syria, Baathist government turned to other ways. Gradual

²⁹ Frolov 2015, 383.

³⁰ Suleymanov 2015, 6.

³¹ Arutyunyan 2007, 34.

³² Gazeteport 2013.

³³ Akhmedov 2000, 12.

achieving of independence on different levels required solution of post Ottoman issues. Turkey was able to recover faster and along with it Ankara turned into advantage its geographical position during World War I so that Alexandretta was bargained for treaties. Considering the modern situation in Syria it is incorrect to claim that returning back Alexandretta appears on the state agenda. Nevertheless, ordinary people's ongoing hopes for alternative future for these lands lead to different thoughts.

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КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ УКРЕПЛЕНИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОСТИ
В ТУРЦИИ И СИРИИ В НАЧАЛЕ XX в. ПЕРВЫЕ ДВУХСТОРОННИЕ
ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВ

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Аннотация. После распада Османской империи и окончания Первой мировой войны страны Ближнего Востока находились в начале долгого пути укрепления государственности. Этническое и конфессиональное многообразие населений новых государств являлось сдерживающим фактором на пути достижения ими политической автономии, закрепления у власти нового режима и обеспечения внутренней стабильности. Тем не менее, Турции и Сирии удалось быстрее по сравнению с другими странами региона добиться устойчивого развития государства. В данной статье автор рассматривает факторы, благодаря которым вышеупомянутые страны превратились во влиятельных акторов Ближнего Востока. Каждый фактор основывается на анализе как событий внутривнутриполитической жизни государства, так и внешних обстоятельств. Настоящая работа довольно подробно прослеживает судьбу Александреттского санджака, считающегося начальным пунктом двухсторонних отношений. В работе исследуется эволюция данного вопроса, показаны точки зрения сирийской и турецкой сторон. Завершает статью оценка современного состояния территориальной проблемы и попытка спрогнозировать его будущее.

Ключевые слова: Турция, Сирия, Александретта, Мустафа Кемаль Ататюрк, Хафез Асад
