


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## Influence of Italian Fascism on Political Scene of Interwar Slovakia (1922–1938)

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### Abstract

The paper analyzes the influence of Italian fascism in interwar Slovakia. Drawing on newest methodological approaches author debates how the fascist “essence” modernized the ideologies, programs and political culture of conservative, nationalistic and Christian traditionalistic political parties in Slovakia. Based on archival research in Italian archives, the article also discusses Rome’s political interests in Czechoslovakia, mainly the support of nationwide and minor pro-fascist movements from Italian fascist regime in the 1920s and 1930s.

**Keywords:** Fascism, Italian fascism, fascist studies, international fascism, totalitarianism, Slovakia, Czechoslovakia, Rodobrana, Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, Slovak National Party, revolution, nationalism, anti-Semitism, anticommunism.

### 1. Introduction

In the 1920s and 1930s Italian fascism represented a pan-continental phenomenon. In this period fascism infiltrated almost every European country and established itself as an integral component of political culture in Europe. New revolutionary stream found its place in Czechoslovak, respectively Slovak politics as well.<sup>1</sup>

During the existence of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938) politically anchored fascism did not skip over the borderline of margin. The National Fascist Community (*Národní obec fašistická* – NOF), the most notable Czechoslovak party copying the Italian fascism, recorded the best election result in 1935 General Elections. Gain of little over 2 % meant nothing but a failure comparing to fascists’ bold pre-election statements. Pre-election speeches by General Radola Gajda, a leader of the NOF, trying to convince the public about a certain triumph of fascist ideas in Czechoslovakia (*SNA-1*) suffered a serious setback.

Fascism in its Czechoslovak mutation appeared to be an impotent branch of Italian pattern, incapable of attracting masses, though Czechoslovakia, stricken by the Great Depression, undoubtedly offered a manoeuvrable space for a new type of modernity that fascism embodied. The failure of NOF’s political ambitions, however, did not mean that Czech or Slovak society would regard fascist ideas to be “alien”. Just the other way around – the ideas of revolutionary ultra-nationalism dreaming about a “better tomorrow”, about a new political force longing to overthrow the social order and to raise a new modernity, had imbed very relatively strong roots in interwar Slovakia. The way of penetrating the fascist myth of national rebirth<sup>2</sup> into society’s mind, at any rate, essentially differed from “Italian story” where the image of “reborn Italy” was foisted

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politically via platform of the Italian National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista* – PNF). Fascism got to “brains and hearts” in Czechoslovakia as a *cultural* innovation.

## 2. Materials and methods

Primary methodological approach was the analysis on a transnational basis. Study draws on author’s previous research of European fascism in comparative perspective and uses sources obtained during archival research in Prague (National Archives), Rome (Central Archives of the State), Bratislava (Slovak National Archives) and Martin (Literary Archives of the Slovak National Library). These sources were confronted with broad range of academic literature concerning fascism and, finally, synthesized in an article which seeks to contribute to ongoing international discussion regarding comparative fascist studies.

## 3. Discussion

Perception of fascism as a cultural phenomenon as defined by Zeev Sternhell helps to answer the questions which Slovak or Czech historiography has not even debated. How come that *Slovák*, a conservatively profiled newspaper of the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (*Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana* – HSĽS) cordially welcomed Italian delegation at the occasion of its visit in Bratislava, portraying allegorical drawing of Slovak peasants saluting to Mussolini’s bust festooned with a laurel wreath? (*Slovák*, 1926) How come that thousands young Slovak men, claiming themselves to be proud patriots, excitedly dressed up into black shirts and following the example of their Italian *camerati*, glorified the “New Order” at the Apennine peninsula? How can we explain that Martin Rázus, one of the most brilliant Slovak writers, got thrilled by new dynamic “neo-nationalism” though he never identified himself with fascist political practice?

In quest for answer why fascism impressed a proportional part of Slovak political scene, we have to overcome the horizon of fascism’s traditionalist reflection as a phenomenon linked exclusively to Italy. An immense methodological progress of *fascist studies* in recent decades had pushed such approaches in the trash of obsolete archaisms. Modern historiography, related humanities and social sciences acknowledge that fascism was not a politically anchored entity in one single country but a transnational spiritual idea born as a cultural rebellion against other forms of modernity in *fin de siècle*.

## 4. Results

Ideal conditions for expansion of this *cultural essence*<sup>3</sup> in Slovakia arose after 1918 in democratic Czechoslovakia. The system of parliamentary republic allowed the legal existence of political movements that did not hide their ambitions to overthrow it and, in a longer term, to fundamentally regenerate the “spirit of nation”. Hypothetical success of fascist essence and its implementation to Czechoslovak political culture depended on post-1918 political situation. Fascistization of several smaller right-wing parties (mainly the National Democracy; *Národná demokracia*) at the beginning of the 1920s had certainly been determined by threat of revolutionary radicalism represented by left and far-left parties. Strong anti-communism of the oldest minor pro-fascist movements, however, did not eclipse other aspects of their political belief. Anti-communism was its notable but not dominant component. Yet the first political clubs and movements, marked as proto-fascist by the Czech historiography, eagerly declared their aversion to the ruling democratic regime and so-called “Castle policy” conducted by President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Beneš. They refused to accept the structure of legislative and executive power, electoral system and the existence of political parties in general (*Pejčoch*, 1994: 44-47).

Fascist essence thus right from the establishment of first Czechoslovak fascist movements subsumed captivating “anti“-framework but not as a negative, solely reactionary category. The essence offered a new form of modernity to potential members and voters which profiled itself as an unconventional project of a complete revolutionary regeneration of society, totally different from all existing alternatives.

This aspect was, on one hand, attractive. On the other hand it retarded the development of fascism in Czechoslovakia. Fascism’s boost depended on the presence of revolutionary atmosphere of which were the Czechs and Slovaks quite exhausted in time when Mussolini came to power. Process of establishing the Republic in October 1918, dramatic months followed after and the

episode of Slovak Soviet Republic in 1919 deeply affected the attitude of Slovaks towards new political experiments with unpredictable outcome and impact.

Under the given circumstances fascist essence influenced the ideology and programmes of existing parties indirectly as a modernising and dynamic factor. In the context of the first half of the 1920s Benito Mussolini embodied a hero to the right-wing parties in Czechoslovakia and a “wall” against communism so much that they were eager to forgive the unconventionally violent political culture of the *fasci* and the PNF. Suppression of the leftist streams in Italy made Mussolini an image of a “brave Messiah” in the eyes of Czechoslovak right wing, all the more that the public in Czechoslovakia had been fed with unverified rumours of a prepared communist coup (these speculative worries lacked any relevance and were made up by the police reports and so-called whispered propaganda).

Fascist essence penetrated political culture in Slovakia especially via nationalistic political parties and movements which sympathized with fascism considering it to be the “renaissance of true values” that society should worship. Political activists thrilled by this innovation, however, did not realize its full content and borrowed only selected aspects out of the fascist portfolio, tailored to Slovak environment.

The reason why Slovak parties and movements excluding several exceptions did not adapt fascist vision of renewal of nation (society) and state as a whole lies in the fact of fascism’s foreign origin. A full adoption of the product out of Italian “cuisine” could have only harmed their profile and conflicted with the self-image they desired to conserve. Most of firmly established parties with a stable membership base and electorate resisted the temptations and maintained rather conservative positions in their public relations. Experimenting with fascist tendencies was therefore a matter of younger movements or parties that had simply nothing to lose.

The first known group, proclaiming its pro-fascist orientation, was the Party of National Fascists (*Strana národných fascistov*) led by Ľudovít Bazovský, a barrister and politician active yet before 1918 in Austria-Hungary. The birth of the organization on 19 November 1922 was supposedly influenced by the March on Rome. Alas, a very brief history of this miniature movement remains shrouded in mystery due to lack of documents (Dončová, 2014: 148). The Unity of Slovak Youngsters (*Jednota slovenských junákov*) known simply as *Junobrana*, linked to the Slovak National Party (*Slovenská národná strana – SNS*), mainly to its central secretary Miloš Kolesár and editor-in chief of the *Národné noviny* Július Turan, existed for longer time but never achieved massive support even within the members of the SNS (Hruboň, 2013: 38).

These fascist-looking “babies” were much more saloon clubs integrating critics of the Czechoslovak regime than pure fascist organization. In other words, they pretended to be fascist more than really were.

The fascist essence established incomparably more in political culture of the *Rodobrana* (*Home-Defence*) movement. The *Rodobrana*, a paramilitary wing of the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (*Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana – HSLS*), attracted the attention of police authorities thanks to its populist political practice from its beginnings in January 1923. *Rodobrana*’s revolutionary nationalism sought far-reaching and higher set goals than just to help the HSLS in the struggle for autonomy for Slovakia within the centralist Czechoslovakia. The core of nationalism it confessed had a defensive character only *pro forma*. Essentially, *Rodobrana*’s political style was immensely offensive and political culture lucidly inspired by fascism.

For leaders of the *Rodobrana*, a hypothetical ideal of autonomous Slovakia meant the same as Christian Slovakia under the rule of the HSLS purified from socialists, national minorities and Jews. Though the *Rodobrana*, as a part of organizational structure of the HSLS, had officially never been politically active and thus never got the opportunity to put their words into practice, its statements were eloquent: “*The interests of a Jewish calf, international impious thieves and crooked-nose “liberators” wish to bury our freedom as soon as possible. But we will ruthlessly sweep them up! We have to wipe them out if we want to purify our country of the nasty filth*” (Mach, 1941: 300).

An author of the quoted commentary published in the *Rodobrana* (the official periodical of the organization) was Alexander Mach – in that time a junior journalist, later a head commander of the infamous Hlinka Guard and leader of national-socialist wing within the HSLS during the existence of Slovak State (1939 – 1945). Mach was the „engine“ of fascistization of the HSLS in the 1920s when he had openly been agitating for applying fascism into political practice and presented

Mussolini as a political idol for „cultural Europe“. Mach, for example, wrote: „*Mussolini ripped out the gallows and planted the grain into Italians' ground which brought tasty fruit: an order, peace and welfare*“ (Mach, 1941: 292).

If it all was only about several articles in periodicals, one can argue the fascist character of the Rodobrana. Fascist essence was a fashionable matter and many political streams had been attempting to utilize it for their purposes. However, the Rodobrana became fascist not just taking words of its leaders and speakers into consideration but also thanks to its political practice. “Blackshirts’” marches, hailing to Mussolini, saluting by raised right hand, aggressive critique of democracy, highlighting the mystical martyrdom similar to palingenetic obsession practiced by Codreanu’s Iron Guard in Romania (Iordachi, 2004) – all these attributes framed the Rodobrana into the fascist sheepfold. Among reports by police offices (NA-1) Rodobrana’s activists shared the lust for such a label too (Mach, 1941: 293; Witt, 2015: 268). Linking of the emancipatory struggle of Slovaks in Czechoslovakia with the idea of a new dawn magnetized thousands of Slovaks and brought them under Rodobrana’s black flag. A vision of revolutionary modernity, contrary to conservative, liberal and socialistic principles had anchored within a part of Slovak public and gained notable support. A spiritual guru of the movement, Prof Vojtech Tuka, had big plans with the Rodobrana. During his business trip in Italy Tuka met the organizers of the PNF and, according to their instructions, intended to reconstruct the Rodobrana organizationally and ideologically. This process could not have been finished because in October 1929 Tuka was sentenced to 15 year prison for high treason.

After the Rodobrana went on hiatus in 1929, the National Fascist Community became a leading fascist force in Slovakia. The NOF’s influence had been growing gradually but never stepped over the threshold of relevancy. Slovak branch of the nationwide operating party was absolutely dependent on party headquarters in Prague which had been giving the direction to all regional organizational units of the NOF and which was as a compact unit reflected by its “big sister”, by the PNF and fascist regime in Italy.

It is well known that Mussolini helped the fascist movement in Czechoslovakia morally and financially in the first years of its existence (Kvaček, 1978: 302). *Il Duce*, contrary to German national socialists, did not consider fascism to be an exclusive Italian specific but a *spirit* that has a potential to culturally conquer whole of Europe and prevail all other “isms”.<sup>4</sup> Mussolini reckoned that European nations will adopt fascism naturally and that it is not necessary, nor clever to export his ideas forcibly and virulently like German Nazis did. Because of this opinion Mussolini never took the steps to excessively support fascist movements and, unlike Berlin, Rome tended to throttle financial taps to foreign fascist parties in the 1930s. *Il Duce* considered an international institution called Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (*Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma* – CAUR) to be more effective tool in distributing fascism abroad. The organization, founded in 1933 and led by Eugenio Coselschi, expressed a vision to become a Fascist International and to integrate all major European fascist movements.

The date of the CAUR’s establishment was not a coincidence. Mussolini, after Hitler’s *Machtergreifung*, endeavoured to reinforce Italy’s foreign policy positions and not to lose them completely in countries falling into Hitler’s interest zone. In summer 1934 the CAUR began to expand its network to the Central Europe as well. Coselschi sent his co-worker Rodolfo Vecchini to Czechoslovakia and Hungary with a mission to search for possibilities of founding local structures of the CAUR and to establish cooperation with local fascist organizations. Italian ambassadors in Prague and Budapest were asked to help Vecchini in fulfilling the given task. As Coselschi wrote to Italian foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano, big expectations were put mainly to associations of former Czechoslovak legionaries in Italy during the World War I (ACdSR-1).

Despite this the NOF obviously remained a most relevant partner for the CAUR. Before General Elections in October 1935 the chair of the CAUR deputed a journalist Manlio Barilli to deliver a propaganda course for Czechoslovak fascists (ACdSR-2). Relative setback of the NOF which the fascists suffered in elections, combined with results of presidential elections in December 1935 and signing of Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty were signals for Italy that Czechoslovak regime was en route to anti-fascist oriented countries. Beside this, Rome realized that the NOF has no chance to gain major support within the Czechoslovak society and is not worth Italy’s financial donations anymore. The CAUR appreciated NOF’s foreign policy stances, contrasting to attitudes of Czechoslovak government (e. g. stance on sanctions against Italy for the Abyssinian War) but was

aware of critical financial situation and growing internal conflicts in the NOF which did not allow the fascists to enhance the activities in Czechoslovakia in accordance with Italian interests. Though Italian authorities were thinking over at least symbolic financial aid to their “comrades” in Czechoslovakia (ACdSR-3), finally, the NOF did not receive any sum of Italian lire to party’s account.

The deputies of the NOF tried to change Mussolini’s decision during their visit of Rome in December 1935. The CAUR requested Czechoslovak fascists to submit the request for money officially in writing but did not guarantee a positive feedback. Italy was well-informed about the NOF. The CAUR praised Radola Gajda for preventing party’s total decay but, on the other hand, knew how wasteful he had been treating with financial resources donated in past. Italy refused to contribute on Gajda’s alcoholic sessions organized for his fascist friends. Coselschi appreciated fascist newspaper’s *Fašistické listy* pro-Italian stance but criticized it for failing to obtain a larger number of subscribers. Due to financial problems the *Fašistické listy* had to lower the circulation and lost the impact on public (ACdSR-4). Declarations by the Great Council of the NOF towards Italy (e. g. declaration on victory of the Royal Army in Abyssinia on 30 April 1936)<sup>5</sup> were evidently formal and nothing but truckling.

Fascism as a cultural innovation was not represented only by the NOF in the 1920s and 1930s Slovakia. The fascist essence in Slovakia absorbed much of the ideas spread by the autonomist Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party and was utterly “nationalised” so the emphasis on national emancipation became much popular than original etatist principles of Italian fascism. Slovak branches of the NOF did not hesitate to ally with the HSES or SNS and profiled themselves as an integral part of the Autonomist bloc struggling primarily for autonomy for Slovakia (Hruboň, 2015: 116).

Erstwhile rhapsodies on “Italian paradise” vanished from fascist rhetoric. Under the circumstances none of Slovak political parties or platforms could longer “advertise” fascist system or regime because, due to the 1938 Munich Agreement and First Vienna Award, Italy had an image of unfair arbiter in the eyes of Slovak public. The support of Italy thus could have looked like a support of policy contrasting to Slovak national interests.

Political style, heavily inspired by fascism, was, nevertheless, present in political culture of Slovakia throughout the 1930s and in the first half of the 1940s. Rodobrana’s radicalism, in many ways comparable to the early *squadristo*, changed and transformed itself to party-institutionalized and more developed forms. Fascist essence mirrored mainly within the HSES’s radical wing formed by young activists like Alexander Mach, Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Karol Sidor or Jozef M. Kirschbaum. The fact that Hlinka’s<sup>6</sup> young followers had to put the black shirts with double cross aside into wardrobes after the Rodobrana split in 1929 did not mean that they gave up the ideology they believed. Radicalism inspired by fascism which Mach proudly commemorated during the Slovak State latently dozed in minds of the HSES’s supporters. This fascism-inspired radicalism was reborn in 1938 after the Hlinka Guard, a successor of the Rodobrana, was established.

Beside the “Ľudáks”<sup>7</sup> the SNS expressed its lust for fascism for short time in the 1920s as well. Not only Junobrana which never achieved notable influence but also prominent leaders of the SNS tended to favour fascist ideas. Matúš Dula, a veteran of Slovak policy, known as yeasty activist long time before 1918, supported the Red-Whites (*Červenobieli*) in the first half of the 1920s, an organization which later became a founding element of the NOF after the merge of pro-fascist movements in March 1926. As the only Slovak Dula was a member of executive committee of the Red-Whites, so-called Council of Ten (NA-2).

Fascism was much more discussed and admired by Martin Rázus, a famous Slovak writer and functionary of the SNS. The Slovak National Party reflected fascism in the context of European politics as a regenerative stream worth support; as a renaissance of the nationalistic idea capable of facing the leftists and socialistic internationalism (Roguľová, 2010: 6). Rázus wrote to his party comrade Miloš Ruppeltdt that he was not a fascist by soul but if the autonomists could not reach their main goal within democratic platform, fascism must be an alternative way (LASNK). Rázus was a man who speculatively operated with fascism. He saw that the NOF was too weak to become a strong political force and awaited the rise of fascism in Europe so the SNS could have taken over the fascist political style and productively use it in a struggle for autonomy.

The NOF considered the SNS to be the closest friend with whom it envisaged a cooperation on the platform of fascism. The SNS helped fascists with managing the political propaganda and

organizational matters. Catholic priest Anton Kompánek, an activist of the SNS, was about to overtake the redaction of the *Slovenský fašista*, a newspaper edited by the NOF in Slovakia (NA-3) (the cooperation latter failed due to financial reasons). In period when fascists proclaimed their movement to be above political parties, the SNS was offered a membership in fascist Council of Directors (SNA-2). Actually, not all nationalists sympathized with fascism because of fascism's vile political culture and violent behaviour in the streets (e. g. Štefan Krčméry and activists gathered around him) (Roguľová, 2013: 241-242). The SNS thereby never adopted fascism as its political ideology or program.

Generally said, fascism lacked major support in the 1930s Slovakia. Excluding the NOF which, by the way, modified fascist universalism and some of fascism's key mottos, none notable political party on scene can be denoted as clearly fascist. Initial enthusiasm for an alternative to a "rotten" democracy and socialism cooled down when the public got informed about not very bright aspects of Mussolini's regime in Italy. Metaphorically, Italian influence did not cross over Danube. For Slovaks and Slovakia Italy remained a quite distant country, one of many "second line" powers in Europe. Attilio Tamaro, a diplomat, close friend to Vojtech Tuka and head of Danube section of the Foreign Italian fasci (*Fasci italiani all'estero*) failed to persuade Mussolini to send a financial aid for Slovak autonomists and via this „essential feature of the Central European policy“ to expand Italy's influence in this region of the continent. Tamaro understood the revolutionary character of Slovak nationalism in the interwar period (Klabjan, 2006: 454) and its potential to make much more out of it than just odes sung and written by the members of Rodobrana, SNS and HSEŠ on „shining example of Italy... glorious Italy and its biggest son Benito Mussolini“ (Slovák, 1926).

Italy as a positive example of "coping with enemies of nation and state" resonated in minds of Slovak right-wing parties, tending to some of fascist ideas in the late 1930s. Journalist Karol Murgaš published a book *Nové Taliansko (New Italy)* in 1937 in which he praised fascist regime for achievements in economic and social sphere and he called Mussolini's policy a "miracle" (Witt, 2015: 276). In 1939 Mussolini's *La dottrina politica e sociale del fascismo* was published in Slovakia under the title *Fašistická náuka* (translated by Vojtech Košík). Radical spectrum of the HSEŠ, the only allowed and ruling party of Slovaks during the existence of the wartime Slovak State, promoted its civilizational nexus with the fascist Axis through a new revue called *Politická korešpondencia (Political correspondence)* edited from November 1940 by Murgaš whom Guido Roncalli, an Italian ambassador in Bratislava, described as a person of fierce pro-Italian stance (ACdSR-6). *Politická korešpondencia*, depicting a map connecting Bratislava, Rome and Berlin on its cover, however, did not openly declare its Italophilia but the pro-Axis attitude of Slovakia. As Murgaš stated in his editorial *Slovensko na prelome (Slovakia at the turning point)* Slovakia „can march into the reorganized Southeastern Europe merely in the garb of the national-socialist state“ (Murgaš, 1940: 1).

Alongside "allies" of Italy like Murgaš several other persons and institutions had been trying to build up a positive image of fascist Italy (and fascism as well) in the eyes of Slovak public, mainly Italian consulate in Bratislava, founded in January 1921 and society called *Circolo Italiano (Circolo Italiano di Cultura* from 1924) under the auspices of consul Francesco Palmieri. The society organized cultural events and languages courses. It was most active at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. From 1934 Circolo's activities had remarkably decreased and in 1935 completely ceased (Kubík, 2011: 17-18). Success of promoting Italy and fascist regime via cinema (like the movie *Mussolini parta*) (Klabjan, 2006: 456-457) or language courses broadcasted by radio were questionable. The author of *Italsky pro samouky* (a guide for self-learners) Dr. Nicola D'Alfonso got the opportunity to teach the Czechoslovak radio listeners late at night (every Monday at 10.20 pm) so it is very disputable how or even whether his effort brought appropriate effect (ACdSR-7).

## 5. Conclusion

Italian fascism was one of inspirational sources for interwar Slovak and Czechoslovak political subjects. Fascism as a modernising essence in its Italian variant generally did not influence political practice of conservative, nationalist and Christian oriented parties so much that we could talk about a thicker root of fascist ideas or fascist spirit within these subjects during the interwar period. Fascism in form of "pure" Italian prototype thus remained a dominance of ultra-nationalist groups and fractions lacking power even in structures of political parties they were part of (like the relationship Rodobrana – HSEŠ). However, fascist experience of "ľudáks" from the

1920s shaped political practice of the HSELS, its paramilitary branch called Hlinkova garda (*Hlinka Guard*; an indirect successor of the Rodobrana) and Slovak politics overall from 1938 to 1945 when the HSELS ruled as the only allowed party in independent Slovakia under heavy German auspices.

## 6. Gratitude

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For analytical purposes this study will differ between *Czechoslovak* (nationwide) and *Slovak* (ethnic) parties in 1918 – 1938 as current Czech and Slovak historiography does.

<sup>2</sup> A myth of national rebirth is considered to be one of core features of fascist ideology by Roger Griffin, a foremost expert on fascism, and as well by many historians reflecting the intense debate on nature of fascism in last quarter century. For basic thesis of Griffin's theory see R. Griffin ([Griffin, 1991](#)).

<sup>3</sup> *Essence* will not be perceived in this study in a philosophical meaning but as a transnational *flavour* of politics capable of crossing the borders and influencing political cultures worldwide.

<sup>4</sup> Mussolini confidently predicted that „*the 20th Century will be a fascist century*“ ([Paxton, 2007: 191](#)).

<sup>5</sup> „*The Great Fascist Council expresses its deepest friendship with Italy, protests against the sanctions by the United Nations, expresses its joy over great victory of the Italian Army in Ethiopia and hopes that this victory will be an absolute satisfaction on the field of politics and diplomacy*“ ([ACdSR-5](#)).

<sup>6</sup> Andrej Hlinka (1864 – 1938) was a Slovak Catholic priest, lifelong chairman of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and leader of Slovak autonomist movement struggling for autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic.

<sup>7</sup> „*Ludáks*“ (*ľudáci*) was an informal name for members of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party.

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