

Marek Pietras

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University (Poland)

ORCID: 0000-0002-9334-7737

e-mail: marek-pietras@wp.pl

Levels of Decision-Making Determinants in the European Council of the EU in 2010–2022

Abstract: The European Union has been recognised as an international system whose decisions and actions are conditioned by environmental determinants, which is a dynamic process of change. The article attempts to explain the EU's decisions based on the conclusions of the European Council in 2010–2022. 93 documents containing the conclusions of the European Council adopted during that period were analysed. It was found that the determinants of EU decisions and actions function – firstly – at the international system level and, secondly, at the level of the domestic systems of the Member States. In addition, the article: 1) reconstructed the discussion in the science of international relations on behavioural determinants, 2) reconstructed the perception of determinants in the conclusions of the European Council; 3) a model for organising the analysis of the determinants of the decisions of the European Council was proposed.

Keywords: *European Union, European Council, determinants, levels of analysis, the level of the international system, the level of domestic systems*

The decisions and activities of the European Union (EU) as an international system undergoing the process of change are determined by many variables, factors, and specific “forces” operating in its environment, which is also in the process of change. In other words, the EU is in dynamic interactions with its environment, which determines its functioning. Considering cause-effect relationships important for political science analysis, “forces” operating in the EU environment are independent variables, and EU decisions and actions are dependent variables. It is also the adopted methodological assumption of the study.

For the purpose of analysis, it has been assumed that these independent variables determine the EU, functioning at many levels of social life and the international one, as well as at the domestic level of states, but also many planes (political, economic, social, ecological, etc.),

with the simultaneous interpenetration of the domestic and the international. Consequently, the EU functions in an environment of dynamic changes.

For many years, of crucial importance were determinants, independent variables operating at the level of the international system, the global one and regional systems. However, in the conditions of the crisis of the Eurozone, unprecedented migration pressure, and the changing lines of social divisions, the EU member states witnessed a clear change in the values preferred by some social groups. It resulted in a shift in political preferences reflected in political sympathies demonstrated at the polls, support for radical forces, and mass social protests. These behaviours challenged the liberal political order and the community of values that define the EU's political identity. At the same time, they became a challenge to the political cohesion of the EU and even to the membership of some states. Thus, the second domestic level of independent variables determining the integration processes emerged. Consequently, the EU began to function in the environment of changes not only at the international system level but also at the internal levels of its member states and the intersection of the state's domestic level and the international environment. The EU thereby functions in the environment of multilevel and multidimensional changes.

Hence, the article aims to identify independent variables operating at these levels and dimensions that determine the European Council's decisions and actions. Secondly, to propose a model that would enable ordering the analysis of independent variables that determine the decisions and actions of the EU institutions in the future. One hypothesis was verified, according to which, in the conditions of the acceleration of changes in social life, its progressive complexity, and its mutually determining multilevelness and multifacetedness, the independent variables that determine the EU's institutions decisions and actions operate at many levels and many sectors of its environment, with the growing importance of the "forces" existing at the domestic levels after the dominance of determinants at the level of the international system. In the context of these research assumptions, the object of analysis in this study is, firstly, to survey the literature and state of research on the variables that determine and, as a result, explain the behaviours of political actors. Secondly, to identify and analyse independent variables determining the EU institutions' decisions and actions at the international system level and member states' level. Thirdly, to propose a model to structure the identification and analysis of the EU institutions' independent variables. The qualitative methods of gathering empirical material include the analysis of the content of documents in the form of conclusions of the European Council in 2010–2022 organised at the level of heads of government or heads of state and the analysis of the state of the literature on the location of independent variables.

A Dispute over Decision-Making Determinants in International Relations

Thinking in terms of cause and effect and the accompanying explanation of phenomena and processes, but most often of the behaviours of political actors, appears to be a permanent and methodological approach with a long tradition of studying international relations. It made its presence especially felt during the period of behaviourism with the focus on explaining the state's behaviours and its foreign policy as a dependent variable determined by independent variables. In the present paper, the logic of thinking and the methodology used to explain the behaviours of states will be applied to analyse variables that determine the decisions and actions of the EU (Pietras, 2021).

As early as the mid-1950s, a dispute began with regard to, firstly, the object of explanation. On the one hand, the analysis focused on explaining the behaviours of states and their foreign policy, and on the other, on explaining international relations, actions and processes in the international environment. However, secondly, the object of dispute became the location, the level of operation of “forces” determining and explaining behaviours or international processes. For the sake of analysis, they were identified at the level of the state, at the level of the international system, and at the same time, the state level and the level of the international system.

The explaining of behaviours of states, and their foreign policy, through the identification of their determinants, which are independent variables, became the object of analysis in the science of international relations almost at the same time as the explaining of international relations. It was the mid-1950s. At that time, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956) focused on identifying variables that determine the behaviours of states, such as the state's power, political strategies, and the *psycho-milieu* of individuals and groups participating in decision-making. This example shows that a vital feature of analysing variables that determine the behaviours of the state is multifactorial (Groom, 2007).

On the other hand, the object of analysis became independent variables determining international relations, i.e., transborder interactions or flows at the international system level. In the mid-1950s, Quincy Wright (1955) suggested analysing international relations in terms of the field of forces of these relations. His proposal inspired diverse thinking directions, including the dilemma of focusing on the “forces” at the international system level or the state's domestic level (Chaudoin et al., 2015). Furthermore, in the conducted analyses, these “forces” were presented in opposition. Kenneth Waltz (1979) recognised that the most appropriate perspective for investigating these relations is to analyse them from the standpoint of the international system in which states operate. He reversed the realist school logic of international relations thinking from the standpoint of the state that functions in the international environment (Morgenthau, 1978). Kenneth Waltz attributed key importance in determining the behaviour of states to the structure of the so-called polarity

of the international system. Robert Jervis (1997) also gave precedence to determinants at the level of the international system, emphasising its complexity.

The study of international relations was marked by a large group of scholars who accorded precedence to variables functioning at the domestic level of states. They assumed that the behaviours of states in the international system originate from within them, particularly from the specificity of their political systems. Andrew Moravcsik (1997) pointed out the importance of the liberal political system for the behaviours of the state. Similar thinking was presented by the followers of the conception of democratic peace (Doyle, 1986). Robert Putnam emphasised the importance of internal determinants in the process of diplomatic negotiations by states as a kind of two-level game. The first level is created by the negotiations of states with one another, and the other – by states with their internal interest groups (Putnam, 1988). In contrast, in her analysis of internal determinants of foreign behaviours of states, Helen Milner afforded precedence to political institutions and information circulation taking place through them (Milner, 1997).

Beside the trends of “one-level argumentation”, which consist of precedence according to factors either at the level of the international system or the domestic level, already in the late 1970s, there emerged an analytical approach whose followers focused at the same time on internal and external determinants. Furthermore, they stressed that the processes at the level of the international system and the internal structures of the state had a mutual impact on one another (Gurevitch, 1978). This direction of thinking is also developed in contemporary political science analyses. They point to the synergy between determinants at the international system level and those at the level of the internal system of states (Kayser, 2007; Boix, 2011).

In the case of the EU, there is a distinct asymmetry in importance between international and domestic determinants. For the community of liberal values, which is the EU, the former was not only dominant for many years but even the only one, especially in the conditions of specific “double change” identified with the end of the Cold War and the growing globalisation processes. However, at least under the circumstances of the global financial crisis and migration pressure, in many EU member states arose a noticeable change in social feeling and increasing Euroscepticism, a change in the preferred values, and a departure from the liberal ones towards populism, radical conservatism, and even xenophobia and exclusion. The significance of changes at this level and the challenge they pose to the formula of the EU as a community of liberal values appears to be growing.

Determinants at the international level evolve, nevertheless (Łoś-Nowak, 2006). There is a clear tendency to pass from structural to functional determinants. The former is identified with the decentralisation of the international environment, its polyarchic nature, and the evolution of the subjective structure, or polarity, i.e., the structure of the balance of powers. Functional determinants are, in turn, identified with processes like, for example, globalisation and related qualitative changes in the international environment, sometimes called the late Westphalian international order.

The identification and analysis of variables at the level of the international environment, the forces that determine the behaviour of states and the EU as a special international system, is associated mainly with the neorealist school, with Kenneth Waltz's (1979) structural neorealism. Its feature was to seek systemic forces in the variability of the international environment with a focus on its polarity but not only. This direction of thinking appeared far earlier than neorealism. Already in the early 1960s, Morton Kaplan (1964) choose as the object of analysis the system's structure in the sense of its polarity, the existing centres of concentration of "power". Stanley Hoffmann presented a similar "structural" line of thinking. In his view, a system is a pattern of relations between basic units of world politics. This pattern is largely shaped by the structure of the world (Hoffmann, 1965). Andrzej Gałganek (1992) presented a similar way of thinking in Polish literature.

It should be clearly emphasised, without denying the importance of structural determinants of international relations and the states, that they do not exhaust the increasing complexity of determinants at the level of the international system because the importance increases of the determinants resulting from international processes, i.e., mainly from qualitative changes of the international environment like globalisation and transnationalisation. Consequently, systemic determinants, combining the elements of structure with the elements of processes with qualitatively new features, reflect the law of the progressive complexity of the international environment (Pietraś, 2009).

Consequently, there is an evident change in the logic of independent variables that function at the international system level (Łoś-Nowak, 2006). The structural ones, predominant particularly during the Cold War, are replaced, though they still exist, by many functional variables in the form of international phenomena and processes. Therefore, we are dealing with a *sui generis* hybrid structure of independent variables at the international system level that determine the behaviours of states and international systems like the EU. It should be remembered that in the EU member states, the importance of internal determinants for the functioning of the EU, for decisions and actions taken, has been growing in recent years. Especially vital are changes in social preferences that produce challenges and sometimes even threats to liberal political systems and the processes of the exercise of power, to the EU as a community of values, and through Euroscepticism – to its existence.

The Perception of the Decision-Making Determinants in the Conclusions of the European Council

In order to identify variables that determine the EU's decisions and actions, the object of analysis is 93 documents containing the conclusions of the sessions of the European Council in 2010–2022. In the context of 2010, it should be stressed that in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The EU obtained its international law subjectivity and increased foreign policy and security competence. The conclusions of the European Council, containing recommendations first of all for the European Commission and EU member states, reflect

the perception of changes taking place in the EU's environment, mainly the international one, but also at the domestic level of the member states. The conclusions are a response to the changes – independent variables – that determine the decisions and actions of the EU's authorities. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. The structure and variability of problems in the conclusions of the European Council in 2010–2020

Problems in the conclusions of the European Council	Intensity of the occurrence of problems in the conclusions of the European Council				Total
	2010–2013	2014–2017	2018–2020	2021–2022	
Climate changes	8	10	9	3	30
Global financial crisis – employment and EU single market	12	9	5	4	30
Migrations	5	12	3	3	23
Eastern European Region (Ukraine and Russia)	4	9	2	7	22
Middle East Region – Arab spring and Syria	9	6		1	16
Brexit – agreement with the UK		5	10	1	16
Cyberspace – digital technologies, digital market, cybernetic security	1	3	4	6	14
COVID-19			4	9	13
Security and defence policy, relations with NATO	2	4	2	4	12
Energy security	3	3	1	4	11
Terrorism – including the so-called Islamic State and hybrid threats		5	3		8
China – especially trade relations	1	2	4	1	8
Transatlantic relations	1	4	1	2	8
Relations with Turkey		1	3	3	7
Iran's nuclear programme	3	3			4
Globalisation processes	1	1	1	1	4
Misinformation, mainly on the part of Russia			3	1	4
North Africa – Libya		1	1	2	4
Ebola virus		2			2
The rule of law			1		1

Source: prepared by the author

In order to capture the variability of the EU's interest in changes in its environment and also to capture the variability of the EU's environment, the period 2010–2022 was divided into four periods: 2010–2013, 2014–2017, 2018–2020, and 2021–2022. The periods do not

stem from the indication of distinct timeframes or special turning points in the functioning of the EU's environment. They nevertheless enable the identification – under the principle of change and continuity – of the presence, or even persistence of some problems that were the object of the EU's decisions and actions throughout 2010–2022, as well as the appearance and disappearance of those that determined such decisions and actions on an immediate, short term basis. For each of the three periods, the number has been shown in how many sittings of the European Council and its conclusions. The identified problem, originally an independent variable, was the object of discussion, diagnosis, or recommendations for decisions and actions.

Analysing the EU's perception of changes in its environment can be recognised as independent variables determining its decisions and actions prompts several conclusions. Firstly, the vast majority of phenomena, problems, or processes determining the EU's decisions and actions occur at the international system level. The internal ones concerning some member states, for example, the rule of law, were not the subject of the European Council's interest for a long time, which does not mean they were indifferent to all the EU's institutions. They were discussed by the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Secondly, a large number of the identified independent variables at the level of the international system cause consequences within the member states by functioning at the intersection of the international and the domestic. They thereby create the specific third level of variables that determine the EU.

Thirdly, the identified variables pertain to different areas, planes of social life, inter alia ecological, economic, social, informative, military, technological, health etc. Therefore, multifacetedness is an indisputable feature of independent variables that determine the EU's decisions and actions.

Fourthly, a characteristic feature of variables that determine the functioning of the EU and how the EU perceives them is the principle of change and continuity. About half of those variables – with different intensities – determined the EU's decisions and actions throughout 2010–2022. These include inter alia climate change, the global financial crisis, migrations, transatlantic relations, changes in Eastern Europe, energy security, globalisation processes, the Middle East region, and trade relations with China. Some of them disappeared, like Iran's nuclear programme, but many arose in the middle or at the end of the period analysed. In the middle of the period, terrorism appeared to be identified mainly with the so-called Islamic State, the Ebola virus, Brexit, or cyberspace. In the third period arose problems connected with Russia's misinformation measures, the rule of law and the COVID-19 pandemic. The fourth period was dominated by the COVID-19 pandemic and in 2022 by Russia's aggression against Ukraine. It means that independent variables that determine the EU's decisions and actions are a dynamic process conditioned by the dynamic and variability of social life. It can be assumed that the frequency of the presence of the analysed determinants in the conclusions of the European Council is a measure of their significance and power to influence the decisions of this body.

In this context, a specific role of globalisation processes should be emphasised. As such, they seldom appear in the European Council's conclusions. More frequently in combination with other independent variables such as the global financial crisis, cyberspace, climate changes, and terrorist threat or trade relations with China.

The Decision-Making Determinants at the Level of the International System

The overview of how the EU perceives – based on the European Council's conclusions – the changes at the international system level that determine its decisions and actions confirms the awareness of the significance, complexity and diversity of these changes. Both the structural and the functional ones, as well as global and regional ones, determine the EU's decisions and actions. Structural variables will include the change in the polarity of the international system, the emerging new international order and increasing rivalry among the powers with various power projection strategies. In contrast, functional variables will comprise climate changes, processes of globalisation in various areas of social life and their context, the terrorist threat, migration processes and the COVID-19 pandemic. A significant problem at the regional level became the hybrid war in Ukraine, Russia's aggression against this state, and the Middle East and North Africa conflicts. However, a general tendency appears to be the predominance of unfavourable changes. It is because after a short period of stability of the international system after the end of the Cold War, especially in the EU's immediate environment, this system entered a period of dynamic changes, instability, and limited predictability, disturbing the functioning of the EU.

The structural changes are determined by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system. To the EU, they meant functioning in the new geopolitical space, its higher international subject status and greater international responsibility, the deepening and geographical broadening of integration processes and a feeling that these changes are positive. However, especially over time, the collapse of the bipolar order launched many previously controlled processes with different consequences for the EU, constituting challenges or even threats to it. What began to significantly contribute to this condition was the change in the existing global but also the regional balance of powers and the change in the polarity of the international system. It was even a problem to identify the structure of the new polarity. A view was formulated that the world is no longer dominated by one, two or even several great powers. Its feature is the existence of many regional powers, with diverse and numerous non-state actors also becoming carriers of power (Haass, 2008).

For the EU, the comparative weakening of the West's position and the ability to maintain the preferred international order is paramount. Quite distinct is the relative weakening of the United States (Zakaria, 2008), their international influence, especially in the conditions of the global financial crisis and Donald Trump's finished presidency, which even resulted in the proposed view about the emergence of the post-American world (Zakaria, 2011). The

declining hegemonic position of the United States was accompanied by questions about the leadership abilities of this state, and the whole West as well, and about the condition and so-called architecture of transatlantic relations, which was reflected in the conclusions of the European Council (EUCO 21/1/10, EUCO 8/17). The Far East was explicitly recognised as the direction of the shifting balance of powers (Snyder, 2010). The ongoing changes mean undermining the West's several-century-old political, military, economic, cultural, and civilisational dominance. A significant unknown is what this means for the European Union and how it should respond. Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the style of Joe Biden's presidency seem to be an opportunity to change the tendency to weaken the global leadership of the United States. The EU welcomed Joe Biden's election with hope, emphasising the expectation of a new transatlantic agenda with a new US administration (SN 2/21). Russia's aggression will undoubtedly accelerate changes at the level of the global international system with unpredictable consequences for the EU.

In the conditions of the change in the global international order and many questions concerning the U.S. strategy during Donald Trump's presidency, Russia and China are becoming a problem for the EU, as is the cooperation between the two states motivated by their wish to weaken the West, restrict its importance in the world and the ability to mould this world according to the preferred model of the organisation of social life, conflicting with the one preferred by Russia and China. The two states are also interested in demonstrating the sense of their world power status (Kuźniar, 2019), with consequences for the EU, for example, limiting the spread of liberal values.

For many years Russia cooperated with the EU under the framework of strategic partnership; however, since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, especially since 2014, it has pursued confrontational and at the same time disintegrative policy towards the West, including the EU. The culmination of this policy was the concentration of Russian and Belarussian troops on the border with Ukraine in the second half of 2021, and then the aggression started on February 24, 2022. In addition to pressure through military and energy instruments, Russia's special interest is public opinion and misinformation measures also in cyberspace, and the object of interest are populist, nationalist forces that oppose the so-called mainstream parties. The region on which such actions were focused is the Central European states like the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Austria – EU members, but also the states in southern Europe, like Italy. These measures stimulated the EU's energy security policy and single energy market (EUCO 139/1/11; EUCO 75/13; EUCO 11/15). It was noted that the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the increase in energy prices (EUCO 17/21). After Russia attacked Ukraine, a decision was first made to reduce EU dependence on gas from Russia (EUCO 1/22), and then it was agreed that the sixth package of sanctions would cover crude oil and petroleum products imported from Russia. There was also support for the creation of an internal electricity market and a market for tradable emission permits. It means that strengthening energy security was combined with pursuing climate neutrality (EUCO 21/22).

The next decisions and actions are enhancement of security and defence, including the armaments potential (EUCO 217/13; EUCO 22/15; EUCO 19/1/17), prevention of hybrid threats (EUCO 22/15; EUCO 1/19), and counteraction to misinformation practices (EUCO 13/18; EUCO 17/18; EUCO 1/19; EUCO 9/19). Following Russia's aggression against Ukraine, there was support for a new agenda of transatlantic relations, increased investment in defence, a synergy between the civil and defence industries, and strengthening European cyber defence and crisis management (SN 2/21). The European Council approved the *Strategic compass for security and defence* (EUCO 1/22). It contains strategic guidelines for the next decade with a focus on faster and more decisive responses in crises, anticipating threats, and strengthening technological innovation and the technological and industrial base of the defence sector (*Strategic*, 2022). Russia's aggression was recognised as changing the EU's strategic situation. Greater defence capacity and strengthening relations with NATO are necessary while preserving the EU's decision-making autonomy (EUCO 21/22).

An ever-growing challenge to the EU – and the whole West – is China's increased power and the accompanying geopolitical strategy of this state, consisting of increasingly advanced economic penetration. It was effected – in addition to reforms initiated in 1978 – by globalisation processes of which China appears to be the greatest beneficiary (Mearsheimer, 2019). In this context, an opinion is expressed that in the changing international reality, the style of China's functioning, the “exercise of the great power status”, is significantly different from Russia's behaviour. Russia issues a direct challenge to the West, openly and officially questioning the international order formed after the Cold War, marking the lines of the West's unacceptable influence in the post-Soviet space. China takes care of its image as a responsible state, ready to accept responsibility for the global international order, which is a problem for the West, not the liberal order. According to John Mearsheimer, the latter is in crisis and has entered a period of decline. It is because it contained the seeds of self-destruction from the beginning (Mearsheimer, 2019). Moreover, the weakness of Western democracies is greater vulnerability to the political effects of economic crises and the external manipulations of choices made by citizens during elections. It introduces elements of instability and greater unpredictability of internal political processes. Hence, not without reason, and not only in relation to China's decisions and actions, the pursuit of resilience to external negative actions, processes, and phenomena in various areas of social life, such as security, climate change, energy security, health security, digital technologies have become an important direction of the preferred decisions and actions of the EU (EUCO 17/21, EUCO22/21, SN 18/21).

The EU responds to China's growing power. However, it focuses not so much on challenges that the state creates to liberal values but, first of all, on those to its economic position, especially bilateral trade relations, protection of intellectual property, on opening the Chinese public procurement market, and expresses concern about China's policy of foreign exchange rates with their consequences for trade (EUCO 21/1/10). The EU was in favour of supporting free trade with China while at the same time protecting its own interests (EUCO 52/1/11). It should be observed that China was present in the European Council's conclusions throughout

the 2010–2022 period: sporadically at its beginning, with an increasing frequency in its second half and at its end.

The language of argumentation also changed considerably. Emphasis began to be laid on the fact that China is a problem for the EU, as it is a state using dishonest trading practices. In 2017 China was demanded to counter protectionism and observe environmental or health norms in trade (EUCO 8/17), and in 2018 attention was drawn to tensions existing in trade with China (EUCO 9/18). In 2019 there were demands for honest competition at the global level and the protection of the EU's interests against dishonest practices of third states (EUCO 1/19). The European Commission took a highly critical stance towards China. The document adopted on March 12, 2019 stated that during the last decade, China's economic power and political influence of this state had increased unprecedentedly, reflecting its ambition to be a global leader. Under such circumstances, the earlier balance between challenges and advantages in the relations between the EU and China ceased to exist. Challenges and negative effects began to prevail (EU-China, 2019). In October 2020, the European Council expressed the wish to restore balance in economic relations with China (EUCO 13/20).

A determinant that functions at the international system level, and combines the effects of the Cold War's end and the increasing globalisation processes, i.e., structural and functional elements, is the new quality of armed conflicts in the environment of the EU. Classical wars between states were replaced by conflicts inside states, involving many non-state actors and conducted not only through military instruments. Initially, they were called "new wars" (Kaldor, 1999; Munkler, 2005), postmodern or low-intensity conflicts and, for over 10 years, a hybrid war or conflicts (Hoffman, 2007). Their hybrid character results from the diversity of actors involved in a conflict and, second, from various methods combining military, economic, propaganda and other instruments used to defeat the adversary.

Conflicts with such characteristics are taking place in the environment of the EU. They are the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and since 2014 – a hybrid war in eastern Ukraine. Each of these conflicts met with a response from the EU. The outbreak of the Arab Spring was accompanied by idealistic hopes of "building a future based on democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, human rights and social justice" (EUCO 7/13). However, in March 2011, it was observable that the situation in Libya caused a mass flow of migrants. With time, attention began to be paid to the interrelation between security problems (EUCO 3/13). With regard to the hybrid war in Syria, however, the emphasis focused first of all on condemning violence (EUCO 76/12) and on the activities of the so-called Islamic State, regarded as an immediate threat to the EU member states (EUCO 163/14). An object of rather intense interest was Russia's hybrid war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. The EU was strongly opposed to the annexation of Crimea, supported sanctions against Russia, and often opted for the peaceful settlement of the conflict under the Minsk Protocol (EUCO 79/14; EUCO 147/14; EUCO 237/14). Having experienced the specificity of Russia's hybrid war, the EU favoured counteracting misinformation practices and strengthening resilience to hybrid threats (EUCO 1/14).

Russia's aggression against Ukraine means a change in the quality of armed conflicts in Europe. In addition to internationalised, hybrid conflicts, Russia has started a "classic" war between states at the borders of the EU. The European Union condemned Russia's aggression, support from Belarus (EUCO 18/22, EUCO 1/22, EUCO 21/22), and Russia's war crimes, called on member states to impose sanctions in a coordinated manner, called for assistance to refugees and the creation of an international platform for the reconstruction of Ukraine, took up the topic of food security ((EUCO 21/22, EUCO 24/22). Recognising European aspirations, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidate states (EUCO 24/22).

The list of functional variables at the level of the global international system is rather long. Of special importance for the decisions of the EU were and are climate changes and the phenomena strictly connected with globalisation processes such as the global financial crisis, but also terrorist threats, threats in cyberspace, migration processes and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Climate changes are the most important ecological, dynamic and prospective threat with the not fully crystallised and identified potential of impact on social life and the condition of the natural environment. They are caused by an increase in the mean global temperature, which in comparison with 1850-1900, will have probably exceeded 1.5 °C by the end of the 21st century (Pachauri, 2014). Nevertheless, the World Meteorological Organization report of 2019 pointed out that the mean global temperature compared with the pre-industrial age rose by ca. 1.1 °C (The Global, 2019). There is a predominant conviction that these changes are anthropogenic and may produce devastating consequences to the state of the environment and social life, and may cause sudden, non-linear changes that go beyond mankind's adaptation capabilities.

The scale of the EU's awareness of threats triggered by climate change, but also aspirations to be the global leader in preventing these changes, caused them to become the object, like no other problem, of the EU's intense interest, decisions and actions reflecting the variability of global climate change negotiations. These concerned the support for the EU's negotiating positions at conferences of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, e.g., in Cancun (2010), Durban (2011), Paris (2015), Bonn (2017), Katowice (2018), aspiring to lead the fight against global warming (EUCO 79/14). After adopting the Paris Agreement (2015), the decisions and measures focused on defining the EU's contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (EUCO 1/18; EUCO 17/18). The strategic direction of actions, repeatedly discussed at the European Council's sessions, was to seek to achieve climate neutrality in 2050 (EUCO 9/19; 22/20; The Commission 2018). Instrumental to this would be the new strategy for a climate-energy policy (EUCO 15/20). Equally importantly, climate neutrality was seen as an opportunity rather than a threat, a chance for new jobs, technological innovation, economic growth, and a new business model (EUCO 29/19). The European Green Deal strategy was accepted.

Globalisation processes are vital variables determining the functioning of the EU at the international system level. They produce consequences for almost every field of social life, also in the EU member states. Their essence is the object of animated discussion and different interpretations. The assumption was adopted that they mean a new quality of social life identified with the mechanism of space-time compression. It creates an environment serving to increase mobility in social life and to produce phenomena and processes for which distances in the sense of physical space are of no importance and function without a definite location in the territorially defined space of the globe (Scholte, 1996). It applies particularly to the finance, capital, and information flows or to global, transborder ecological problems like climate change. The transborder mobility of social actors increases manifested in threats posed by terrorist organisations, organised crime structures, and migration processes. Thus, there is the “dark side” of globalisation processes with security threats (Mandel, 1999; Cronin, 2002; 2003). Terrorism appears to derive strength from globalisation processes, from the global flow of people, finance, information and the global reach of the media. It is confirmed by the terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain.

Globalisation processes mean the quite free flow of capital, goods, services and labour force within the global market, and consequently, the dominance of market rationality inconsistent with thinking in terms of national economies and “economic patriotism”. This kind of specificity at the economic level is becoming a significant problem for political preferences in many EU member states and a challenge to the supporters of liberal values, institutions, and market mechanisms. During the campaign before the presidential election in France in 2017, the right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen argued that the globalisation processes caused the loss of jobs. It is one of the elements of the complex effects of these processes upon the EU and its member states that were the object of decisions and actions. In the globalisation processes, the EU suffered heavily from the global financial crisis initiated in September 2008 in the United States. The EU’s decisions and actions – especially at the end of 2010–2022 – were determined by changes in cyberspace and the terrorist threat throughout that period.

The global financial crisis and its effects on the EU were, in addition to climate change, the most frequently discussed problems in the European Council’s conclusions of 2010–2022. Also noticeable is the logic of the EU’s response. The global financial crisis first determined the immediate, “defensive” measures against its effects and then built a long-term strategy for strengthening the EU, especially the single market and competitiveness in the global market. This crisis made the EU’s decision-makers and member states aware of the importance of global determinants. The conclusions of the European Council’s meeting of September 16 explicitly said, “The recent economic and financial crisis has dramatically shown the extent to which the well-being, security and quality of life of Europeans depend on external developments (EUCO 21/1/10)”. At the beginning of 2010–2020, the priorities were: to counter the global crisis, Greece’s assistance package, to protect jobs, stability of the Eurozone, and the change in economic management in the conditions of a financial crisis (EUCO 13/10; EUCO

25/10; EUCO 30/10; EUCO 2/11). A significant element in building a strategy for overcoming the crisis, stimulating economic growth, and strengthening the economic and currency union was the adoption of the Pact for Economic Growth and Employment (EUCO 76/12). It was recognised that the EU's budget for the 2014–2020 financial perspective should be geared toward getting the EU out of the crisis and supporting the “Europe 2020” strategy (EUCO 37/13). One of the priorities was to support the bank union, regarded as crucial for the financial stability and efficient functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EUCO 104/14). The emphasis was laid on strengthening the single market (EUCO 26/16), recognising it as the basis of the EU's position in the global environment (EUCO 17/18).

One of the manifestations of the narrowing of time and space, the “deterritorialisation” characteristic of the globalisation processes, was the functioning of cyberspace that vitally changes the space of social life. This fact began to determine the EU's decisions and actions, also combined with exiting the global financial crisis. The digital economy was an element of the process, recognised as fundamental for the EU's economic growth and competitiveness in the globalised world. Consequently, the creation of the digital single market was announced (EUCO 169/13). In 2020, in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic-triggered crisis, it was decided, as part of the recovery package, that economic transformation would be carried out in the framework of two mutually strengthening pillars: 1) ecological transformation and 2) digital transformation linked with the single market. The EU's digital sovereignty concept was introduced and built based on the single digital market (SN 18/21). The term will denote striving at the level of the international system to influence the content of the adopted regulations. At the same time, digital development will protect the EU's values, fundamental rights, and security and will conform to the concept of sustainable development (EUCO 13/20). At the same time, stress was laid on the necessity of building the capability to respond to security threats in cyberspace and to develop the instruments of digital diplomacy (EUCO 24/21) to prevent cyberattacks more effectively (EUCO 9/19). In the conclusions of the European Council, digital transformation was recognised as essential to the EU's security, prosperity, and competitiveness (SN 18/21). Calls were made for an inclusive and sustainable digital policy and adopting the programme *2030 Digital Compass: the European Way for the Digital Decade* (COM 2021, EUCO 17/21).

The globalisation processes produce a convenient environment for the mobilisation and transborder activity of transnational actors identified with asymmetric security threats that create a new kind of sensitivity and vulnerability of the EU. These actors also include terrorist organisations, particularly active during the strong position of “Islamic State”. The threat on their part determines the EU's decisions and actions. In addition to using the symbolism of condemning the attacks and being aware of the transborder nature of the terrorist threat, the EU supported cooperation with the most important partners, including the United States, and favoured the exchange of intelligence information. The European Counterterrorism Centre was created at the EUROPOL (EUCO 28/15). Guidelines for combating terrorism were also adopted (EUCO 22/15). Support for counteracting,

also in the Internet, and the radicalisation of some social groups were also agreed upon (EUCO 22/20).

In the circumstances of disproportions in the level of development and instability in its environment, the EU has been exposed to migration pressure for many years. It can be perceived as a symptom of globalisation processes with regard to people's mobility. From 2014 it intensified, peaking in 2015 and 2016 and decreasing from 2017. According to the Eurostat data, the number of applications for asylum in the EU member states in 2014 was 562 680, in 2015 – 1 257 030, in 2016 – 1 204 280, in 2017 – 649855 (*First*, 2017), in 2018 – 580845 (*First*, 2018), and in 2019 – 612 685 (*First*, 2019).

The unprecedented migration pressure became a factor in the increasing support for radical, usually right-wing, nationalist and populist political parties. It occurred in Austria, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. During the 2017 campaign before the presidential election in France, fears were expressed that the migration pressure combined with the globalisation processes might lead – especially in local communities – to the loss of identity, the sense of community and belonging.

The radical increase in the migration pressure reaching an unprecedented dimension found the EU unprepared. The scale of the phenomenon and associated threats made the subject of migration – along with climate change and the global financial crisis – the most frequent topic in the European Council's discussion and decisions in 2010–2020. It was called the “migration crisis”. The EU was learning to respond. In the first half-year of 2015, the focus was, first of all, on seeking strategies for response, with a growing awareness of the phenomenon's complexity. The need for an approach on a geographically large scale and for retaining the right to asylum was emphasised, and the humanitarian context of migration involving many fatalities was taken note of, as was the issue of the smuggling of migrants and the need to cooperate with the states of migration origin, as well as the need was perceived for the relocation of migrants but also their return home and reintegration (EUCO 22/15). The result of the discussion was the adoption of a comprehensive strategy for responding to the migration crisis. Then the control of the EU's external borders became a priority, and hence so significant was the agreement with Turkey (EUCO 1/16; EUCO 21/1/16; EUCO 12/1/16; EUCO 26/17). After the control of the external borders was tightened, the object of discussion and decisions was the return home of migrants (EUCO 13/18).

The actions Belarus took in mid-2021 to launch an organised channel of migratory pressure on the EU across the border with Poland brought a new impetus to the discussions and decisions of the European Council. The Council condemned the use of migrants as an instrument of political pressure, called for the need to deal with all migration routes (EUCO 22/21), and spoke out against the use of transit to initiate migratory pressure (EUCO 7/21, EUCO 17/21).

The COVID-19 pandemic was an unprecedented experience for the EU and its member states. The EU's response was in two stages. Stage one is to focus on the pandemic as a health threat. The second stage focuses on mitigating the social and economic effects of

the pandemic and shaping the future, long-term resilience of the EU to crises, including health crises.

In the first phase, the emphasis was on a common European approach to the pandemic, identifying three priorities: 1) limiting the spread of the virus; 2) delivery of medical equipment; 3) supporting research (Statements 164/20). Actions at the EU level have been accompanied by declarations of commitment at the level of the global international system: first, international solidarity in response to the pandemic (EUCO 7/21); second, a declaration of strengthening international health security in cooperation with the WHO and seeking to negotiate a global pandemic response treaty within the WHO (SN 2/21).

Concerning mitigating the pandemic's social and economic effects, it was considered a crisis affecting all areas of social life. Thus, the EU agreed and focused on implementing the *A Roadmap for Recovery strategy. Towards a more resilient, sustainable and fair Europe*. As part of this strategy, an investment plan has been prepared to revive and transform the economies of the Member States. The key areas of action include: 1) revitalisation of the single market; 2) ecological and digital transformation; 3) strategic autonomy to reduce dependence on third countries; 4) investment activities; 5) supporting global multilateralism and open international order (A Roadmap, 2020).

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, ad hoc counteraction to health threats was combined with a long-term strategy of shaping the EU's resilience to future health crises. The pandemic was considered to have a lasting impact on the European and global economies (EUCO 13/20). The decisions taken by the Council concerned two lines of action. First, the focus was on identifying critical systems and strategic sectors that may be subject to the pressure of crises in the future (SN 18/21). Secondly, it was recognised that digital transformation is a promising direction to strengthen the EU's resilience to future crises (EUCO 17/21, EUCO 22/21). It was considered a condition of the EU's security, prosperity and competitiveness and was linked to the ecological transformation (SN 18/21). In October 2021, the Council called the Member States to accept the programme *2030 Digital Compass: the European Way for the Digital Decade* (COM 2021, EUCO 17/21).

The Decision-Making Determinants at the Domestic Level of the EU Member States

Determinants at the internal level of the member states will include those that challenge the system of liberal values espoused by the EU. Hence, the subject of the analysis is the tendencies to change the values of the EU to those associated with Euroscepticism and support for anti-liberal, populist political parties. These determinants create a significant challenge for the EU as a community of values. Nevertheless, they are only occasionally included in the conclusions of the European Council as an intergovernmental body. As already emphasised, they are present in the decisions of the European Commission and the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the importance and occasional presence of these

independent variables in the conclusions of the European Council led to the decision to include them in the article.

Euro-scepticism, the development of populist, and radical movements were caused by changes at the international system level, especially the global financial crisis and migration pressure. It means mutual interpenetration, a specific interdependence of the level of the international system and internal systems of states, the creation of a specific space, and a separate level of social life at the intersection of what is international and what is domestic. Except for a few comments in the next paragraph, this level will not be analysed separately. However, it will be included in the proposed model of organising the analysis of independent variables of EU decisions.

The developments and processes functioning at the intersection of the international and the domestic concern different areas of social life and are reflected in the decisions of the European Council. In the context of the global financial crisis, attention focused on combating unemployment, reducing the social effects of the crisis, and strengthening public administration in the course of these actions (EUCO 7/1/14). In the context of climate change, the European Council appealed to the member states to adopt long-term strategies for implementing the Paris Agreement and for achieving the climate neutrality target (EUCO 1/19). Migration pressure was reflected in the recommendations on the asylum policy and relocation of refugees. And in the context of asymmetric threats, the European Council encouraged the member states to implement internal security strategies to combat terrorism and prevent money laundering (EUCO 34/16). Regarding digital Europe, the member states were encouraged to set up sectors of public administration adapted for the digital era and to combat terrorism and crime on the Internet (EUCO14/17).

The EU was established and functions as a community of liberal values. Article 2 of the Treaty on EU says, “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (*Traktat*, n.d.). There is a political consensus on the values underlying the existence and functioning of the EU and its political identity identified with liberal values.

At the domestic level of many member states, processes began to take place that created challenges but also threats to their liberal model and, consequently, to the cement of the European Union. It should be remembered that criticism of the EU existed in many states from the moment of its establishment. The problem lies, however, in the present intensity of this criticism, in the political strength of many parties rejecting liberal values, propagating radical, nationalist slogans, and being against the existence of the EU. The intensity of these phenomena is unprecedented in the EU’s history and appears to be an element of a synergic process also determined by changes at the international system level.

A significant confirmation of changes at the internal level of states, connected with changes in values and social preferences, these being essentially changes at the micro-level, i.e., the level of individuals or social groups, are the processes called Euroscepticism, Europhobia (*Euroscepticism...*, n.d.), but also the development of populism and of usually right-wing, radical political parties. The latter appear to be closely connected with Euroscepticism, aversion to liberal values and liberal political elites, and, consequently, to the EU, which espouses these values.

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism is a process, and its concept evolves. The term appeared in the 1980s to name the British mistrust, distance from and criticism of the deepening of European integration. With time, however, it was used to name the attitudes of doubts about the need for European integration and criticism of this process among any citizens of the EU member states (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014). After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, difficulties in the functioning of the EU began to manifest themselves as a gradually growing criticism, first of all at the level of societies. The EU began to be perceived as not having legitimisation, as distinguished by a deficit of democracy, as a project of the elites detached from the needs of society (Hogge & Marks, 2008). The process was accelerated under the global financial crisis and migration pressure. Trust in the EU declined. This trend began to be accompanied by increased confidence in nation-states.

Opinion polls confirm a drop in the level of trust in the EU. Taking into account the mean regarding all member states in 2004, i.e., when as many as ten new states became EU members, the EU was trusted by 50% of its citizens and not trusted by 36%. In 2005, when France and the Netherlands rejected the so-called Constitution for Europe, the EU was trusted by 44% and not trusted by 43%. However, with the onset of the global financial crisis, a rise in distrust of the EU became a tendency to achieve in the spring of 2012 and 2013 the highest level of distrust at 60% and the level of trust at 31%. In the spring of 2016, distrust reached 55% under migration pressure, and trust was at 33%. (*Public...*, 2016). The level of trust increased to 43%, and distrust dropped to 47% in 2019 (*Public...*, 2019), while in the summer of 2020, the confidence level stayed at 43%, and the distrust level at 48% (*Public...*, 2020).

The confirmation of growing Euroscepticism in many EU member states was the election to the European Parliament in 2014 but also the rising influence of extreme right-wing parties in the elections to national parliaments. In the UK, the election to the European Parliament was won by the extreme anti-European United Kingdom Independence Party with 26.6% of votes (in 2009 – 16.5%). Although it gained 3.22% in 2019, the Brexit Party won as much as 30.79%. In France, this election was won by the anti-European National Front, receiving 24.86% of votes compared to 6.3% in 2009, but in 2019 it received 23.34%. The Eurosceptic Freedom Party of Austria received 12.7% in the 2009 election but in 2014, as much as 19.7%, to win 17.2% in 2019. In the elections to Austria's parliament in 2013, this party gained 20.51% of votes and as many as 40 seats, and in 2017 – 26% and as many as 51 seats, to gain, however, only 16.2% and lose 20 seats, going down to 31, in 2019. In

the Netherlands, the Eurosceptic and populist Freedom Party won 17% of the election to the European Parliament in 2009, in 2014 – 13.32%, and 14.64% in 2019. In the elections to the national parliament in 2010, it received 15.45%, in 2012 – 10.1%, and 2017 – 13.1%. In the 2019 European Parliament elections in Denmark, success was gained by the Danish People’s Party with 10.76%, and in Hungary – the extreme right-wing Fidesz won 52.56% in the coalition, but the extreme right-wing and anti-European Jobbik – 6.34%. These are only selected examples of the rising importance of right-wing, Eurosceptic, and populist parties in the EU member states in recent years.

These tendencies in the change of values and social attitudes were not the objects of decisions of the European Council. Although the European Commission and the European Parliament did this more often, they discussed the cases of violations of the rule of law. The EU Strategic Agenda 2019–2024 emphasises that shared values are the foundation of freedom, security and prosperity. The rule of law is a guarantee that these values are well protected. Hence, it has to be observed by all the member states (*European Council*, 2019). In December 2020, in connection with the EU budget for 2021–2027 and the introduction of the conditionality mechanism linking the budget with the rule of law, it was emphasised that the EU is based on shared values, including the rule of law. Article 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides a procedure for remedying violations of the shared values, and the EU’s states and institutions are obliged to promote and respect these values (*European Council*, 2020).

Model of Analysis of the Determinants of Decision-Making in the European Council

The presented essence (Fig. 1) of the model of analysis of the EU in the environment of multilevel and multidimensional changes determining its functioning is a structure inspired by three analytical constructs significant for a political-science approach (Pietraś, 2021). They are the concept of the level of analysis of international relations, the concept of identification of behaviour-determining independent variables called factor analysis, and the concept of combining the domestic and the international. Therefore, the proposed model is an eclectic, hybrid construction that combines three research approaches recognised in the science of international relations, which (approaches) complement one another. Significant reasons for this stem from the change in social reality, its progressive complexity, and the interpenetration and mutual determination of individual elements. It appears to justify the combination of different theoretical approaches and research tools (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010) with a challenge for achieving analytical cohesion.

Of significant importance for the concept of the levels of analysis were the publications of Kenneth Waltz (1954) and David Singer (1961). In his book published in 1954, the former analysed the phenomenon of war at three levels: that of the individual, the state and the international environment. David Singer in 1961 used the term “level of analysis”. He pointed to the methodological dilemma of scholars studying international relations, i.e., consisting

Figure 1. The logic of the multilevel determinants

Source: own study inspired by Richmond (2002).

of the selection of the right research perspective. He distinguished two analysis levels: the level of state and the level of the international environment.

Both levels are accompanied by a significant dilemma of research perspective, the place of viewing international reality: whether from the level of state and its foreign policy or the level of the international system? However, in the proposed model, identifying the levels of social reality serves to point out the place – the level of location of independent variables determining the EU's decisions and actions. According to David Singer's proposal, the level of the international system and the state domestic level have been "maintained". Assuming that identification of the levels of analysis in the science of international relations is an open process determined by changes in social reality, a special level has been proposed at the intersection of the international and the internal.

The second approach that "co-creates" the proposed model of analysis, i.e., the field theory or factor analysis, consists in the identification of "forces" – independent variables that determine it, but also the level of the organisation and functioning of social life, at which these "forces" occur. Quincy Wright (1955), already in the mid-1950s, suggested analysing international relations in terms of the field of forces of these relations. The analysis of independent variables at the international system level is connected with the problem of change in international relations and the identification of "great forces" operating at this level, and it focuses on how the whole determines the parts (Waltz, 1979).

The third approach is concerned with analysing linkages, the mutual determination of the state's domestic level and the international environment. It was proposed by James N. Rosenau (1969) at the end of the 1960s. He pointed out interrelationships between national politicians and the international environment. He understood them as a sequence of behaviours in one of these systems that triggers a response from the others and changes their behaviours. It means the interrelation and – despite specific features and a separate logic of the organisation and functioning – mutual interpenetration and determination between the two systems. James N. Rosenau (1997) also formulated the view that specific space of social life, its specific level, arises at the intersection of the domestic and the international.

Under globalisation processes and increased penetrability of state borders, there is even a mutual determination of the local and the global.

Inspired by these approaches, the structure of the model of the multilevel and multi-dimensional changes that determine the functioning of the EU is of framework character. It serves to organise their analysis, identifies the levels of changes, and their types with a distinction between structural and functional ones, and indicates the levels of social life at which the changes occur.

Diagram 1. The structure of the model of multilevel and multifaceted changes that determine the functioning of the EU

The level of the international system

structural factors: change in the alignment of forces, the polarity of the international system

functional factors: globalisation processes, global financial crisis, climate change, migrations, asymmetric threats, hybrid conflicts

planes of factors: political, economic, social, security

The level of the intersection of the domestic and the international

structural changes:

functional changes: strategies for climate neutrality, digital single market, combating terrorism, migration policies of states

planes of factors: ecological, economic, security

The level of state

structural factors: changes in the structure of political systems

functional factors: changes in values preferred by societies

planes of factors: political, social

Source: own study.

To recapitulate, an important methodological approach present in political-science thinking for years is the analysis of cause-and-effect interrelations. They have been analysed using the example of the European Union as an international system undergoing dynamic changes as a dependent variable adopted for analytical purposes, determined by independent variables. Identification of the latter was the main objective of this analysis. Its results highlight the progressive complexity – presented in multilevel and multifaceted terms – of

the independent variables determining the EU's decisions and actions. They occur first at the international system level but also at the domestic (internal) levels of states and various planes of social life. With regard to the international system, they reflect not only the "traditional" change of its polarity but also qualitative changes determined by globalisation processes, the technological factor, or the pandemic.

Consequently, the adopted research hypothesis about the multilevel and multi-sectoral nature of independent variables conditioning the decisions of the European Council was positively verified. These variables – firstly – function especially at the level of the international system, but also at the level of the internal systems of states and the intersection of the mutual penetration of these systems. Secondly, the variety of the analysed independent variables means that they concern many sectors of social life, such as politics, economy, technologies, ecology, health problems, etc. Structural determinants are more and more supplemented with functional determinants. Multilevel and multi-sectoral independent variables of the conclusions of the European Council reflect the progressive complexity of social life that determines the decisions and actions of international institutions.

References:

- A Roadmap. (2020). *A Roadmap for Recovery strategy. Towards a more resilient, sustainable and fair Europe*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/43384/roadmap-for-recovery-final-21-04-2020.pdf>
- Boix, C. (2011). Democracy, Development and the International System. *American Political Science Review*, 105(4), 809–828.
- Chaudoin, S., Milner, H., & Pang, X. (2015). International Systems and Domestic Politics. Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical in International Relations. *International Organization*, 69, 275–309.
- COM. (2021) *2030 Digital (2021) Compass: the European Way for the Digital Decade*, Brussels, 9 March 2021, COM/2021/118.
- Condruz-Bacescu, M. (2014). Euroscepticism Across Europe: Drivers and Challenges. *European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 6(2), 52–59.
- Cronin, A. K. (2002; 2003). Behind the Curve: Globalisation and International Terrorism. *International Security*, 27(3), 30–58.
- Czachór, Z. (2013). *Kryzys i zaburzona dynamika Unii Europejskiej*. Warszawa.
- Doyle, M. W. (1986). Liberalism and world politics. *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151–1163.
- EU-China. A strategic outlook*. (2019). European Commission, JOIN, 5 final, Strasbourg.
- EUCO 1/16. Session of the European Council 18 and 19 February 2016, Conclusions.
- EUCO 1/18. Session of the European Council 22 March 2018, Conclusions.
- EUCO 1/19. Session of the European Council 21 and 22 March 2019, Conclusions.
- EUCO 1/19. The European Council 21 and 22 March 2019, Conclusions.
- EUCO 1/22. Session of the European Council 24 and 25 March 2022, Conclusions.
- EUCO 104/13. The European Council 27–28 June 2013, Conclusions.
- EUCO 11/15. Session of the European Council 19 and 20 March 2015, Conclusions.
- EUCO 12/1/16. Session of the European Council 17 and 18 March 2016, Conclusions.
- EUCO 13/10. The European Council 17 June 2010, Conclusions.

- EUCO 13/18. Session of the European Council 18 October 2018, Conclusions.
- EUCO 13/20. Extraordinary session of the European Council 1 and 2 October 2020, Conclusions.
- EUCO 139/1/11. The European Council 9 December 2011, Conclusions.
- EUCO 14/17. The European Council 19 October 2017, Conclusions.
- EUCO 147/14. Special session of the European Council 16 July 2014, Conclusions.
- EUCO 15/20. Session of the European Council 15 and 16 October 2020, Conclusions.
- EUCO 163/14. Special session of the European Council 30 August 2014, Conclusions.
- EUCO 169/13. The European Council 24–25 October 2013, Conclusions.
- EUCO 17/18. Session of the European Council 13 and 14 December 2018, Conclusions.
- EUCO 17/21. Session of the European Council 21 and 22 October 2021, Conclusions.
- EUCO 17/21. Session of the European Council 21 and 22 October 2021, Conclusions.
- EUCO 18/22. Extraordinary session of the European Council 24 February 2022, Conclusions.
- EUCO 19/1/17. Session of the European Council 14 December 2017, Conclusions.
- EUCO 2/11. The European Council 4 February 2011, Conclusions.
- EUCO 21/1/10. The European Council 16 September 2010, Conclusions.
- EUCO 21/22. Extraordinary session of the European Council 30 and 31 May 2022, Conclusions.
- EUCO 217/13. The European Council 19–20 December 2013, Conclusions.
- EUCO 22/15. Session of the European Council 25 and 26 June 2015, Conclusions.
- EUCO 22/20. Session of the European Council 10 and 11 December 2020, Conclusions.
- EUCO 22/20. The European Council 10 and 11 December 2020, Conclusions.
- EUCO 22/21. Session of the European Council 16 December 2021, Conclusions.
- EUCO 237/14. The European Council, 18 December 2014, Conclusions.
- EUCO 24/22. Session of the European Council 23 and 24 June 2022, Conclusions.
- EUCO 25/10. The European Council 28–29 October 2010, Conclusions.
- EUCO 26/16. Session of the European Council 28 June 2016, Conclusions.
- EUCO 28/15. Session of the European Council 17 and 18 December 2015, Conclusions.
- EUCO 29/19. Session of the European Council 12 December 2019, Conclusions.
- EUCO 3/13. The European Council 7–8 February 2013, Conclusions.
- EUCO 30/10. The European Council 16–17 December 2010, Conclusions.
- EUCO 34/16. The European Council 15 December 2016, Conclusions.
- EUCO 37/13. The European Council 7–8 February 2013, Conclusions.
- EUCO 52/1/11. The European Council 23 October 2011, Conclusions.
- EUCO 7/1/14. The European Council 20–21 March 2014, Conclusions.
- EUCO 7/11. Extraordinary session of the European Council 11 March 2011, Statement.
- EUCO 7/21. Session of the European Council 24 and 25 June 2021, Conclusions.
- EUCO 75/13. The European Council 22 May 2013, Conclusions.
- EUCO 76/12. The European Council 28–29 June 2012, Conclusions.
- EUCO 79/14. The European Council 26–27 June 2014, Conclusions.
- EUCO 8/17. Session of the European Council 22 and 23 June 2017, Conclusions.
- EUCO 9/18. Session of the European Council 28 June 2018, Conclusions.
- EUCO 9/19. Session of the European Council 20 June 2019, Conclusions.
- EUCO 9/19. The European Council 20 June 2019, Conclusions.
- Eurocepticism and Europhobia: the threat of Populism.* (n.d.). <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0375-eurocepticism-and-europhobia-europe-under-the-test-of-populism>

- First time asylum applicants EU 27.* (2019). <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/themes-in-the-spotlight/asylum2019>
- First time asylum applicants EU 28.* (2017). <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/themes-in-the-spotlight/asylum2017>
- First time asylum applicants EU 28.* (2018). <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/themes-in-the-spotlight/asylum2018>
- Gałganek, A. (1992). *Zmiana w globalnym systemie międzynarodowym: supercykle i wojna hegemoniczna*. Poznań.
- Gourevitch, P. (1978). The Second Image Reversed. The International Sources of Domestic Politics. *International Organization*, 32(4), 881–912.
- Groom, A. J. (2007). Foreign Policy. Analysis: From Little Acorn to Giant Oak? *International Studies*, 44(3), 195–215.
- Haass, R. N. (2008). The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S. Dominance. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3), 44–56.
- Hoffman, F. (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century. The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington.
- Hoffmann, S. (1965). *The State of War: Essay on the Theory and Practice of International Politics*. New York.
- Hogge, L., & Marks, G. (2008). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 1–23.
- Jervis, R. (1997). *System Effects; Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton.
- Kaldor, M. (1999). *New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge.
- Kaplan, M. (1964). *System and Process in International Politics*. Wiley.
- Karta praw podstawowych Unii Europejskiej.* (2010). 2010/C 83/02.
- Kaysner, M. (2007). How Domestic is Domestic Politics? Globalisation and Elections. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10(1), 341–362.
- Kuźniar, R. (2019). Przegląd sytuacji międzynarodowej – aspekty globalne i regionalne. *Rocznik strategiczny 2018/2019*. Warszawa.
- Lindberg, L. N., & Scheingold, S. A. (1970). *Europe's would Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community*. Prentice Hall.
- Łoś-Nowak, T. (2006). *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie – systemy – uczestnicy*. Wrocław.
- Mandel, R. (Ed.) (1999). *Deadly Transfer and the Global Playground: Transnational Security Threats In a Disorderly World*. Westport.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. *International Security*, 43(4), 7–50.
- Milner, H. (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information*. Princeton.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously. A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513–553.
- Morgenthau, H. (1978). *Politics among nations. The struggle for power and peace* (5th ed.). New York.
- Munkler, H. (2005). *The New Wars*. Malden.
- Pachauri, R. K., & Meyer, L. et. al (Eds.) (2014). *Climate Change. Synthesis Report*. Geneva.
- Pietraś, M. (2009). Dynamika globalnego środowiska międzynarodowego. Analiza uwarunkowań systemowych. In K. Wojtaszczyk (Ed.), *Demokratyczna Polska w globalizującym się świecie*. Warszawa.
- Pietraś, M. (2021). Unia Europejska w środowisku wielopoziomowych i wielowymiarowych zmian. Propozycja modelu analizy. *Przegląd Sejmowy*, 166(5), 99–132.
- Public opinion in the European Union.* (2016). Standard Eurobarometer 85, Spring 2016.
- Public opinion in the European Union.* (2019). Standard Eurobarometer 92, Autumn 2019.
- Public opinion in the European Union.* (2020). Standard Eurobarometer 93, Summer 2020.

- Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427–460.
- Richmond, O. (2002). *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*. New York.
- Rosenau, J. N. (1969). Toward the Study of National-International Linkages. In J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), *Linkage Politics Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. New York.
- Rosenau, J. N. (1997). *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge.
- Scholte, J. A. (1996). Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization. In E. Kofman, & G. Youngs (Eds.), *Globalisation: Theory and Practice*. London.
- Sil, R., & Katzenstein, P. (2010). Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems in and Mechanisms across Research Traditions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), 411–431.
- Singer, D. (1961). The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics*, 14(1), 77–92.
- SN 18/21. (2021, March 25). Statement of the Members of the European Council, Brussels.
- SN 2/21. (2021, February 26). Statement of the Members of the European Council, Brussels.
- Snyder, Q. (2010). Rising Powers and International Politics: A Liberal Systemic Perspective. *APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper*. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1643369>
- Sprout, H., & Sprout, M. (1956). *Man-milieu relationship hypotheses in the context of international politics*. Princeton.
- Statements. (164/20). *Conclusions by the President of the European Council following the video conference with members of the European Council on COVID-19*. Statements and Remarks 164/20, 17.03.2020.
- Strategic compass for security and defense. For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security*. (2022). https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf
- The Commission calls for a climate neutral Europe by 2050*. (2018, November 28). Brussels.
- The Global. (2019). *Climate in 2015–2019*. Geneva.
- Traktat o Unii Europejskiej*. (n.d.). <https://www.arslege.pl/glowne-wartosci-unii/k78/a11010>
- Waltz, K. (1954). *Man, the state, and war. A theoretical analysis*. New York.
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading.
- Wright, Q. (1955). *The study of international relations*. New York.
- Zakaria, F. (2008). The Future of American Power. How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3), 18–43.
- Zakaria, F. (2011). *The Post-American World*. New York.

