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Specification of Bilingual Scenario of Cross-Language Relationship and Its Implementation Problems (Based on the Examples of Canada, Belgium and Spain)

ABSTRACT

Our current research is dedicated to the analysis of the most demonstrative scenarios of bilingual cross-language relationship and peculiarities of their implementation within a single state, comparing the experience of such countries as Canada, Belgium and Spain. It has been examined that “type A” scenario implies the ideas of the absence of “Great Tradition”, “type B” – the existence of such “Great Tradition” and “type C” involves several “Great Traditions”, which remain in the relationship of competition. Besides, it has been estimated that diglossia models were distributed in former colonial states of Africa and India.

Consideration of Canadian experience firstly showed the facts of the English-French bilingualism type; in addition to it, it has been proved that all Federal Institutions had been transferred to bilingual background that was adopted legislatively by the Constitution of Canada. The case of Belgium has occurred to be even more demonstrative, while this country has two components, which qualitatively differ “Belgian case” from the “Canadian”: a) more consequent background upon the ethnic model of communities’ identity (in Canada this model is exclusively “linguistic”, close to American “civil nation’s model”) and b) practical absence of the question consideration about “Belgian nation” (in Canadian case there exists such a public require, but it remains unsatisfied). Third country’s (Spain) investigation involves two principles which allow Spain to occupy the middle position between unitary, centralized, monolingual France and completely regionalized Belgium and pushes us to characterize the combination of these principles (“state integrity” and “regional demand”) as the “symbols of combination”.

Key words: *cross-language relationship, relationship scenario, monolingualism, bilingualism, diglossia, official language, language conflict, language policy, language status.*

The significant paper of I. Popescu “Theoretical Aspects of Language Policy” is dedicated to the role of “Tradition” in the elites’ choice of “language policy”. He underlined that in the situation of elite choice of language police type the ideas of the absence of “Great Tradition” may occur (and in this case the so called “exoglossia” or “polylingual” states appear). This type is called provisionally by the author “type A”. “Type B” implies the existence of such “Great Tradition”. And finally, the last – “type C” implies several “Great Traditions”, which remain in the relationship of competition. The curiosity arisen by the last type is connected with the fact that it provides struggle not only on the level of symbolic construction but also on the level of the elites themselves as the Centers of Power or “powerful institutions” (Popescu, 2003).

Diglossia models were distributed in former colonial states of Africa and India. In such states the combination of actual “scenario C” with “scenario B” (and partially – “scenario A”) took place. Unlike these models “bilingualism” characterizes the principle of equity (but not the principle of hierarchy) and it is obvious that its basic scenario is “scenario C” (that is the recognition of several equal Great Traditions) (Puzevich, 2012). Exactly these scenarios fall under our consideration in the current issue and we’ll try to demonstrate these scenarios’ hidden conflicts. So, we’ll pay attention to the concrete polylingual countries, and then we’ll conclude the results of our analysis.

A. Canada. Firstly, the most curious fact is that the English-French bilingualism type was formed not between the colonizers and natives but between two competing language-cultural communities of colonizers – French and English. To definite extend it is a unique factor which has no analog, therefore English-French bilingualism in Canada gained so specific feature.

This mentioned paradigm was operating correspondingly to the following steps. As it is known, the first attempt to establish bilingualism on the legislative level was made in 1867, when the Act of British Northern America was adopted. According to this Act the compromise and incomplete scenario of English-French bilingualism, to our opinion, was implemented, due to which English was recognized as the state language and French had the status of official language. It meant that French was used in the Federal Parliament and also it became dominant in judicial proceedings in Quebec.

We’ve defined this scenario as compromise while it combines elements of “scenario C” and aspects of “scenario B”, although the latest mentioned one has been dominating. To some extent, French occupied the position of the subordinate language; it means that in the competition between two communities of white colonizers the English ones appeared to be “whiter” while the French experienced some discrimination. The feeling of the complex of less importance among the French population caused the struggle for their language-cultural rights. It is known that the break happened in the XXth century, concretely in the 60th, according to which the equal rights of French and English languages were supported legislatively, that means the real *bilingualism*. It is proved by the fact that all Federal Institutions had been transferred to bilingual background that was adopted legislatively by the Constitution of Canada.

Even P. Trudeau consequently and clearly explained the essence of “scenario C”, which was included to the adopted type of bilingualism: “There is no single cultural policy for the Canadian of British and French origin, the other one – for the native citizens and persons who compose the third part of the population of the country. And although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, and no ethnic group has privileges above the other” (Trudeau, 1971). Analyzing this statement more thoroughly might lead to the interpretation by the means of the terms of “scenario A”, the one which excludes the existence of the dominating cultural tradition, but impeccably – and we insist on this point of view – it implies the existence of two similar traditions – English and French. References to other ethnos means simply benefit to political correctness and not more. So, actually we have the public recognition of two great cultures and language communities, which was supported by the terms of bilingual scenario.

Is it reasonable to consider the English-French bilingualism in Canada as the most favorable way of regulating cross-language relationship? Otherwise speaking, can we consider it fair? Unfortunately no, and in our research we drive from the statement that there is no such ideal language policy at all, because there is the contradiction that every power’s solving of one problem introduces a new one, sometimes rather unexpected. In the Canadian variant situation this problem was the phenomenon of separatism, which is overwhelming above the country as the black cloud. Nevertheless, we are going to pay attention to it later, and now let us return to the exclusively structural aspects of bilingualism.

First of all, we can estimate the existence of the remnants of language discrimination to French, which is partially connected with qualitative dominating of English speakers over French speakers (nearly 18,5 million over 7 million). How does it display itself? First of all, in every day communication purely bilingual are the representatives of Francophone population (who fluently possess English and French languages), while English-speaking Canadians don’t need to learn French, expressing some snobbism of the community’s dominating there before.

The second negative peculiarity of this type scenario lies in the actual neglecting of the rights of the useful ethnos, according to which the typical colonial scenario remains, deprecating these ethnos’ rights for their language being recognized as official. In this respect of neo-colonial discrimination of native population of local tribes, the Anglophones as well as Francophones remain equal, which demonstrate the similarity of the “white human being”.

The third peculiarity is the fact that such type of cross-language relationship scenario forms serious difficulties for developing the solitary national community or “Canadian nation”. (Unlike Canadian variant, American culture, being close to Canada, succeeded in forming the community, which could be precariously called the “American nation”). The absence of the language-cultural equity brings the forth remarkable disadvantage of the Canadian scenario of bilingualism, mentioned above. It deals with the separatism phenomenon, which followed the “Quebec project” as the shadow. This separatism is the constant part of the Francophone nationalism and Francophone language-cultural identity, demanding their own state. (The problem of the close connection between separatism and nationalism has been examined in the Ph.D. thesis of Russian researcher F.Gobozov “The Role of the Ethnic Factor in the Development of Separatism in Canada” (2003), where one of the paragraphs was titled “Separatism as nationalism”).

As it is known, the Party of separatists in Quebec won the elections in 1976 and initiated the Referendum about the Canadian province Quebec separating; the population of the province expressed their position against the separatist scenario. Although, irrespective of it, in 1992 the second attempt to gain state independence and to create its own state was made. As far as it is known, this time the project failed too. So, the Canadian society remains separated, while, on one hand, it is characterized by “patience to separatism”, as a result of which its phantom is constantly renovating above the country. On the other hand, despite the democratic traditions of the country, language-cultural war was actually wagging in Canada, which was initiated by the community considering itself deprived (Francophone community), which proves the reasonability of the ideas of Istvan Bibo (Bibo, 1976).

Let us give an interesting example of the existence of discriminative strategies of the former monopoly against the local population. We mean not only the recognition of the rights of the language of native citizens, but also the community’s rejection to consider the issue of secession. For example, there exists the demand of the so called “Nushalls” (one tribe’s name), who live densely in one region and require separating from Canada. But these demands are not taken into account seriously, and in public sphere of the Canadian society only the problem of Quebec is being under discussion. This fact highlights once again the limits of the democracy of Canadian variant of bilingualism and the existence of the population which is considered not equal but *Homo Sacer*.

B. Belgium. We have just described the main problems of the development of national community in Canada, which had appeared as a result of dividing of Canadian population into two communities, while these communities are competing, that is, communities’ being involved into the language war, which may lead to the separation within the country. The case of Belgium is even more demonstrative, while this country has two components, which qualitatively differ “Belgian case” from the “Canadian”: a) more consequent background upon the ethnic model of communities’ identity (let us remind that in Canada model is exclusively “linguistic” and, with the respect to it, is close to American “civil nation’s model”) and b) practical absence of the question consideration about “Belgian nation” (in Canadian case there exists such a public require, but it remains unsatisfied).

Let us analyze thoroughly this case. We should imply the methodological means for this model’s analysis, suggested by T.Puzevich (Puzevich, 2012). In particular, the author gives the following characteristics of “language situation” (LS): a) quantitative characteristics (the amount of the languages-components, language demographic “value”, language communicative power); b) qualitative characteristics (the essence of the languages genetic relationship, the society’s evaluation of the languages prestige, normative-stylistic composition of the literary language); c) judicial status of the languages-components of “language situation”. As for Belgium, T. Puzevich summarized the given characteristics as following.

As for the quantitative characteristics, it should be underlined that in this country the three-languages exoglossia situation takes place, including Dutch as the state language and German as the official one. The demographic aspect of the underlined above characteristics belongs to the approximate difference of Dutch and German languages among the representatives of Belgian population (nearly 60 per cent are covered by the Dutch language speakers, some quantity make up German citizens, and almost 40 per cent are made up by Francophones). From the author’s point of view, the described languages are characterized by the approximate equal communicative power in the public sphere application (though, as for some of the data, this statement can be argued with, and further on we’ll return to this analysis).

As for the qualitative characteristics T. Puzevich states that, according to the level of genetic relationship, state languages are quite far from each other (as it is known, Dutch language belongs to the German languages, while French – to Roman). Interesting branch which has

caused great problems and conflicts in public communication of state language speakers is the issue of prestige. Irrespective of details of the history of cross-ethnic relationship of the Flemish (Dutch speakers) and the Walloons (Francophones), we should underline that during a long period of time French language was dominating in Belgium, what caused the so called Flemish movement as the struggle against “French proceeding”, having started in 1830 with its waves reaching our nowadays.

This struggle for the “rights” of Dutch language against its discrimination has, to our opinion, all characteristics of the “language war”, which fell under our analysis of the Eastern Europe states. The only difference of this “war” is comparative mildness, that means it didn’t reach the edge forms of Dutch language prosecution (for example, Dutch language had the status of the official language) and wasn’t distributed over Flemish ethnos itself. As a result of this struggle we observe the consequent enhance of language (and, simultaneously, social and economic) rights of the Flemish. As for the judicial aspects of cross-language relationship and language policy in Belgium, we can agree with a rather contradicting author’s opinion, concerning the fact that the bigger is the resistance of two communities the more particular are the judicial aspects descriptions of cross-language relationship (it concerns mostly Eastern Europe countries).

For example, one of the most significant moments of the expressive *bilingualism* (as rather “polylingualism”) is the fact the Belgian Constitution was written in three languages (Dutch, French and German). Although, the expressiveness mentioned above, doesn’t solve the conflict, but controversially operates as its catalyst. (In this context, the statement of T. Puzevich seems true, dealing with the fact that the high level of development doesn’t provide stability in the polyethnic state). What conflicts can we identify in modern Belgium and which of them form the deepest background of the analyzed “language practice”? They can be demonstrated by the ideas of Belgian former official officer Willy Forte, who has been working in the Language Rights’ Protection Committee for a long period of time (the article “Belgium: Unsuccessful Policy in the Field of Language Variety”, The Day, March 21, 2011) (Fotre, 2011).

The title of W. Forte’s article itself is highly expressive, while it takes the final conclusion about the Belgian language policy failure. So, the author suggests the facts about the Party “New Flemish Alliance”, which has gained the power following the separatist views and launched the policy of hidden discrimination of Francophones. For example, the Flemish government introduced serious limits for school French-speaking education in Flemish districts; in addition to it, definite discrimination measures had been implemented in the library issues. (Only those libraries get state subsidies whose books collection is 75 per cent composed by Dutch language books). As a result of such assumption of language equilibrium, the Francophone population creates so called “private libraries” where the amount of French language books exceeds 25 per cent. One more example of discriminational technologies is the financing break for the number of Francophone journals and switching off of French language cable TV programs.

The given example clearly illustrates the elements of language discrimination of the population from the side of Dutch-speaking Flemish ethnos, which happens in the frames of formal-judicial bilingualism. The examples of such discrimination policy are numerous (for instance, the compulsory character of Dutch-speaking for the Heading positions, even in Francophone communities, that proves the direct violation of language rights of Francophones); although the facts mentioned above might be enough. We should add the fundamental difference between political projects of Flemish and Walloons, who are closely connected with ideological concept of the Language. By such concept or “language ideology” we mean the language consideration in the context of Belgian state composition. So, for example, the Francophone Parties and politicians stand for the definite centralization of the Power (and in this situation the genetic similarity of Wallons with their “native” French Culture, which, as we have already analyzed before, is characterized by centralizing), while Flemish political power supports the regionalization, which contains real and serious threatening of possible separatism.

Having based upon mentioned above facts we may conclude the cursory analysis of “language practice” and “language communication” in Belgium, which are unique due to their consequent bilingualism, which defines the specification of even discriminative forms from the side of language-cultural community concerning another community. First of all, let us underline that the described bilingualism implies the clear existence of “scenario C” in the branch of cross-language relationship, which, as we remember, implies the existence of two language traditions. (We have already revised this connection of Belgian Francophones with French culture – although not quite direct). As for the Flemish culture, we should highlight that it contains not only the facts of Dutch language usage within this community, but also the presence of Dutch culture heritage, which led to the consequent and conscious – with the help of special Institutions and Experts – linguistic integration with language norms of modern Dutch language.

What is the reason of the crisis in language policy sphere in Belgium? Firstly, it is necessary to remind once again about the typical ethnic background of identical community development and total absence of the question about Belgian single nation, which under the conditions of polyethnic can’t be *political* or *civil nation*. Absence of such Unity in the situation of two communities’ co-existence – which are language-ethnic communities – consequently turns the bilingualism notion into “language fragmentation”, called so by the experts. Regionalization can be taken as an administrative equivalent of this fragmentation according to the territory, which also implies autonomy of social life in the frames of ethnic-moral communities. The absence of the feeling of social-political Unity and any agreement within this Unity (for example, “peoples” as the ideal subject and source of higher legitimating of social order) has considerable outcomes in the branch of political representativeness.

Here we mean the inquiring practice of Parliament and Government members meeting as separate meetings corresponding to the language group of their members, with the exception of the so called “national electorate” and promoting its benefits – theoretically under such conditions – electorate or communities, who elected on of the members (deputies). (Otherwise speaking, there is no such traditional value as “social Benefit” or all Belgians’ Benefit in Belgian consciousness). Similar hypertrophy of “scenario C” in the field of cross-language relationship, consequent bilingualism and anti-centralism in the field of political institutions, power practice and state composition inspired W. Forte to state “two civil societies, two political and two social cultures”. And as a result of such situation, the phantom of separatism appears which grows to be even more actual than in Canada. The example of Belgium displays that sometimes consequent bilingualism is able to be as unconstructive as diglossia, which caused the discrimination of the scenarios in Eastern Europe.

C. Spain. Analyzing language policy and cross-language relationship in Spain, we should underline that unlike Belgium, state policy in this country was based upon the presumption of *Spanish nation* existence irrespectively of ethnic origin of definite individuals included there. In the Article 2 of the Constitution of Spain it is mentioned about the “unbroken unity” of this nation community. Otherwise speaking, language policy in Spain is based upon the background of *civil* and *political nation* and it resembles France to some extent by this apriority centralism, although the similarity doesn’t go further than this background. In the suggested Article f the Constitution it goes about Spain’s being

the “Motherland” for all the “Spanish”, who personalize different “nationalities”. While, on one hand, there is the official language which is functional around the whole Spanish territory, it means that *Spanish language* (which is the Castile dialect indeed); and exactly this fact is the feature of the mentioned centralism. It is stated in the Article 3 of the Constitution of Spain that Castile language” is not only the official language of Spain but it has been also underlined that “citizens of Spain must know it” (underlined by the author – N.Z.) and certainly have the right to use it.

But there is also another tradition in Spain which could be called the tendency of *regionalization*. Otherwise speaking, other official languages besides Spanish operate on the territory of the country, which remain so in the autonomies. Therefore appears the natural question of the principles according to which Spain is divided into the autonomies, formed correspondently to the territorial features. The answer to this question is quite simple: according to the principle of dominating ethnos (or the same “nationalities”, which were mentioned in the Article 2 of the Constitution of Spain). That’s why the researchers (for example J. Pogescho) underline the existence of two contradiction principles of national-language identity and language policy in Spain, which result from such model of identity.

On one hand, as J. Pogescho examines in his article “Language rights in Spain”, the principle of “Single Spanish Nation” acts in the country, and on the other hand – there is the variety of “nationalities”, which cannot be compared by their status to the status of “national minorities”. This comparison is impossible, firstly because of the ideas of political correctness in Spain – the same as in Italy, by the way, – the notion of “national minorities” is not implied. Secondly, “Spanish nationalities” possess much bigger rights than “national minorities”, having not only the official status for their languages but also their bodies of selfgoverning and power Institutions.

Application of two principles mentioned above allow Spain to occupy the middle position between unitary, centralized, monolingual France and completely regionalized Belgium and push the researcher to characterize the combination of these principles (we mean the principles of “state integrity” and “regional demand”) as the “symbols of combination”. Besides the Italian author, the similar position is occupied by Russian scientist B. Hamitov in his article “Language Dimensions of Political Process: Domestic and International Dimensions: Based upon the Examples of Catalonia”, who only states the centralization and regionalization of the tendencies, but unlike his Italian colleague he estimates not exactly the “courage” of such combination but its conflict potential.

Can we fix according to the strategy of language policy and its indicators on the scale of “conflict / non-conflict” (and the possibilities of the direct “language wars” and threatening of separatist scenarios) as a result of this “meaning combination”? For better understanding of this aspect we should realize that Spain is not such a multilingual state as, for example, Belgium. We should remind that the latest mentioned one follows the tendency of “autarchy” of ethnic communities or, as W. Forte called it, “language contacts fragmentation”. (A curious case of the autarchy of this kind represents itself in the fact that even in Parliament and Government the meetings are held separately depending on the language group to which a Parliamentary member or the politician belongs).

The described fact from the language situation in Belgium obviously illustrates the situation of real polylingualism in the frames of which one of the official languages speaker can’t but know the other one, as well as successfully act as state officer, which is strictly impossible in the country like Spain. According to the Law of 1992 (Article 36) in Spain it is compulsory “to translate all official documents and state administration papers into Castile language from other official languages, which differ from Castile”. Although, there is a definite note in this obligation, according to which such translation is required to be made if the document acts beyond the measures of the territory regions. The analyzed facts are enough to conclude that Spain is not exactly “polylingual” country but rather a *bilingual* country, determining that communication is performed there in the form of the definite “centaur” between official regional language (or the language of Spanish state “Center”) and official regional language (or the language of “Periphery”).

A special case which, by the way, demonstrates the weakness of the whole “language-national model” of Spain – is the case of Catalonia. Autonomy of Catalonia reaches really far and allows the ideologists of “Catalonia proceeding” (this nationalist movement appeared in the end of the century before last) to suggest the ideas about “Catalonia” as the “special state” inside Spain. According to the Law of 1982, “Catalonian language” is official and state together with Spanish.

At first glance, such law is the prove of typical “bilingualism” for Spain, but in Catalonia itself Catalan language consequently started dominating above Spanish around the whole territory of the autonomy, which means that knowing Spanish on this territory consequently turns into the additional and the citizen of Catalonia only “has rights” to use Spanish (while it doesn’t belong to his duties). This “language situation” in Catalonia is supported by the Law about policy language of 1988. Simultaneously with the practice of using languages on Catalonia territory, the process of “Catalonia proceeding” of consciousness begins (alongside with the development of “Catalonian” identity separate from Spanish) in educational field.

So, within the secondary education there proceeds the so called “strategy of penetration” into the Catalan language (sometimes this language is called “Catalan”) causing the increase of this language grade on University level. From the facts mentioned above appears the question about the conflict ability of Catalan phenomenon for the whole “Spanish project”, which includes also the basic background of “Spanish nation”. At first glance, the “Catalan proceeding” – even in its radical forms – didn’t raise the question of separatism and gaining state independence of Catalonia. Unlike it, the Basque separatism has already long before become, as it should be called, “byword”, although the level of ethnic consciousness and identity development on this consciousness background in the province of Euskadi is remarkably lower than in Catalonia, besides the number of the followers of radical “Basque ideas” is considerably lower there.

Nevertheless, the sequence of the accentuation from the side of Catalanian intelligence of their “special status” permits the researchers to call their language “Rear policy” as “intervene” (J. Pogescho) and “war for language” (B. Hamitov). Russian researcher develops the idea even further and insists that the “war for language” is mostly a political fight; as for Spain, specific in this respect, it means the fight for “recognition of nation’s status for the Catalanian people”.

This statement can be fully agreed with, as far as “Catalonians” as a community belong to the net of the notions of “national minority” (although, as we have already mentioned before, there is no such notion in Spain) and are not included to the term of “nationality” by ideologists. Upon what background can we conclude this? First of all, upon the fact that Catalanian nation recognizes itself as the autonomous subject not only on the domestic level but also internationally. Otherwise speaking, in EU field it behaves not like the representative of Spanish people, but as, called so by the researchers, “subnational subject”, whose Unity is accordingly called “Europe of regions”. Recognizing itself as such a subject caused the tendency for economic separation and, finally, political separation.

The example of Catalonia proves that Spanish model of language-national identity, language policy and cross-language relationship sce-

nario is far from being perfect; besides the phantom of conflicts, language wars, and separatism are constantly hanging over Spain. What is this scenario like from the point of view of our methodology? To our opinion it combined the features of “scenario B” or Empire monolingualism (which is based upon one great tradition) and “scenario C” (the scenario of several competing traditions co-existence, cause by the “Catalonian phenomenon”). The strong point of the Spanish model is the absence of obvious diglossia, which is the integral part of “scenario B”. The elements of the overall diglossia are expressed in the fact of Spanish language’s being compulsory on the territory of all autonomous formations (besides Catalonia they include also Galicia, Valencia, Euskadi / Navarra, Asturias and Aragon). But at the same time this language policy possesses the strong elements of bilingualism (the role of the second language as official in the autonomies) (Horowitz, 1985).

The bright example of such bilingualism is the status of Basque language in the “land of Basques” (Euskadi / Navarra), which is used only by 20 per cent of the citizens of this autonomy. Nevertheless, state language policy in this region is characterized by the so called “Basque proceeding” of the whole Basque administration. According to the language laws of the independent Basque language, it is, unlike other languages of Spain, very distant from the rest of the languages of this country according to its language group, but should be mastered by all state officials, including police officers. Exactly such policy seems reasonable, rather rational and successful in general (despite the little share of the radical formations).

In this context absolutely different place is occupied by Catalonia that demonstrates **conflict contradictions** between “scenario B” and “scenario C” operating in Spain. Within this conflict, on the contrary to Spanish moderate diglossia and real bilingualism, Catalonia has placed the **Rear diglossia**, consigning Spanish language, beneath Catalanian (if not judicially than, at least, within the value field) (Matsievskiy, 2000). If we remember such characteristic of language status in social consciousness as **prestige**, we’ll be able to observe that all around Spain the status of Spanish language (as the language of “great culture”) is rather high. Although, the situation in Catalonia is precisely converse; and it is the Catalanian language that possesses more **prestige** than Spain’s official language. So, conflicts between Barcelona and Madrid clarify in the form of **conflict prestige**, which is rather profound and is probable for further overgrowth.

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