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**КИТАЙСКАЯ И ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-АЗИАТСКАЯ ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ГЕОПОЛИТИКА**

*Китай — непосредственный сосед Центрально-Азиатских государств, он имеет очень длинную историю взаимодействия с ними. Краткая история китайского сотрудничества описана в данной статье. Китай — мировая крупнейшая экономика, зависящая от нефти и газа, импортируемых из различных стран мира. Закупка нефтяных и газовых ресурсов составляет значительную часть расходов страны, к тому же в силу многих причин цены на них часто нестабильны, поэтому Китай заинтересован в сотрудничестве со странами Центральной Азии как региона с большими запасами углеводородов. Китайская политика, целью которой является завладение нефти и газа Центрально-Азиатского региона, также исследована в данной работе.*

**Ключевые слова:** энергия, стратегия, политика, безопасность, геополитика, поставка, экспорт, импорт.

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**CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY GEOPOLITICS**

*China is immediate neighbour of Central Asian States and has very long history of engagement with the region. A brief history of Chinese engagement is discussed in given paper. China is world largest economy and dependent of imported oil and gas from different part of world and this oil and gas supply is expensive and vulnerable because of various reasons, therefore China is focusing on Central Asia as this region has vast amount of hydrocarbons. Chinese policies and strategies to grab Central Asian oil and gas are also examined in given paper.*

**Keywords:** Energy, Strategy, Policies, Security, geopolitics, supply, Export, Import.

China is also the immediate neighbour of Central Asia and shares the border with 3 out of 5 Central Asian countries. China shares 1533 km boundary with Kazakhstan, 858 km with Kyrgyzstan and 414 km with Tajikistan[1]. China is not only the neighbour of Central Asia but China's largest province «Xinxiang» is a part of Greater Central Asia, which is also called the «Eastern Turkistan». A large number of Kazakh, Tajik and Turk people live in Xinxiang. Before the USSR domination, the whole region was called Turkistan and was divided into Eastern and Western Turkistan. So there exist historical relations between CA and China.

For the last 1000 years, China is active in CAR and all Chinese emperors consider CAR as integral part of Chinese empire. During this period China fought different wars with Turks, Arabs and Russia to control CAR. Although China only could maintain control over Eastern Turkistan, but it always laid a claim on Western Turkistan also. China also signed many treaties with Russia to solve the border issues. For instance in 1689 China signed its first treaty with Russia about Chinese position in Eastern Siberia. On 14 November 1860, China signed treaty with Russia to redefine her border with Central Asia because it was actively engaged in the Region. Things changed differently in 19th century when Russia captured Western part of Turkistan presently knowing Central Asia[2].

In 1864 Russia occupied Bukhara, and Khokand in 1874 and established its border with China [3]. In 1890 Russia conquered Pamir Mountain and signed a treaty with Indian British government to define its border with Afghanistan. In 1917 USSR's Red army occupied whole Central Asia and divided Turkistan in two parts, Western Turkistan controlled by Russia and Eastern by China. Russia also recognized Eastern Turkistan. In 1954 Mao's communist government came to power in China and claimed many part of Russian controlled CAR as theirs. China also called to abolish all signed treaties with Russia, treaty Tientsin (13 June 1859), Peking (14th Nov 1860), Petersburg (12th Feb 1881), and treaty of Aigun (28 May 1958)[4]. China described all these treaties as «unequal» treaty and demanded cancelation of all these treaties. But Russia rejected all these demands of the China. Many negotiations and talks were conducted between both countries to discuss about boundary question. Some time situation became bad to worst and relations reached in deep crises during the talks. After dissolution of USSR, China adopted pragmatic policy and recognized all the five countries as independent nations despite border disputes with CAC. Emergence of new Central Asia posed many challenges and opportunities before China. Opportunities of trade and economy to reduce dependency on Russia and to establish strategic equations in the region. Challenges for security were increasing because of emerging Islamic militancy in the region which could also affect Xinxiang internal security. Russia and US could also use these weak countries as their client state and could also be used against China.

Xinxiang is the largest province of China with 1. 6649 million sq km and which is one sixth of the total Chinese territory and shares boundaries with eight countries. Therefore, Chinese western border became more venerable for pro Xinxiang independence militants which are supported by many Central Asian ethnic and militant groups. «Free Uighursatn Party» activities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan increased fear in Chinese authorities. Uighurstan is not only threat to Chinese integrity but other groups as all Turkic and non Han minorities are supporting the separatists.

Some groups are also working for creating «Greater Central Asia» based on unity of Eastern and Western Turkistan. Hypothesis of greater Islamic circle including Xinxiang, Middle East and Central Asia was also posing threat to Chinese internal security[5]. Thus, after the emergence of Central Asia, a cluster of problems gathered at China's Western border. Therefore, to counter these challenges and gain support from Central Asian governments became the important point of Chinese Central Asian policy.

Though, China recognized CAC just after independence declaration, but could establish diplomatic relations only after two years in 1992. In the beginning, China was hesitant in establishing strong ties, but after the growing violence by separatist groups and supported Central Asian ethnic groups, China paid attention and decided to engage at good level with Central Asia.

First high level visit paid by Chinese side was by Chinese Prime Minister Lepeng in 1994. During this visit Lepeng visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Prime Minister Lepeng tried to convince CAC to assist them in fighting against separatist movements in China and prevent any support to them from the side of Central Asia. In 1999 Chinese President Jianag Zemin visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Ziang appreciated CAC governments for their support to China to fight against terrorism and separatism[6].

China went far ahead in April 1996 when she established Shanghai Five with Russia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to address all Central Asian policy related issues. Fight against terrorism, separatism, religious extremism and drugs and weapons smuggling were some of the aims of the Shanghai Five[7]. This organization was very well structured and organized to maintain all level of Central Asian issues. In 1997 Moscow's summit, all members, heads of States signed an agreement on reduction of military forces from each others' borders. In 1999, and 2000, Shanghai five held the meeting respectively and discussed on regional co-operation. Uzbekistan accepted the membership in 2001 and

Shanghai five converted to Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO)[8]. China made SCO as most powerful and influential tool of her policy on Central Asia. Through this China replaced Russia as regional leader. According to deputy director of the Carnegie center of Moscow, Dimitri Ternin «Having refused to become the junior partner of the United States, Russia can become the Vassal of China»[9].

Nightmare of US direct presence and intervention in the region became true after 9/11 and US establishment of military bases in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia itself. But like Russia, China also adopted pragmatic approach and supported US against Taliban regime. China also sieged the opportunity to creak down its separatist organizations. China also used SCO to face the new challenges after 9/11. Between 2002-2007 China participated in 18 bilateral and multilateral joint anti terrorism drills with SCO members to expand the co-operation on the terrorism issue[10]. In 2002 also China carried out first joint military exercise with its immediate Central Asian neighbour Kyrgyzstan. This exercise was very significant for China because US forces were stationed in Kyrgyzstan just 100 mile away from Chinese border. Again in 2003, China and all Central Asian States conducted anti terror exercise in China and Kazakhstan[11]. Through SCO China not only focused on terrorism issue but also tried to expend its military relations with CAC.

In August 2005 China launched a high profile 8 days joint military exercise with Russia by naming it as «Peace mission 2005»[12]. In this exercise over 10,000 armed personals, air born units, marine corps and logistic unit were involved. Through SCO China established strong relations with Russia and CAC. China also used 9/11 to crackdown Xinxiang terrorist network and successfully blocked the Central Asian side support to separatist movement. Through SCO China not only tackled regional issues but also marginalized US military presence in Central Asia. In Dec 2005 SCO set a deadline to withdraw US troops from Central Asia within 180 days[13]. Therefore, in such a short time China used 9/11 event as an opportunity to suppress domestic unrest.

China established good trade relations with CAC. Chinese ministry of foreign trade and economic co-operation and Chinese commercial and trade center established trade centers in different cities of CAC. China focused her investment in heavy transport and started construction of a European rail link through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, part of Middle East and ending up with Rotterdam[14]. China also motivated its ally Iran to invest in CAR especially in oil, gas and pipeline sector. China initiated talk to develop a pipeline network from Iran to China through CAR. In this project China excluded both Russia and US. Trade between China and CAC increased very fast in 14 years. Trade grew from \$500 million in 1992 to 8.5 billion in 2005[15]. In trade and commerce China especially focused on Kazakhstan. In \$8.5 billion of total business with CAC, \$6.8 billion was with Kazakhstan[16].

Chinese economy is one of the largest economies with more than 10% of the growth rate. Contemporary economic growth rate directly depend on energy supply. In other words, economic growth rate shows the energy consumption of any economy. Since early time, coal is the largest source of energy consumption in China. Till 1960 coal had accounted more than 90% of Chinese primary energy mix. In 1960 it was 93.9% but due to lower growth and shutdown of a host of mines it sharply dropped to 68% in 1999. According to US energy information administration coal accounted 69% in China's total energy consumption in 2011, oil and gas shared 18% and 4% respectively[17].

China started economic reforms in 1978 and after that because of heavy foreign direct investment economy grew very fast and so the demand of hydrocarbon fuel too. Oil consumption was 4 to 5 percent of total Chinese need up to 1960. After economic development it increased dramatically up to 25% in 1996 and increased from a low 88 million tons in 1980 to 252 million tons in 2002 and 293 million tons in 2004. This consumption increased very fast between 1995 and 2000 from 160.7 million to 230 million tons. Between 1995 to 2005 Chinese oil consumption doubled to 6.8 million barrels per day[18]. China has been consuming more oil than Japan since 2003, the year it became the world's second largest consumer of oil[19]. In 2004, China consumed 6.6 million bl/d, still a third of US consumption (20.5 million bl/d), with a 16% increase over the previous year consumption (Bustelo, 2005). The consumption grew very fast in 2007 with a 15% hike and maintained 9% in 2005. The major part of the consumption of oil goes to industry (43%) and automobiles (34%). To sustain the present economic growth ranging between 8-10% China projected energy consumption to the tune of 150% by 2020. As per the current growth rate the oil consumption would increase by 7.5% annually. This growth is 7 time faster than United States. In 2000 oil accounted for 32% of total energy mix of china and according to the director of energy economics and development strategy of Chinese National Development and Reform commission by 2010 oil will account between 51.4% and 52.6% of Chinese total energy need. When oil consumption was growing very fast the production was very slow and insufficient. In 1990 total oil production was 138.3 million tons which reached to 175 million tons in 2004 with a growth rate of 20%. Consumption rose to 57.5% during same period. In 2000 Only 73% of the demand oil was produced while the remaining 27% was imported. But in 2010 import increased significantly, according to General Administration of Customs of China, in 2010, China imported 4.7 mb/d (236 Mt) of crude oil, accounting for around 53.8% of total demand[20].

Till 1997 China was self sufficient in oil but started importing w.e.f. 1990. This import increased fast between 1990 to 2000, in 1990 it was 2.8 million tonnes it increased up to 17.1 million in 1995 and 70.3 million tons in 2000. In 2003 China imported 91.0 million tons and 122.7 million tons in 2004 with a 35% of growth in the import. Till 2004 Chinese self sufficiency in hydrocarbon decreased up to 60%. According to IEA, in 2000 China imported 32% of its oil demand and 40% in 2004 and this demand as projected is to be doubled by 2010.

Table 1. Middle East Oil in China's Imports (in ten thousand tons)

Year	Import from ME	Total Import	Percentage %
1993	659.87	1567.12	42.1
1994	490.67	1234.59	39.74
1995	776.40	1708.99	45.43
1996	1196.20	2261.69	52.89
1997	1678.16	3546.97	47.31
1998	1666.83	2732.26	61.01
1999	1690.39	3661.37	46.17
2000	3764.99	7026.53	53.58
2001	3385.99	6025.54	56.19
2002	3439.22	6940.77	49.55
2003	4636.51	9112.63	50.88
2004	5578.85	12281.55	45.42
2005	5999.19	12708.32	47.21
2006	6560.48	14518.03	45.19
2007	7276.37	16317.55	44.59
2008	8962.07	17889.30	50.09

Source: Tian Chunrong, «Analysis on China's oil import and export in 2008», *International Petroleum Economics*, 2009

To secure energy interest China diversified its oil supply and started oil hunt all over the world. Till 2004 China was heavily dependent on Middle East with 39.4% in 1990, 53.5% in 2000 and 45.4% in 2004. Asia Pacific also played very important role in China oil policy, in decade of 90's with 60.6% but later in 2000 and 2004 it reduced very heavily with 15.1% and 11.5% respectively. Then after China tried to reduce her dependency over these two regions and established energy relation with all major oil producers. To achieve the goals of energy diversification

China started oil import from more than 20 countries including African countries, Russia and Central Asia. China successfully diversified its oil supply from Middle East. In 1995 share from Middle East was 45.4% which is increased to 53.6% in 2000. Middle East is the most viable option because of its good geographical location and political stability. According to IEA, Chinese oil import from Middle East would reach up to 70% by 2015[21].

In Middle East, China is focusing on Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2003 Saudi share was 16.7% and its increased up to 20% in 2008, Iran's share was 13.6% and slightly decreased with 11.9% in 2008 because of sanctions over nuclear disputes with US and some European powers. To expend energy relations, all three Chinese energy majors signed oil and gas agreement with Iran worth of \$70 billion.

Table 2. China's Top 10 Oil Importers

1997	%	2003	%	2008	%
<b>Oman</b>	<b>25.47</b>	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<b>20.3</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>18.57</b>	<b>Iran</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>Angola</b>	<b>19.6</b>
<b>Yemen</b>	<b>11.43</b>	<b>Angola</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>Iran</b>	<b>11.9</b>
<b>Angola</b>	<b>10.82</b>	<b>Oman</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>Oman</b>	<b>8.2</b>
<b>Iran</b>	<b>7.77</b>	<b>Yemen</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>6.5</b>
<b>Vietnam</b>	<b>4.23</b>	<b>Sudan</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>Sudan</b>	<b>5.9</b>
<b>Congo</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>Venezuela</b>	<b>3.6</b>
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>1.06</b>	<b>Vietnam</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>3.3</b>
<b>Australia</b>	<b>0.92</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>Kazakhstan</b>	<b>3.2</b>
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	<b>0.91</b>	<b>Congo</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	<b>2.6</b>

Source: Tian Chunrong, «Analysis on China's oil import and export in 2008», *International Petroleum Economics*, 2009

The share of import from African countries increased 10.8% in 1995 to 24% in 2003 and 28.7% in 2004. Although China diversified its oil supply but this diversification has a negative dimension, 80% of total oil import passes through Strait of Malacca and some amount is also imported through Taiwan[22].

According to Zhang Yuncheng international relations expert in Chinese institute of contemporary international relations «China would face and energy crisis if its oil supply lines were disrupted and that whoever controls the strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean could block China's oil transport route[23]».

Therefore, China has made efforts to turn to Russia and Central Asia for searching her energy need. China shares a long border with Central Asia and Russia. Kazakh Pipelines are also located near the Chinese border. Many Central Asian oil and gas region are also located near the Chinese border. China has expended its energy relations with Russia and has become good importer of Russian oil. In 1995 Russian share in Chinese oil supply was 2% and in 2000 it was 3.1% of total Chinese oil imports. Russian oil export to China increased to 5.8%, in the year of 2003. It further rose up to 8.8% making Russia as the 7th largest oil supplier to China[24]. China was not only engaged as oil importer but also involved in the acquisition and stakes holding activities. China granted \$6 billion loans to Russian oil giant Rosneft[25]. In 2004 Chinese Prime Minister announced that China would invest \$12 billion in Russia's infrastructure and energy sector by 2020[28]. China also used SCO to achieve its energy goals in CAR. Through SCO energy forum, China tried to established good energy relation with CACs.

Though China entered very late in the so called «Great game» but became main player very soon. In the matters of energy, China and Central Asia are complementing each other. Central Asia has huge amount of hydrocarbon reserves but because of land lock nature Central Asian countries cannot export oil and gas in international market, same time China is fastest and one of the largest economy that requires huge amount of oil to maintain its economy growth. Therefore both are best options for each other. To point out the importance of Central Asia, Chinese president Hu Jintao praised Central Asian region as «Centre to Chinese development» an adopted parallel policy to engage Central Asia in security and energy matter» as well.

Primarily, China focused on Kazakhstan oil market because Kazakhstan shares longest border with China and a pipeline was already near to Kazakhstan and China border. So after some efforts it was very easy to transport Kazakhstan oil. China signed its first Central Asian energy deal with Kazakhstan in 1997 to build an oil pipeline from Atyrau in Western Kazakhstan to Dushanghi in Chinese Xinxiang province[27]. Total length of this project was 3088 km. Later Chinese planned to expend this pipeline route up to Chinese commercial capital «Shanghai». The decided capacity of this pipeline is 20 million tons per year. The pipeline was to complete in three phases and first section from Qandyaghash to was completed in March 2003. The section from Atasu of Kazakhstan to Alasanku of China Starting from Sep. 28, 2004, the first phase of the project was completed on Dec. 15, 2005[28]. In 1997 the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) won the bid of 60% acquisition stake in Kazakhstan Oil Company Aktobemini gaz[29]. Again in 2003 CNPC acquired shares in different British and US oil and gas projects in Kazakhstan[30]. In March 2003 another Chinese big hydrocarbon company «Sinopec Corp» paid \$ 615 million to British Gas for a stake in oil and gas field in Kazakhstan[31]. On 16 March, 2003 Chinese National offshore oil Company acquired 3.33% of the British GAS's North Caspian Sea project.

In 2005 China emerged as a power in Central Asia energy when China took over «Petro Kazakhstan». In this bid China defeated all big powers such as Russia, India and US. India's ONGC and its partner L.N Mittal offered \$ 3.9 billion against the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) offer of \$3.6 billion which was more but later China increased its offer up to \$4.18 billion and won the bid. Total asset of Petro Kazakhstan comprising of 11 oil fields and a license to explore seven fields, these fields contain nearly 12% of total Kazakhstan oil reserves[32]. These exploration areas are located in Kumkol and Kzyl-Orda region of South Kazakhstan. Petro Kazakh is the third largest Kazakh Oil Company with 1,50,000 barrel per day production and 8,000 barrel per day refinery capacity.

China mainly focused not only on Kazakhstan but it was also engaged in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. During Turkmenistan president visit to China both countries signed a gas agreement, according to this agreement China will purchase 30 b c m of gas per year from 2009 to 2039. The pipe line for this gas will pass through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan[33].

China started participating in Uzbekistan in 2005. CNPC and Uzbekistan gas (UNG) signed an agreement worth of \$ 600 million to establish a joint venture to explore 23 oil and gas blocks in Kuhara –Khiva and Ustyurt region. During the same year in July, Chinese Sinopec and Uzbek's UNG established a joint venture to develop non-operation able oil wells in Uzbekistan[34]. According to this joint venture \$106 million would be spent on exploration of oil in the Andijan region. China also granted \$35 million loan to Uzbekistan to upgrade its oil and gas pipeline. On August 30, 2005 Chinese CNPC signed to participate in production share agreement (PSA) with Uzbekistan's UNG, Russia's Lukoil, Malaysia's Petronas and South Korea's National Oil Corporation[35]. Though, China's engagement in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan was very late but quick in establishing good relations with them.

Therefore, it appears that in near future CACs and Chinese business relations will be further strengthened. It is the need of hour also as far as the sustaining of the current economic growth rate of China is concerned on one hand; on the other hand for CACs the development and strong business relations with China would help in easing out hegemonic political influence of US and Russia beside huge economic profits.

Conclusion:

China involved herself in Central Asia through every possible dimension: economics, security and energy. It is very interesting that even after entering late, China achieved all its foreign policy goals in Central Asia. In the beginning, China had serious border disputes with CACs; however, it adopted pragmatic and soft policies to resolve border disputes without military tensions and border clashes. China successfully convinced CAS to counter and suppress militant and separatists of Xinjiang, supported by many Central Asian militant groups. To counter the EU's and the US's influence, China established SCO with the help of Russia and CAC. China invited Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan to SCO for cooperation in regional issues. During Afghan War, China dealt the situation brilliantly and adopted the Russian line. In the war, China supported NATO's action against Taliban but after the end of the war and elimination of Taliban, China with Russia through SCO, successfully pressurised the US to vacate her bases from Central Asia. In energy sector too, China entered late but involved deeply very soon. China signed its first oil agreement with Kazakhstan and within 9 years in 2006 China established energy relations with all energy producer countries. China avoided the US and EU companies for energy cooperation and made active her own oil companies. China cooperated with Russian and Iranian oil companies to counter the US influence in energy sector. China started many pipeline routes to import Central Asian oil like Turkmenistan-China pipeline. China focused on Turkmenistan specially which has 4th largest gas reserved. After the completion and full operation of Turkmenistan–China pipeline, China will fulfil 50% of its gas demand. In future of Chinese energy policy and strategy, Central Asia will play very important role.

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