journal of Philosophical Investigations

13-23

Authors: Anthony Afe. Asekhauno و Wesley Taiwo Osemwegie

Over the centuries, beginning with the classic Greeks through the trends of the mid-20 th century, philosophical enterprise has been intricately and seemingly irretrievably rooted in the theory of the given—an edification of philosophy as that giant mirror and standard for measuring what counts as knowledge; but is it thus synonymous with or reducible to epistemology? How or why? There are two answers to both of these questions. The attempt in this work is to delineate those separate concerns, their areas of convergence and disparity, but also indicated the genesis of edifying philosophy rooted in epistemology but which has been discredited in the works of some postmodernist reformers—Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty. Against theirs, this piece shows that historically, philosophizing has had a methodology and some perceptual axioms; that it is not easy to abdicate it from this mode, no matter the will and zeal—for success is not a matter of will alone; that the post-modernists revolution is nothing new with its swollen nerves and arteries (as others before it, it soon wanes). It concludes that the urge for philosophic understanding shows no sign of abating and so the philosophical journey will probably go on and on, each stage building on and rewriting its past and ruminating specific but perennial problematic; that while some of the issues seemingly do appear resolved, others may have endured and eloped any final solution; and finally that the philosophical method and basic assumptions have seriously remained firmly even beyond post-modernist restructurers.

53-67

Authors: John Greco, Sahar Joakim (corresponding author)

We value possessing knowledge more than true belief. Both someone with knowledge and someone with a true belief possess the correct answer to a question. Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief if both contain the correct answer? I examine the philosophy of American pragmatist John Dewey and then I offer a novel solution to this question often called the value problem of knowledge. I present and explicate (my interpretation of) Dewey’s pragmatic theory of inquiry. Dewey values competent inquiry and claims it is a knowledge-forming process, and I argue that it is competently conducting inquiry that explains why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Knowledge is always the result of a process of competent inquiry (itself valuable) whereas belief can but need not be the result of inquiry. I end by considering and replying to reasonable objections to my pragmatic solution.

23-61

Authors: Monireh Panjtani, Yazdan Mansourian, Mahtab Mobini

The present study attempts to investigate this concept through a phenomenological study of the lived experience of the visitors of Naghsh-e-Jahan monuments at summer time of 1393. Apart from a comprehensive review of literature on qualitative research methodology, and the architecture of the period, the theoretical foundations of phenomenology and its application in architecture were thoroughly reviewed. Using the phenomenological observation method of Max-Vanen & a semi-structured interview plan, 58 visitors of the historical monuments of Naghsh-e-Jahan were chosen as participants and were interviewed in depth. Then the recorded data were transcribed and analyzed and the findings indicated that 16 components were significantly effective in forming the esthetic perception of the participants. Therefore, as the result of the investigation, the following conclusions may be stated: The concept of beauty is not an absolute entity. The different concepts of beauty are formed on the basis of the lived experiences of the people.

91-117

Authors: Mohammad Hossein Mohammad Ali Khalaj, Ata Heshmati

Dialogue between Dreyfus, as the biggest American commentator of Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty, and Searle, as one of the biggest analytic philosophers, started at the seventies. According to Searle, phenomenology is superficially and blind and has systematic errors. Additionally, in his view the concept of non-representational intention as center of Dreyfus’s phenomenology is inconsistent. But, in our opinion, Dreyfus introduces a consistent concept of non-representational intention, and proposes that Searle does not have a sound understanding of phenomenology. Dreyfus draws a distinction between two interpretations of Searle: Searle as phenomenologist and Searle as analytic philosopher. Dreyfus believes Searle’s approach as a phenomenologist is wrong because ignores non-representational intention; He also criticizes Searle’s approach as analytic philosopher because this approach accepts causality for an abstract structure. However, we believe that Dreyfus himself fails to go beyond the subject-object dualism. Moreover, we show in this paper that introducing non-representational intention is not sufficient for rejecting Descartes dualism.

141-159

Authors: Seyed Mostafa Shahraeini

Descartes is truly named as the father of modern philosophy, but why his philosophy is accompanied with the qualification of “new? The innovation on Cartesian system follows from the fact that he tries to present a innovative picture of Man, God, and World basically different from those found in traditional philosophy. The Cartesian Man differs from the Aristotelian one in that the latter is a rational animal while the former is of two separate, incompatible parts: res cogitans and res extensa. In Descartes, soul - as a principle of life in traditional philosophy - reduces to the mind, rationality to the speaking, and life to the pure mechanism. The Cartesian World is, also, very different from Aristotelian one because the latter is a world of Ten Categories but in the former one can find no Aristotelian categories but quantity or, in Cartesian terms, extension. The Cartesian God is a supremely perfect being that never deceives us while in traditional philosophy God is of several divine names, most important of them, the Creator. The main role of God in Descartes thought, is an epistemological than ontological or theological. Descartes by his philosophy, designs to make us as the “masters and Lords of nature”.

181-199

Authors: Abdolrahim Fatemi

In Wittgenstein’s view, religious beliefs use an image; they are commitments which are unshakably everlasting and have the potentiality to give order to whole life. It is hardly based on evidence. Accordingly, they neither receive any assistance from science or philosophy nor receive any damage from them. Nowadays you may observe priests including Don Cupitt who are not realists. This observations stands in sharp contrast with what is held in religious societies. They even contradict with scientific and religious realities which hold religion as a set of images of reality. As Wittgenstein argues to be the case, religious propositions are pieces of evidence about which objective realities are not taken to be very true. These statements are not supposed to refer to anything, rather they are assumed to play a significant role in human religious life.

213-233

Authors: Tahereh Kamalizadeh, Fatemeh Asghari

Question: In Islamic philosophy, Active Intellect is Peripatetic tenth intellect. Also in Peripatetic epistemology, Potential human intellect, acts by unification or conjunction with active (agent) intellect. This intellective thrust has a wielder and more attractive role in Illuminative wisdom. Meted: The research methodology based on tradition Comparative studies to analyze and adapt votes Gazi Saeed Qummi and votes illuminated Suhrawardi .Results:1- Human’s archetype adjust with Gabriel, in religions and Active (agent) Intellect in Illuminative wisdom. 2-Human’s archetype appears as “perfect nature” format during personal relation to every special individual.3 and also explains relation between Emam and believer in shiaa’s idea.