BUKOVYNA DURING BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI'S CAMPAIGNS IN MOLDOVA OF 1650-1653: MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIMENSION

Abstract. The body of the article goes on to discuss the military and political situation in Moldavia in the context of the history of Northern Bukovina, Moldavian-Polish and Moldavian-Turkish relations that affected our region. In 1650-1653 Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi made four military campaigns of Cossack troops in Moldova. During the first campaign the Cossacks and Tatars plundered the country, took many Moldavian settlements and towns, including Chernivtsi and Khotyn and signed such a desirable alliance with the Moldavian hospodar. During the next two years V. Lupu did not fulfill his obligations that caused the second campaign to Moldova in summer 1652. The marriage of Tymish and Rozanda caused concern among Moldavian boyars, who threw V. Lupu from the last throne with the help of Wallachian and Transylvanian people. Rebellious Logofet G. Stefan became a new hospodar of Moldova. Those events caused the third march of B. Khmelnysytki troops to Moldova in April-May 1653. The success in the battles against the troops of G. Stephan changed to failures and defeats from Wallachian and Transylvanians troops. As a result V. Lupu lost the Moldavian throne. Having learned that, Khmelnysytki sent Cossacks led by Tymish to the fourth and the last Moldavian campaign, which ended with the failure and the death of the Hetman’s son.

Keywords: Northern Bukovina, Moldavia, the military-political relations, Rzeczpospolita, Ottoman Empire, Wallachia, Transylvania, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.
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БУКОВИНСКИЕ ЗЕМЛИ ВО ВРЕМЯ МОЛДАВСКИХ ПОХОДОВ БОГДАНА ХМЕЛЬНИЦКОГО В 1650-1653 гг.: ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ

Аннотация. В статье на основе анализа источников и монографической литературы проанализированы военные события и общественно-политические отношения на территории Молдавского государства в контексте истории Северной Буковины, молдавско-польские и молдавско-турецкие отношения, которые затрагивали интересы региона. Выяснены результаты четырех походов Войска Запорожского в Молдавию. Констатируется, что буковинские земли в то время ощутили значительные опустошения и демографические потери.

Ключевые слова: Северная Буковина, Молдавское государство, военно-политические отношения, Речь Посполитая, Османская империя, Валахия, Трансильвания, Богдан Хмельницкий.

The declaration of Ukraine’s independence influenced the study of historical past of the Ukrainian lands, including Bukovyna, which becomes very important and topical. Clarification and coverage of the content and nature of military and political relations in these lands during the period under study acquire nowadays a great research, theoretical and practical importance. The purpose of research is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the military and political situation in Bukovyna during Cossack military campaigns in Moldova in 1650-1653.

Among priority objectives of the study are the following: interpretation of state activities of Moldavian hospodars in the context of Northern Bukovyna history, research of the situation in Bukovyna during four Cossack campaigns to Moldova and analysis of military and political relations between Moldova and Rzeczpospolita (Polish Republic), Turkey, the Zaporizhzhia Cossack Army concerning the territory of Bukovyna.

Research analysis. This period of Bukovyna history is not explored. There are some articles and chapters in monographs of general attitude on history of Ukraine, Moldova, Turkey, Poland, Romania, but there is little special research which would comprehensively cover all aspects of the problem. The issues were partially discussed by the following authors: M. Hrushevskyi [13], A. Zhukovskyi [16], O. Masan [19; 20], L. Semenova [24; 25], V. Smoliy and V. Stepankov [27; 28] and other researchers.

Material presentation. Bukovyna lands had lived in relative peace for three decades (between 1621 and 1650).

But since 1648 the Ukrainian Liberation war led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitskyi had been expanding and it caused complications of the domestic situation not only in Poland but also in neighboring countries. The Moldavian state and its northern part – Bukovyna quickly caught up in the center of the struggle, in which the other vassals of the Ottoman Empire, including the Crimean Khanate, participated. Moldova was not able to take an independent part in their neighbors’ conflicts; therefore, it was vitally important for the fighting parties to be in control of Moldova due to the geopolitical reasons could not take an independent part in their neighbours’ conflicts though the fighting parties considered it very important to be in control of Moldova due to the geopolitical issues. Bukovyna played a very important role in this respect due to its strategic position between Moldova and Poland and it could be used as a foothold for offensive, forefront or rear in the defense or place for the military forces concentration. [19, p. 103-104].

During the Liberation War the royal army of Rzeczpospolita received from Bukovyna rations and provender. The population in Moldova joined Cossacks regiments or arranged their own
independent military units. A so-called “Wallachia Regiment” [3, c. 97] was a part of the Cossacks army during the siege of Lviv in 1648 led by Zakhariv Khmelnytskyi who was the cousin of the Hetman. Obviously, the people from Bukovyna were in that regiment too [12, p. 50]. And in 1650 Moldavian troops under command of Syla Voloshyn and Mudrenko [21, p. 324], who supposedly were the Ukrainians from Bukovyna, fought the Polish army.

Vasyl Lupu, a cunning and extremely rich man, was a voivode or hospodar of the Moldavian state, which was separated by the Dniester River from the Ukrainian territory. He skillfully maneuvered between Turkey where he was subjected to, and Rzeczpospolita, which he feared and sometimes assisted the Poles against Ukrainian troops.

Meanwhile, in 1648, the relations between three Danube knighthoods (Moldova, Wallachia and Transylvania) were getting worse. The reasons of that worsening were of the Crimean khan who caused them. Wallachia was afraid of the joint activities of V. Lupu and Tatara. There were clashes on the Moldavian-Transylvanian border. Islam Girey Khan began introducing into life his anti-Polish plans using his freedom of action at the time when Porta was busy with its own crisis of empire, which became very complicated after Sultan Ibrahim’s assassination in August 1648 and their failures in the Cretan War. And the Liberation War of the Zaporizhia Cossacks under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi against Rzeczpospolita, which burnt at the beginning of the year, supported the Crimean Khanate plans which were interested in joint actions with Cossacks against Poles. At the same time the events in Ukraine in 1648 made a decisive impact on the balance of political forces in the eastern and southeastern parts of Europe. With the end of the Thirty Years’ War and signing the Peace of Westphalia these events took an important place in the foreign policy of the countries of this region [24, p. 196].

At the initial stage of the National Liberation War of the Ukrainian people against Rzeczpospolita Bukovyna as an integral part of the Moldavian state was aside of those events. Though, Moldavian chronicler and participant of those events M. Kostin wrote that time, “all neighboring lands shook of sudden embarrassment of Rzeczpospolita” [4, с. 102].

In October 1648 Moldavian hospodar V. Lupu received Ukrainian ambassadors with great honors and agreed with their demands not to allow Poles entering Moldova and to sink all ferries on the Dniester River for this purpose. But he did that only under growing Ukrainian pressure. On the other hand he kept helping Poles giving them information about events in Ukraine, Porta plans and continued intriguing against B. Khmelnytskyi. The Hetman wanted to link Moldova by a diplomatic way, but V. Lupu wriggled out of decisions and the Hetman decided to make him take that step [16, p. 70].

In late 1648 B. Khmelnytskyi sent his delegation to Istanbul with a letter in which he informed the Sultan about taking possession of the lands up “to the Vistula” and raised the issue of their transfer under protectorate of the Ottoman Empire on the same terms as Moldova and Wallachia, and he also requested for permission to give him a possession of Moldavian lands [18, p. 361]. But the Sultan confined to provide military assistance from the Silistra Pasha and the Crimean Khan to fight Rzeczpospolita.

The people of Bukovyna had suffered Tatars’ attacks for many times. Kalga-Sultan Krim-Girey who led the Tatars Army during warfare in Galicia in 1649 was returning back to the Black Sea region through the territory of Bukovyna and Moldova. They had a lot of goods plundered during their military campaigns, but they continued plundering and robbery in towns and villages, killed local people and destroyed fields on the way home. The Tatars made a stop in the Moldavian village of Bratuliany on the bank of the Rezina River. The Moldavian troops attacked the Tatars and crushed them. They took the Tatars’ robbed goods and only a little group of them managed to escape from the battlefield and save their lives. [19, p. 104; 23, p. 206; 25, p. 234].

The Crimean Khan could not excuse the Moldavian hospodar the defeat of his troops and decided to punish him and the entire Moldavian state. In late 1649 he invited B. Khmelnytskyi to
participate in a joint march to Moldova but the Hetman requested him to postpone it till later time [23, p. 207]. Besides, there were rumours in the Crimea about the joint Moldavian-Polish march against Khan. But Islam-Girey did not consider V. Lupu his enemy and Moldavian-Polish relations were not able to break his agenda where the union with Rzeczpospolita against Muscovy was the major issue. This trend in the foreign policy appeared for the first time during negotiations on Zboriv peace agreement in 1649 between B. Khmelnytskyi and the Polish king. Right after returning from Zboriv Islam-Girey began preparations for joint march with B. Khmelnytskyi against Don Cossacks and Kalmyk troops. They informed Porta about it and presented the Tsar government with an ultimatum. But as a result Moldova suffered intervention in 1650 [24, p. 197]. Thus, B. Khmelnytskyi tried to use the fact that the Crimean Khanate was preparing for a war against Moscow and decided to send its army together with his troops against the Moldavian state.

The Moldavian hospodar and the influential group of Moldavian pro-Polish boyars supported the Polish king and refused to provide military aid to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in the war against Rzeczpospolita. The sources showed that fact, “Wallachia (Moldova – O.B.) hospodar united with Poles, he supported them and wanted to help them in everything, and said that he would fight and defeat Cossacks” [2, p. 456]. Such attitude did not suit the Hetman and diplomatic means to take Moldova away from the Polish sphere of influence were very complicated to accomplish. That is why he decided to go a different way and conquer Moldova using military force.

It is believed in historiography that the Crimean Khan, not the Hetman, was the architect of the campaign in Moldova, and it could be explained that the Tatars suffered failures in military campaigns against Muscovy, and were looking for lands to carry out their aggressive raids aimed at enrichment. Hetman B. Khmelnytskyi “marched to Walachia (Moldova – O.B.) to fight people there according to the Crimean king (khan – O.B.) orders because the Hetman was afraid to infuriate him” [2, p. 457], such words were written in the report made by envoys of the ‘Russian’ government in Ukraine. This version is also supported by modern Ukrainian historians V. Smoliy and V. Stepankov who insist that the Hetman just fulfilled the Crimean Khan’s ultimatum [27, p. 218], and they are sure that “there is no ground to depict Khmelnytskyi as an initiator of the Moldova march” [28, p. 277]. According to Chernivtsi historian O. Masan B. Khmelnytskyi did not want to march to Moldova, but had to agree in order to keep the union with the Crimean Khanate, although the Cossack army played only a supporting role in the campaign against Moldova and Bukovyna [19, p. 105]. Thus, the testimony of contemporaries as to the identity of the campaign organizer confuses us even more, and lack of the Cossack archives gives rise to further research of this issue.

The Crimean hordes after having cancelled their march to Muscovy kingdom and together with the Cossacks and B. Khmelnytskyi changed their plans and campaign directions to Moldova. It is believed that the brunt of Cossack units had to be directed at the northern Moldova parishes, that is, Bukovyna. The reason for this was that the Hetman considered this Moldavian-Polish border territory as a base for raids to Rzeczpospolita, which made it possible for Cossacks to bypass Polish border troops to attack freely in Pokuttia and the central areas of the state. [14, p. 129].

The Zaporizhia Army led by the Hetman left Chyhyryn and stopped at Uman way [2, p. 456] where it was to unite with other Cossack regiments. The Cossack army numbering up to 40 thousand people and the Tatar army in the amount of 20-30 thousand soldiers arrived at the borderlands of Bukovyna and Podillia [14, p. 129]. Cossacks also possessed powerful artillery, “the Chyhyryn regiment had 20 cannons itself, the other regiments had 6-7 cannons each,” wrote A. Zhukovskyi [2, p. 461; 16, p. 70-71]. In late August 1650, the Cossacks moved to merge with the Tatar horde to the town of Yampil, which was located opposite the Moldavian fortress Soroca on the bank of the Dnister. To cover the rear of the troops two Cossack regiments stayed on the Dniester left bank, and the Hetman led the main forces across the Moldavian border [14, p. 129]. In relation to those events, the Moldavian chronicler wrote, “both armies moved to the Dniester in great secrecy, there they divided into two equal parts, mixing
the Cossack and Tartar armies. Some were sent directly from Soroca to Suceava, and others were sent in the direction of Lapushna and Orgeyiv" [4, p. 103].

According to some sources the Tatars forced a crossing over the Dniester first and the Cossacks led by the Hetman entered Moldova a week later [14, p. 129; 24, p. 198]. This can be explained by the fact that Khmelnitskyi was expecting the reaction of Rzeczpospolita Crown Hetman M. Pototski who was the head of his troops near Kamyanets-Podilskyi [2, p. 455-458] and could attack the joint Tatar-Cossack troops. However, along with the Tartar troops the Hetman sent the Cossacks as well, “and Nosach, Pushkar and Doroshenko with sixteen thousand Cossacks, with twenty thousand Tatars would go across the Dniester, where three bridges had been already built” [6, p. 85], and then they crossed the Moldavian border. So, in late summer – early autumn of 1650 the joint Tatar-Cossack army crossed the Dniester and was divided into two parts: one part marched to the capital of the Moldavian state that time, the city of Iasi, and the other went north to Suceava and devastated that land.

The Moldavian hospodar did not expect the attack as he sent rich gifts to the Crimea and the vizier of Kazi Sefer-aga Khan assured V. Lupu that Khan had no resentment toward him. The hospodar sent a message to Istanbul with a request for protection but the response advised him to buy off the Tatars [23, p. 207]. M. Kostin mentioned that “Hospodar Vasyl knew nothing sitting with Boyar Council. And one after another came the news that the Tatars were robbing the country. Only now he realized the outcomes of the decision taken at the feast, and how useless it was to rely on Sefer Kazi-Agha letters” [4, p. 103].

The Moldavian army suffered defeat after defeat from the Khan’s superior forces. The situation for Moldova hospodar worsened by the fact that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitskyi signed a union agreement with Wallachian Hospodar Matthew Basarab and Transylvanian Prince Dierd II Rakoczy in 1650 [18, p. 363]. Although V. Lupu tried to repel the invaders he ceased resistance when D. Nechay’s Cossack units came up. The Moldavian soldiers did not even have a desire to protect their hospodar. Therefore the latter began evacuation of children, women and property to inland Bukovyna, and the rest of the people escaped [14, p. 129]. By the way, the Cossack units of Bratslav Colonel Danylo Nechay captured the capital city of Iasi, where V. Lupu had to flee from [16, p. 71]. His wife, children and some knights’ families were sent “through the woods across Kapoteshty to Nyamets fortress,” and he “moved from Iasi to forest glades that are called Kodra Kaposhteshti” [4, p. 103-104], which were located not far from Suceava.

Meanwhile, the rest of the joint forces, heading north to Suceava across Bukovynian lands, devastated them. Starting with Soroca, in turn, were captured “Khotyn, Dorohoi, Hyrule, Chernivtsi up to the Suceava castle, and the flanks of the army came up the mountains” [4, p. 103]. In Chernivtsi several knights’ estates were looted and Moldavian nobleman Stephan Murulets who had been the Chernivtsi mayor for some time was killed [11, p. 199; 20, p. 39; 30, p. 29]. Having taken the besieged fortress of Suceava, Tatar-Cossack forces almost captured several noble boyars, including logofet and yet the richest Bukovynian landowner Havrylash. They managed to escape, only paying a significant amount of money [4, p. 103; 19, p. 104].

Moldova and Bukovyna experienced difficulties at that time, “Tatars burned and devastated towns and cities with great anger” [4, p. 103]. Only churches and monasteries were not damaged because Cossacks refused to destroy them, citing the fact that “this was not ordered them to do by Hetman Khmil” [4, p. 104], and the Tatars themselves could not get churches and monasteries because monasteries were surrounded by strong walls. “In addition, there were people with muskets on the monastery walls” [4, p. 104] indicating activation of defensive actions of the Moldavian population against the Tatars.

The joint Tatar-Cossack campaign against Moldova caused a lot of troubles to the local population, especially from the Tatars who subjected the country to frantic looting because they saw the essence of any war in such behaviour. The Tartars deported from the country enormous booty,
stole many animals and people [21, p. 327]. According to the chronicler, “the country (Moldova – O.B.) remained robbed; much land was devastated and deprived of previous prosperity” [4, p. 104] and “the land of Walachia (Moldova – O.B) was completely destroyed by the fire and sword of Tatars” [8, p. 14; 19, p. 105]. It is evident that Bukovyna suffered a lot of devastation those days as well.

The Moldavian hospodar tried various methods to get rid of Tatars and Cossacks, as solid information about robberies in the state could let other candidates for the Hospodar’s throne off the leash. In that difficult time the position of the Ottoman Empire on those events remained unclear. In order to draw Sultan’s attention to his personality V. Lupu “sent his boyars to the Sultan (...). They held talks with the Sultan, which cost a lot of expenses. Since that time hospodar Vasyl was obliged to give the Sultan a lot of money and purses annually” [4, p. 104]. Thus, using considerable resources hospodar V. Lupu managed to hold the Moldavian throne.

As for the Tatars, the Sultan advised the hospodar to make peace with them giving gifts, which was done. “Vasyl gave good gifts to the Tatars” [4, p. 104] and acquiescence in taking away of all stolen before. According to some reports the amount of ransom paid to the Tatars was 100 thousand thallers [8, p. 14], the other said – only 20 thousand thallers [14, p. 131]. The Cossacks following the Hetman’s order accompanied Tatars to their borders in order to prevent further devastation of Moldova [23, p. 207]. So, having taken a ransom, and looted goods and great yasyr, the Tatars began to leave Moldavian land.

After normalization of relations with the Sultan and the Crimean Khan it was necessary to build good relations with B. Khmelnytskyi, who stayed with his army near the Prut that time [2, p. 460], although it is not known now about the specific location. The Hetman was watching M. Pototski whose troops were at the Polish-Moldavian border near Kamyanets-Podilskyi. In the event of the Polish attack on Bratslavshchyna the group of Cossacks sent to Bukovyna had to provide the main forces of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with fast ferry across the Dniester near Khotyn and attack the Polish troops in the rear [19, p. 104-105; 28, p. 278]. The envoys headed by Dzhedzhaliy were sent to V. Lupu. The Hetman accused the hospodar of having links with the Poles and blamed V. Lupu for this Tatar-Cossack campaign, and warned against continuing alliance with the Poles, because he might lose his throne [14, p. 131]. The Moldavian hospodar wanted to end fighting in the country because almost all cities had already been captured (only some isolated fortresses resisted, such as Nyamets fortress) [7, p. 59], he sent to the Cossack camp his envoys with many gifts: a sable coat covered with gold, a horse with all the harness and a sword, framed in gold and inlaid with precious stones [2, p. 460]. The Cossacks were also paid in cash contribution. Its amount was 12 thousand thallers [8, p. 14] and other sources said that about 40 thousand thallers [14, p. 131].

The outcome of the joint Tatar-Cossack successful campaign in 1650 was the agreement of V. Lupu to have the union between Moldova and the Cossack Army, and refusal from the Moldavian-Polish alliance. The agreement also included the marriage of Tymish Khmelnytskyi and Rozanda Lupu [2, p. 460] as a guarantee of allied relations between the states. This marriage was seen by the rulers of neighboring countries (Austria, Poland, Hungary, etc.) not only as dynasty development but also as a diplomatic move and they did not hurry up to support one of the sides and took a waiting position [14, p. 131]. So, Khmelnytskyi got the right to the throne in Moldova and strengthened his flanks.

Marriage of Rozanda and Tymish could facilitate rapprochement of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi with Lithuanian Hetman Janusz Radziwill, as the latter was married to the eldest daughter of V. Lupu whose name was Elena [16, p. 71], which would provide protection to the right flank of the Cossack Army. On this occasion, the chronicler wrote that “by mercy from Turkey, from Moldova through marriage, from Moscow through a faith alone rear and sides (flanks – O.B.) itself were insured (Khmelnitsky – O.B.), and he expected with the hope in the future” [6, p. 86].
The Moldavian-Ukrainian union was differently interpreted by different scholars. Chronicler H. Hrabianka wrote that “Khmelnyskyi wished marriage of his son with Wallachian woman to assure no further fighting with Poles from the Danube” [6, p. 85]. The Romanian historiography saw the goal of the union for B. Khmelnytskyi that he wanted to enter the circle of educated rulers becoming relative with V. Lupu. Polish historians argued that the Hetman, first of all, wanted to win the Moldavian throne for himself [21, p. 325]. Soviet historians interpreted the Moldavian campaign in 1650 as the initiative of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to take away Tatar attack at Muscovy [17, p. 79]. M.S. Hrushevskyi, in turn, believed that the essence of the conflict between Moldova and the Cossack Army was the Hetman’s desire to force the Moldavian hospodar to unite with the Cossacks [13, p. 428].

After having completed all business in Moldova and having sold the remains left by Tatar hordes in Moldavian land [2, p. 461] Khmelnytskyi and his troops returned to Ukraine on September 17, crossing over the Dnister [4, p. 104; 11, p. 200; 19, p. 105]. And on October 13-18, 1650, the Moldavian envoys headed by M. Choholya and Suceava Metropolitan Varlaam, which had to agree on the details of the marriage of Tymish and Rozanda, including the time and place of the wedding, arrived at the Hetman’s residence in Chyhyryn. It was agreed that the wedding ceremony would take place in the city on the border of Moldova and Ukraine, namely, Yampil or Mohyliv-Podilskyi, because all the preparation carried out in haste [14, p. 131]. The wedding party was planned to be held in late January 1651, because a number of issues remained unresolved. The only right decision at that time was to postpone the wedding. It was not clear and the Moldavian hospodar had sent his daughter Rozanda to Istanbul, where she spent two years in the Sultan’s palace and was released only in 1652 [14, p. 132]. Obviously, the union of Cossacks with V. Lupu was a forced step, and contradicted with the hospodar’s policy concerning Moldavian boyars. So he decided to postpone the wedding ceremony for the indefinite period of time.

The issue of Khotyn castle’s possession was not a priority in the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi ‘Moldavian’ policy. The Cossack army, having captured it during the first Moldavian campaign in 1650, could get a chance to attack or strengthen their position to control Podillia. However, Khmelnytskyi did not use that opportunity. Obviously, the Moldavian hospodar did not want it happen and was forced to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Cossacks and become the Hetman’s matchmaker, and he secretly continued to support the Poles [26, p. 243].

In late 1650 the international position of Moldavian state worsened a lot. For decades hospodar V. Lupu carried his own, independent of anyone, policy and subordinated only to Porta, and now he had to pay tribute to the Tatars and join the anti-Polish alliance [23, p. 208]. The Sultan was against the Moldavian-Ukrainian union because he saw a threat to his interests in Moldova, but he was not able to prevent it. However, Porta continued supporting the Hetman, seeking the possibility to weaken Rzeczpospolita. In early 1651, Turkey sent its vassals (the Crimea, Moldova, Wallachia, Transylvania) the order to support the Cossacks in their war against Poles [24, p. 199]. It was very dangerous to support Poland in that situation. However, offended and insulted V. Lupu considered it appropriate to secretly help the Polish king. His reluctance to be in the alliance with the Hetman was confirmed by numerous facts: he delayed military aid to Cossacks; misled Hetman plans informing him of failure to obtain reinforcement from Wallachia and Transylvania; reported to the Poles of approaching Tartars; sent Moldavian troops to help Poles; helped supply the Polish army [23, p. 208]. Thus, V. Lupu was formally an ally of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi but in reality, he supported and helped the Poles.

At the end of June 1651, the Cossack troops were defeated by the Poles at the Battle of Berestechko. The Moldavian hospodar learned of those events from Khotyn commandant Ionashkutse and after that, he “put the sable coat on him hoping that that victory of the Poles would save him from becoming Khmil’s (Bohdan Khmelnytskyi – O.B.) matchmaker” [4, p.
In that situation, V. Lupu tried to break the Moldavian-Ukrainian union and cancel the scheduled wedding. So in spring 1652 B. Khmelnytskyi decided to make the second Moldavian campaign to force the Moldavian hospodar to join the union and to arrange Rozanda and Tymish marriage. To reach that aim a numerous Cossack army led by the Hetman’s son was sent to Moldova. Having learned that, V. Lupu sent a messenger to the King of Poland with a request to interfere with the plans of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi [6, p. 113]. The Polish army headed by new crown hetman Marcin Kalinowski stopped Tymish regiments at the foot of Batih Mountain (near the modern village of Chetvertynivka in Trostyanets district of Vinnytsia region). The Hetman brought his Cossack army to help his son and on May 22-23, together with Tatars, they defeated Poles at Batih [16, p. 72; 18, pp. 359]. Under the pressure of circumstances, V. Lupu resumed talks with B. Khmelnytskyi. The other thing, which made him do that, was deterioration of relations with the rulers of neighboring Wallachia and Transylvania [21, p. 328]. The hospodar was not able to resist any longer because the Tymish’s army that numbered ‘tens of thousands of good Cossack knights’ [1, p. 102] came up to the Moldavian border. Arriving in Iasi in late August of 1652 Tymish Khmelnytskyi married Rozanda Lupu. Chronicler V. Velychko wrote, “He (Tymish – O.B.) received a warm welcome and the wedding party was going on for the first, second, third and other days (...). After that he took his wife (Rozanda – O.B.) and left for his father Khmelnytskyi (Bohdan – O.B.) to Chyhyryn” [1, p. 103]. So, Khmelnytskyi with the help of his eldest son made the second successful Moldavian campaign with the purpose to restore the Ukrainian-Moldovan military and political alliance and become relatives with V. Lupu. It should be noted that the events of the second Moldavian campaign in 1652, fortunately, did not affect Bukovyna.

However, the campaign significantly influenced the foreign policy of the Moldavian hospodar who decided to use it for his having become relatives and having settled an alliance with the Hetman. “The old enemy, hospodar Matthew (Basarab. – O.B.), who, fearing the union between hospodar Vasyl and Cossacks, reported Turks on it, and with Rakoczy (Dierd II. – O.B.) began to conspire” [4, p. 105]. That is, the hospodars of Wallachia and Transylvania reacted negatively to the recovery of the Moldavian-Ukrainian union.

Meanwhile, the Sultan having learned of the union between Moldova and Ukraine did nothing against V. Lupu, as he had a hope that the Hetman would retain previous relations both with the Turks and Tatars [23, p. 209]. At the same time, Moldavian nobility turned away from their ruler. And the hospodars of Wallachia and Transylvania agreed with the opposition groupings of Moldavian boyars of V. Lupu displacement from the throne [24, p. 200]. Thus, the plot inspired by Logofet George Stefan against the Moldavian hospodar was organized. George Stefan was “a man who had already designed to capture the hospodar’s throne (...). After being ambassador Logofet agreed his plans for ruling with Rakoczy (Prince of Transylvania – O.B.), and hospodar Matthew (Basarab – O.B.)” [4, p. 105]. Considering the fact that V. Lupu dismissed hired troops, the troops from Wallachia, Transylvania, and Moldavian boyars who joined them entered Moldova in March 1653 [21, p. 329-330]. The Moldavian hospodar learned of the march against him from Spafari Chohol. “The whole secret thing was opened for the hospodar (...). But he was not prepared for such a sudden turn of events” [4, p. 108-109]. Stamati Hadymbula was sent to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi with the news about those events. And V. Lupu, having taken his family and some boyars, saved his life fleeing from Iasi to Khotyn fortress [4, p. 108-109]. Semyhorodskyi troops led by Kimeni and Wallachian troops led by commander Duka seized Iasi on April 6 and declared the new Moldavian hospodar who became former Logofet G. Stephen [16, p. 72]. “So began the war between the Cossacks against Walachians (rebellious Moldavians), Munteanu (Wallachian) and Rakoczy (Transylvanians),” Hrushevskyi wrote [13, p. 521].
Interesting events of local importance took place that time in Chernivtsi. After the death of G. Mateyash (in early 1652) who was one of the largest landowners in Bukovyna (he owned 79 villages or their parts) his legacy was shared between his daughters Ilyana and Alexandra and his son Jeremiah. The latter received the villages of Zhuchka and Denysivka [9, p. 183-184]. During the aforementioned Boyars conspiracy, the owner of Denysivka was visternak Yordakiy, married to Alexandra Mateyash. Due to support of V. Lupu Chernivtsi City Council took advantage of those events and managed to return Denysivka ‘clearings’ to the Chernivtsi community with the help of new hospodar G. Stephen. However, having received the hospodar’s certificate of July 18, 1653, boyar Yordakiy returned Denysivka, gaining the commitment of G. Stephen [10, c. 196; 20, p. 38-39]. Chernivtsi once and for all lost land areas on the left north of the Prut [30, p. 45]. It is worth mentioning the qualitative growth of property associated with Denysivka. In the early 17th century there were ‘clearings’ there, that is, unoccupied meadows among the bushes; and in 1627 on the site of those clearings ‘the settlement of Denysivka’ appeared; in 1645 the ‘settlement’ became the ‘village of Denysivka.’ Thus, for half a century the clearings had changed to the whole village because during the period from completion of the Khotyn war in 1621 and the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Moldavian campaign in 1650 the city of Chernivtsi and its outskirts “were in relative peace” [20, p. 39].

The military and political situation both in Moldova and Bukovyna was destabilized in the result of a coup attempt. G. Stephan, having taken Iasi throne, sent a detachment led by Hetman Petrashtko Moryanul and formed of “people of Hungarian troops and the Wallachian (as well as local)” to Khotyn in pursuit of V. Lupu. All treasures of the former Moldavian hospodar were taken from Nyamets castle to Khotyn. Vasyl Lupu, having known that G. Stephan sent the army to Khotyn and the boyar squads and mercenary troops were unwilling to protect him, ordered to cross the Dnister to Kamyanets to get protection from Kamyanets headman Petro Pototski [5, p. 107-108; 11, p. 206]. Most of the entourage of the former hospodar and the soldiers returned to Iasi to serve a new hospodar. They encountered G. Stephen army near Khotyn and were discussing for several hours who they supported, thus having allowed V. Lupu and his close people cross the Dnister without loss and taking their treasure. “The people of Khotyn seeing the fear and the rush at the crossing, rushed to plunder the convoy rear and managed to grab a lot of expensive clothes and silver” [5, p. 108]. The shootout took place between the people of hospodar G. Stephen and V. Lupu. During it even Khotyn people fired “from the castle using small cannons” and almost hit the former hospodar [5, p. 108].

Quite interesting is the criticism of former hospodar V. Lupu for underestimating the strategic Khotyn castle made by chronicler M. Kostin, stating, “I cannot keep silent about Khotyn castle. How it was not reasonable to leave it in the wrong hands! At least for the reliability of the crossing he had to put riflemen there. Do they need a lot of people to do that? Thirty Germans would have kept the castle for years defending it from the Moldavian and Hungarian armies. Or didn’t they have enough food? Only bread alone having taken from one neighboring village or that from town could feed the castle around the year. Therefore, that castle if someone considers it carefully caused destruction of hospodar Vasyl’s home. (...) If his wife were in the Khotyn castle, but not in Suceava, hospodar Stefan could not be able to capture the Khotyn castle so easy as he had done it in Suceava. (...) Would hospodar Stephan be able to take Khotyn castle when Khmil was in Husiatyn just a day’s journey from Khotyn? A lot could have been done by hospodar Vasyl (...)” [5, p. 108; 11, p. 207].

Meanwhile, B. Khmelnytskyi having learned of the plot against his matchmaker sent to help him “Tymish and Colonel Bohun and twelve thousand good Cossacks” [1, p. 113]. Information on the number of Cossacks differs: according to different sources there were from 8 to 16 thousand soldiers. So in spring of 1653, the third Moldavian campaign of Cossacks started. Destroying the
first resistance in the town of Soroca, Cossack troops on April 21 defeated hospodar G. Stephen troops and took Iasi [16, p. 72]. Having erected a fortified camp in Iasi Tymish stayed there until the arrival of V. Lupu from Kamyanets. The news of the Cossacks victory the latter received while he was in Zhvanets where he crossed the Dnister. Arriving at Khotyn, V. Lupu tried to return the town diplomatically because of the garrison loyal to G. Stefan and led by mayor Hyzhdeu had already stayed there, but in vain. The castle had been under siege for months, until the “second coming of hospodar Stefan from Wallachia” [5, c. 108; 11, c. 209].

After returning to Iasi V. Lupu began preparing a new campaign against Wallachia. However, Cossack-Moldavian troops getting several victories in the battle near Wallachian village of Finta on May 17, 1653, suffered unfortunate defeat. V. Lupu ran to Iasi and T. Khmelnytskyi returned to Chyhyryn with the remnants of Cossack troops late May [16, p. 72-73; 23, pp. 211; 29, p. 148]. Shortly after that G. Stephan leading his troops entered Moldova and took the throne over again. V. Lupu tried to resist the invaders, but he was defeated in the first battle (August 6, 1653) and fled to Ukraine after crossing the Dniester [23, c. 212; 24, pp. 200-201].

Having attracted the support of Poland, G. Stefan Suceava started besieging the Suceava castle which garrison remained loyal to V. Lupu. The wife of the hospodar and his family and his treasures were there that time. In early August 1653 Tymish Khmelnytskyi leading 9 thousand Cossack troops came to help his father-in-law and on August 10 they were in Suceava. Having broken through the encirclement the Hetmanєs son led active defense of the fortress [16, p.73]. It was the beginning of the fourth and final campaign of Cossacks in Moldova.

The army numbering 20 thousand soldiers formed by the Poles, Hungarians, Wallachian and Moldavians, G. Stephen supporters, stood against the Cossack army and Suceava garrison [16, p.73]. T. Khmelnytsky bravely defended the fortress and made raids against enemies. Bohdan Khmelnytsky decided to help his son, but the Polish king at the head of a large army came to Podilia [15, p. 98]. Polish troops numbering 5-6 thousand soldiers led by Colonel J. Kondratskyi came to help G. Stephen as well [19, p. 107]. Though, chronicler M. Kostin implied only “one thousand Poles” [5, p. 118]. The king also sent Colonel Dynov who led a detachment of 600 Germans with four light cannons and one heavy cannon [5, p. 120]. They were to go through Chernivtsi and other Bukovyna settlements to get to Suceava [19, p. 107].

There were also Tatars in Tymish regiments. When Murza asked permission to let them go he was killed by the angry Hetman’s son. The same night the Tatars left Suceava. They went first to Chernivtsi, and then they walked through Khotyn and moved in the direction of Mohyliv-Podilskyi. The Tatars did not stay in Chernivtsi for a long time, and near Khotyn they tried to break up groups of Khotyn pyrkelab Jora, but were defeated, and then the Tatars crossed the Dnister [5, c. 120; 11, p. 220].

The squad of opryshky (local rebels) led by Dytynka which was placed in Khotyn and Chernivtsi districts was active that time in Bukovyna. To suppress them G. Stefan sent a regular army led by ‘stolnyk’ Buchko which defeated all Dytynka’s units [22, p. 69-70].

The fate of Tymish Khmelnytskyi was regrettable. In early September of 1653 during a cannon attack at Suceava fortress he was seriously wounded and died on September 4 or 5. The Cossacks led by Colonel M. Fedorovych defended Suceava till October 8 but had to surrender on honorable terms. With arms, flags and T. Khmelnytskyi’s body they crossed the Dnister near Soroca [20, p. 40]. There is a legend according to which T. Khmelnytsky asheshes were taken to his father through Chernivtsi and Khotyn. But this could not have happened because all roads to Khotyn and the town itself were occupied by the enemy [15, p. 99]. Therefore, this legend is fantasy on the contrary to facts.

When the Cossacks returned to Ukraine G. Stefan troops came up to Khotyn to join the Polish army. The Moldavian hospodar apologized to the King because he managed to send to Khotyn only a thousand of cavalry led by Khotyn pyrkelab Ionashko. And during the battle of
Zhvanets the Polish army was able to survive only because of the provisions supply from the territory of Bukovyna [19, p. 108].

Conclusion. During 1650-1653 Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi made four military campaigns of Cossack troops in Moldova. Their goal was to prevent the union of the Moldavian hospodar with Poles, set up Moldavian-Ukrainian military and political agreements that were fixed by wedlock of Hetman's son Tymish and V. Lupu's daughter Rozanda. During the first campaign the Cossacks and Tatars plundered the country, took many Moldavian settlements and towns, including Chernivtsi and Khotyn and signed such a desirable alliance with the Moldavian hospodar. During the next two years V. Lupu did not fulfill his obligations that caused the second campaign to Moldova in summer 1652. The marriage of Tymish and Rozanda caused concern among Moldavian boyars, who threw V. Lupu from the Iasi throne with the help of Wallachian and Transylvanian people. Rebellious Logofet G. Stefan became a new hospodar of Moldova. Those events caused the third march of B. Khmelnytskyi troops to Moldova in April-May 1653. The success in the battles against the troops of G. Stephan changed to failures and defeats from Wallachian and Transylvanians troops. As a result V. Lupu lost the Moldavian throne. Having learned that, Khmelnytskyi sent Cossacks led by Tymish to the fourth and the last Moldavian campaign, which ended with the failure and the death of the Hetman's son.

Thus, the Moldavian campaigns were a complete failure for Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, they meant curtailing of his Danube policies, refusal of military assistance from the allies, the loss of time and a significant amount of Cossack forces, devastation in Bukovyna, which had further negative impact on both Moldova and Bukovyna, as well as Cossack Ukraine.


References:

Отримано 15.10.2016