

Study on the role of identity-oriented actors in the Syrian crisis

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Abstract

Recent developments in Arab countries have provided new opportunities and possibilities for the transformation of the political climate, security and change the balance of power in the region. Since the beginning of 2011, the Middle East has witnessed major developments and serious changes. The main changes resulting from the Arab Spring in the Middle East can be "crisis development" in the region. Different approaches have been presented on the reason of the crisis in the Middle East, especially political and security developments in Syria. By 2011, signs of civil disobedience and political upheaval in the Middle East have been observed on the agenda of planners. From 2011 onward, identity components provided the context for civil disobedience radicalization and thus social violence has been formed in the form of security policy of radicalized groups.

Keywords: security crisis of Middle East, the Arab Spring, Identity-Oriented Actors, Cooperative Security, crisis of identity and legitimacy

JEL Classification: K33

1. Introduction

In Syria, the country's strategic position in the region and the ethnic and religious structure within the society and the state have made some complexity in the process of transformation. Syria transformation has been under the dominance of the religious identification of Salafi groups who's rooted in the ideology of Ahmad Ibn Hanbali, Ibn Timiyeh, Mawdudi, Mohammed Abdel Wahab and SayyidQutb. Each of these approaches have reflected signs of violence, Salafism and dealing with secular governments in the Arab Spring process.

Social transformations in this geographic area not only lead to escalation of the crisis and displacement of power, but also provide a context to convert the political competition to social conflict and civil war. Regional security is another matter has affected Arabic Spring development. It is obvious that, Arabic Spring development caused some changes and transformations in the past coalitions and alliances, and has disturbed former situation largely.

Transformations of Arabic spring have affected the security in the Middle-east from international aspect. International aspect concerns the role and intervention

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of Trans-regional powers in the affairs of Middle-East and due to the transformation of Arabic spring, these interventions increased the domain of influencing variables on the security of the Middle-East and made it more complex. Interventions of trans-regional actors are done for two reasons: first, trans-regional actors seek some interest in the Middle-East for their self. The second reason is that their intervention is asked by some actors of Middle-East region. The causes of the crisis can be found in severe weakness of Middle Eastern communities in various spheres such as political, economic, social and training. Also, the absence of a real nation-state and tribal and sectarian culture in political and governmental structures can be noted as the reasons. Extensive intervention of global powers in the internal affairs of these communities with a strong presence of political dictatorship and finally reaction and Salafism are the main causes of the crisis³.

2. Theoretical framework

The identity and polarity approach of Barry Buzanis applied in this article. When ideas about the territorial status state of a country and distribution of power are considered, it will get close to neo-realistic approaches and when the security process as a result of inter-subjective interaction of actors is taken into account, constructivist approaches in it are highlighted⁴. Buzan believes that the Middle East is conflict oriented by nature, causing tension and a permanent place to fight among hostile powers and groups and this conflict also allows other powers to transfer their battlefield to this area He adds that security in the Middle East is a mystery, so that friendship of an actor with other actors must ensure enmity with another actor and hence, in this area, any movement involves an anti- security reflection⁵.

It is important to note that the effect will vary according to geographical proximity and distance. In other words, transformation in countries, that are in the same region of our country regarding security ties, has more serious and direct impact on our security since "in regional level, governments or their other units are so close to each other that their security cannot be considered apart from each other"⁶. Reviewing relations of the regional states through recent transformations of Middle East, particularly Syria, is indicative of accurate recognition of Buzan.

He also states that considering Middle East issues related to security, is a function of elites' understanding that mainly live on survival stage and see their country and government at risk and their minds are occupied by inhibition and naturally fail to think over future political and social horizons of the issue. And finally, he says that every region has its own security formula and method of conflict resolution among regions is not generalizable from one to another and believes that

³ Athari, Seyed Asadollah, Vahid, Hosein, *Unfold the Hidden Reality*, Aban, 2014, p. 17.

⁴ Dadandysh, Parvin, KozegarKaleji, Vali, "A Critical Study of regional security complex theory with emphasis on the South Caucasus's regional security environment ", *Fasnam eRahbord*, Vol. XIX, No. 56. Dadandysh and Kozegarkalegi, 2010, p. 78.

⁵ Buzan, Barry, "Middle East and causing conflict structure ", *FaslnameSiasatKharji*, No. 3, 2002, p. 669.

⁶ Buzan, Barry, Weaver, L., "Regions and powers" translated Rahman Ghahremanpour, Tehran, *MarkazMotaleat Strategic*, 2009, p. 54.

issues such as the ethnic, national, religious, and international interventions have easily and quickly made the Middle East witness bloody conflicts. Recommendation of Buzan in this regard is that the West's formula for resolving the interference crisis in the Middle East is meaningless and even intensifying⁷.

According to Barry Buzan's theory, can be considered as the most important component in friendship and enmity patterns in the Syrian crisis⁸. Thus, in the Syrian crisis, regional powers of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, due to the prevailing anarchic environment of the Middle East and domination of friendship, enmity and contrast patterns, are trying to create and maintain the balance of power against each other. This is why the Saudi that is looking for a Salafi system pattern is against Iran, which follows Shiite order. In fact, Saudi Arabia wants to disrupt the existing status in Syria and the Assad regime's fall to counter the regional influence of Iran and in organizing new regional balance, is trying to strengthen the Salafi Arab force for the reduction of the forces affecting anti- Israel atmosphere in the Arab world.

In contrast, there are countries such as Iran, Russia, China and non-state actors like Hezbollah, that in addition to supporting reforms, call for changes in the countries that have cooperated with the West and the United States so far, but do not support the fundamental change in countries such as Syria⁹. In fact, Iran seeks to maintain through dialogue based on the Shiite resistance model, which is contrary to Turkey, which follows Brotherhood order.

3. Middle East and Arab Spring

About the Arabic Spring transformations it should be noted that despite the differences that Arabic spring had in each of the countries of the region, it has had three important consequences: the impact on other countries, the uncertainty of the future, changing relationships between the actors¹⁰. In fact, lack of formation of nation-state, in its real meaning, in the Middle East, deepening the gap between rulers and people, and intensification of legitimacy crisis have caused protest in this area.

As Beverly Milton Edwards and Peter Hynchhif believe the conflict in the Middle East is multi-dimensional, and in his analysis reminded the Middle-East region based on three components, including government (conflict between states), internal factors (groups of violent or peaceful, terrorist groups) and the intergovernmental factors (level of regional analysis) and believe that nature of

⁷ Nasri, Ghadir, "Three Formula for Understandin Conflict Middle East: View Barry Buzan", Pazhoheshkade Motaleat Esteratejic Middle East (in persian). <http://fa.cmess.ir/view/tabid/127/ArticleId/935.aspx>, 2010, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

⁸ Mousavi, Hossain, "Model of regional security in the Persian Gulf, experiences and obstacles", Faslanme Motaleat Strategic, Issue 4, 2007.

⁹ Torabi, Ghasm, "Impacts of regional and global competition in the Arab world's changes and security of Islamic Republic of Iran", Pezhoheshname Defae Moghadasm, second years, 2012, p. 164-165.

¹⁰ Shuaib, Bahman, "Russian and Arabic Spring: Challenges and Implications", Faslanme Asiaie Markaziva Ghafghaz, No 77, spring, 2012: 31-32.

conflicts in the Middle East is necessary to adopt such an approach¹¹.

In addition, the Middle East is facing a total of three important trends that affect each other.

1- Global trends: global policy is linked with aspects of identity, power, military orientation and energy resources. In such a space world powers seek to manage the international system and try to manage global trends. It is possible to manage the global system if utilizing the regional balance policy leads to regional balance and cooperation of the actors.

2- Regional trends: Today, the Middle East has an identity-oriented, Islamic, ideological and normative atmosphere. The present time is the era of Islamic identity finding and this Islamic identity finding has caused lower social forces to enter the deep historical field and social infrastructures.

3- National trends: This trend is underway in each of the Middle East countries individually and has native aspect. However, national trends in the Arab countries have highly affected social and political trends in other Arabic countries. Victory of people in Tunisia affected our Egyptian uprising very soon and victory of the Egyptian made the people of Libya, Bahrain and Yemen to up rise and these transformations disturbed and changed the atmosphere in Syria¹².

4. The role of identity crisis, legitimacy and authority in the crisis of Syria

According to Volker Perhes, the aim of Bashar al- Assad is to modernize the authoritarianism in Syria. This aim coincided with plan of other countries in the region to lead the modernization; in fact, it was a type of movement from traditional and populist form of authoritarianism to post- populist or neo-liberal authoritarianism. In fact, Bashar al-Assad has failed in creating a kind of political adaptability among its people and that has provided fields for popular uprising in Syria. Syrian government from Hafez al-Assad time and after that at the time of Bashar al-Assad has constantly been looking for developing the state-building process in its multi sectional community that the plan has failed because of presence of different and contrasting ethnic, religious and cultural groups¹³.

When political structures of authoritarian countries are faced with a crisis, it is natural that mechanisms related to managing the Department of Social Affairs will be changed too. Such a process has reflected its signs associated with crisis of Arab countries in the Middle East¹⁴.

Weakness of legitimacy of the ruling elite and absence of right political and

¹¹ Jansis, Ahmad, Rohollah, Ghasemian, "Mainstreaming native and non-native opponents in Syria" *faslname elmi pazhoheshi siyasat jahani* 2, Number 3. paez. Jansis, Ghasemian, 2013, pp. 110-113.

¹² Alaei, Hossain, "Analysis of changes in the balance of power in the Middle East, after popular uprisings in the Arabic countries", *Faslname Siasat Kharji*, Vol. Issue 4 Winter, 2012, pp. 848-849.

¹³ Himmebusch, Raymond, "Syria: from authoritarian upgrading to revolution?" *International Affairs*. Volume 88, Issue 1, pp. 18-20.

¹⁴ Benard, Cheryl, "Civil Democratic Islam: American approach", translation A. Ghahramanpour, Tehran, Markaz Motaleat Strategic. Benard, 2005, p. 41.

social approaches at the heart of communities and as a result, increasing problems of the people has made rulers turn to repressive and restrictive strategies in these countries. Also, social and class gap, corruption and consumerism in the ruling elite and upper classes have caused great cultural-political gaps in these communities¹⁵.

Citizens that are affected by political waves and forms related to the identity crisis in the Middle East, are confronted by signs of turbulence due to the lack of social and institutional infrastructure¹⁶, as transformations showed in 2011. Arabic authoritarian governments in the Middle East are facing a crisis deeply¹⁷.

In the Arab world, what has always been stable is the authoritarianism culture. In light of this culture, Arab leaders and elites consider their status as acquired, right and absolute property¹⁸.

In fact, lack of formation of nation-state, in its real meaning, in the Middle East, deepening the gap between rulers and people, and intensification of legitimacy crisis has caused protests in this area.

Another contributing factor to political transformations in Syria can be "crisis of efficiency". In general, authoritarian political systems due to closed administrative structure and expanding surveillance of the authorities are not able to adjust their administrative processes. Using individuals, who lack expertise in high management and decision-makings, can be among the factors that influence crisis of efficiency in authoritarian countries such as Syria.

It should be noted that authoritarian groups in the political structure of Syria that have gained their positions from their political relations, dominate the economy: among these people Rami Makhoulf can be referred to. Public opinion in Syria clearly knows that Makhoulf has become an economic giant due to its relations with the state system and is not merely a private citizen¹⁹.

5. Takfiri groups in the Crisis of Syria

These transformations have occurred in such conditions that Western countries along with Saudi Arabia and the dominant waves in Arab League West, are trying to provide required fields to structural collapse in this country. This is formed through delegitimizing .Syria is part of an alliance axis, which is supported by Russia, Iran, and to some extent China. The axis is condemned by the Arab League, Turkey and the West²⁰.

¹⁵ Maghsodi, Mojtaba, Heidari, Shaghaiegh, "study the similarities and differences of Arabic movements in the Middle East", *Rahname Siasatgozari*, Issue Two, Summer, 2011, p. 44.

¹⁶ Mosalanejad, Abas, "The impacts of security instability on the balance of power in the Middle East", *Faslanem Zhopoltic*, No. 27, 2014, p. 18.

¹⁷ Rezvanifar, Ismail, "Political and social challenges of Saudi Arabia in the light of Islamic awakening", *Pezhoheshhaie Mantaghaci*, fall, 2013, p. 128-129.

¹⁸ Shemshadi, Akhund Kaka, "Islamic awakening of Muslim nations and regime change in Arabic countries", *Faslname Hablol Matin*, Article 8, Volume III, Issue VI, Spring, 2014, p. 4.

¹⁹ Motaghi, Ebrahim, KohKhail, Mariam, "The role of regional actors in the radicalization of social forces in the Middle East", *Faslanem Siasat Jahani*, Volume III, Issue II, Summer, 2014, p. 56.

²⁰ Chatan, House, "The political outlook Syria", *Mena Programme: Meeting Summary*, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/0112syria_mtgsummary.pdf, 2012, p. 15, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

Takfiri groups under ideological, political and security supports of Saudi are considered the main axis of the Syrian crisis. In this regard, the role of Takfiri groups can be observed in the radicalization process of political transformations in the Middle East and security crisis. Even the spread of the crisis in relations of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt should be considered as a reflection of the process that has created Salafi identity through reproduction of Takfiri action model and terrorist violence in Syria and Iraq.

Syria's transformations have been affected by religious identity finding movement of Salafi groups, identity of groups whose ideology is rooted in the thought of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, Mawdudi, Mohammed Abdel Wahab and Sayyid Qutb. Understanding security facts of Syria is not possible regardless of identity indices of ISIS. The word and concept of ISIS was first proposed when traces of spreading Syrian crisis to Iraq, got the attention of journalists and analysts of strategic issues. In fact, dominance of Isis on some parts of Syria and Iraq has important regional consequences, including extension of competition and differences among regional actors, probability of disrupting the country's borders in case of partition and loss of territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria, spread of extremism and terrorism in the region and increase of ethnic and religious tensions, possibility of regional war with intensified competitions over Iraq and threat of security and stability in the Middle East and change of the equations in regional crises such as the Syrian crisis²¹.

Takfiri identity groups play role as the main force disturbing balance in the process of crisis escalating. Ethnic and religious gaps in Syria are much more active and more serious than the gaps arising from the opposition of tyranny and freedom. Based on general understanding, anti-government unrests of Syria are mostly directed and supported by the Sunni majority of this country, especially the Muslim and other religions have a lesser role in these uprisings²². On the other hand, the intervention of the great powers has brought the necessary grounds for creating "unstable governments" and "fragile regimes" in the Middle East. This caused the background for the emergence and spread of political radicalism²³.

6. The role of Iran in the Syrian crisis

Syria is part of an alliance supported by Russia, Iran, and China partly. The Unity is doomed by the Arab, Turkey and the West unions²⁴. The alliance between Iran and Syria not only be searched on common interests or common religious values, but also should be sought in tactical and strategic unity and cooperation

²¹ Asadi, Ali Akbar, "The rise of ISIS and security crisis in Iraq", Markaz Pezhoheshhaie Majles Shoraie Eslami, 2014, p. 39.

²² Dziadosz Alexander, Olivr Holm, "Special Report: Deeping ethnic rifts resharpe Syria towns", Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21us-syrian-rebels-sectarianism-specialreport-idusBRE5K08J29130621>, 2013, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

²³ Mosalanejad, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.

²⁴ Chatan, House, *op. cit.*, 2012, p. 15.

between the two countries²⁵.

Syria's importance in foreign policy can be stated as follows:

1. Alignment with anti-American policies, especially anti-Israeli
2. One of the most important strategic regional ally of Iran
3. The particular geopolitical of Syria in the Middle East
4. Support the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance and militant groups
5. The power that supports Lebanon transformation and Lebanon's

Hezbollah resistance²⁶. Ismail Qaani, deputy commander of the Quds in an interview with Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) acknowledged that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been involved in military operations, militants and civilians in Syria. He added, if the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Republic was not present in Syria killings was multiplied²⁷.

Ali Larijani, Iran's parliament speaker, considers Palestinian freedom as a center of strategic policies of Iran. Also Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, who is now senior adviser of Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, stresses on the fact that Syria is the golden ring in the chain of resistance against Israel²⁸.

In fact, the current crisis of Syria is the biggest challenge facing the 35 years coalition of Iran and Syria since in this case, not only the position and influence of Iran will be limited by the loss of its most important Arab ally, but also Iran's ability to provide support for Hezbollah and affecting the situation in Lebanon and thematic area of the Arabs and Israel will be severely limited²⁹. On the other hand, firm union of Iran and Syria is not only resulting from threats of Saddam Hussein and the war against Iran in the 1980s, but also arises from mutual hatred towards the United States and Israel³⁰. On the other hand, since regional and non-regional policies of Iran have been in line with support from Palestinian movements such as Hamas and jihad in conflict with the policies of America and Israel and also support for Lebanon's Hezbollah through Syria is very important for Iran, then transformations of Syria directly affect the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran³¹.

Generally, operational strategy of Iran to help Syria's regime should include

²⁵ Price, Bryan, "Syria A wicked problem for all", CTC Sentinae,6(8),1-4.URL. <http://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CTC-Sentinel-Vol6Iss8.pdf>, 2013, p. 11-12, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

²⁶ Ajourloo, Hosein, "Analysis of the Syria s position in Supporting of the resistance", Fasname motaleat felestin, Number 8, 2011, p. 58.

²⁷ Segall, Micheal,"The Role of Iranian Security Forces in the Syrian Bloodshed", Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. http://www.jcpa.org/wp-content/upload/2012/06/segall/up_5891pdf Segall, 2012, p. 2, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

²⁸ Tracy Samuel, Annie,"The Syrian Uprising: The View from Tehran", telaviv Note and update on Middle East development by Moshe Dayan center, Volum 6, Number 12, 27 Jun., 2012, p. 1, <http://www.dayan.org/file/16083/download?token=8ipjARj2>, www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/the-islamic-state-isis-isisil-factsheet-1pdfTracy, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

²⁹ Goodarzi, Jubin, "Iran and Syria at the Crossroad: The Fall of the Tehran-Damaseus Axis?", Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, <http://www.WilsonCenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran-and-Syria-at-the-Crossroad>, 2013, p. 4, consulted last time on October 20, 2016

³⁰ Price, Bryan, *op. cit.*, 2013, p. 11-12.

³¹ Sajedi, Amir, "The Syrian crisis and the intervention of foreign powers", Pezhoheshname Ravabet Bainolmelal, Volume 6, Issue 24, winter., 2013, p. 172.

the following things: 1) Oil and funds 2) information support 3) arms assistance and providing military equipment 4) sending technical experts and officers to Syria for training military forces of this country 5) direct presence of the Quds force in Syria and conducting operations of the Syrian army against opposition 6) forming and training the militants like Jubaysh Alshbieh according to the military-defense strategy in Syria³².

In short, two main objectives of Iran's support from Syria's are as follows:

1-Maintaining strategic position and increasing regional influence: Iran's strategic look to Syria is one of the reasons for Tehran's support from Damascus in recent transformations. For Iran, Syria is as an agent to move forward in the region, a shield and strategic bumper and a tool for project of power and influence in the Middle East³³.

2-Maintaining the axis of resistance: resistance axis represents the unity of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria and the Arab and most powerful non-state actors, including Lebanon's Hezbollah and some Palestinian groups that have always been at the forefront of fight to Israel, rejection of West's policies (especially the United State) in the Middle East and opposition to some policies of some Arab conservative regimes such as Saudi Arabia³⁴.

In contrast, Iran helps militants (Shabiha), who are dependent on government, prevent the fall of Assad government³⁵. Hezbollah has always supported President al-Assad's regime through trained force that military intervention of this party is in line with the strategic interests of Iran³⁶.

7. The role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the Syrian crisis

Saudi Arabia's political system has traditionally been a conservative player and most despotic political system in the region. In connection with development of Arabic spring in the world, Arabs seek to remove threats and protect the security of its own.

The role of Arabia was not limited to military and financial aids, to Political opponents of President Bashar al-Assad. Also, this country focused on strengthening and increasing the ability and improving the situation of political opponents of president Bashar Al-Assad especially National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Although the budget and financial appropriation of Arabia

³² The Clarion Project, "The Islamic State". Clarion Project. www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/the-islamic-state-isis-isil-factsheet-1.pdf, 2014, p. 14, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

³³ Chubin, Shahram, "Iran and the Arab Spring Ascendancy Frustrated". Gulf Research Center. <http://www.Carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran-and-the-Arab-Spring-Ascendancy-Frustrated.pdf>, 2012, p.30, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

³⁴ Mohns,Erik, Andre Bank, "Syrian Revolt Fallout End of the Resistance Axis? Middle East Policy Council, N. 3. <http://www.mepc.org/journal/MiddleEastPolicyCouncil>, 2012, p. 1, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

³⁵ Futon, Will Holliday, Joseph and Wyer, Sam, "Iranian strategy in Syria", ISW, May. <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria> Futon, Holliday, 2013, p. 5-6.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

In relation to the crisis in Syria three are the important strictures interested by the United States including: 1) limiting regional instability (such as Iran) and control of chemical and biological weapons, despite the political policy of the United States in relation to the current situation in Syria, the country will witness violence and regional instability in the future. So, the interests of the United States are to restrict the number of civilian victims in Syria. 2) Prevent the development of terrorists within Syria. 3) Limiting Iranian influence. 4) Reduction chemical and biological weapons and to limit the spread of instability in the region. The United States should help and train the rebels, but at the same time should a context to grow jihadists linked to the rebels by depriving them from weapons⁴².

In this regard, the United States has also made extensive efforts to guide and approve anti-Syrian resolutions in the Security Council; five resolutions of the Security Council in connection with the crisis Syria can be seen, one of the most important of which has been Resolution 2118 dated September 27, 2013 in relation to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and charging Syria in this regard (Security Council Report, 2014).

Diplomacy of John Kerry and Lavrov was conducted in August and September 2016 in Geneva has been focused on the mechanisms for a cease-fire as crisis management. Although a cease-fire results in the field of power reproduction, but the created contradictions have identical, ideological and strategical natures. Thus enabling the reproduction processes toward political stability cannot be achieved through diplomacy. Syria crisis management imperatives dictate that confront the Daesh pattern should be followed in real space by the great powers. Enabling all identity groups creates new problems in the process of transfer of power.

10. The role of Russia and China in the Syrian crisis

For several reasons, Russia continued to support President Bashar Assad: 1- maintain bilateral relations; 2. Maintain Military base in the Mediterranean; 3- International equations. So, in addition to the supporting of Russia in the form of against Syria's veto in the Security Council resolutions of Bashar al-Assad, the country despite international pressure, continued and extended the military aids to Syria⁴³.

In fact, in the issue of Syria, the United States and Russia still have not been able to reach any consensus to detect terrorist groups and this resulted in decreasing the level of cooperation between the two governments⁴⁴.

Files/dosyab61019948ff0e761ddf2c4104982b5cb.pdf, 2012, p. 7-8, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

⁴² Fishman, Brian, "The conflict in Syria: An Assessment of US Strategic Interests" Iyengar, Radha RAND Crop, NEW America Foundation. 19 March. <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/the-conflict-in-syria/>, 2013, p. 2-3, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

⁴³ Wezeman D. Pieter, Arms transfers to Syria. Sipri yearbook, <http://sipri.org/yearbook/2013/files/sipri-yearbook-2013-chapter-5-section-3>, 2013, section 3, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

⁴⁴ Stent, Angela, "Putin's Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia's Intervention" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, number 1, January-February, 2016, p. 108.

China, along with Russia vetoed the United Nations Security Council resolution against Syria. It seems that some considerations are associated with motivation and goals of China's foreign policy in the Middle East include:

- Confrontation with the unilateralism policy of the United States (the country with a serious unilateralism policy is serious to deal with a unipolar system of the United States and this is obvious in recent transformations of Shanghai Alliance.

- Achieve international role as a global player
- Develop economic relations with countries in the region⁴⁵.

11. Model of cooperative security and Syrian crisis

Pattern of actor's action has made inevitable the required context to expand the crisis. Russia, as a great power, tries to follow the security equation in the Middle East based on geopolitical goals and normative requirements. Radicalized Salafi and Takfiri groups are the future enemies of the Russian Federation integration. That is why the Russian security policy will be based on «Monopolistic Equilibrium». Mutual cooperation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia has led to tactical, staged and progressional contradictions with Iran. In such circumstances, dual cooperation in relations of Saudi and Turkey, Turkey and America, Iran and Russia can be considered. America has the potential for «Punctuated Equilibrium» policy making in security crisis trend in the Middle East. The main reason for enjoying Punctuated Equilibrium policy can be caused by a fundamental contradiction of Iran and Russia with ISIS, parallel to tactical differences of Saudi Arabia and Turkey with Isis. It is natural that in this process, conflicts of Turkey and Russia have ideological and geopolitical nature. The security policy of Turkey has been along with signs of expansion of region's security challenges⁴⁶.

Given the multiplicity of external actors with conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis, we are witnessing the confrontation between actors of crisis in managing the crisis, rather than making agreements and resolving the crisis that has provided continuity and complexity of the crisis. Therefore, the approach of "narrow security" and limiting regional actors in the process of focusing on resolving disputes cannot provide the desired results in regional diplomacy and management of the security crisis⁴⁷.

Cooperative Security has a pluralist nature and several regional actors with different political and security approaches can pursue specific goals and results. In the crisis of Syria so far, failure in achieving concrete results in resolving the Syrian crisis has been according to regional and trans-regional actors' balance and

⁴⁵ Zoghi Barani, Qaderi Kangavari, "Codification on Irans Foreign Policy in the Middle East", *Majale siyasat defaee*, year 20, number 77, 2011, p. 210.

⁴⁶ Motaghi, Ebrahim, "Crisis management in chaotic environments", *HamshahriMah*, No 89, KodeKhabar 3375, www.hamshahrimah.persianblog.ir/post/36, 2015, consulted last time on October 20, 2016.

⁴⁷ Kohkhail Marjan, "Regional and International Challenges Policia changes Regim in Syria" 2 *Mahname etelate Rahbord*, year 10, Number114, Esfand.Kohkhail, 2013, p. 43.

interaction. According to this view, the main concern of actors participating in the Geneva 1 and 2 negotiations should be considered changes in the regional balance in their favor in framework of crisis management⁴⁸. In such a process, the issue related to security identitism of Syrian has left effects on the environment. The reality is that the Syrian security crisis not only will not be controlled in the short run, but also its social and security effects will be extended to the surrounding countries.

12. Conclusion

New waves of political change in the Middle East, especially Syria are obtained according to the signs of identitism and political transformations radicalism. According to "Marc Lynch," collapse of the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Yemen has caused these countries to be open fields of combat for regional powers to confront their political disputes. Iran has mobilized Shiite networks and military troops and the countries of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have entered Sunni Islamist networks with different titles into the battlefield. These wars that are the result of political interferences are very fatal and destructive and have provided the way for independent and powerful non-state actors such as the ISIS. Therefore, as strategic realities of the Syria show, in the current situation of Assad government, there are undeniable regional and trans-regional actors that influence regional security trends in different ways.

Understanding the realities of political, social, regional and international structure show that Syria requires application of new mechanisms to be able to control cumulative and combined threats against itself. Taking such a step is possible only on condition that the Syrian government is aware of the inefficiencies and challenges within its structure. Participation of the resistance front forces could establish the position of the Syrian government in the region. Continuation of Syrian government cannot be explained without considering the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Realization of these goals will be resulted in a situation that a constructive relationship can be established between goals of different regional and international actors. If some actors like Saudi Arabia and Israel, use the model of limiting Iran to eliminate Syria, the conditions for the continuation of the crisis will be created. An agreement in this field requires a unifying discourse among different identities.

13. Executive suggestions

From the macro perspective:

- unity of regional and global the perception about the common threat from Salafi extremist against the international community and supplying global security,
- collaboration and joint decision-making in all the members of the international community in the fight against extremists,

⁴⁸ Poustinchi, Zphre, Pazan, Mozghan, "Pattern of crisis management in light of identifying fault in the Middle East", Faslname Jahan Siasat, Volume II, Issue 4, 2013, p. 132.

– multilateral strategy adopted by the United Nations in order to increase security and maintain stability

From a micro perspective:

– the responsibility of regional countries to maintain cooperation to strengthen regional stability and to prevent any cooperation between Salafist extremist groups,

– strength Iran's role as a responsible player in order to stabilize and maintain the balance of power at the regional level,

– cooperate with countries in order to prevent the spread of extremism in South West Asia and the Middle East,

– modifying religious extremist movements in the region and strengthen ties with moderate Sunni currents,

– consolidating and developing friendly relations with countries in the region and developing economic and cultural cooperation,

– the need to reduce religious tensions between the Sunnis and establish communication and cooperation between them due to the Salafi extreme-forces around Iran's borders.

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